The 1976 GOP Primary: Ford, Reagan, and the Battle that Transformed Political Campaigns in Texas

Sean P. Cunningham

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj

Part of the United States History Commons

Tell us how this article helped you.

Recommended Citation

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History at SFA ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in East Texas Historical Journal by an authorized editor of SFA ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact cdsscholarworks@sfasu.edu.
THE 1976 GOP PRIMARY: FORD, REAGAN AND THE BATTLE THAT TRANSFORMED POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS IN TEXAS

by Sean P. Cunningham

In the sixteen years prior to the 1976 election season, politics in Texas was characterized by conservative ideology, as were voting trends at the local level. Candidates with legitimate hopes of victory sought the conservative label and vilified liberal opponents while conservative Democrats held the Texas governorship and most senate and house positions. Yet national politics was challenging this status quo and, consequently, the Texas Democratic Party system grew all the more strained. Candidates from both political parties gained favor with voters by embracing law and order and repudiating national social unrest, seemingly born on university campuses and effecting the lives of conservative families across the country. The Democratic Party was leaning left more consistently in its presidential nominations, and many Texans perceived Republicans as viable conservative options in national races. As the liberal wing of the Democratic Party assumed a more prominent national position, Texas conservatives established not only a viable Republican Party but also one surging toward power.¹

Ronald Reagan’s popularity in Texas increased after his first attempt at the presidency in 1968. The former California governor’s stance on big government and American values – loosely defined as Judeo-Christian, family ethics coupled with individualism and a strict-constructionist view of the federal government’s role in daily lives – brought support from Texas conservatives regardless of party affiliation and provided a substantial base for the 1976 presidential race. Political stars like John Tower and John Connally played significant roles in the fight for the GOP presidential nomination. Reagan’s bid to unseat incumbent President Gerald Ford further revealed the tremendous strain within the Democratic Party, as well as a previously unseen schism in the Texas GOP. Shifts in party affiliation resulted from reinvigorated conservatism, especially among grassroots enthusiasts and former Goldwater supporters. Established party leaders who failed to see the warning signs of realignment were subject to replacement by newcomers who effectively tapped into a brand of conservatism made more palatable by the style and persona of Ronald Reagan.²

At the Republican state convention in August 1974, Tower and the rest of the old guard GOP faction should have seen that their hold on Republican operations in Texas was weakening. Despite a significant Texas presence in the Ford administration, including Houston businessman James Baker and White House Chief of Staff Richard Cheney, convention delegates passed several resolutions highly critical of Ford and his policies. Fifteen months later, shortly after Reagan announced his candidacy, Houston Representative Ray Barnhart and Midland Mayor Ernest Angelo, Jr., became co-chairmen of the

Sean Cunningham earned his M.A. (history) and M.Ed. (higher education administration) from Texas Tech University, and currently works as an Academic Counseling Specialist for the Advising Center at Texas Tech (ACTT).
Citizens for Reagan organization in Texas.

Reagan was given a boost when members of the Texas Legislature voted to institute a presidential primary in Texas. Consequently, Reagan’s hopes of winning in Texas rested with the general public, not the state’s established GOP leadership. The legislature hoped that a presidential primary would enhance Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen’s chances of victory in the Democratic race against Jimmy Carter. The split between liberal and conservative Democratic party leaders had traditionally made the selection of delegates at the state convention a difficult task. However, for Republicans, the new primary meant that established GOP leaders could no longer control the process, as they would have in the traditional nominating convention. Instead, grassroots Reagan supporters made their voices heard in the primary campaign rather than being ignored in the backroom politicking at a state convention.1

The first ever presidential primary in Texas was scheduled for May 1, 1976. As that date drew closer, a number of individuals became active in shaping the race. John Connally, for instance, was convinced that the GOP needed to revamp its image both at the national and state level. Americans had grown increasingly disenchanted with the nation’s chaotic atmosphere left over from the previous decade. Nixon’s Watergate scandal, coupled with the powerful state Democratic organization, obstructed the Texas GOP’s track toward mainstream acceptance.4

Connally argued that television advertisements could revamp the party’s image; they were “instant and dramatic,” and could be as powerful as any branch of the federal government. As a former Hollywood actor and General Electric spokesman, Ronald Reagan was well prepared to utilize television to appeal to conservative Democrats in Texas. His brand of new conservatism stressed social issues such as opposition to abortion and gun control, support for school prayer, and other issues not adopted by the traditional Texas GOP leadership.5,6

