



East Texas Historical Journal

A Publication of the East Texas Historical Association

Volume 43 Issue 1

Article 8

3-2005

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Recommended Citation

Wilson, Mary L. (2005) "Profiles in Evasion: Civil War Substitutes and the Men Who Hired them in Walker's Texas Division," *East Texas Historical Journal*: Vol. 43: Iss. 1, Article 8.

Available at: <https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj/vol43/iss1/8>

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PROFILES IN EVASION: CIVIL WAR SUBSTITUTES AND THE MEN WHO HIRED THEM IN WALKER'S TEXAS DIVISION

By Mary L. Wilson

In April 1861, after the southern states seceded and Fort Sumter was fired upon, thousands of southern men rushed to defend the newly created Confederacy. So many men volunteered in the first months of the war that the military turned away two hundred thousand because of a lack of supplies and training facilities. These early volunteers have been written about in numerous treatments of the Civil War. Less well known, however, are those men who hired or who were hired as substitutes to serve in the Confederate army.¹

The idea that a southern gentleman would hire a substitute to take his place in the military is alien to the myth of the "Lost Cause." The "moonlight and magnolias" image of the Old South remains attractive to some to this day. Deeply held convictions about the southern devotion to the Confederacy can still be found in the recent controversies over South Carolina's Confederate flag or the modern-day secessionist organization called the League of the South. Conversely, the practice of substitution represented a reluctance to fight for this cause and presents an interesting contrast to modern rhetoric.²

In the nineteenth century, providing substitutes in lieu of personally serving in the military was a time-honored tradition dating back to before the Revolutionary War. Europeans brought the custom with them when they populated the colonies. Colonial authorities excluded men of wealth and power from serving in the militia and substituted men considered to be of lesser quality on conscription lists. Commutation, the practice of an individual paying the government a predetermined amount of money instead of serving or furnishing a substitute, was also common. So when the Civil War started, the idea of avoiding service by hiring a substitute was by no means new.³

Although an accepted practice, substitution was not popular among those who could not afford it. In both the Union and the Confederacy, surviving correspondence, diaries, and memoirs criticize the system that allowed this practice. The Union's conscription system allowed either for the hiring of a substitute or for the payment of a commutation fee. Congress included commutation to lower the cost of hiring a substitute and to give middle and lower class men more opportunity to avoid serving in the military.⁴

During and after the war, newspapers and periodicals reviled substitutes and the men who hired them (referred to as principals) equally. They described principals as rich men who shirked their duty to God and country, and depicted substitutes as bounty-jumping deserters and the very worst of soldiers. All levels of official correspondence discussed them with equal distaste. In 1863 Jefferson Davis sent a message to the Confederate Congress remarking on substitutes:

Not only has the numerical strength of the Army been seriously impaired by the frequent desertions for which substitutes are notorious, but dissatisfaction has been excited among those who have been unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the opportunity thus afforded of avoiding the military service of their country.⁵

Virginia's attorney general ruled in 1902 that principals were not entitled to register to vote although substitutes were.⁶ In 1905 an early historian of conscription in the Confederacy, R. P. Brooks, stated,

Of all classes of soldiers, the substitutes were found most troublesome. They deserted in such numbers that the War Department was forced to lay down the rule that if a substitute became lost to the service through any other reason than casualty, the principle [*sic*] should immediately become liable for enrollment.⁷

Albert B. Moore's detailed study of the Confederate draft in 1924 is still the best source of information about the Confederacy's efforts to raise and maintain a military force. Moore vividly described how the general public, legislators, and the military alike scorned substitutes and principals. He concluded that the system was reprehensible in that "It produced moral turpitude, popular discontent, and class animosity; and [greatly reduced] the fighting strength of the Army." Subsequent historians echoed this opinion. Fifty years later, Lowell H. Harrison repeated, "Substitution probably caused more resentment than conscription itself, and it contributed few good soldiers to the Army."⁸

Problems created by this system of substitution began with the first conscription laws enacted by the Confederate legislature in 1862 and continued until the lawmakers disallowed any further substitution in 1864. With war a reality, the Confederate legislature passed a law in October 1861 declaring that all able-bodied white men were obligated to serve in the military. This statute allowed substitutions for men who had 'volunteered' for the militia. It also permitted those not required by law to enlist in the military to serve as substitutes. However, by the Spring of 1862, after a year of fighting and hardship, the flow of new volunteers became a trickle, which forced the Confederacy to pass the first American conscription law. In April 1862 the legislature authorized a draft of men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years. This law also allowed substitutes to be used. Later that year, in September 1862, the legislature extended the maximum draft-eligible age to forty-five years. The revision specifically stated that only those who were not eligible for the draft – presumably those too old, too young, or foreign citizens – could serve as substitutes. Some potential draftees claimed they did not understand the parameters as stated in the October 1861 law and hired out as substitutes rather than serving in their own stead. The Confederate Congress made a third, desperate attempt to obtain soldiers in February 1864 by extending the draft to men from seventeen to fifty years of age. This third and final law abolished substitution.⁹

