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Ben M. Hobratsch

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"'THE BRIGHTEST ERA THE CONFEDERACY HAD EVER KNOWN': TEXAS PRESS OPINION OF THE FALL OF ATLANTA AND THE REELECTION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN"

By Ben Melvin Hobratsch

Historian Charles W. Ramsdell in 1924 first argued that a general decline in public morale doomed the Confederacy. Since that time, historians have supported his thesis and tied the ebb in morale to a lack of government-sponsored propaganda. More recently, historians have shifted the blame to Confederate newspapers that were too critical of government and unable to rally the citizenry behind "the cause." Scholars claim that in the wake of military and political failures newspapers showed a tendency to find fault rather than to look at events from a positive angle. Yet, although the study of Confederate press opinion has attracted well-deserved scholarly attention, its study has been almost invariably linked to the news press of eastern states; Texas press opinion has received only scant consideration by scholars.1

One aspect of the Texas press that has benefited from meticulous study is the period of time from the establishment of the first Texas newspaper amid the turmoil of the War of 1812 to the divisive months leading to the secession convention in February 1861. However, scholarship considering the Texas press during the Civil War has mentioned it in incidental ways. Wartime Texas press opinion of key military and political events and the effects of their coverage on the morale of the readership have not been as carefully investigated. It is the intention of this author to begin such an investigation by examining Texas press coverage of the Union capture of Atlanta and the reelection of Abraham Lincoln.2

Texas press coverage of the fall of Atlanta and the reelection of President Abraham Lincoln provide propitious subjects for study for two reasons. First, these two events significantly affected the fortunes of the southern bid for independence. Atlanta was a key rail and telegraphic depot that served as the hub between the eastern and the western states of the Confederacy. Lincoln's reelection was important for southerners because it hushed speculation that the northern electorate had grown weary enough of the war to demand peace. Additionally, both of these events occurred concomitant to one another in the latter half of 1864, more than a year after the fall of Vicksburg, the point generally conceded to be the beginning of the decline in Confederate morale. Thus, a study of Texas press opinion during this period provides a unique opportunity to administer a test on the effects of distant military and political events upon the press opinion and morale of a state on the periphery of the nation. The uniqueness of Texas's wartime newspaper culture within the broader context of Confederate newspaper culture will be examined. If the case of Texas is found to be similar to that of eastern states, news coverage and morale should exhibit signs of despondency; however, if unique, Texas

Ben Melvin Hobratsch is a graduate student at the University of North Texas.
newspapers should exhibit a level of morale divergent from the currently accepted norm.

By examining the extant Civil War-era Texas newspapers—both rural and urban dailies and weeklies—published in the summer, fall, and winter of 1864 as well as the pertinent secondary literature, the reader develops a sense of Texas press opinion of the fall of Atlanta and Lincoln’s reelection. Sometimes the information provided in the accounts turned out to be false; however, the sentiment was always valid.

Texas press opinion and the opinion of the Texas public were inextricably linked. Newspapers were the primary medium by which Texans received news of the events going on in the East. Letters from the front were not so frequent, and published journals were often of a literary or cultural nature. In addition newspapers were inexpensive, and one copy was often shared among several readers.

Many Texans believed what they read. Given the void of any other information about the war, the contents and opinions expressed by the newspaper had a direct effect upon popular opinion. As a result, the best way to see inside the mindset of the Texan is to read what he read—the newspaper.

In months directly preceding Atlanta’s capture, the Confederate war effort enjoyed a generally high level of public support. General Robert E. Lee was successful in encumbering the Federal drive toward Richmond. Northern forces suffered staggering losses at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor. Because of comparisons made by Texas newspapers between Grant’s losses at Cold Harbor and Sherman’s losses at Kennesaw Mountain, Texans were confident of the situation in Georgia as well. Texas newspapers found that the Confederate army under Joseph E. Johnston generally prevailed in its attempts to protect that city from Sherman’s army. Although Johnston allowed a steady advance of Sherman’s troops, editors pointed out key victories in which the casualty trade-off was decidedly in the favor of Confederate forces. Throughout the campaign, his ability to maintain a low rate of casualties contributed to the press’s favorable opinion of Johnston. Sympathetic press and public opinion seemingly vindicated his “defensive” attack strategy.

