3-2007

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UNSPOKEN WORDS: JAMES MONROE'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE MAGEE-GUTIERREZ FILIBUSTER

By Kevin Brady

Following the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, Americans residing in the South still coveted additional territory. Some satisfied their expansionistic desires by claiming that the Louisiana Purchase included Texas, and thus the boundary between Louisiana and Texas became a point of contention between Spain and the United States. Fearing that American settlers would migrate into East Texas, Spanish officials stationed additional soldiers at Nacogdoches and at the mouth of the Trinity River. With the Texas-Louisiana border dispute unresolved, General James Wilkinson, who commanded American forces in Natchitoches, proposed to Spanish officials that an area of Neutral Ground be established between the Sabine River and the Arroyo Hondo. The Spanish authorities' acceptance of the proposal eased tensions between the two countries, but the region became a haven for filibusters, outlaws, and smugglers. In 1812, Jose Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara, a Mexican revolutionary, and Augustus W. Magee, a former army officer, organized a group of American rebels to invade Texas. Secretary of State James Monroe believed that he could use this filibustering activity along the Texas-Louisiana border to serve national interests. Although historians and scholars speculate on the exact nature of Monroe's involvement in the Magee-Gutiérrez filibuster, his actions during the course of the expedition demonstrated that he was involved in filibustering activities.¹

The roots of James Monroe's involvement in the Magee-Gutiérrez expedition began during the onset of the Mexican independence movement. In March 1811, Jose Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara accepted a commission from Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, then fighting to overthrow the Royalist government in Mexico. Hidalgo authorized Gutiérrez to venture to the United States for the purpose of requesting aid for the independence movement. On August 1, Gutiérrez and a group of twelve revolutionists began their journey toward Natchitoches. The party engaged in a skirmish with Royalist forces shortly before entering the United States. Although Gutiérrez escaped the Spanish soldiers, he lost his documents and credentials from Hidalgo.²

When Gutiérrez arrived in Natchitoches, he was greeted hospitably by local officials, including John Sibley, United States Indian agent, and Governor William C. C. Claiborne of Louisiana. Their hospitality Gutiérrez stemmed from their interest in the revolutionary movement in Mexico. Prior to Gutiérrez's arrival in the United States, Claiborne had issued several orders against American filibustering activities along the Texas-Louisiana border, but he believed that Mexican independence would serve national interests if it took "a proper direction." When Claiborne and Sibley learned of Gutiérrez's plans, they furnished him with letters of introduction and funds for his journey to Washington and encouraged him in his quest to seek aid.³

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Upon his arrival in Washington in December 1811, Gutiérrez secured a meeting with Secretary of State James Monroe, and during a private conservation he pleaded for American arms, munitions, and merchandise. If Monroe agreed to aid the revolutionary cause, Gutiérrez assured him that the Mexican provinces would offer the United States silver, wool, and other products in exchange. He also maintained that these activities would foster a trading network between the two countries. Aside from these benefits, Gutiérrez asserted that providing support for Mexican independence would serve national interests because should the United States not offer assistance, the Mexican rebels would seek aid in Europe.¹

Gutiérrez commented on his meeting with the secretary of state in his diary. "He [Monroe] told me that it was expedient for me to go back to my country to fetch the documents necessary to undertake the purchase of arms, and to report the friendly disposition of this country to favor the Republic of Mexico." According to Gutiérrez, Monroe also informed him that he would write to the French, English, and Danish ambassadors urging them to follow a policy that advocated independence for all of the Spanish colonies. In addition, Monroe proposed sending an American army to the Rio Grande in an effort to assist the revolutionists in the internal Mexican provinces. When Gutiérrez suggested that he would assume personal command of such an army, however, Monroe quickly decided to drop the subject.²

Although Monroe broke off negotiations with Gutiérrez, he still showed interest in Mexican independence. Perhaps he believed that an independent Mexico would open Texas to larger numbers of American settlers who could help the United States validate its claim that Texas was included within the Louisiana Purchase. The secretary of state also thought that removing the Spanish government from power would allow the United States to establishing a prosperous trading monopoly in Central America. While Monroe did not want to accept Gutiérrez's terms, he still realized the benefits of supporting the revolutionary's cause.³