As the leaders of both parties braced themselves for the upcoming election, a number of issues emerged that illuminated subjects the Ford campaign had hoped to avoid. In July 1975 the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a 1971 desegregation plan adopted by the Dallas Independent School District was inadequate. In order to comply with the new decision, Dallas Judge William Taylor devised a new plan for the district.7 On March 12, 1976, district officials announced that more than 20,000 students would be bused to satisfy the court’s desegregation compliance program.8 As if Dallas conservatives were not unhappy enough with these decisions, Judge Taylor announced that property taxes would be increased to fund the busing program. Reagan supported a constitutional amendment outlawing busing; Ford advocated limited federal intervention in elementary and secondary education, a softer stance necessitated by his need to maintain the support of moderates in other regions. During the early stages of the Texas primary campaign, Ford skirted the issue of busing.9 But he was unprepared when a San Antonio citizen questioned him about his administration’s support for a $5,000 National Endow-
ment for the Humanities grant, which the citizen claimed was being used in part to fund a homosexual rights convention in San Antonio. 10

As the Texas primary approached, Ford was forced to adjust his positions – or at least his words – to appeal to the heavy concentration of social conservatives enamored with Reagan. But he appeared insincere to many voters because his campaign rhetoric was rarely supported by action. 11 To complicate matters further, Ford’s campaign strategists consistently misread the relationship between conservative Texas Democrats and big business. The 1973 Arab oil embargo had weakened the economy in some regions, but in Texas it had been a catalyst for growth. Few Texans wanted to tamper with the good fortunes of oil barons. Nevertheless, Ford’s strategists theorized that a majority of Texans looked with disfavor upon big oil. This was not the only miscalculation made by the Ford campaign. The president and his advisors also failed to capitalize on the shifting political climate of the state. Strategists dismissed traditional economic conservatives as solidly Democratic – as had long been the case – and made no plans to court crossover voters. 12

President Ford’s chief advisor in Texas was John Tower, who was rumored to be seeking a cabinet appointment. The President paid little attention to Tower, however, except to encourage his pursuit of John Connally’s elusive endorsement. Connally consistently denied his own interest in the GOP nomination but criticized the party ceaselessly and publicly. He repeatedly spoke of strengthening American business and patriotic resolve within the party. His refusal to support Ford enthusiastically may have given many Texans the impression that the administration was merely a carry over of the scandal-ridden Nixon administration. 13

Ford’s campaign advisors researched Reagan’s popularity even before the former California governor announced his candidacy. 14 In December 1975, Ford campaign committee chairman Bo Calloway informed his staff of some potential problems with several issues. Preliminary research showed the president had potential weaknesses with conservative voters in his policy toward the Soviet Union and the issue of détente. Furthermore, and somewhat more disconcerting, Ford had an image problem; he was not perceived as “presidential,” but only as a hand-picked successor to a failed and disgraced predecessor. Ford’s advisors also concluded that Reagan’s support was “soft” at best, based on the fact that over forty percent of his supporters were not very knowledgeable of his record in California. Fifty percent of them were not even sure what they liked best about Reagan. 15 Reagan, however, was enjoying an astonishing ninety-five percent name recognition factor, with a favorability rating of fifty-four percent. Poll respondents saw Reagan as bolder, more decisive, more straightforward, more competent, and stronger than Ford. 16

As the Ford campaign began to shape its national strategy, the president’s appeal in Texas continued to dwindle. Ford wanted the public to view him as both a different kind of Republican, unafraid to attack corporate America, and a traditional GOP leader. This lack of a clear political identity hurt Ford in Texas. Ford campaign strategists refused to believe that voters connected the
GOP, support for big business, and economic growth. Chairman Calloway went so far as to encourage Ford to sign the Energy Policy and Conservation Act in December 1975. This bill imposed price controls on oil companies, a regulatory measure that fostered bitterness toward the federal government among oil interests, many of which had become reliable fundraisers for conservative politicians in Texas. Rising gasoline prices further turned public sentiment against Ford. The president calculated that Texans would find his anticorporate sentiments appealing. In reality, those with the power to influence electoral outcomes were again alienated by the Ford administration.17

