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"WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH THE NEGRO?":
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU IN TEXAS
by Diane Neal and Thomas W. Kremm

Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation freed all slaves in Texas on January 1, 1863. Despite Lincoln's decree, freedom did not come to Texas slaves until June 19, 1865, when General Gordon Granger, Commander of the District of Texas, arrived at Galveston and placed the proclamation into effect. General Edgar M. Gregory, Assistant Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau for Texas, supplemented Granger's order on October 12, 1865, when he issued Freedmen's Bureau Circular No. 1. Warning that slavery had been abolished, he ordered Negroes still being held in bondage freed and stated that they would be protected and their liberties guaranteed. Moreover, he advised blacks to seek employment, since contrary to a widely circulated rumor, "the lands of their former masters" would not be "divided out to them" on Christmas Day, 1865. Gregory's announcement of freedom, but not land, initiated a five-year effort by the Freedmen's Bureau to aid Texas blacks in their transition from slavery to freedom.¹

The Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, usually referred to as the Freedmen's Bureau, was established by Congress on March 3, 1865 as a part of the Department of War. Congress provided for the Bureau to expire one year after the end of the "rebellion," but in three additional acts extended it until June 30, 1870. Congress gave the Bureau the tasks of administering all abandoned lands and supervising all matters relating to freedmen in the South. In short, the Bureau was to insure that blacks received "social, economic, and political rewards in a community offering equal opportunities to its citizens."²

The Bureau possessed the power to sell or rent to Negroes lands "within the insurrectionary states as shall have been abandoned, or to which the United States shall have acquired title by confiscation or sale, or otherwise." It was also authorized to serve as courts of law in cases to which a freedman was a party, but only in areas where "the ordinary course of judicial proceedings had been interrupted by the rebellion." Bureau jurisdiction was to terminate when "the ordinary course of judicial proceedings" returned. Congress also ordered the Bureau to transform blacks into "self-supporting citizens of the United States." To accomplish this last objective, it could furnish freedmen with food, clothing, and rations of medical supplies, but this direct relief was to end as soon as freedmen were able to provide for themselves.³

To supervise Bureau activities, Congress provided for the president to appoint a commissioner and ten assistant commissioners, subject to

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confirmation by the Senate. Assistant commissioners, aided by sub-agents, were to oversee activities at the state level. On May 12, 1865, Andrew Johnson appointed Brigadier General Oliver Otis Howard as Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau. Born in Maine, Howard was graduated from both Bowdoin College and the United States Military Academy. He began the war as a colonel of Maine volunteers, and ultimately was commissioned in the regular army. A veteran of numerous battles, including Gettysburg, Howard sustained a wound at Seven Pines that resulted in the amputation of his right arm.

During his tenure as Bureau commissioner, Howard attempted to follow Congressional directives. In 1865 he established guidelines for Bureau operations: direct relief to freedmen would end as soon as possible to insure that blacks became "self-supporting citizens," and agents adjudicating cases must not transgress Congressional mandates. Bureau personnel were to insure that freedmen negotiated labor contracts and such agreements must be filled out in triplicate and a copy retained by the Bureau. To guarantee that employers paid Negroes, Howard suggested that workers secure a lien on their crops. Agents were to assist blacks in obtaining titles to lands held by the federal government and all non-discriminatory state vagrancy and apprenticeship laws were to be recognized. Finally, he ordered all Bureau aid to paupers ended because it should be handled by state and local governments. Operating within Congressional mandates and orders from Howard, General Gregory began executing Bureau policies in Texas.

Owing to the late date of surrender by Confederate forces in Texas, Gregory's appointment did not become official until September 19, 1865. Howard selected Gregory because he believed the former "radical Abolitionist so fearless" that he could cope with conditions in a state where "lawlessness prevailed, disloyalty ran rampant, and little semblance of government existed."