Confederate War Department directives carefully explained how the sys-

tem of substitutions was to function. First, the military notified an individual of his impending service. If, as a result, the man desired to hire a substitute, he first had to obtain written acknowledgement from the captain of his future company that the unit would accept a substitute in place of the draftee. Once the principal identified a substitute, the law required the potential substitute to obtain medical certification of fitness to serve. Then the law stipulated that both the principal and substitute had to report to the camp. If the company captain accepted the substitute, he issued the principal a certificate of discharge and the principal was free to depart. The directives carefully pointed out that the army was not responsible for the cost of transportation to or from the camp for either the principal or the substitute.¹⁰

As soon as the Confederate Congress passed the first draft law in April 1862, some men rushed to hire substitutes. Newspaper advertisements appeared, placed both by individuals looking for substitutes and by men willing to be hired as such. Prices varied from \$1,500 to \$6,000. Apparently, one man was even willing to pay for a substitute with his 230-acre farm. Another offered money plus a young slave. It was not long before professional substitute brokers created a booming business in identifying able-bodied men willing to fight for other able-bodied men – for a price.¹¹

The Confederate military leadership was, for the most part, opposed to substitution. One general officer issued an order flatly stating that no substitutes would be allowed in his unit. Another officer claimed that eighty percent of his deserters were substitutes. On the unit level, many substitutes were unwelcome in the ranks because the troops believed them to be too old or infirm to fight. Politicians lamented that men would be so preoccupied searching for substitutes that their minds and hearts would never be properly devoted to the task of winning the war.¹²

One general wrote a lengthy letter to the Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon, urging repeal of the substitution provision and calling it a “glaring error.” He further suggested that almost fifty thousand men could be added to the army if substitution were eliminated, easing the manpower crisis of the Confederate army. Jefferson Davis added his voice to the call for substitution to be abolished in his December 7, 1863 message to the Confederate Congress.¹³

Many who believed patriotism a nobler motive for answering the call to arms than money subjected substitutes to harsh criticism, and Texans proved to have long memories. In 1909 the Texas legislature passed a new Texas Confederate Pension Law and excluded substitutes or their widows from receiving Confederate pensions. Society in general expressed contempt for principals who refused to take up arms in defense of their country and preferred to pay someone else to do it for them. Mary Chesnut, a prolific diarist in South Carolina, feeling guilty after avoiding volunteer duty at the local hospital, wrote, “I am so glad to be a hospital nurse once more. I had excuses enough, but at heart I felt a coward and a skulker. I think I know how men feel who hire a substitute and shirk the fight. There must be no dodging duty.”¹⁴

Most authors who have written about substitutes and principals have one thing in common – they speculate about, or assume, the identities of both substitutes and principals. Were substitutes elderly, infirm, or bounty-jumping deserters, as they are so frequently described in the historical literature? Record keeping in the nineteenth century was often spotty, especially in the Confederacy. Nevertheless, Confederate records offer one of the best sources by which to identify the men who served in the Confederate army. If the men who served as substitutes or who hired substitutes can be identified, perhaps a fuller portrait can be drawn, and perhaps another longstanding question can be answered: were substitutes poor men hired by rich men to fight their war? Although determining the true character of either substitutes or principals remains difficult, a quantitative analysis can help discover who they were in terms of economic status, education, and occupation.