In mid-July, President Jefferson Davis removed Johnston from his command and replaced him with John Bell Hood, a Texan. The Davis administration was frustrated with Johnston for “always” retreating and not pursuing a more aggressive strategy. Once Johnston was replaced by Hood, the Texas press demonstrated loyalty to Richmond by abandoning their original stance and asserting that Johnston’s defensive strategy was incompatible with an ultimately successful defense of Atlanta. Texas editors expounded that despite their deep affection for the general, Johnston’s successive retreats gave too much valuable ground to Sherman’s army. The press was especially wary of Johnston’s movement from his propitious position at Kennesaw Mountain to one south of the Chattahoochee River within a few miles of the city. It became increasingly evident to the War Department and to the Galveston News alike that it was probable that in search of better ground on which to fight,
Johnston would give up Atlanta to Sherman without a contest.

Editors also cautioned their readership. Although Hood was a “gallant officer [who was] not afraid to risk his reputation in a battle,” the decision to replace Johnston with Hood may have been made too late to save Atlanta. Too much ground had already been lost when Hood took command near the outskirts of the city. Additionally, the troops were exceedingly fond of Johnston and familiar with the peculiarities of his generalship. They were wary of Hood. Johnston was well-loved by his troops for the very reasons that the Davis administration and later the Texas press forsook him—he was overly cautious and unlikely to lead bloody charges at strong enemy positions. By contrast, no one questioned Hood’s bravery; he had lost a leg and had a dead arm from previous engagements.8

Nevertheless, those who had access to Texas papers read of the constancy of Hood’s troops and their unwillingness to allow Sherman entrance into Atlanta. The Marshall Texas Republican went so far as to state that not only did the Confederate troops still hold the city, but they were likely to break Sherman’s attempts at a siege and in turn siege the Federal army. The idea sounds questionable, but the notion that Sherman’s army could survive and excel as deep into Georgia as it presently was conflicted with Texans’ notions of both Hood’s “rare pluck” as a general and that of their own southern exceptionalism.9

News coverage also highlighted the numerous failed attempts of Sherman’s troops to push the Confederates from their positions. In stark contrast to newspaper editors’ previous warnings of a probable breakdown of Confederate lines at Atlanta, evidence of battlefield failures are conspicuously absent from the columns of Texas newspapers. In the one instance that a telegraphic report mentions Confederate troops being driven from their position, it is pointed out that the position was immediately retaken.10

By late August, Hood’s troops were rapidly becoming encircled and besieged around Atlanta. All the same, papers continued to provide their readership with examples of “great victories” and “splendid successes achieved” such as the “annihilation of some of [Sherman’s] commands.” It was not uncommon to read of a daring Confederate charge over the enemy breastworks. One late-August morning the San Antonio News reported to its subscribers that Hood’s troops had driven Union forces from their first two lines of entrenchments. According to war correspondent “Personne,” these victories decimated Yankee morale; concomitantly, they served to preserve and bolster Confederate morale. For “Personne,” the ruins of Atlanta were void of anything material worth retaining. The exigency in maintaining that city lay in that “the morale of the army had to be preserved.”11

Texas editors, such as Willard Richardson of the Galveston News, no doubt agreed with “Personne.” In an effort to bolster civilian morale and shift the focus of the reader from possibly disheartening news, accounts of “victories” of an increasingly trivial nature were scattered throughout his paper. Desultory firing was presented in one issue “producing great
consternation among the enemy.” The “victories” presented to the readership were not always directly combat-related. A small cavalry raid, in another issue, was lauded for capturing “a large number of beeves.”

Additionally, as was the case during both Johnston’s and Hood’s tenure in command of the Army of Tennessee, the Texas press pointed to low casualty numbers as a reason to remain confident in the progress of the nation’s struggle. Confederate losses in the Atlanta campaign were offered as infinitesimal in comparison with Yankee losses that were, according to the Dallas Herald, “incomparatively large [sic].” Along similar lines the Crockett Quid Nunc drew up a table in one issue presenting Confederate losses in the Atlanta campaign as just over 65,000 men. The Quid Nunc contrasted this total to the large sum of 283,070 men lost by the Federal army in Virginia.