The first task facing Gregory was the necessity of informing Texans that slavery no longer existed — a fact unknown to many former slaves as late as November 1865. Immediately after arriving at Galveston, he embarked upon a three-week tour to assess conditions in the state and to speak to freedmen and planters about changed relationships resulting from emancipation. Negroes, although free from bondage, must seek employment and planters must deal honestly with them. Blacks and whites must work together harmoniously to bring about the "uniting of capital and labor" to enhance the economic well-being of Texas. To be valid, contracts must be written and witnessed by "two responsible parties" and a copy filed with the local Bureau headquarters. In December 1865, Gregory made a second but more limited tour of the state, covering the area along the Brazos River and in the Colorado Valley. After completing this trek, he finished filling sub-assistant commissioner posts and turned his attention to the task of aiding blacks in their transition to freedom.
Direct relief dispensed by the Bureau in Texas was slight, consisting mainly of rations of food and medicine. Food rations consisted of pork, or fresh beef; flour, bread, and occasional issues of peas, corn, or hominy; coffee and tea. After October 1, 1866, Texas Bureau officials limited rations to those confined in hospitals and asylums. The Bureau established only one hospital in Texas and it remained open for less than a year.  

In Texas, the Bureau exercised a limited and short lived judicial power. The limitations imposed by Congress and Howard were complicated by overlapping jurisdictional claims within the state. Civil courts asserted the right to try all criminal cases, the United States Army of occupation insisted on trying all cases involving soldiers or other federal officials, and the Bureau claimed jurisdiction in cases involving blacks. The Bureau, an anathema to most Texans, increased little in popularity when it attempted to exercise its limited judicial power.  

The procedure followed by Bureau courts resembled that used by justice-of-the-peace courts. The assistant commissioner possessed the power to hear and decide cases, but usually delegated this authority to sub-agents assisted by two civilians, one selected by the plaintiff and one by the defendant. These three-member courts could levy fines up to a maximum of $100 and impose jail sentences up to thirty days. Parties convicted and sentenced by Bureau courts could appeal to the assistant commissioner, the commissioner, the secretary of war, and finally to the President of the United States.  

Because most Bureau agents did not have a working knowledge of the technical points of law, they frequently came "in collision with the civil authorities" and compelled the assistant commissioners to transfer most judicial matters to state courts. Since there was no attempt to develop "any uniform and guiding principles," individual agents "decided cases in accordance with his own peculiar judgement and experience." Moreover, because the Bureau lacked sufficient military strength, "it was impossible" to enforce its decisions, which frequently were "defied" with impunity, and freedmen who used Bureau courts were sometimes "maltreated and murdered." Because of the lack of uniformity in Bureau courts, General Joseph B. Kiddoo, who replaced Gregory in April 1866, ordered all cases involving blacks except those dealing with whippings, beatings, or similar mistreatment tried in state courts. Subsequently, General Charles Griffin, who succeeded Kiddoo on January 4, 1867, ordered "all criminal cases . . . left to civil authorities." Agents were permitted to bring "outrages committed upon freedmen" to the attention of the courts and could serve as advisers to blacks involved in civil cases, but never as judges.  

Bureau judicial power in Texas ended on November 29, 1867, when Fifth District Military Commander Winfield Scott Hancock ordered all Bureau courts to cease operation. His General Orders No. 40 declared "the great principles of American liberty are the lawful inheritance of the
people, and ever should be. The right of trial by jury . . . must be preserved. Free institutions always furnish the strongest inducement to peace and order.”

After this order was issued, civil authorities in Texas were responsible for judicial matters within the state. General Joseph Jones Reynolds, who succeeded Griffin when the latter died of yellow fever on September 22, 1867, protested Hancock’s order, but to no avail. Reynolds claimed that Hancock’s action violated the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867. Hancock disagreed, stating that the Reconstruction Acts gave him the authority to designate the mode for securing peace and order in Texas.

The actions of Kiddoo, Griffin, and Hancock were mistakes. Even though agents lacked legal training and occasionally acted too harshly towards whites, they represented the only hope for justice in legal matters involving black Texans. Sub-assistant commissioners and private citizens believed that civil courts failed to provide justice for blacks and cited several examples where local officials denied fair hearings because they feared reprisals or because they were unsympathetic. According to Robert Smith, a United States district tax commissioner, Red River County grand juries “composed of good men” dared not “indict criminals” whose guilt was common knowledge because to do so meant certain death. Smith added that conditions in other northeastern counties were “the same.”