The soldiers in one well-known Texas unit form the basis for this study. John G. Walker's infantry division was the largest Texas unit that fought in the Civil War. The regiments of the division spent almost all of 1862 organizing and training before being organized into brigades in October. Walker's Division served mostly in Louisiana and Arkansas. Known for its ability to march long distances quickly, the unit was also known as "Walker's Greyhounds." The division initially numbered almost 12,000, but once it left Texas it apparently received few if any replacements for the men it lost, either in battle or to diseases such as malaria and dysentery. The attrition rate (mostly due to disease) was terrible, and by March 1864 division numbers had dwindled to about 4,000. By the time the unit marched home to Texas in 1865, it numbered fewer than 3,500 men.¹⁵

Early in the twentieth century, the U.S. War Department compiled information about individual Confederate soldiers from official Confederate documents. These compiled service records identified which soldiers were substitutes and which were principals. Unfortunately, the records only occasionally provide information regarding who substituted for whom. Once the substitutes and principals were identified, they were then found, if possible, in the Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, to determine their ages, occupations, and other characteristics. The Eighth Census of the United States, Schedule I, Free Inhabitants, provided basic data on free individuals, including their marital status, occupation, age, real and personal wealth, literacy, and position in the household (e.g., head of household, dependent, boarder, etc.). Schedule II, Slave Inhabitants, listed all the individuals who were slaveholders as well as the number and ages of their slaves. Schedule IV, Productions of Agriculture, helped determine whether any of the men in the survey earned any income as farm operators even though some listed occupations other than farming in Schedule I. The Agricultural Schedule contained information about an individual's improved and unimproved acreage, value of land and farm implements, and agricultural production (i.e., crops and livestock).¹⁶

This information made it possible to identify the economic status of substitutes and the men who hired them. One note of caution, however: this study

is based only on one division, and to draw conclusions about the rest of the Confederate Army is risky. Historians have conducted a limited number of general studies on other Texas units, and where possible the substitutes and principals were compared to men in these units (the 14th Texas Infantry, 3rd Texas Cavalry, 28th Texas Cavalry, and Daniel's Battery). They were also compared to the general population of antebellum Texas using the exhaustive studies by Randolph B. Campbell and Richard G. Lowe in *Wealth and Power in Antebellum Texas* and *Planters & Plain Folk: Agriculture in Antebellum Texas*.¹⁷

This study examined all three brigades of Walker's Division. The brigades included the following regiments:^{xviii}

1st Brigade

12th Texas Infantry
18th Texas Infantry
22nd Texas Infantry
13th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)

2nd Brigade

11th Texas Infantry
14th Texas Infantry
15th Texas Infantry
28th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)
Gould's 6th Cavalry Battalion
(Dismounted)

3rd Brigade

16th Texas Infantry
17th Texas Infantry
19th Texas Infantry
16th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted)

The artillery batteries originally assigned to these brigades were excluded because they were eventually detached and assigned elsewhere. The Fifteenth Texas Volunteer Infantry Regiment was also excluded because it was detached to serve with another brigade.

The service records compiled by the U.S. War Department listed 320 men of Walker's Division as either substitutes or principals, fewer than three percent of the original enlistees. According to these records, the division mustered 161 men into its ranks as substitutes and subsequently discharged 159 principals. Records of two of the substitutes may have been lost or perhaps were not annotated to indicate the substitute status. Of those two groups, 125 principals and 104 substitutes were subsequently identified in the 1860 census. The 161 substitutes constituted slightly more than one percent of the division's initial strength of 12,000 men (see Table 1). Two units within the division apparently had no identifiable substitutes, Gould's Sixth Cavalry Battalion and the Sixteenth Texas Cavalry. The Seventeenth Texas Infantry had the highest number of substitutes, thirty-six. But even at that, substitutes accounted for less than four percent of the regiment's approximate strength of 1,000 men.¹⁹

All of the substitutes in this study entered the regiments that would constitute Walker's Division between January 5 and December 6, 1862. Table 2 breaks down the ages of the substitutes and principals. The substitutes' ages ranged from fifteen to sixty-two years of age, with the largest number falling

in the thirty to thirty-nine group (31.7 percent). A little more than ten percent of substitutes were between twenty and twenty-nine.²⁰ The sizes of these age groups are surprising in light of the maximum draft age of thirty-five until September 1862 and then forty-five. Thirty-one of the substitutes who joined between April and September 1862 were not officially eligible to be substitutes because their ages ranged between eighteen and thirty-five, and they were all therefore qualified for the draft. The fact that some men hired out as substitutes although clearly eligible to be drafted may have been because of occupational exemptions, ignorance, or even disregard of the law. When the legislature changed the law in September 1862, twenty-eight of the substitutes already serving in the army were within the new conscription range of thirty-five to forty-five years of age. Although these men were now ineligible to serve as substitutes, records do not record any change in their status. Only four substitutes are recorded as joining after the September 1862 revision, and all but one were legally eligible to serve as substitutes.²¹