On December 17, 1811, the two men met for the final time, and Monroe insisted that if the United States declared war on Great Britain, the government would place an army of 50,000 soldiers in Mexico to help the independence movement. Gutiérrez profusely thanked Monroe, and he asked the secretary of state to confirm his offer in writing. Monroe said that he would consult his superiors and submit a reply.⁴

Following the meeting, American officials in Washington urged Gutiérrez to return to Mexico "with all possible diligence." They feared that if Gutiérrez remained on the Texas-Louisiana border, he might encounter foreign agents and accept a proposal detrimental to the interests of the United States. On December 31, 1811, John Graham, chief clerk of the State Department, furnished Gutiérrez with two hundred dollars along with a letter of introduction to Governor W. C. C. Claiborne. In the introduction, Graham requested Claiborne to provide Gutiérrez with funds to facilitate his transportation from New Orleans to the Louisiana border. Taking his leave of Washington early in
January, Gutiérrez sailed for Philadelphia.*

In Philadelphia, Gutiérrez met with Jose Alvarez de Toledo y Dubois, who had recently fled Spain because of his revolutionary views. Originally, Toledo came to the United States to enlist the support of James Monroe for a revolutionary movement to establish independent Spanish colonies in the Caribbean. During their meeting, the revolutionary informed Monroe that the Spanish parliament would acquiesce to the British seizure of Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico. Believing that Toledo could lead a revolutionary movement that would undermine British efforts to gain control of the Caribbean islands, Monroe furnished him with money to venture to Cuba and a letter of introduction to William Shaler, United States Special Agent, then supposedly in Cuba.*

After meeting Gutiérrez, Toledo's plans changed. Instead of leaving for their respective destinations, the two remained in Philadelphia to develop plans for a revolutionary movement in the Mexican provinces. The two men agreed that Toledo would remain in the United States and protect the interests of the revolutionary cause, while Gutiérrez would travel to the Louisiana frontier and organize an invasion army for Texas. On February 19, 1812, Gutiérrez departed Philadelphia for Louisiana. When he arrived in New Orleans, Gutiérrez presented his letter of introduction to Governor Claiborne. Claiborne did not know “the degree of countenance to show him” because a corresponding letter from Monroe had not arrived in New Orleans. Even so, Claiborne decided to have Gutiérrez's return to Mexico “be expedited,” and he personally introduced him to William Shaler, who had returned from Cuba and recently been appointed United States Commercial Agent to Mexico. Claiborne instructed Shaler to pay for Gutiérrez’s passage to Natchitoches because without funds Gutiérrez would become “the victim of numerous foreign and domestic intriguers in New Orleans.”

Gutiérrez impressed Shaler not only because he had met with Monroe, but he also carried a letter of introduction from Graham. Unwilling to let foreign intrigues influence the Mexican revolutionary, Shaler convinced Gutiérrez to share quarters with him as they awaited a barge to take them to Natchitoches. The American agent’s concerns were soon eased when he learned that Gutiérrez “will listen to no proposals whatever without my approbation.”

As a commercial agent to Mexico, Shaler’s commission served a dual purpose. Not only did it allow the American to obtain information about the independence movement and report it to the secretary of state, but it also permitted him to influence the direction of any war for independence. Shaler could also cooperate with and provide monetary support for Mexican revolutionaries that he encountered along his journey to Natchitoches. In addition, Shaler could help organize a provisional government after the defeat of the Royalist Spanish regime in the provinces. Although it is difficult to surmise the exact nature of Shaler’s mission, the American agent provided Monroe with a full account of his activities along the Louisiana-Texas frontier for almost a
year. If Monroe disproved of Shaler’s activities, he never indicated so in writing.12

On March 23, 1812, Shaler informed Monroe that he would accompany Gutiérrez to Natchitoches. Monroe probably expressed enthusiasm over the American agent’s efforts because he saw Shaler as an individual who could convince Gutiérrez to relinquish Texas to the United States. Should Gutiérrez decide not to adhere to Monroe’s plan at least Shaler’s mission might weaken Spanish control over the region.13