Sub-Assistant Commissioner DeWitt C. Brown, stationed at Paris, in September 1868 lamented that conditions in his area resembled those reported by Smith. According to Brown, laws in northeast Texas were not executed, freedmen frequently were assaulted and robbed, and civil authorities were “doing nothing” because they were “afraid to make arrests.” Moreover, armed bands of up to sixty men terrorized the counties and threatened to kill any black male who did not have a “certificate of protection” attesting to membership in a Democratic club. Freedmen dared not complain for fear of reprisal and “civil officers neglect[ed] or refuse[d] to act with the Bureau.” The complaints of Smith and Brown were not isolated examples nor were they the words of radicals bent on defaming Texas whites; they were only two of many accounts which cited the failure of the judicial system to protect the interest of black citizens.

Even though the Bureau intervened actively in the affairs of the planters and the freedmen, its success in the area of labor relations, like that in legal matters, amounted to little. With regard to labor relations, the Bureau merely modified a system previously established by the Union Army of occupation commanded by General Granger. In June 1865, he had encouraged blacks to remain with their former masters and to work “under such contracts as could be made for the present time.” They would not be “subsisted in idleness” nor be permitted to congregate near military posts. Furthermore, to travel on highways, Afro-Americans must have passes from their employers. Relief would be extended only to the “destitute” or the ill, and no one capable of performing work would be
so classified. He warned planters that "cruel treatment" and "improper use of authority" would not be tolerated. Thus, although placing the Emancipation Proclamation in effect, Granger took no action to help blacks gain the benefits which should have accompanied freedom.\[^{16}\]

Once negotiated, work contracts were recorded on forms provided by the Army and were enforced strictly. Blacks worked under three types of agreements — for cash; for food, clothing, and shelter; or for a stated portion of the year's crop. When Gregory arrived and the Bureau began supervising labor relations, a contract crisis existed in Texas.

In late 1865, many planters, hostile to the concept of free black labor, refused to contract with freedmen, while many Afro-Americans, distrustful of whites, refused to bargain with landowners. Many planters believed that blacks were lazy and incapable of working without coercion. One reason that blacks refused to come to terms was the persistent rumor that former slaves were to receive the lands belonging to former masters on Christmas Day, 1865. The knowledge that Sea Island, South Carolina, blacks had received land reinforced the rumor. Failure of the federal government to distribute the land at the appointed time in December discredited the rumor. Even though blacks did not receive lands, the possibility that they might hindered contract negotiations. Other considerations, however, were more important in making freedmen hesitant to enter into labor agreements.\[^{17}\]

Fearing that contracts meant a return to slavery, some blacks refused to come to terms with whites. Secondly, dishonesty on the part of planters also hampered Bureau efforts in the area of labor relations. On several occasions they refused to abide by the terms of work agreements, choosing instead to cheat freedmen out of their just share of crops or wages. One of the major problems confronting the Bureau was convincing planters of the necessity of and the mutual benefit inherent in working with blacks to promote the economic revitalization of the state's devastated agricultural economy.\[^{18}\]

Hoping to protect the planters' source of labor and to guarantee that Negroes would not suffer by being lured away from their jobs by false promises of better pay, on May 15, 1866, Kiddoo outlawed enticement of laborers under contract. Persons found guilty of such "dishonorable" practices would be fined not less than one hundred dollars, while those permitting themselves to be seduced would be fined not less than five dollars.\[^{19}\]

Even though committed to strict enforcement of labor contracts when conditions warranted a flexible policy, the Bureau acted accordingly. In June 1866, after heavy spring rains resulted in "the rapid growth of grass" that left cotton crops in a "precarious condition," Kiddoo annulled labor contracts in Trinity County and ordered new ones negotiated and crops replanted. In October, he reminded agents to make certain that planters...
settled their accounts "in a fair and equitable manner.""

