Anthony Butler: A Flawed Diplomat

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Anthony Wayne Butler tried desperately to shape the destiny of both the United States and pre-revolutionary Texas. As the American charge d'affaires to Mexico during the Andrew Jackson administration, Butler, driven by contravening motives of duty to himself and duty to the country, doggedly pursued one of Old Hickory's primary diplomatic objectives — the acquisition of Texas from the Republic of Mexico. With his political and financial future tied to the success of the Texas initiative, Butler worked zealously and at times unscrupulously to acquire the land west of the Sabine River. Despite his untiring efforts, Butler's mission ended in failure, a failure resulting as much from his ambition and ego as from the political instability of the Mexican Republic.

Butler was born in South Carolina in 1787 (the exact date of his birth is unknown), and he spent his life scrambling for prestige and position. Before his appointment as American envoy to Mexico, the ambitious Butler married the sister of politically influential John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, attained the rank of colonel during the War of 1812, served as a Jeffersonian Republican in the legislatures of Kentucky (1818-1820) and Mississippi (1826-1828), and launched a successful slave “rental” business. It was as a businessman that Colonel Butler made his first trip to Texas in 1828 to collect payment for the use of some of his slaves from Stephen F. Austin. Butler not only settled his business with Austin, but also traveled extensively throughout Texas, keeping copious notes on the region’s geography, politics, and precarious ties to Mexico. He left Texas convinced that its acquisition should be an American diplomatic priority.

Returning to his home in Mississippi in 1829, Butler was pleased to learn that his friend Andrew Jackson had been elected president. Butler had served under Jackson at the Battle of New Orleans and he believed that his friend would be receptive to ideas concerning the acquisition of Texas. Eager to share these ideas with Jackson, and perhaps intending to lobby for a political appointment at the same time, Butler set out that summer for Washington, D.C. He reached the nation’s capital in early August and quickly arranged a meeting with Jackson’s secretary of state, Martin Van Buren. During his interview with Van Buren, Butler briefly outlined his expansionist views and gave the secretary a copy of his Texas notes to give to the president.

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In these notes Butler forcefully argued his belief that future American security depended heavily on the acquisition of Texas. He maintained that the boundary between the United States and Mexico, the Sabine River, was inadequate. In his opinion, a foreign nation was too close to the important trading center at New Orleans, and that the Sabine failed to provide a formidable enough natural barrier between the Mexican and American republics. Moreover, Butler feared that under Mexico's tenuous control the potentially rich and strategically located Texas presented tempting opportunities for the extension of Great Britain's influence in North America. British ascendancy in the region could permanently block further American expansion in the West, thus limiting American economic and territorial growth. Only by acquiring Texas could the United States effectively secure, in Butler's words, the "weakest and least defensible" of its borders and, at the same time, assure American expansion to the Pacific. And as far as Butler was concerned, only Mexico stood in the way.  

Butler expressed confidence that the Republic of Mexico — rent with factional interests and still locked in a struggle for independence with Spain — could be persuaded to sell Texas. He reasoned that a combination of elements, particularly the increasing influx of independent American pioneers to Texas and Mexico's internal instability and virtual bankruptcy eventually would convince Mexican leaders to swallow their pride and accept a reasonable offer from the United States. Arguing that the separation of Texas from Mexico was inevitable, Butler conjectured that the Mexican government must already realize this and would be eager to capitalize on an American proposition of this kind before the fact. Butler concluded his arguments to Jackson by pointing out the political benefits of obtaining Texas: "The people of the South and particularly the West," he wrote, "feel an interest on this subject so deep, so engrossing, as to secure for that man who may accomplish the recovery of Texas, their thanks, their confidence, and their gratitude ...."

Butler's notes to Jackson could not have arrived at the White House at a more opportune time, nor could they have had a greater impact on the president. Unknown to Butler, his notes reached Jackson at a time when the new administration was busy formulating a Mexican policy. Though Jackson envisioned the United States stretching from Florida to California, he had stated publicly during the 1820 controversy over the Adams-Onis Treaty that Texas was not essential to the protection of the American western frontier. Butler's ideas, together with the passage of some nine years, changed Jackson's mind. Only a day after reading Butler's persuasive Texas arguments, he informed Secretary of State Van Buren that the acquisition of Texas was to be a goal of the administration. In several
hastily-prepared notes to Van Buren, Jackson outlined both his motives for wanting to acquire Texas and the inducements to be offered Mexico for the region. For the most part, these notes merely reiterated Butler’s earlier beliefs that the acquisition of Texas would provide the United States with a more secure western border and that the exchange would benefit Mexico by relieving that country of a potentially troublesome territory. Jackson revealed to Van Buren that he would be willing to pay the Mexican government as much as $5 million for an unencumbered Texas, with a western border running roughly from the Gulf of Mexico north along the Nueces River to its source and then due north to the forty-second degree, north latitude, the American boundary established by the Transcontinental treaty. Butler’s arguments had a significant impact on the president’s Texas policy and on the timing of his Texas initiative.