In addition to highlighting the scattered successes of Hood’s army, editors pointed to what they viewed as the moral depravity of Sherman’s forces in an effort to unify their readers behind a banner of moral rectitude. Newspapers informed their readership that Sherman had ordered his artillery to shell Atlanta, killing women and children, in full knowledge of the fact that Hood’s lines were entrenched outside of the city. For this act the Dallas Herald branded Sherman a barbarous murderer. Most likely such announcements, which were printed alongside those detailing the steadfast heroism of the Confederate troops, served to create a scene for the reader that confirmed both the success of the military aspects of the war and the moral righteousness of the southern cause. The “barbarous murderer” was being convincingly held at bay by Hood’s constant and “virtuous” troops.

Nevertheless, on September 1, 1864, Hood withdrew from Atlanta, and the following morning Sherman’s forces occupied the city. In the weeks that followed, eastern newspapers trickled across the Sabine River and made their way into editors’ hands. By the end of September, news of Atlanta’s capitulation made its way into Texas papers. Not surprisingly, the news was heralded as a “severe blow” but no cause for alarm. Editors such as Robert W. Loughery of the Marshall Texas Republican and J.H. and J.R. Burnett of the Crockett Quid Nunc evinced the belief that the holding of the city of Atlanta itself gave the Union army no advantage; Sherman could not claim victory, and Southerners should not abandon hope, unless Hood’s army was squarely defeated. Meanwhile, Hood’s army escaped unscathed and even “repulsed with slaughter” pursuing Union troops.

Editors were aware that Atlanta’s fall to Union forces, a catastrophe of the first magnitude, struck a hard blow to the morale of their readership. The damage of Atlanta’s capitulation was evident in the longer time it took to get news from Richmond. Predictably, the Texas press quickly mobilized to soften any possible harm to morale. In their efforts to combat the sudden wave of despondency, editors sought to bolster the resolve of readers in three key ways. First, editors ensured their readers of the insignificance of Atlanta’s fall. This was accomplished by presenting the city’s capture as an unequivocal good. In the eyes of the press, Sherman’s capture of Atlanta was a “defensive victory”
for the South that freed Hood’s army from a city of ruins that contained nothing of military value. Any war materiel had been shipped off or destroyed by Confederate troops before their evacuation. Now mobile, Hood could lure Sherman deeper into Georgia.¹⁶

Second, as was the practice before Atlanta’s capitulation, articles of various lengths highlighted the perceived moral degeneracy of Sherman’s troops and the depredations they committed upon Atlanta’s inhabitants. The La Grange True Issue informed its readers that Sherman and his officers had celebrated their victory by attending a ball accompanied by “black harlots.” In the same light, various papers printed accounts of Atlanta evacuees who had been stripped of everything of value by northern troops. The intent of these stories was to enrage the heart of any pro-Confederate Texan.¹⁷

The third argument the press employed to maintain higher levels of public morale was that the morale of Hood’s army was high. To this end, newspapers published official army records that evinced the high level of army morale. Often these reports were published in the same issue that announced Hood’s withdrawal. Along the same lines as the arguments put forth by editors, the reports from Hood’s army rooted its spirit in the fact that it still constituted an able and mobile fighting force. Editorial precautions such as this helped cushion the blow of the recent military failure.¹⁸

This coverage instilled a belief among editors and readers alike that Sherman would be forced to retreat from Georgia to his base of operations in Tennessee. Apparently oblivious to the fact that his forces could live off the land as they marched across Georgia, newspapers informed Texans that the Federal army’s supply lines were precariously stretched hundreds of miles long. This notion that Sherman was committing substantial logistical errors bolstered the Confederate conviction of long-term success. News articles alluded to Sherman’s apparent inability to move swiftly across the state. In mid-October the Marshall Texas Republican stated that because of damaged roads and rail lines, Sherman would be immobilized for a month to conduct basic repairs. Sherman’s immobilized force would then be pinned down by Hood and Nathan Bedford Forrest. Sherman, squarely defeated, would be unable to leave Georgia with an organized army.¹⁹