Moving beyond Kiddoo's concern for the state's prosperity, Griffin embarked upon a plan designed to procure the highest possible compensation for blacks. Believing that blacks had received very little for their work in both 1865 and 1866, he decided to appoint a bonded commission merchant to sell their crops for "the highest market price" possible. Although the use of a single agent left him open to charges of monopoly, on September 3, 1867, Griffin directed agents to encourage Afro-Americans to consign their crops to the firm of A. Ruttkay and Company to protect them "from loss in the sale of their cotton." Freedmen, rather than being compelled to use the service of Ruttkay and Company, were "simply told" that it was available and that they would receive "the full market price" for their cotton.21

On September 22, 1867, when Griffin died of yellow fever, his plan perished with him. Stating that Afro-Americans "must act for themselves sometime," General Reynolds revoked the commission merchant plan. In addition to his desire to have blacks fend for themselves, Reynolds asserted that nowhere in the law creating the Bureau was there any provision authorizing the use of a commission merchant to sell blacks' crops.22

Although the Bureau failed to eradicate the mistrust between planters and laborers, its policies succeeded in effecting an increase in the number of contracts entered into by the two antagonistic groups. Blacks, desirous of owning land, disliked working for whites, and planters still harbored a belief that free black labor would prove unworkable, but even so, by the spring of 1868 nearly all sections of Texas reported that contract signings had increased. Labor relations under the new order were far from satisfactory, but thanks to the Bureau crops were planted and harvested.23

Although the Bureau failed to resolve agricultural problems, its accomplishments in the area of education had a lasting impact and represented its most significant effort. Freedmen's education ranked at the top of Howard's priorities, and even though Congress initially failed to make provisions for it, he instructed assistant commissioners to coordinate the efforts of volunteer groups working to educate Afro-Americans. Believing that education was the key to eradicating racial prejudice, Howard's concept of a reconstructed South included a system of free public schools for all children. Although the Second Freedmen's Bureau Act provided for limited aid to black education, Howard took steps in this direction even before Congress acted. In 1866 he ordered Kiddoo to use subterfuge, if necessary, to provide school facilities for blacks. Moreover, because congressional mandates forbade expenditures for school buildings, Howard told Kiddoo to erect them and list expenses as "rent or repairs."24

Despite Howard's faith in the efficacy of education and a sincere desire on the part of blacks to learn, opposition to Negro education hindered Bureau efforts in Texas. Whites expressed their opposition
through violence, insult, and disdain. Lingering war passions, dislike of what was perceived as interference in the internal affairs of the state, and the fear that education was the first step to equality for Afro-Americans contributed to white resistance. In Texas, the strongest hostility prevailed in the interior of the state, especially in the northeast where military power was almost nonexistent. Most resistance consisted of ostracizing white teachers and of refusing to sell or rent land and buildings earmarked for educational purposes. In 1866 Kiddoo complained that newspaper editors frequently insinuated that "lady teachers" working with blacks were no better than "'common prostitutes.'" 25

Even though most resistance was passive, violence and intimidation were employed. As late as October 1868, the Bureau reported that schools were absent in Red River County because Negroes believed "no practical good" would result from "agitating" for education. In the same year, John H. Morrison, an agent operating near Palestine, claimed that conditions in his area were similar. Blacks, he lamented, "are very assiduous, but from the prejudice evinced by whites . . . are afraid to start a school." According to him, Afro-Americans in Mount Pleasant had purchased a building and a lot for educational purposes, but were "not allowed" to use them due to white opposition. Other examples of white hostility towards black education included the burning of school buildings in Waco and Circleville. 26

Not all white Texans opposed Afro-American education. Some welcomed it as a new departure that would benefit the entire state. Whites provided financial support, land, and verbal endorsement for Negro education. At Gonzales, Seguin, and Liberty, they donated land for black schools. In 1866, the Texas State Teachers' Convention applauded the concept of black education, but only if it remained under white control. Despite some support from white Texans, most financial aid for black education came from Northern benevolent agencies, especially the American Missionary Association. 27