During the spring of 1812, Gutiérrez began recruiting volunteers to participate in the liberation of Mexico and the United States prepared for war with Great Britain. With the onset of the War of 1812, some Americans believed that Spain would enter the conflict on behalf of Great Britain. Those residing in the South viewed war with Spain as an opportunity to expand American territory by invading Spanish provinces and establishing independent governments. These individuals also thought that they would receive territory and commercial wealth for their efforts to liberate Mexico. Once Gutiérrez arrived in Natchitoches, a number of frontiersmen volunteered for the expedition because they considered it a way of realizing their ambitions.14

In April 1812, Gutiérrez renewed communications with the United States. He wrote John Graham explaining that several individuals from Texas had said that the people of northern Mexico were prepared to rise up against the Spanish government. But these rebels would not act unless they knew that American support would be forthcoming. In addition, Gutiérrez mentioned that once he arrived on the Texas-Louisiana frontier he would join the rebels in their efforts. Graham most likely sent the letter on to Monroe.15

Little doubt exists about Monroe’s knowledge of Gutiérrez’s efforts to assemble an expeditionary force to liberate Mexico, because Shaler wrote to Monroe explaining the situation in Natchitoches. According to Shaler, Gutiérrez had prepared an expeditionary force comprised of North Americans, Mexicans, and Indians to liberate Mexico from Spanish tyranny. Shaler urged Monroe that “if such speculations were inconsistent with the views and policy of the United States, the time had come to take measures to prevent the actuality of these schemes.” Shaler’s letter reaffirms the likelihood that Monroe supported this filibustering expedition. Had he disapproved of the American agent’s activities, Monroe would have sent a condemning reply to Shaler.16

During the summer of 1812, Gutiérrez recruited men for his expedition by offering them a salary of forty dollars a month and one league of land. To attract volunteers from the interior Spanish provinces, Gutiérrez distributed broadsides in northern Texas, which he believed would serve a twofold purpose: they would not only inform the inhabitants of Texas about the coming invasion, but they would also prompt individuals to join in the uprising. Meanwhile, Shaler continued sending reports to Monroe about the organization of the expedition.17

One of the individuals that Gutiérrez convinced to join the revolutionary cause was Augustus Magee, an army lieutenant who had been stationed in
Natchitoches to suppress the numerous bandits and rebels engaged in illegal commerce in the Neutral Ground. Unable to receive a promotion in the army, Magee developed an interest in the events that transpired along Louisiana-Texas border. When Gutiérrez offered to place him in command of the Republican Army of the North, the lieutenant saw the value of such an opportunity, resigned his commission, and accepted the proposal.  

In July 1812, Shaler informed Monroe that the expeditionary force planned to depart for the Sabine River within ten days. Shaler expressed confidence in the strength of the expedition, noting that all of the troops at Fort Claiborne could not stop the army from crossing into Texas. In addition, Shaler assured Monroe that the army would achieve success beyond the Louisiana-Texas border because rumors from the interior Spanish provinces reported that Mexican troops stationed at Bexar and Nacogdoches planned to offer no resistance to the incoming soldiers. Shaler concluded by remarking, "I have acted entirely according to my own conceptions of what may be his [President James Madison's] wishes." Here again Monroe had a chance to reprimand Shaler for his actions, but the secretary of state did not. 

On August 7, 1812, the Republican Army of the North crossed into Spanish Texas and marched toward Nacogdoches. When Bernardino Montero, the commander of the Spanish troops at Nacogdoches, learned of the advancing army, he attempted to rally the local inhabitants against the invaders, but not a single citizen answered the commander's call to arms. Fearing for their lives, Montero and ten of his subordinates fled the city, seeking refuge at Bexar. When the soldiers of the Republican Army of the North marched into Nacogdoches, they encountered no opposition from the locals. 