Some men who were too young to enlist served as substitutes. At least six of the 104 substitutes were under eighteen years old. Apparently, three of the young substitutes joined in lieu of an older brother or perhaps an uncle. However, almost half of the substitutes were men over forty. One father substituted for his son. Particular units used for comparison reported less than ten percent of their members as forty or older. Seventeen of the substitutes were fifty or older. Compared to the high proportion of substitutes who were older men, Bell I. Wiley found that only thirteen percent of all the soldiers in *The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy* were forty or older. On the other end of the spectrum, the number of teenaged substitutes is slightly lower when compared to the men in Wiley's survey. Wiley found approximately thirteen percent of the soldiers in his sample to be eighteen years old or younger compared to the 9.6 percent of the substitutes in this age group. Wiley's figures are not included in Table 2 because his age groupings were different. According to Wiley's figures, it was not uncommon to find youths serving in the Confederate army. It is not known how many of the young men identified by Wiley may have been substitutes.²²

Most of the substitutes were older rather than younger than the average enlistee. Some of the younger substitutes were joining for family members and probably had reasons other than money for doing so. The unusually high number of older substitutes could have been due to any number of reasons, especially the law's stipulation that only those too old for the draft could serve as substitutes. In one unusual case, a soldier who was discharged due to his age (fifty years old) immediately reenlisted by substituting for another man.²³

Principals were mostly in the twenty-to-twenty-nine (45.6 percent) and thirty-to-thirty-nine (46.4 percent) year groups. Only one principal was younger than twenty years old (nineteen). The principals' mean age of thirty was significantly lower than the substitutes' average age of thirty-seven. Wiley found the majority of men in the Confederate army to be between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine. So apparently, the principals were also older than the average Confederate soldier. These men were in the prime of

their lives. At best, they wanted to stay home to take care of family responsibilities, and, at worst, they wanted to stay home to make money off the war effort. Moore speculated that the principals were frightened or wanted to take advantage of economic opportunities presented for wartime profit.²⁴

Fourteen of the substitutes (13.5 percent of all substitutes) still lived with their parents and were single. Thirteen principals (10.4 percent of all substitutes) lived at home with their parents, and none of these were married. The principals, with an average age of twenty-two, tended to be older than the substitutes who lived at home. The fourteen substitutes who lived at home were, on the average, sixteen years old. Both the substitutes and principals were more likely to be married and heads of households than single and/or living at their parents' home (Table 3). Seventy-three percent of the substitutes and almost seventy-five percent of the principals were married. All of the married substitutes were listed as heads of household. Four of the married principals were not listed as heads of households but were not living with their parents either. The numbers of substitutes and principals who were married and heads of households is not surprising in light of the fact that they came from an older segment of the population.

These two groups of men were remarkably similar. Both substitutes and principals were older, married men with stakes in the welfare of their communities. Those substitutes above the draft age did not have to serve at all, and their motivation may have come from a desire to make money, to serve their country, or to meet other objectives. Those illegally signing on as substitutes were probably trying to make money. The lure of bounty money, sometimes up to \$6,000 (Confederate currency) or \$400 in gold, must have been strong. Although the substitutes and principals were similar in some ways, in others, such as economic status, the differences were clear.²⁵

Illiteracy was uncommon, with ten percent of the substitutes and four percent of the principals being illiterate. Only one of the illiterate substitutes could be considered to be of school age – he was under eighteen. Most were in their forties, and one was fifty-eight. Most illiterate principals were in their twenties. Statewide, four percent of white males were illiterate, so the illiteracy rate among substitutes was about twice that of Texas men in general. Wiley pointed out that each Confederate unit had “anywhere from one to a score of members who could not write their name.” This information does fit the usual image of less-educated substitutes taking the place of better educated, perhaps wealthier, principals.²⁶

Table 4 lists where the substitutes and principals were born. The overwhelming majority of both the substitutes and principals were from the upper and lower South. However, few of the men in the study listed Texas as their place of birth – only three substitutes (2.9 percent) and sixteen principals (12.8 percent). Overall, eighty-eight percent of the principals were from the South (upper and lower). This figure is not significantly different from the number of substitutes from the upper and lower South, which was eighty-three percent. Campbell and Lowe found in their general survey that a small-

er portion, thirty-six percent, of Texas heads-of-households in 1860 were from the lower South and 41.1 percent were from the upper South. Neither the substitutes nor the principals in Walker's Texas Division fit this pattern. Both groups included more men from the lower South. Almost sixty-four percent of the principals and 43.8 percent of the substitutes who were heads of households were from the lower South. Although foreign-born immigrants were a significant proportion of the Texas population (over 14.5 percent), only eight percent were identified as substitutes in this study, and almost as many foreign principals were identified (seven percent).²⁷

Most of the principals and substitutes were farmers. According to the study conducted by Campbell and Lowe, this was normal for 1860. Campbell and Lowe found that 71.3 percent of Texans were occupied in an agricultural trade while about 3.8 percent of Texans were involved in commerce. Table 5 compares Campbell and Lowe's figures with the principals and substitutes.

