Title
Policy and Nuclear Proliferation: How Arms Control Encourages Proliferation
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-2002
Abstract
It is generally accepted that arms control enhances nonproliferation efforts. This article examines interactions between arms control proposals in the near- to mid-term and nonproliferation, and argues that some arms control actually provides incentives for increased proliferation. Specifically, unilateral arms control may lead to increased proliferation. Bilateral arms control has shown little if any impact on nonproliferation efforts. Multilateral arms control, however, may well strengthen the nonproliferation regime (the general regime, not simply the treaty). Another areas of interest is the interaction between the prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons and nuclear proliferation. Here, I argue that retaining the option to respond to biological use with nuclear weapons does not hinder nonproliferation efforts. Finally, I suggest that a unilateral and absolute no-first-use commitment by the United States would actually encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8895130
Repository Citation
Tkacik, Michael, "Policy and Nuclear Proliferation: How Arms Control Encourages Proliferation" (2002). Faculty Publications. 6.
https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/government/6
Comments
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8895130