Following the capture of Nacogdoches, Governor Claiborne of Louisiana condemned those citizens who had participated in the filibustering expedition. He referred to a 1794 congressional act announcing that any individual engaged in military activities against any territory at peace with the United States would be subject to misdemeanor charges. In addition, the governor instructed civil and military officials in Natchitoches to act against any individual engaged in the expedition. Claiborne's official protest against the filibustering expedition appears to indicate that the United States did not support the Magee-Gutiérrez raid. Secretary of State Monroe, perhaps realizing that Spain might construe an invasion of Texas as an act of war, even authorized the governor to make the proclamation. But Claiborne did not wish to stop the invasion of Texas, merely to appease Spanish officials. The governor issued his decree three days after the Republican Army of the North departed from Natchitoches. 

While Claiborne condemned the filibustering expedition, Shaler expressed great enthusiasm about the Republican Army's conquest of Nacogdoches. Shaler informed Monroe that he believed the army would seize the Texas capital within a month. Furthermore, he described how the expeditionary force had grown to five hundred men because of the constant arrival of individuals from Natchez and other surrounding towns. Shaler's letter gave the
impression that Spanish forces would offer no resistance to the advancing army.22

Leaving Nacogdoches secured, the Republican Army of the North seized Trinidad, and three small canons. With the addition of these artillery pieces to their odd assortment of arms, Magee ordered the men to move towards San Antonio. They marched across central Texas, encountering little opposition from the local inhabitants, but had to stop at the Brazos River because of high water. As the soldiers made arrangements to cross the river, Magee captured a Spanish spy who reported that Spanish forces planned to ambush the army as it crossed the Guadalupe River. Furthermore, the spy revealed that only a small Spanish force protected La Bahia. This information prompted Magee to move against La Bahia.23

As the Republican Army of the North continued its march across Texas, Gutiérrez sent Shaler a note explaining his desire that the United States take possession of Texas in return for sending a military force into the interior provinces of Mexico. Shaler forwarded this proposal to Monroe but did not receive any notification as to whether the government would accept these terms.24

Meanwhile, Monroe attempted to distant himself from the filibustering expedition by sending Dr. John Hamilton Robinson to Chihuahua to meet with Don Nemesio Salcedo y Salcedo, Commandant-General of the Interior Provinces. The secretary of state instructed Robinson to inform the Mexican general that the United States government had condemned the recent activities in the Neutral Grounds. Furthermore, Monroe authorized Robinson to confer with Don Nemesio in an effort to suppress the filibustering expedition. While the nature of Robinson’s mission appeared to counteract Monroe’s support of the filibuster, Robinson most likely traveled to Mexico as a way of convincing the Spanish officials that the United States still respected Spanish neutrality.25

As Monroe tried to preserve peace between Spain and the United States, Shaler continued to praise the success of the Magee-Gutiérrez expedition. He explained how “the volunteer expedition from the most insignificant beginning is growing into an irresistible torrent that will sweep the crazy remains of Spanish Government from the internal provinces.” He truly believed that the army would open Mexico “to the political influence of the United States and to the talents and enterprise of our citizens.” While Shaler thought that Spanish officials would not be able to withstand the continued onslaught of the Republican Army, he did posit that British intervention could pose a serious threat to the expeditionary force. Publicly, it appeared that Monroe disapproved of the filibustering activities along the Louisiana-Texas border, but Shaler’s letters continually reinforced Monroe’s support, even if tacit in nature, for the Mexican independence movement.26

As the Republican Army approached La Bahia during the winter, the Spanish garrison fled. The soldiers captured the city without any resistance, but they could not savor their victory. A larger Royalist Army commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Simon de Herrera quickly attacked La Bahia. The Royalist
Army outnumbered Magee’s forces, but the Republican Army thwarted Herrera’s attempt to take the city. Even though the Republican Army drove the Spaniards back, Herrera laid siege to the city for the next four months.

Then in early February Augustus Magee died, leaving Major Samuel Kemper to command the Republican Army. Some soldiers noted that their commander had committed suicide while others speculated that he was murdered. While Magee’s death lowered the morale among the American soldiers, news of reinforcements from Nacogdoches lifted their spirits; their morale continued to rise when they learned that Herrera had lifted his siege of the city and retreated toward Bexar. On February 16, 1813, Kemper ordered the army to march toward San Antonio.