In addition to cooperating with agencies such as the AMA, the Bureau established and maintained its own schools in Texas. It opened its first one at Galveston in September 1865, and by January 1866, it operated a total of eleven schools that instructed 600 pupils. Besides these "day schools," six "night schools" had an enrollment of 400. An epidemic of cholera in the summer of 1866 temporarily retarded the growth of black education in the state. The problem was exacerbated because most teachers were Northerners who fled Texas to escape the disease. 28

In the summer of 1867, a second epidemic also retarded efforts to enhance Afro-American education. A serious outbreak of yellow fever that year killed 1,134 people in Galveston alone, including Assistant Commissioner Griffin. Once the fever subsided, educational progress resumed and by June 1, 1868, the Bureau was operating forty-one schools with an enrollment of 1,718 students. When the Bureau withdrew from Texas
on June 30, 1870, black school enrollment in the state stood at 6,449 students.29

The Freedmen's Bureau, Northern benevolent societies, and white Texans were not the sole supporters of Afro-American education in Texas. Blacks, through tuition payments and the purchase of land and buildings, advanced their own education. In some areas black churches purchased school sites and buildings and this action, coupled with a $1.50 per month tuition fee paid by each student, enabled Negroes to establish educational facilities. In addition, freedmen, including George T. Ruby, a delegate to the Texas constitutional convention of 1868 and a member of the legislature during Reconstruction, occasionally served as teachers. Black aid to education through financial support and land contributions, as well as supplying teachers, indicated the willingness of freedmen to support educational opportunities.10

In spite of the Bureau's accomplishments in the area of education, it failed to insure that black Texans received the benefits inherent in emancipation. On June 30, 1870, when the Bureau withdrew from the state, few Negroes owned or rented land and most still depended on white planters for survival. However, the fault lay beyond the Bureau — its short, five-year tenure, manpower problems, lack of adequate revenue, opposition from white Texans, and the limitations imposed by Congress and General Howard all prevented the Bureau from doing much to aid ex-slaves.

In Texas, the Bureau possessed only enough military strength to extend its authority over a third of the state and to serve only half of the population. The Bureau drew its personnel from two sources — the United States Army and the state's civilian residents. Most soldiers detailed to the Bureau were members of the Volunteer Reserve Corps, men disabled during the war by the loss of either an arm or a leg. Moreover, since nearly all troops stationed in Texas were infantry rather than cavalry, the herculean task of policing an area "as large as New York and all [of] New England" was complicated by the absence of a speedy and mobile force. In addition, because most agents believed that civilians would use the Bureau status to exploit rather than protect "the interests of the freedmen," few were selected for service. Owing to these difficulties, assistant commissioners assigned to Texas frequently complained of an acute manpower shortage.31

In May 1866, Kiddoo claimed "the withdrawal and muster out" of soldiers "will materially damage the successful operations of the Bureau." Civilians, stated Kiddoo, had no "sympathy" for blacks and volunteered to serve as agents only to "use their position for personal gain" through cooperation with planters. Hence, they could not be used to replace troops recalled from the state. In August 1866, he again complained that the lack of soldiers threatened to undermine the work of the Bureau. In December 1868, Joseph J. Reynolds forwarded several extracts of letters from agents
attesting to insufficient military strength that left the Bureau "powerless" in most areas of the state. During its entire tenure in Texas, the Bureau remained impotent in areas remote from the Gulf Coast.\textsuperscript{12}

The Bureau received its operating funds from two major sources, Congressional appropriations and the sale of abandoned lands. Because Texas contained no abandoned lands and Congress made no direct appropriation for the Bureau until 1867, the Bureau in Texas survived its first two years on supplies received from the Army and a meager income collected from fines. When Congress finally made a direct appropriation, the sum was inadequate to meet the task. Owing to these problems, assistant commissioners in Texas never had sufficient revenue.\textsuperscript{13}