Even when such quixotic predictions became false, editors retained optimism. As the months rolled on it became evident that Sherman was not retreating to Tennessee, but alternatively pursuing a march toward Savannah. The roadblocks that newspapers had stated were detaining Sherman were non-existent. Damaged roads proved to be of no consequence to northern forces, and Hood had proven unable to rout or trap Sherman’s army. Nevertheless, as late as mid-December papers such as the Gonzales Inquirer startlingly opined that Sherman’s campaign in Georgia had produced nothing but failure and disappointment to the Yankee cause; the Marshall Texas Republican proffered that autumn as “the brightest era the Confederacy [had] ever known.”²⁰

Aside from the loss of Atlanta, another misfortune befell the Confederacy in the autumn of 1864 – the reelection of Lincoln to a second term as President
of the United States in November. Lincoln’s election in 1860 had proven to be a catalyst that sparked secession in the South. His reelection marked a clear determination among the northerners to pursue the war until the southern rebellion was completely suppressed. Although Lincoln’s reelection should have naturally diminished public spirit, press coverage of the northern presidential election provides another clear example of the attempts of Texas newspapers to shape civilian morale.

Beginning in the early summer, the Confederate press exhibited a great interest in the United States’ presidential election, and the Texas press was no exception to the rule. Editors saw in the 1864 canvass a hope for an early termination to the war. The fact that the Lincoln administration had been unable to force the South back into the Union within the confines of his first term nurtured a notion in the southern mind that northerners were growing tired of war as well as the idea that Lincoln did not have the ability to win the conflict. In the southern mind, northern malcontents would naturally support an opposition party such as the Democrats. Therefore, the aspirations of an early conclusion to the war rested on the chances of the Democratic Party in the upcoming election. In light of this, the Democrats’ late August convention at Chicago received ample exposure in Texas papers. Where Lincoln’s National Union (Republican) Party convention at Baltimore received a few lines of coverage or in many cases no coverage at all, the Democratic convention received columns. Texas newspapers many times even included authoritative adumbrations of the convention’s resolutions – the most interesting of which was a call for peace.1

When the Democratic convention nominated former general-in-chief George B. McClellan for the presidency, E. H. Cushing, editor of the Houston Telegraph, informed readers that northern support for the peace movement was strong. According to Cushing, leading Republican journals were urging Lincoln to withdraw from the presidential race since his defeat by McClellan was inevitable. Several northern journals and the Texas press alike felt that Lincoln’s chances for reelection were slim. With Grant seemingly stalemated at Petersburg, the northern war effort suffered from a lack of decisive military victories from the late spring throughout the summer of 1864. The seemingly never-ending war took a toll on the appeal of a ticket committed to continue war to the last extremity.2

The trend of military stagnation and sanguine southern hopes for an early peace ended just days after the Democratic convention when two crippling events occurred. First was news of Sherman’s occupation of Atlanta and the key rail junction the city commanded. This blow to the southern cause renewed vigor among the previously desiccated Republican Party as well as among the war Democrats. If the war was going well for the North, the war was going well for the Lincoln-Johnson ticket. Second and arguably just as shattering to Texas editors was the substance of McClellan’s acceptance letter. In accepting the Democratic nomination he rejected peace without unification and as a result rejected the pro-peace platform of the convention that had nominated him for the presidency.3
These twin debacles served briefly to dishearten the press. John W. Swindells of the *Dallas Herald* confessed his "disappointment on reading [McClellan's acceptance letter]." A sense of betrayal is even felt in the editorials concerning the matter. The Jefferson *Confederate News* presented McClellan's nomination as the culmination of a grand premeditated ruse by which the war Democrats tricked the peace Democrats into giving their support to McClellan only to have him, once accepted by the unified party, reject the peace plank of the party platform.24