In *Battle Cry of Freedom*, James M. McPherson reached the conclusion that the occupation pattern he found (see Table 5) did not support the axiom of "a rich man's war and a poor man's fight." McPherson thought the commerce and professional occupations were over-represented while those of skilled and unskilled labor were probably under-represented. In this study, however, the opposite is true, at least where the substitutes are concerned. Almost twice as many substitutes as principals were laborers, both skilled and unskilled. The principals, on the other hand, included twice as many men in the commercial and professional occupations.²⁸

Dissimilarities between the two groups are more obvious with respect to their wealth holdings. Both substitutes and principals owned slaves, although principals were more likely to own bondsmen and owned a greater number (see Tables 6 and 7). Only eleven substitutes, about 10.6 percent, owned slaves or lived in households that did. Forty-six principals, four times as many (36.8 percent), fell into this category. In addition, the substitutes owned far fewer slaves than men in the comparison units, and the principals owned more. The only exception is the 3rd Cavalry (not a unit in Walker's infantry division), with fifty-two percent of its members listed as slaveholders. The 3rd Cavalry was an unusually rich unit, drawing its volunteers from the wealthier classes in Texas.²⁹

The percentage of principals who owned slaves (36.8 percent) was higher than in the general population of pre-Civil War Texas (27.3 percent). The number of substitutes (eleven) who owned slaves (10.6 percent) was much lower. In both groups, a few slaveholders owned the largest number of slaves. The wealthiest 12.8 percent of principals (sixteen) owned 73.5 percent of all slaves (total number of slaves was 509) owned by principals. Although a much smaller population, substitutes demonstrated the same pattern, with six owners possessing eighty of the slaves (from a total of ninety-two) in that group. The slaveholders among substitutes and principals followed the same pattern as those statewide, with a few individuals owning most of the slaves and the majority with no slaves.³⁰

Seventy-three principals who owned farms or whose parents owned farms possessed more farmland per person than did substitutes in the same category. Principals owned an average of 591 acres while forty-nine substitutes or their families owned an average of 411 acres. Principals also owned a significantly greater amount of improved land (103 acres) than did substitutes (75.5 acres). Whether comparing the average number of acres owned by substitutes and principals or the median, principals emerge as a wealthier group. Principals owned a median of fifty improved acres, but substitutes' median was only twenty-five improved acres.

The principals' land was also more valuable than land owned by substitutes. Average cash value of the substitutes' land (including improved and unimproved) was about \$4.00 an acre, but the principals' average cash value was about \$6.00 an acre. The principals' farm value, \$3,594.20, was also higher than that for the average Texas farm owner in 1860. The average cash value of Texas farms in 1860 was \$2,748.90 (see Table 8). The value of the substitutes' farms was well below this amount, at only \$651.08.³¹

Combining the two types of wealth listed in the census, real and personal property, it is possible to approximate an individual's economic status. There are noticeable differences in the amount of wealth claimed by substitutes and principals (see Table 9). In real estate, principals claimed over three times the assets of substitutes, and in personal assets, the gap was even wider. Principals claimed almost four times the personal assets as substitutes. Few substitute families were comparable except one substitute's father who posted a personal wealth of \$23,000, but he was an exception. The total worth of the principals' assets was about 70 percent higher than that of the substitutes. The median total wealth of the principals was also considerably higher. Principals possessed a median wealth of \$4,390.00 compared to the substitutes' median wealth of \$900.

Principals enjoyed a higher average net worth (\$9,462.06) than soldiers in any of the other Texas units in this study except the 3rd Texas Cavalry. The average net worth of a member of the wealthy 3rd Cavalry was \$12,787. In addition, principals possessed more wealth than the average Texan in 1860 (\$6,393). Thirty-four principals listed a net worth over \$10,000. These individuals or their families were considered wealthy using Campbell and Lowe's definition of wealth in *Wealth and Power in Antebellum Texas*. Six substitutes or their families possessed an average net worth of \$10,000 or more. The substitutes' mean net worth of \$2,684 was well beneath the \$6,393.00 average for the state. The contrast is even greater in the median wealth for each group. Principals enjoyed a median wealth of \$2,633 while the substitutes' median wealth was only \$800.³²