According to Ford's internal polls, many Texans distrusted the Federal Energy Administration, a symptom of a larger distrust of the federal government. Ford's signing of a price roll-back bill, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), had not helped his popularity in Texas. Oil companies feared divestiture within their industry and embraced the philosophies of Reagan, who opposed the new law for three reasons. First, he argued that it would increase dependence on foreign oil sources. Second, he claimed that price controls were a disincentive for domestic producers. And third, he argued that controlled prices conflicted with any hopes for conservation, because fixed prices encourage greater consumption.18 Late in April, Ford and his advisors became aware that the bill would cost them considerable support in Texas. However, some within the administration mistakenly believed that faltering support was attributable only to the EPCA. In reality, Texas's emerging conservative coalition consisted of social conservatives and religious leaders as well as the oil magnates with distaste for regulatory policy.19

At the same time, John Tower spent much of his time trying to curb Reagan's growing popularity, which had been fostered mainly by the actions of the Citizens for Reagan grassroots organization. Reagan, whose campaign success stories in other state primaries to that point were few and far between, began looking to Texas as key to his aspirations. In preparation for the Texas campaign, he focused more attention on anti-government sentiment, aid to oil businesses, and a corporate-friendly energy policy. Tower chose to pursue Connally's endorsement while offering blanket dismissals of Reagan's criticisms of the Ford administration. Although Ford consistently pursued Connally's favor more fervently than did Reagan, both candidates sent telegrams praising Connally's comments at a GOP fundraiser in Tarrant County. Connally had lambasted the GOP for ethical lapses in Washington and called on the party improve its morals through less intrusive government. Meanwhile, Ford tried to diminish the legitimacy of Reagan's presidential aspirations by intimating that Reagan was costing himself a chance at the vice-presidency – implying that higher aspirations were improbable. Ford used words like irresponsible and extreme when describing Reagan and his policies toward the Soviet Union and the Panama Canal. The same tactics had crippled Barry Goldwater's campaign in Texas twelve years earlier, and Ford hoped the charges of extremism would stick to Reagan as well.20

On March 24, Reagan upset Ford in the North Carolina primary, due in large part to a series of diatribes painting Ford's plans to renegotiate America's
defensive and territorial rights to the Panama Canal as a relinquishment of “sovereign U.S. territory” against the consent of the public. Ford did not effectively defend his stance on the issue in Texas until an interview on April 21, in which he attacked Reagan’s strategy as irresponsible. The President stated that Reagan’s actions would result in a war in which as many as 10,000 U.S. troops would likely lose their lives. Additionally, Ford claimed that failing to negotiate with the Panamanians would alienate relations with much of Latin America. Despite this relatively vague defense, it was Ford’s main offensive effort to minimize the issue in Texas. In earlier trips to Texas, Ford had tersely denied that he would ever relinquish sovereign United States territory. In San Antonio on April 9 and 10, Ford limited his answers to questions on the Panama Canal to two and three sentences. Reagan predictably pounced on Ford’s new stance, claiming it was merely a reaction to the public’s renewed interest in the issue.

After losing in North Carolina, Ford’s campaign staff place renewed importance on the May 1 primary in Texas and announced a revamped schedule that included more visits to the state. The President spent much of April 9 through 12 in San Antonio and Dallas. He returned during the last week of April, visiting the Texas Panhandle, students at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, and business leaders in Abilene. Despite his efforts to appeal to Texas conservatives, Ford never seemed to be accepted wholeheartedly. He never convinced Texans that he was passionate about the issues they, and Reagan, thought important. Ford’s sincere interest in Texas was being questioned, while Reagan appeared genuinely to enjoy his visits to the state. Reagan’s image as a Westerner and cowboy, advocating rugged individualism and presenting frontiersman persona, was hardly mirrored by Ford’s personality.

Ford largely avoided significant issues in Texas and continued to chase his dream of a Connally endorsement most fervently. Connally refused to endorse Ford, saying that their close personal friendship prevented him from making an impartial decision on behalf of the Texas people. Reagan did not rest his hopes in Texas on Connally’s endorsement, at least not as strongly as did Ford. Instead, he pursued crossover votes from conservative Democrats, businessmen in the oil industry, and former Goldwater backers, all without appearing to pander to any single constituency. Public perception of Reagan in Texas was consistently positive; he was characterized as honest and, unlike Ford, a straight-talker rather than a back-room politician.