White Texans expressed their hatred and opposition to the Bureau in two basic ways, physical assaults and verbal abuse. In June 1867, an unknown assailant ambushed Major Alfred Manning at Cotton Gin in Freestone County. The would-be assassin failed to kill Manning but did inflict a severe thigh wound that incapacitated the agent for several days. Five months later, another attacker in Freestone County assassinated Captain Charles E. Culver and decapitated his remains with an axe. In April 1868, Captain George T. Eber was shot to death and robbed in Kaufman County. Assaults against Bureau personnel continued until the organization withdrew from Texas. As late as January 1869, a group of whites attempted to murder Captain William Rock at his home in Richmond. Using brass-knuckles, the intruders severely beat Rock and left him to die. Although Rock survived the savage assault, his abilities to function as an agent were impaired.\textsuperscript{14}

In addition to assaults and murders, white Texans bitterly assailed the Bureau and Howard through letters, newspaper editorials, and resolutions passed by conventions. In the state constitutional convention of 1866, Liberty County delegate Ashley Wood Spaight introduced a motion requesting President Johnson to remove the Bureau from Texas. Introduced only six months after the Bureau’s arrival, the resolution declared it to be "absolutely prejudicial to the real interests of the black race." Even though the motion failed, it indicated strong hostility to the Bureau in many areas of the state. On March 24, 1866, the Galveston \textit{Daily News} accused the Bureau of being "totally ignorant of the Negro character" and of pursuing a policy of justice unfair to whites.\textsuperscript{15}

The Bellville \textit{Texas Countryman}, reprinting an editorial that appeared in other Texas papers, offered its readers a satirical "skeleton" of a new Freedmen's Bureau that would cost the federal government "only" $40 million. The August 17, 1867, edition of the \textit{Countryman} suggested that individual blacks be given their own "personal bureau" complete with an "optional looking glass on top," a "private secretary," and "whatever else ... [they] cried for."\textsuperscript{16}

Verbal attacks against General Howard, although infrequent, were
harsh. In April 1869, the San Antonio Express blasted the Commissioner as a man without "administrative talent" unable to make sound judgments and a "timid, indecisive, pious, but untruthful" person surrounded by "survey favorites who bent him as they willed."

In view of the many obstacles it encountered in Texas, the Bureau did well to accomplish the little it did. The limitations imposed by Congress and Howard made it possible to give more than minimal aid to newly freed blacks. Its indefinite status within the Department of War led to problems with the army of occupation and Fifth District Military Commanders. The Bureau not only had to depend on the Army for most of its personnel, but had to contend with orders that overturned its policy decisions. Moreover, on September 22, 1867, when the office of assistant commissioner and the Department of Texas military commander were merged, Bureau goals became subservient to military objectives. Manpower shortages, lack of revenue, and opposition from whites exacerbated problems. Despite all these handicaps, the Bureau advanced the status of ex-slaves and the welfare of the state.

NOTES

*Oliver Otis Howard to Assistant Commissioners, June 14, 1865, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (Record Group 105), National Archives as quoted in William S. McFeely, Yankee Stepfather: General O.O. Howard and the Freedmen (New Haven, 1968), p. 84.


*Ibid.


5Bureau Circular No. 5, May 30, 1865; Bureau Circular No. 11, July 12, 1865; Report of the Commissioner (Serial 1255), p. 58.

6McFeely, Yankee Stepfather, p. 68; Charles William Ramsdell, Reconstruction In Texas (New York, 1910), pp. 72-73; Bureau Circular No. 16, September 19, 1865.

7E.M. Gregory to O.O. Howard, January 31, 1866 (Record Group 105); Lonnie Sinclair, "The Freedmen's Bureau in Texas: the Assistant Commissioners and the Negro," (Unpublished paper presented to the Institute of Southern History, July 22, 1969, Johns Hopkins University), p. 3; Bureau Circular No. 4, December 27, 1865.


Report of the Commissioner (Serial 1255), pp. 22-23; Paul S. Pierce, The Freedmen’s Bureau (Iowa City, 1904), pp. 144-145.