Texas editors quickly made the best of bad news. To this end, in the wake of military failure and McClellan's rejection of the peace platform, Texas editors switched positions on which candidate they preferred to have elected president of the United States. Some papers announced that the outcome of the northern election no longer concerned the Confederacy. William H. Neblett of the Corsicana *Navarro Express* articulated that his paper did not "care a cent" who wins. Other papers were not so ambivalent. Reevaluating the possible benefits of the Lincoln-Johnson ticket and determining that Lincoln's reelection would provide the best outcome for the Confederacy, many Texas papers offered various reasons why Lincoln's election – and not McClellan's – would more likely lead to an acceptable peace. The *Houston Telegraph* averred that Lincoln is "half whipped-half badly wounded." Editor Cushing saw the northern gains at Atlanta not as a major turning point that would eventually lead to a northern victory, but as an anomaly in a war record that was on balance strewn with failure. Thus, the peace-seeking portion of the northern electorate would vote for him because they knew he could not continue the war much longer.

McClellan on the other hand would be a fresh replacement and would prolong the conflict for a much longer time. Unlike Lincoln, he had not endured the grinding wartime pressures of the executive office for four years – he was not near the breaking point. The *Dallas Herald* and the *Confederate News* echoed this estimation when they argued that Lincoln's worn out administration would be much more likely to propose an acceptable peace. Any peace offered by a newly elected McClellan administration, on the other hand, would require reunification and reconstruction and thus would be out of the question.25

Additionally, Lincoln's ticket offered another net benefit for southerners that McClellan's ticket did not provide – Andrew Johnson would hold the vice presidency. The *Dallas Herald* ran an editorial that argued that Johnson was so detested throughout the South that his election would cause a mass realignment of loyalties in Tennessee. Ambivalent and pro-Union Tennesseans would flock to the Confederate cause, repulsed by Lincoln's association with a man repugnant to the virtue of the southern gentleman. While the argument was exaggerated – the notion that an undecided Tennessean's loyalties could be uniquely won by the promotion of one man within the Lincoln government is preposterous – the article highlighted the extent to which editors went to find good in otherwise foreboding events.26
Whether editors wished Lincoln’s victory in the upcoming election or not, an almost universal prediction pervaded Texas newspapers – Lincoln would win. Since Sherman’s capture of Atlanta, victories in the Shenandoah Valley and at Mobile Bay had been won by northern forces. In stark contrast to a mere two months earlier, a continuing string of northern military successes vindicated Lincoln’s war plans. For the northern electorate, the tide had turned in favor of war and consequently in favor of the Lincoln administration. For their part, McClellan’s ticket offered no competitive advantage for voters. McClellan’s rejection of his party’s platform had alienated peace-minded voters; voters of the more bellicose persuasion had already found their leader in President Lincoln.

When the results finally reached Texas in late-November and early-December, there was no surprise. Newspapers lectured Texans to stiffen their resolve for a brutal fight. Lincoln’s victory in the presidential election was a declaration for four more years of “uncivilized war” by the northern voting public, or as the Galveston News put it, “those who’ve voted to destroy us.” Although newspapers informed their readers that Lincoln would prepare for four more years of war, the Texas press hardly believed the war could last much longer. As stated previously, editors felt the Lincoln administration’s war effort would soon collapse from fatigue. The call to prepare Texans for a stiff fight was seen as the call for the coup de grâce. That is to say, editors did not present these misfortunes as anything so serious that they would alter the eventual outcome of the war. The intention of these admonitions was to strengthen the doggedness and morale of the readership.

For those Texans who did feel that the southern cause was now lost, the Texas press admonished that submission to the North was unthinkable. Surrender now would be an acknowledgement that all the suffering and death that the South had endured had been in vain. Additionally, submission would entail the reconstruction of the Union, which was universally denounced throughout the Texas press. An editorial that was reprinted in newspapers from the Richmond Examiner presented the alternative to continued warfare as the acceptance of a dissolute South in which southerners, forced into servitude, would be lowered to “beg shelter and employment from Yankee and negro masters.” Rather than face such morally offensive consequences, many wayward Texans fell back in line to support the cause.