Reagan advertised and promoted his candidacy far more in Texas than did Ford. The Ford campaign also had difficulty raising money in the state, while Reagan's direct-mail fundraising operation was proficient. Ford’s strategists planned a five-minute, statewide speech to counter many of Reagan’s allegations, but the president’s personal advisors urged Ford to remain above the fray in the hopes that he might appear more “presidential.” On April 9, the Ford campaign, which had originally allocated $450,000 to advertising in the Texas primary, reduced its promotions budget by $30,000.

Reagan spoke with student leaders at Southern Methodist University on
April 6 and was pleased to discover that they opposed the counter-culture movement that had plagued the Reagan governorship in California during the late 1960s.\(^27\) Reagan’s confidence appealed to the growing number of youths involved in state politics. During the final week of the campaign, Reagan raised the issue of crime more often and accused Ford of treating the safety of Texas’ citizens as an afterthought. Hoping to quell such talk, the President delivered a speech at Texas Stadium and announced a new “get tough on crime” prevention policy.\(^28\) After the speech, Ford appeared confident but admitted that he would have to do some work to regain favor with oil constituents due to his unpopular signing of the EPCA the previous December.\(^29\)

Reagan successfully controlled the campaign against Ford by proactively pursuing his own agenda. Ford was often forced to defend his claim that Soviet military spending had not made the United States a second-rate military power by citing complex tonnage and firepower comparisons and arguing that America’s secure borders limited the need for increased military spending. Presidential advisor David Gergen addressed some of these issues with Ford during speechwriting sessions. However, while Gergen and Ford agreed to touch on the issues Reagan raised, the Ford campaign team continued to underestimate the importance of foreign policy to Texans.\(^30\) Reagan did not limit his criticism of Ford’s foreign policy to the Soviet Union. He also brought relations with Angola and Cuba to the public’s attention, and attacked Ford on détente and alleged poor leadership from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.\(^31\)

Ford added to his troubles with a poorly worded phrase during a speech on the campus of West Texas State University in Canyon. In reference to his personal political philosophy, Ford said, “any government big enough to give you everything you want is big enough to take away everything you have.”\(^32\) Clearly, this was an attempt to convince the public that he, and not Reagan, was the candidate of smaller government and more local control. Unfortunately, the public perceived Ford as the leader of just such an intrusive government.\(^33\) Reagan continued to pressure Ford on issues such as the national debt, increased inflation, and government interference in various social issues. With the American public exhausted by a decade of war and scandal, Reagan captured the anti-government, anti-establishment sentiment and turned it into a platform that later became the basis of his presidency.\(^34\)

Reagan’s popularity grew in part because of his constant appearances at GOP fundraisers. Despite increased spending by Ford, Reagan outspent the president by a substantial margin.\(^35\) By April 14, Reagan’s appearances around the state were out-drawing Ford’s, and the number of issues Reagan discussed expanded proportionately. Once again, the Panama Canal became a hot topic, despite Tower’s insistence that Reagan was misinterpreting Ford’s intentions. Reagan also began targeting conservatives in both parties more specifically. He spoke frequently about the need to put God back in public schools and criticized research grants to institutions of higher education; he addressed crime prevention and attacked Ford on busing and energy. Reagan’s Texas campaign
became an all-encompassing conservative platform with broad support. Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter's decision to withdraw resources from Texas in mid-April further advanced Reagan's cause in the state. Without a noticeable Democratic campaign (Carter expected to carry the state by twenty points), Texas Democrats became a more legitimate crossover threat.

The potential for George Wallace to siphon votes from Reagan's more right wing followers seemed less credible after both candidates held rallies in Fort Worth on April 15. Reagan drew 3000 supporters for his speech at Burnett Park in the city's central business district, ten times the number Wallace attracted later that day. Reagan was reported to be "poised and confident" and attacked Ford's lack of attention to busing programs and school prayer. Meanwhile, John Connally spent April 16 denying reports that he had been offered the position of Secretary of State in exchange for endorsing Ford. The incumbent president clearly remained on the defensive, without a legitimate presence in Texas and only a shred of hope that a Connally endorsement would turn things around.