Van Buren acted swiftly. He organized Jackson’s scribbled notes and disjointed reflections on Texas into a diplomatic dispatch. On August 25, 1829, Van Buren sent this dispatch by special messenger to Joel R. Poinsett, the American charge de'affaires in Mexico. The messenger was none other than Colonel Anthony Butler. Before Butler reached Mexico City, however, Poinsett, who himself had worked unsuccessfully to obtain Texas for the administration of John Quincy Adams, had been recalled to Washington at the request of the Mexican government. Jackson now faced a worrisome dilemma. He could either recall Butler from his mission, thus temporarily postponing his administration’s attempt to purchase Texas, or he could replace Poinsett with Butler, though he believed him to be too hot-headed for delicate negotiations. Jackson found both choices distasteful. But with the Democratic press clamoring for the “reacquisition” of Texas and with the continuing immigration of Americans to Texas further straining relations with Mexico, Jackson felt compelled to choose the latter course — the appointment of Butler as charge d’affaires to Mexico. The exigencies of politics and diplomacy made delay in the opening of Texas negotiations unthinkable. Once the decision to appoint Butler was made, Jackson decided to personally guide him in his negotiations with Mexico. Jackson hoped that he could keep a firm rein on Butler and at the same time maintain control of the Texas negotiations.

On October 16, 1829, the State Department sent Butler word of his appointment along with “official instructions,” but his true instructions came from the president himself. In a letter marked “strictly confidential,” dated October 10, 1829, Jackson instructed him to work toward two objectives: Mexican ratification of a treaty of commerce and the acquisition of Texas. The president’s dispatch, which Butler labeled a “remarkable communication,” clearly reflected the intensity of Jackson’s obsession for obtaining Texas and
intimated that deviousness was not to be ruled out as a means to promote policy. Jackson informed his new envoy to offer Mexico up to $5 million for the cession of territory lying between the Nueces and Sabine rivers. If a Nueces boundary was unacceptable, then Butler was to offer smaller increments of that amount for borders farther to the east. Once the money changed hands, Jackson admitted that he did not care in whose pocket it ended up or how it was spent. He even implied that part of the sum could be used to appeal to the self-interests of Mexican government officials, writing: "I scarcely ever knew a Spaniard who was not the slave of avarice [sic], and it is not improbable that this weakness may be worth a great deal to us, in this case." Jackson wanted no time lost in opening the Texas talks because each day the Republic of Mexico grew more suspicious of the relationship between the American government and the Texans. Jackson feared that if the Texans pushed for independence, then Mexico would hold the United States accountable for their actions. Jackson closed his message to Butler, cautioning: "Let a listening ear, a silent tongue, and a steadfast heart, the three jewels of wisdom, guard every advance which you make on the subject of Texas."

Jackson's instructions to Butler were ill-conceived and open to misinterpretation. Apparently Jackson wanted to use the dispatch to outline the parameters in which Butler was to work and to suggest a possible Texas strategy, but instead his tone convinced the envoy that there were to be no constraints to his negotiations. Moreover, several readings of the message persuaded Butler that the White House was more interested in results than in methods. Aware that the acquisition of Texas could further his own career, Butler used any tactic that promised success — regardless of ethical considerations. After all, he surmised, Jackson's note seemed to sanction everything from legitimate diplomacy to bribery.

Butler arrived at his post in Mexico City in late 1829 and found the capital torn by revolution. Before he had an opportunity to gauge Mexican attitudes toward Texas, his mission was dealt two serious setbacks. First, on January 9, 1830, El Sol, the leading conservative newspaper in the country, ran an editorial revealing Butler's intentions in Mexico. The paper lashed out at the American goal to acquire Texas and labeled any such purchase attempt an insult and a disgrace to the proud people of Mexico. Second, Manual de Mier y Teran, the Mexican commander sent to Texas in 1828 to evaluate conditions there, published his long-awaited report. In this report Teran concluded that the Americans living in Texas were a dangerous threat to Mexican sovereignty over the area and that the Jackson administration would stop at nothing to obtain the land west of the Sabine. He recommended a number of reforms in Texas, all aimed
at tightening Mexican control and restricting further American immigration. With the United States the subject of such resentment and scorn, Butler decided not to push immediately for the purchase of Texas.\textsuperscript{15}