Charles Griffin to O.O. Howard, February 18, 1867 (Record Group 105); Bureau Circular No. 13, May 14, 1866; Bureau General Orders No. 5, February 2, 1867; Sinclair, “The Assistant Commissioners and the Negro,” pp. 4-5, 10-11; Ramdsell, Reconstruction in Texas, pp. 133-134. Kiddoo relieved Gregory in April, 1866, when the latter became a Bureau inspector. Griffin replaced Kiddoo in 1867 when the latter requested removal for reasons of ill health. When Griffin became assistant commissioner, he simultaneously held the position of District Military Commander. The combining of the two positions was initiated by the Department of War for reasons of efficiency. Reynolds became Assistant Commissioner in September 1867, when Griffin died of yellow fever. Joseph B. Kiddoo to O.O. Howard, May 14, 1866; January 25, 1867; Charles Garretson to O.O. Howard, September 15, 1867 (Record Group 105); Report of the Commissioner (Serial 1324), pp. 651-683.


J.J. Reynolds to O.O. Howard, January 24, 1868 (Record Group 105); Report of the Commissioner (Serial 1367), pp. 253, 266.

Robert Smith to Joseph B. Kiddoo, October 30, 1866 (Record Group 105).

Joseph B. Kiddoo to O.O. Howard, June 26, 1866; October 25, 1866; John Mackey, Eli Hawkins, and J.A. Glenn to A. Craig, December 16, 1866; A. Craig to H.A. Ellis, December 17, 1866; Charles T. Rand to H.A. Ellis, December 31, 1866; John H. Morrison to Charles A. Vernon, August 29, 1866; Gregory Barrett, Jr. to Charles A. Vernon, August 31, 1868; C.C. Raymond to Charles A. Vernon, August 31, 1868; DeWitt C. Brown to C.S. Roberts, September 30, 1868 (Record Group 105).

“Granger’s Proclamation,” p. 201; Lincoln’s “Proclamation of Emancipation,” VI, pp. 157-159; U.S. Statutes at Large, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., XII, pp. 1268-1269; Marshall Texas Republican, July 28, 1865.


J.B. Kiddoo to O.O. Howard, August 8, 1866 (Record Group 105).

Bureau Circular No. 14, May 15, 1866.

Bureau Circular No. 17, June 19, 1866; Bureau Circular No. 21, October 1, 1866; Galveston Daily News, June 26, 1866.

Charles Griffin to O.O. Howard, June 12, 17, 1867 (Record Group 105); Bureau General Orders No. 17, October 29, 1867; Sinclair, “The Assistant Commissioners and the Negro,” pp. 14-17.

J.J. Reynolds to O.O. Howard, December 23, 1867 (Record Group 105); Bureau General Orders No. 17, October 29, 1867; Sinclair, “The Assistant Commissioners and the Negro,” pp. 14-17.


22George Shorkley to C.S. Roberts, October 31, 1868; John H. Morrison to Charles A. Vernon, August 29, 1868 (Record Group 105).


27James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1967), p. 47; Carpenter, Sword and Olive Branch, p. 99; E.M. Gregory to O.O. Howard, January 31, 1866; J.B. Kiddoo to O.O. Howard, May 14, 1866, August 8, 1866; Charles T. Rand to Henry A. Ellis, December 31, 1866; Charles Griffin to O.O. Howard, February 12, 1867; J.J. Reynolds to O.O. Howard, December 1, 1868 (Record Group 105).

28Carpenter, Sword and Olive Branch, pp. 99, 128; J.B. Kiddoo to O.O. Howard, August 8, 1866; J.J. Reynolds to O.O. Howard, December 1, 1868 (Record Group 105).


30Marshall Texas Republican, June 29, 1867, August 14, 1868; San Antonio Express, November 30, 1867; Galveston Daily News, December 3, 1867, January 12, 17, 1869; Charles Griffin to O.O. Howard, July 13, 1867 (Record Group 105).


32Bellville Texas Countryman, August 17, 1867.

33San Antonio Express, April 9, 1869.