Although only thirty-four principals were wealthy enough to be considered part of the planter class, as a group they were wealthier than the substitutes and richer than average Texans. Principals owned more slaves and land, the land they owned was more valuable, and they had more personal property than substitutes. Substitutes were more likely to come from a lower eco-

nomic stratum, although there were exceptions. Being part of a poorer segment of the population, they were probably driven, at least in part, by economic needs. Economically, the substitutes were statistically closer to the average fighting man and only slightly below the average Texan. As with any group of people, exceptions may skew the information to make the rich look richer and the poor look poorer, but in general, the averages are fairly representative. While this study looked at only one division and may therefore not represent the pattern in the Confederacy as a whole, it does demonstrate that in Walker's Division, a wealthier group of men (the principals) hired men with fewer assets (the substitutes) to fight for them.

TABLE 1

Number of Substitutes in Regiments and Brigades
Of Walker's Texas Division^a

1 st Brigade	Subs	2 nd Brigade	Subs	3 rd Brigade	Subs
12 th Infantry	30	11 th Infantry	9	16 th Infantry	11
18 th Infantry	12	14 th Infantry	10	17 th Infantry	36
22 nd Infantry	3	28 th Cavalry	5	19 th Infantry	20
13 th Cavalry	25	Gould's 6 th Cavalry Battalion	0	16 th Cavalry	0
TOTALS	70		24		67
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BRIGADE STRENGTH	1.7		0.06		1.7

^aCompiled Service Records.

TABLE 2

Age of Enlistees in Percentages^{*}

	Mean Age**	19 & Under	20-29	30-39	40 & up	40-49	50-59	60 & up
Substitutes	37.0	14.4	10.6	31.7	-	26.9	13.5	2.9
Principals	30.0	.08	45.6	46.4	-	7.2	1.6	0
14 th Texas Infantry ^a	27.4	18.8	44.4	29.2	7.6	-	-	-
28 th Texas Cavalry ^a	27.1	16.1	47.6	36.2	-	-	-	-
Daniel's Battery ^a	27.2	13.5	56.0	25.9	4.6	-	-	-

^{*}Bell I. Wiley's figures are not included in this table because his age groupings were different.

^{**}In real years, all other figures are percentages

a. Parker, "' Best Stuff which the State Affords,'" p. 11.

b. Johansson, *Peculiar Honor*, p. 17.

c. Perkins, "Daniel's Battery," p. 65.

TABLE 3
Heads of Household

	% Head of Household	% Married
Substitutes	76.2	73.0
Principals	72.4	74.8
4 th Texas Infantry ^a	52.0	54.0
28 th Texas Cavalry ^b	61.6	61.6
Daniel's Battery ^c	44.0	41.8

a. Parker, "' Best Stuff which the State Affords,'" p. 14.

b. Johansson, *Peculiar Honor*, p. 18.

c. Perkins, "Daniel's Battery," pp. 68–69.

TABLE 4
Points of Origin

	Substitutes %	Principals %	14 th TX Infantry ^a	Daniel's Battery ^b	28 th TX Cavalry ^c	All Texas Heads of Household ^d
Lower South	45.0	57.0	64.7	35.2	68.4	36.0
Upper South	38.0	31.0	30.2	54.5	29.7	41.1
Total South	83.0	88.0	94.9	89.7	98.1	77.1
Other States & Territories	9.0	5.0	2.0	7.3	1.4	8.1
Foreign Countries	8.0	7.0	3.1	3.0	0.5	14.5
Unknown	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.3

Note: Lower South includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas. Upper South includes North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Washington D.C.

a. Parker, "'The Best Stuff Which the State Affords,'" p. 11.

b. Perkins, "Daniel's Battery," p. 63.

c. Johansson, *Peculiar Honor*, p. 18.

d. Campbell and Lowe, *Wealth and Power*, p. 29.

TABLE 5
Percent in Each Occupation*

	Substitutes	Principals	Confederate Soldiers ^a	Texas ^b
Farming	72.1	78.4	61.5	71.3
Commerce	-	8.8	7.0	3.8
Professional	6.7	2.4	5.2	5.4
Public Office	0.96	-	-	0.7
Manufacturing	-	-	-	1.1
Skilled Trade	14.4	4.8	14.1	10.9
Unskilled	4.8	4.0	8.5	5.8
Miscellaneous	0.96	1.6	3.7	1.0

a. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, p. 614.

b. Campbell and Lowe, *Wealth and Power*, p. 30.