Internal polls encouraged Ford to push for high voter turnout, clearly misreading the potential crossover voters for Reagan. Ford's advisors largely ignored this threat of conservative Democrats while overestimating the support of traditional, less conservative Republicans who had moved South during the oil boom. They believed that relocated northern Republicans would balance any crossover vote. Pollsters assured the president as late as April 15 that he would win the Texas primary by a margin of anywhere between five and fourteen percent. In fact, polls showed Ford as the more popular candidate in Texas among every demographic group except the thirty-five-to-fifty-four-year age bracket and those with incomes under $5,000. Ford's campaign strategists further interpreted the president's seventy-two percent job approval rating (among Republican voters only) as a positive sign. In reality, twenty-eight percent of Republicans in Texas disapproved of Ford's performance, while between seventy-two and eighty-two percent held favorable opinions of Reagan. And while polls showed Ford leading among all demographic groups save the two mentioned above, they also revealed that Reagan was perceived as the more competent candidate on all issues except foreign policy. Ford's inability to seize upon this strength, instead allowing Reagan to control debate on defense issues, was another miscalculation by the president's campaign.

Ford desperately spent campaign dollars during the final week of the Texas primary campaign. Outspending Reagan $200,000 to $75,000, Ford predicted that the "New Texans" who had flocked to the Sunbelt during the oil boom would relate to his brand of conservatism. At the same time, First Lady Betty Ford commented to the press that a loss in Texas was not a "killer" and could be overcome. The perception grew that Ford was failing to identify with Texas conservatives, both of the social and fiscal persuasion. The campaign appeared to be mired in a defeatist attitude.

The Ford campaign also devoted a significant amount of time and effort to filing complaints and making allegations against Reagan's campaign oper-
ations in Texas. The Texas Citizens for Reagan organization, listed as Reagan's official campaign committee in Texas, was limited by federal campaign regulations regarding fundraising and soft money. Another group, called Delegates for Reagan, a self-proclaimed independent support organization, did not fall under the same guidelines. As advertising dollars from the Delegates for Reagan increased, far outweighing regulated spending reported by the Texas Citizens for Reagan, Ford campaign representatives began to file exhaustive complaints. These objections against Reagan’s organization in Texas began as early as February 1976 when Ford’s staff challenged the publication and distribution of statewide Ronald Reagan newsletters, the compilation of GOP voter lists, and the use of congressional district offices as campaign offices. Evidence of collusion, such as both groups using the same letterhead, was present. Somewhat inexplicably, however, few repercussions resulted. In fact, perhaps the only consequence of the filing of complaints was the distraction of the issue itself, which better served Reagan than Ford.

Before May 1, the Reagan bandwagon gained more national followers with the addition of convention delegates from South Carolina and Missouri. A poll showed that Oklahoma’s delegates would soon be pledged to Reagan as well. Tower tried to use Reagan’s Panama Canal issue against him and warned Texas voters that a Reagan nomination would be like handing the Democrats the White House come November. At that point, Tower queried, “Who knows what would be given away?” Despite Ford’s outspending of Reagan during the final weeks of the campaign, pro-Reagan advertisements, purchased by various independent political action groups, continued to appear in newspapers and television stations across the state. Throughout the campaign, Ford challenged Reagan’s experience and approach to important issues. He claimed that Reagan offered overly simple solutions to complex problems. This argument failed to convince Texans who related to Reagan’s straight-talk approach. Ford ended his campaign in the conservative districts of Lubbock and Abilene, mentioning a personal friendship with conservative Democrat and longtime representative from the 19th Congressional district, George Mahon of Lubbock.

Vote totals on May 1 validated what political observers already knew: Reagan had overwhelmingly defeated Ford in Texas. The final percentages gave Reagan a sixty-seven percent to thirty-three percent victory. Although initial reports suggested that Ford had won Raines County, one of the few in which the voting had been close, tabulations over the next three days confirmed that Reagan had swept the entire state. Tower criticized voters for blindly accepting Reagan’s inaccurate descriptions of Ford’s policies and dismissed the victorious Reagan as a “bombastic preacher” who used “hard-lining clichés, parables and jokes” to captivate a personality-starved constituency. Pre-election calculations had determined that a Republican voter turnout of more than 175,000 would be impossible without a heavy crossover vote. With more than 464,000 votes cast in the GOP primary, Reagan’s influence had clearly been felt across party lines and drastically altered the way future primary campaigns and general elections were conducted in Texas. Reagan’s certified margin of victory was 310,381 to 152,022 (2,329 uncommitted votes). A
post-election analysis showed that even without any crossover votes from conservative Democrats, Reagan would still have taken the state by some 58,000 votes.\(^{47}\)