During the Republican Army’s march to San Antonio, deserters from the Spanish Royalist Army, along with Lipans and Tonkawas, joined the expedition. When Kemper’s forces approached the Texas capital they encountered Herrera’s forces at Salado Creek on March 29. The Battle of Salado represented a devastating defeat for the Royalist Army. Following the battle, Kemper ordered the men to continue toward San Antonio. By April 1, the Republican Army had surrounded San Antonio, and the following day Governor Manuel Salcedo agreed to surrender. When Shaler learned of the Republican Army’s victory, he wrote to Monroe and described how the army had captured the city. His letter implied that, with the Texas capital in the possession of an army comprised mainly of American soldiers, the United States could easily annex Texas.

Monroe probably believed that the United States could capitalize upon Kemper’s capture of San Antonio, but events in Texas proved detrimental to American interests. After the occupation of San Antonio, Gutiérrez declared himself governor of the state of Texas. As one of his first acts, Gutiérrez ordered that Herrera and Salcedo be executed. The American members of his force expressed outrage. On May 14, 1812, Shaler wrote to Monroe and explained that these actions caused him to question Gutiérrez’ character. Furthermore, he feared that the Mexican revolutionary would become corrupt and unmanageable if he assumed “uncontrollable power.”

Meanwhile, Gutiérrez had drafted a constitution for the State of Texas that revealed he had no intention of relinquishing his claim to power. Shaler noted to Monroe in May 1813 that Article One of the constitution proclaimed that the State of Texas formed “a part of the Mexican Republic, to which it remains inviolably joined.” The constitution removed any doubts as to whether Gutiérrez believed that Texas had been included in the Louisiana Purchase. Monroe may have previously believed that, under Shaler’s supervision, Gutiérrez could be convinced to surrender Texas to the United States. He now doubted that such was the case.

Jose Alvarez de Toledo y Dubois, in the meantime, arrived in Natchitoches on April 4, 1813, after his plan to liberate Cuba and Santo Domingo had come to naught. Toledo had decided to join his more successful compatriot in Texas and met with Shaler to discuss his role in the movement.
Shaler suggested that he replace Gutiérrez as the commander of the Republican Army of the North, believing that placing Toledo in charge of the army would benefit American interests. Shaler wrote to Monroe, explaining his desire to have Toledo assume command of the army. The American agent concluded by asking for Monroe's approval, but never received a reply.32

On July 20, 1813, Shaler ventured to Nacogdoches to monitor the activities in Texas. As he journeyed across the Texas frontier, he finally received a dispatch from Monroe informing him that he should "not interfere in the affairs of those provinces, or to encourage any armaments of any kind against the existing government." Monroe maintained "the United States being at peace with Spain wished to preserve that relation with whatever government may exist." The secretary of state ordered Shaler to return to Natchitoches until he received further instructions from the federal government. In conclusion, Monroe stated, "This is the spirit of the instructions given you at the commencement of your service, and they have never since been altered." While Shaler had been sending the secretary of state information about events for almost eighteen months, this letter marked the first reply indicating Monroe's disapproval.33

What changed Monroe's mind? Did he realize that the filibuster no longer served national interests following Gutiérrez's usurpation of power? The Texas Constitution, which demonstrated that Gutiérrez would not relinquish Texas to the United States, coupled with the possibility that Spain might join with England in the war, could have convinced Monroe to terminate his connection with the expeditionary force. If Monroe had any involvement with the Magee-Gutiérrez expedition, his letter of June 5, 1813, severed any relations once and for all.34