TABLE 6
Slaveholders

	%
	Slaveholders
Substitutes	10.6
Principals	36.8
14 th TX Infantry ^a	18.7
Daniel's Battery ^b	20.9
28 th TX Cavalry ^c	28.7
Texas ^d	27.3

a. Parker, "The Best Stuff Which the State Affords," p. 15.

b. Perkins, "Daniel's Battery," p. 83.

c. Johansson, *Peculiar Honor*, p. 12.

d. Campbell and Lowe, *Wealth and Power*, p. 28.

Table 7
Distribution of Slaves per Household

Number of Slaves	0	1-4	5-9	10-19	20-29	40-49	70-79
SUBSTITUTES	93	5	0	5	1		
Percent of Substitutes w/slaves	89.4	4.8	0	4.8	1.0		
Percent Slaves Held	0	13.0	0	65.2	21.7		
PRINCIPALS	79	15	15	9	4	2	1
Percent of Principals w/slaves	63.2	12.0	12.0	7.2	3.2	1.6	.8
Percent of Slaves Held	0	5.8	20.6	23.8	16.1	18.1	15.5

TABLE 8
Average Total Agricultural Holdings*

	Average Number of Improved Acres	Average Number of Total Acres	Average Cash Value of Farm
Substitutes	75.5	411.0	\$1651.08
Principals	103.0	591.0	\$3594.20
Texas ^a	66.5	550.0**	\$2748.90

*The figures on the substitutes and principals were calculated using those men listed as farm owners whether or not their occupation was listed as a farmer.

**This information was calculated using the database (containing 5,000 heads of households listed in the Texas 1850 and 1860 census) compiled by Dr. Richard G. Lowe and Dr. Randolph B. Campbell.

Lowe and Campbell, *Planters and Plain Folk*, pp. 64–65.

TABLE 9
Principals and Substitutes
Average Personal and Real Estate Wealth

	Real Estate	Personal Assets	Total Average Worth
Substitutes	\$1001.45	\$1682.56	\$2684.01
Principals	\$3594.20	\$6240.68	\$9462.06
Texas ^a	\$2699.00	\$3692.00	\$6393.00

Average Personal and *Wealth and Power*, p. 116.

NOTES

¹Lowell H. Harrison, "Conscription in the Confederacy," *Civil War Times Illustrated* 8 (July 1970), p. 11.

²Jim Auchmuty, "The New Secessionists," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, August 16, 1998.

³James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York, 1985), p. 603; Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York, 1984), p. 8.

⁴McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, p. 603; James W. Geary, *We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War* (Dekalb, IL, 1991), pp. 20–21.

⁵James D. Richardson, ed., *The Messages and Papers of Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy Including Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861–1865*, 2 vols. (Nashville, 1905), 1, p. 370.

⁶*Annual Report of the Attorney-General to the Governor of Virginia for the Year 1902* (Richmond, 1902), p. 22.

⁷R.P. Brooks, "Conscription in the Confederate States of America, 1862–1865," *Bulletin of the University of Georgia* 27 (1905; reprint, March 1917), p. 423.

⁸Albert B. Moore, *Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy* (New York, 1924), pp. 27–51; Harrison, "Conscription in the Confederacy," p. 13.

⁹Brooks, *Conscription in the Confederate States*, p. 423; Harrison, "Conscription in the Confederacy," pp. 11–19; Richard N. Current, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Confederacy*, 4 vols. (New York, 1993), 1, pp. 396–400; Moore, *Conscription and Conflict*, pp. 28–30.

¹⁰U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), Series IV, Vol. 1, p. 695 [hereafter cited as *OR*].

¹¹Moore, *Conscription and Conflict*, pp. 29–30; Patricia L. Faust, ed., *Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War* (New York, 1986), p. 731.

¹²*OR*, Series 1, Vol. 15, p. 781; Ella Lonn, *Desertion During the Civil War* (1928; reprint,

Gloucester, MA, 1966), p. 7; *OR*, Series 1, Vol. 17/2, p. 791; Moore, *Conscription and Conflict*, p. 50; James I. Robertson, Jr., *Soldiers Blue and Gray* (Columbia, SC, 1988), p. 39.

¹¹*OR*, Series 4, Vol. 2, pp. 946–47; Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy*, 1: 370; *OR*, Series 4, Vol. 3, pp. 25–26.

¹²*General Laws of Texas*, 31st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Austin, 1909), p. 233; C. Vann Woodward, ed., *Mary Chesnut's Civil War* (New Haven, 1981), p. 641.