In contrast to coverage of Atlanta’s capitulation to northern forces, once newspapers announced that Lincoln was victorious, the issue was for the most part dropped. News of the ongoing struggle between Hood and Sherman resonated throughout newspapers for months after Atlanta fell. Papers clung to hopes that the loss could somehow be reversed in the immediate future – that Sherman could be routed and Atlanta could be regained. This level of tenacity was not possible with Lincoln’s election because the outcome could not be undone; it was a fixed truth that Lincoln would be the president of the United States for four more years. Despite this one instance of contrast between the press’ treatment of Atlanta’s capture and Lincoln’s reelection, coverage of these two events proved to be more similar than dissimilar. The reason for the
striking similarities is that their coverage served the same end – to solidify support for the national war effort.

The examination of Texas press opinion of both the fall of Atlanta and the reelection of Lincoln has revealed three trends. The first was a pronounced degree of uniformity of opinion across all of the newspapers – the Texas press being consistent in its pro-government stance. Texas was unlike other sections of the Confederacy, such as Georgia and North Carolina, where opposition papers such as the Augusta *Constitutionalist* and the *Raleigh Standard* were accepted as a necessary byproduct of a democratic system. The editors of opposition papers in Texas either “went with their state” after Texas withdrew from the Union and muted their own criticisms for the sake of patriotism, were silenced by threats of violence and acts of vandalism perpetrated by members of the secessionist majority, or in the case of the German-language press, were confined by the language with which they expressed their discontent.

The second trend, which is closely related to the first, is that Texas press coverage remained distinctly sanguine even in the wake of disaster. This can be explained in part by the fact that the Union controlled the Mississippi River, and as a result Texas was increasingly cut off from the war-torn eastern section of the nation. Aside from ephemeral coastal warfare and minor campaigning in the Red River and Rio Grande valleys, Texas enjoyed relative isolation. The absence of contesting armies, wartime emancipation of slaves by roving Yankee units, and other exigencies felt east of the Mississippi River allowed for the perpetuation of antebellum norms in the Lone Star State that helped contribute to the press’s optimistic outlook.

The third trend was a marked tendency toward equivocation. The press’s presentation of events at any given point in time was not a static construct; rather, the press demonstrated a proclivity to change its position based on the current military situation or the political climate. Although Texas editors genuinely believed their news to be accurate, it was more important to sustain public spirit. When continuity clashed with the need to strengthen public morale, morale won out. This trend can be best demonstrated in the press’ treatment of the generalship of Joseph E. Johnston or the benefit to the Confederacy of the Lincoln-Johnson ticket. In the case of Johnston’s generalship, the press originally heralded him as the champion of the southern cause, but once he was removed by the Davis administration, it became manifest to the press that he was only a champion of misguided tactics. Additionally in the case of the acceptability of Lincoln’s reelection, throughout the summer the prospect of his reelection was viewed as abhorrent to everything for which Texans were fighting, but once McClellan disavowed a peace acceptable to the South, Lincoln was viewed as the preferable presidential candidate.

In the context of the greater Confederate newspaper culture, the Texas press was unique. Scholarly consensus, which has invariably looked at the Eastern press, proffers that public morale was low in the autumn of 1864. An analysis of Texas press opinion demonstrates that in the case of Texas, morale
did not deteriorate after the twin debacles of the fall of Atlanta or the reelection of Lincoln. To the contrary, Texas news coverage demonstrated an acute ability to minimize misfortune and augment auspicious successes for the net effect of sustaining spirit. The Texas press offered its readership a generally optimistic opinion of the state of Confederate affairs as late as the winter of 1865. Indeed, as the Marshall Texas Republican observed, the autumn of 1864 was "the brightest era the Confederacy [had] ever known."

NOTES


7Dallas Herald, July 30, 1864; Galveston News, August 3, 16, 1864; Stephen Davis, Atlanta Will Fall: Sherman, Joe Johnston and the Yankee Heavy Battalions (Wilmington, 2001), pp. 7-18.

8Galveston News, August 24, September 6, 1864: Davis, Atlanta Will Fall, pp. 131, 199; Gallagher, The Confederate War, pp. 132-134.