Tower’s credibility and popularity with Texas voters also took a massive hit as a result of Ford’s primary defeat. In the weeks following the contest, rumors circulated that Tower’s sole motivation in working with Ford was to gain minority leadership status in the Senate. Additionally, the now embattled Tower faced hostility and animosity from many within the Texas GOP leadership. As the state convention approached in June, it was clear that Tower would not be invited to take a seat in the Texas delegation at the Republican National Convention in Kansas City.\(^{48}\)

Reagan continued to gain momentum in the weeks following the Texas primary, and captured enough delegates in Indiana, Georgia, and Arizona to claim a lead over Ford. Texas Governor Dolph Briscoe announced his support for Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter in mid-May, although his enthusiasm was tempered by Carter’s selection of liberal Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale as running mate. Other developments in May included the release of a statewide poll indicating that a John Connally endorsement would not have had any bearing on the outcome of the GOP primary. In fact, the random sample showed that while thirty-four percent claimed that a Connally endorsement would have made them more likely to vote for a particular candidate, thirty-eight percent claimed that it would have had the opposite effect. Polls in April showed that the Connally endorsement would have resulted in a twenty-nine percent increase in Ford’s vote total.\(^{49}\)

Political pundits also claimed that, on a national level, Ford never fully managed to embrace the advantages of his incumbency. Rather, the president struggled to convince voters that he was a legitimate president and deserved the office on his own merits. To conservatives in Texas, Reagan represented a new beginning and an end to the chaos that had plagued the United States in domestic and foreign policy for a decade. By mid-May, some within the Ford administration were on the verge of panic. Reagan was clearly controlling the issues of the campaign. Ford’s responses were not only inadequate, but had reduced the president to a mere candidate rather than the incumbent.\(^{50}\)

For Texans, the 1976 presidential primary was a landmark political event. The viability of Republican candidates at the local level was forever altered as a result of the decisive Reagan victory. By 1980, marginalized leaders such as John Tower were forced to embrace a new conservative agenda, not because Texans altered their collective political ideology but because Reagan’s brand of Republicanism more accurately reflected the with deeply rooted conservative beliefs about the size and scope of the federal government. Reagan did not cause the partisan realignment experienced in Texas between 1976 and 1984, but he and the candidates who adopted his philosophies, especially in the way of campaign strategy, benefited most from the shift. Texas voters began voting Republican in larger numbers during the 1970s and 1980s, not just in presidential races but in state and local elections as well. Reagan’s victory in 1976
made the GOP fashionable in Texas, and resulted in legitimate political competition for the first time since Reconstruction.

NOTES


'Baer, Reinventing Democrats, pp. 22-35.

'Roger Olien, From Token to Triumph: The Texas Republicans Since 1920 (Dallas, 1982), pp. 236-238.


'DMN, March 12, 1976, 1A.


'DMN, March 13-14, 1976, A.


'U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Gerald Ford, 1976-1977, p. 1031


'DMN, March 13-14, 1976, A.

'Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1975, 1.


'DMN, March 18, 1976, 8A; March 20-21, 1976, 11A, 36A.

'Texas Correspondents Interview, April 21, 1976, Box 53, Ron Nesson Papers, 1974-1977, Ford Library.

'U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Gerald Ford, 1976-1977, 1066.

'U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Gerald Ford, 1976-1977, 1262-1269; DMN, March 24, 1976, 22A.

'DMN, April 2, 3, 6, 1976, sec. A.


'Memorandum For: Rogers Morton, From: Bruce Wagner, April 7, 1976, Box B4, Hughes

"DMN", April 7, 1976, 1A.


"DMN", April 8, 1976, 1A.

"Possible Texas Speech," April 26, 1976, David Gergen Files, Texas Speeches, Ford Library.


"DMN", April 11, 1976, 1A, 14A.


"DMN", March 16, 1976, 7A; "DMN", April 11, 1976, 14A.

"DMN", April 14, 15, 1976, 7A, 1A.

"DMN", April 16-17, 1976, 8A, 11A, 1A


"DMN", April 25, 1976. 1A – 13A.


"DMN", May 3, 1976, 1A-3A.

"Certified Results of May 1 Texas Primary, May 18, 1976, Box C11, MOR Texas Primary Survey Files, President Ford Committee Records, 1975-1976, Ford Library.

"DMN", May 4, 1976, 5A; May 5, 1976, 14A.