Although Monroe never made any official statement supporting the Magee-Gutiérrez expedition, evidence demonstrates that the secretary of state played an important role in the filibustering activities along the Louisiana-Texas border. Even before the Republican Army of the North invaded Texas, Monroe supported other filibustering activities. For example, Monroe encouraged the annexation of West Florida by the United States after eighty Americans rebels conquered Spanish Baton Rouge. Additionally, Monroe earlier encouraged George Mathews to establish an independent territory in East Florida. During the Patriot Rebellion, Mathews claimed that he had orders from Monroe that gave him the authority to seize East Florida. As Mathews's forces prepared to launch an assault against St. Augustine, Monroe wrote Mathews explaining that he had exceeded his orders. Monroe probably reprimanded Mathews for his actions because he did not want to provoke a conflict with Spain as the United States waged war against England. Furthermore, the secretary of state defended General James Wilkinson's conquest of Mobile in the spring of 1813. Monroe justified the capture of Mobile as a precautionary measure aimed at preventing the British from taking the region. Following the War of 1812, the United States did not relinquish Mobile to Spanish officials, but rather incorporated the area into the Mississippi Territory. Monroe never
discussed his views of the Magee-Gutiérrez expedition in writing, but his involvement in previous filibustering activities during the nineteenth century indicates that he supported the events in Texas.35

Aside from Monroe’s involvement in earlier filibustering activities, Shaler’s communications with the secretary of state demonstrate that Monroe played an important role in the Magee-Gutiérrez expedition. During the course of the filibuster, Shaler constantly informed Monroe about the events that transpired in Texas. If Monroe had disproved of Shaler’s activities, he would have sent him a condemning reply. Furthermore, Monroe did not reprimand the American agent until nearly eighteen months after Shaler sent his initial letter to the secretary of state. Therefore, Monroe’s unspoken words served as an endorsement of the Magee-Gutiérrez filibuster in Texas.

NOTES


2 Elizabeth H. West, ed., “Diary of Jose Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara,” American Historical Review 34 (October 1928), pp. 56-57; Warren, The Sword was Their Passport, p. 5.


4 Don Jose Bernardo Gutiérrez to Secretary of War, no date or place, in Mexico Filibustering Expeditions Against the Government of Spain, 1811-1816, State Department Manuscripts, Microfilm Publication T-286, National Archives, Washington D.C. (hereafter cited as Mexico Filibustering Expeditions); Isaac J. Cox, “Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents,” American Historical Association Annual Report for the Year 1911 (Washington, 1913), Vol. 1, p. 201.


8 Notes for a dispatch from Gutiérrez to the Commander in Chief, enclosure in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, in Dispatches from Special Agents of the Department of State, State Department Manuscripts, Microfilm Publication M-37, reel 2, National Archives, Washington D.C. (hereafter cited as Shaler Papers); West, ed., “Diary of Jose Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara,” p. 77.

9 Toledo to Monroe, Philadelphia, November 16, 1811, Mexico Filibustering Expeditions; Garrett, Green Flag Over Texas, pp. 98-99; Cox, “Monroe and Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents,” p. 203.


13Shaler to Monroe, New Orleans, March 23, 1812, Shaler Papers; Garrett, Green Flag Over Texas, pp. 105-106.

14Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1812 (Gloucester, Mass., 1957), pp. 120-124.

15Gutiérrez to Graham, Natchitoches, April 28, 1812, Mexico Filibustering Expeditions; Garrett, Green Flag Over Texas, pp. 111-112.

16Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 2, 1812; Shaler to Monroe, May 22, 1812, Shaler Papers.

17Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 7, 1812, Shaler Papers; Gronet, "The United States and the Invasion of Texas," p. 289.


19Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, July 12, 1812, Shaler Papers.


22Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 18, 1812, Shaler Papers; Warren, The Sword Was Their Passport, pp. 35-36.


24Gutiérrez to Shaler, La Bahia, November 25, 1812, enclosure in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, December 25, 1812; Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, November 29, 1812, Shaler Papers.

25Monroe to Robinson, Department of State, July 1, 1812, Mexico Filibustering Expeditions; Owsley, Jr. and Smith, Filibusters and Expansionists, pp. 46-47.

26Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, October 5, 1812, Shaler Papers; Gronet, "The United States and the Invasion of Texas," p. 284; Warren, The Sword Was Their Passport, p. 36.