9Texas Republican (Marshall), September 9, 1864.

10Dallas Herald, August 13, 20, 1864; Galveston News, August 23, September 7, 1864; Houston Telegraph, August 26, 1864; San Antonio News, August 13, 1864; Texas Republican (Marshall), September 9, 1864; Texas State Gazette (Austin), August 24, 1864; Davis, Atlanta Will Fall, pp. 158-159.

11Dallas Herald, August 6, 20, 27, 1864; Galveston News, August 23, 1864; San Antonio News, August 20, 1864.

12Dallas Herald, August 20, 1864; Galveston News, August 23, September 7, 1864; San Antonio News, September 17, 1864; Van Tuyll, "Gray Ladies," p. 387.

13Dallas Herald, August 20, 1864; Quid Nunc (Crockett), November 15, 1864.


15Countryman (Bellville), September 20, 1864; Dallas Herald, October 1, 15, 1864; Galveston News, September 13, 1864; Houston Telegraph, September 14, 1864; Texas Republican (Marshall), September 16, 1864; Texas State Gazette (Austin), November 30, 1864; Weekly Quid Nunc (Crockett), September 20, 1864; Davis, Atlanta Will Fall, p. 191; Charles P. Roland, An American Illiad: The Story of the Civil War (New York, 2002). p. 185; John C. Waugh, Reelecting


"Countryman (Bellville), October 3, 1864: Texas Republican (Marshall), October 28, 1864; True Issue (La Grange), November 12, 1864; Quid Nunc (Crockett), September 27, 1864; Gallagher, The Confederate War, p. 58.

"Goliad Messenger, November 12, 1864; Houston Telegraph, November 9, 1864; Texas Republican (Marshall), September 16, October 7, 14, 21, 1864; Tyler Reporter, November 10, 1864.

"Gonzales Inquirer, December 12, 1864: Texas Republican (Marshall), October 21, 1864.

"Countryman (Bellville), August 16, September 27, November 1, 1864; Dallas Herald, July 30, October 29, 1864; Galveston News, June 15, 1864; Houston Telegraph, August 10, 17, 29, 1864; Journal (Brownsville), July 13, 1864; San Antonio News, September 24, 1864; Texas Republican (Marshall), September 16, October 14, 1864; Victoria Advocate, October 1, 1864; Quid Nunc (Crockett), September 20, 1864; Roland, An American Iliad, pp. 185, 189; Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, pp. 148-158; Andrews, “Confederate Press and Public Morale,” p. 459.

"Houston Telegraph, August 10, 17, 29, 1864; San Antonio News, September 24, 1864.

"Dallas Herald, October 8, 1864. Texas Republican (Marshall), September 30, 1864; San Antonio News, October 8, 1864; Roland, An American Iliad, pp. 185-186; Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, pp. 297-298.

"Countryman (Bellville), October 11, 1864; Dallas Herald, October 8, 1864; Navarro Express (Corsicana), November 10, 1864; (Marshall) Texas Republican, September 10, 1864; Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, p. 298.

"Dallas Herald, November 5, 1864; Galveston News, September 6, 1864; Goliad Inquirer, December 2, 1864; Goliad Messenger, November 12, 1864; Houston Telegraph, November 2, 8, 1864; Texas Republican (Marshall), November 18, 1864.

"Dallas Herald, December 3, 1864.

"Countryman (Bellville), September 20, 1864; Galveston News. November 15, 1864: Houston Telegraph, November 8, 26, 1864; Texas State Gazette (Austin), November 9, 1864; Roland, An American Iliad, p. 190.

"Countryman (Bellville), November 29, 1864; Dallas Herald, December 3, 1864; Galveston News, December 7, 1864: Houston Telegraph, November 24, 1864; Ranchero (Brownsville), December 17, 1864: Texas Republican (Marshall), November 25, 1864; Texas State Gazette (Austin), November 30, 1864; Andrews, “The Confederate Press,” p. 452.

"Richmond Examiner, November 12, 1864; Silver, “Propaganda,” p. 502.