¹³Harry M. Henderson, *Texas in the Confederacy* (San Antonio, 1955), pp. 51, 55; Joseph P. Blessington, *The Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division by a Private Soldier* (New York, 1875), p. 44.

¹⁴U.S. War Department, Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from the State of Texas, War Department Collection of Records, Record Group 109, National Archives, Washington D.C. (Microfilm M323, rolls 43–44, Gould's 6th Cavalry; rolls 75–80, 13th Cavalry; rolls 143–46, 28th Cavalry; rolls 344–50, 11th Infantry; rolls 372–75, 14th Infantry; rolls 356–61, 12th Infantry; rolls 381–85, 16th Infantry; rolls 391–94, 18th Infantry; rolls 395–99, 19th Infantry; rolls 413–16, 22nd Infantry; rolls 386–90, 17th Infantry), hereafter referred to as the Compiled Service Records; Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Schedules I (Free Inhabitants), Schedule II. (Slave Inhabitants) and Schedule IV (Productions of Agriculture) Record Group 29, Microfilm M653, Reels 1287–1312, and Microfilm T1134, Reels 3–4, National Archives, Washington D.C., hereafter referred to as the Eighth Census of the United States.

¹⁵Randolph B. Campbell and Richard G. Lowe, *Wealth and Power in Antebellum Texas* (College Station, 1977); Richard G. Lowe and Randolph B. Campbell, *Planters & Plain Folk: Agriculture in Antebellum Texas* (Dallas, 1987); Scott D. Parker, "'Best Stuff which the State Affords': A Portrait of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry in the Civil War, 1862–1865," MA thesis, University of North Texas, 1998; M. Jane Johansson, *Peculiar Honor: A History of the 28th Texas Cavalry, 1862–1865* (Fayetteville, AR, 1998); John D. Perkins, "Daniel's Battery: A Narrative History and Socio-Economic Study of the Ninth Texas Field Battery," MA thesis, University of North Texas, 1995; Douglas Hale, "The Third Texas Cavalry: A Socioeconomic Profile of a Confederate Regiment," *Military History of the Southwest* 19 (Spring 1989).

¹⁶Norman D. Brown, ed., *Journey to Pleasant Hill: The Civil War Letters of Captain Elijah P. Petty, Walker's Division CSA* (San Antonio, 1982), pp. 180–181.

¹⁷Compiled Service Records.

¹⁸For soldiers whose ages were not recorded in the Compiled Service Records, two years were added to the age recorded in the 1860 census. Since all of the men in this study joined Walker's Division in 1862, this was judged the most dependable method of determining their ages.

¹⁹Eighth Census of the United States. The information presented about the men from this point in either the narrative or tables is drawn from either the Compiled Service Records and/or the Eighth Census of the United States, Schedules I, II, and IV, unless otherwise noted. Two hundred twenty-nine of the men were identified on Schedule I of the 1860 census.

²⁰Bell I. Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy* (Baton Rouge, 1970), p. 331; Parker, "'Best Stuff which the State Affords,'" p. 11; Johansson, *Peculiar Honor*, p. 17; Perkins, "Daniel's Battery," p. 65.

²¹Harrison, "Conscription in the Confederacy," p. 13.

²²Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb*, p. 331; Parker, "'Best Stuff which the State Affords,'" p. 11; Johansson, *Peculiar Honor*, p. 17; Perkins, "Daniel's Battery," p. 65; Moore, *Conscription and Conflict*, p. 38.

²³Harrison, "Conscription in the Confederacy," p. 13.

²⁴Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb*, p. 337; U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistics of the United States, (Including Mortality, Property, Etc.,) in 1860*, 4 vols. (Washington, D. C., 1866), 4, pp. 508.

²⁵Campbell and Lowe, *Wealth and Power in Antebellum Texas*, p. 29.

²⁶McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, p. 614.

²⁷Douglas Hale, *The Third Texas Cavalry in the Civil War* (Norman, 1993), p. 39.

²⁸Campbell and Lowe, *Wealth and Power*, p. 44; Lowe and Campbell, *Planters and Plain Folk*, p. 108; Frank L. Owsley, *Plain Folk of the Old South* (Baton Rouge, 1949), p. 207; Parker, "'Best Stuff which the State Affords,'" p. 17.

²⁹Lowe and Campbell, *Planters and Plain Folk*, pp. 64–65.

³⁰Campbell and Lowe, *Wealth and Power*, pp. 39, 116; Hale, *Third Texas Cavalry*, p. 26.