Though Butler advised delaying the opening of negotiations, Jackson preached immediate action. Intelligence reports filtering into Washington indicated that a “project” was under foot by American adventurers — presumably led by Sam Houston — with the goal to foment revolution in Texas to sever the province from Mexico. In several dispatches written in 1830 and 1831, Jackson informed Butler of this purported plot and vowed to do everything in his power to foil the shadowy plan. Jackson realized, however, that constitutional limitations, together with sketchy and unreliable information on the details of the plot, made preventive measures difficult. He also feared that any revolt in Texas would be blamed on American government machinations and would preclude indefinitely the peaceful acquisition of the province. With this in mind Jackson suggested that Butler inform the Mexican government of the rumored plan, then offer to purchase Texas. Jackson believed that confronted with the option of either suppressing a revolt in Texas or accepting cash for the transfer of the burdensome territory, the Mexican government would choose the money.\textsuperscript{16}

Jackson’s call for action was not ignored. Butler indirectly broached the subject of Texas with the government of Anastasio Bustamante on October 6, 1831. Meeting with the Mexican minister of foreign affairs, Butler discreetly mentioned the purchase offer. The Mexican minister abruptly rejected it. His reason for not entertaining the offer was that the Mexican federal government held no national domain and exercised no power of transfer over Mexican territory. The individual states shaped Mexican land policy, emphasized the foreign minister, and only they had the power of alienation. As long as Mexico continued to operate as a federal republic under the Constitution of 1824, the obstacles to the American acquisition of Texas appeared insurmountable. In addition, Butler realized that popular sentiment in Mexico was so adamantly opposed to the transfer of Texas that the Bustamante government could not consider the offer for fear of sparking a revolt. Convinced that any further discussions would be counterproductive, Butler dropped the subject and chose instead to bide his time.\textsuperscript{17}

Butler’s inaction did not please the president. Jackson continued to receive reports of a Texas revolt in the planning and in 1932 he again urged immediate action to stem the rumored uprising. Once again Butler responded. On July 2 and 10, 1832, Butler met with Lucas Alaman, the retired Mexican foreign minister, but still the guiding spirit in the Foreign Office, to discuss the boundary issue.
Their sessions were cordial but unproductive. Alaman rejected the offer for the purchase of Texas while insisting that a treaty of limits agreeing to the Sabine boundary be approved. Butler, however, argued that the Neches River, some fifty miles west of the Sabine, was the border. Having no instructions on this point, he contended that both the Neches and the Sabine emptied into Lake Sabine, making the former the western tributary of the latter. This reasoning led him to conclude that the west bank of the Sabine, referred to in the Adams-Onis Treaty as the western boundary of Louisiana, was actually a reference to the west bank of the Neches. Since the boundary claims of both countries were based on the Adams-Onis Treaty, this fundamental disagreement posed potential problems. Unable to reach a settlement, both agreed to refer the thorny question to a boundary commission. The inability of the two diplomats to agree on the presumably simple boundary question foreshadowed rough times ahead for the more complex Texas discussion.18

Though Butler had been rebuffed, he left these meetings outwardly confident that the goal of obtaining Texas was possible. Even after the Bustamante government fell in late 1832 and Santa Anna organized a new cabinet, Butler’s confidence remained apparently unshaken. He conceded that although such government changes might delay the American acquisition of Texas, they would never defeat it. He vowed to Jackson in early 1833: “I will succeed in uniting Texas to our country before I am done with the subject or I will forfeit my hand.”19 Butler’s buoyant optimism, however, was only a facade intended to placate Jackson’s burning desire for Texas. Inwardly he was aware that he had been in Mexico for three years and had made little progress toward his goal. He also realized that Jackson, evidenced by his communications, was growing increasingly impatient. Fearing a possible termination of his appointment if success continued to elude him, Butler decided that bolder actions were justified.

In 1833 Butler scrapped the slow and uncertain Texas negotiations and instead advocated three separate schemes to gain the territory. For the first time since his appointment, Butler, not Jackson, attempted to shape policy pertaining to Texas. Much to Jackson’s chagrin, his once tight rein on Butler had been loosened.

Wasting no time, Butler broached his first plan to Jackson in February. He suggested that the United States float a sizable loan to the bankrupt Mexican government, with Texas as security. He assured Jackson that Mexico’s instability would cause her to default on the repayment, resulting in the American acquisition of Texas as provided in the terms of the loan.20 Jackson received this suggestion in March, but never approved it; he had other matters on his mind. Shortly before Butler’s dispatch reached the White House, Jackson had received a letter from his friend in Texas, Sam Houston, inform-
ing him that Texas was soon going to petition the Mexican government for separate statehood. Fearing such a petition would be summarily rejected and that such a rejection would spark a revolt, Jackson instructed Butler to suspend all negotiations for Texas by April.21

Jackson's order killed the loan scheme, but it awakened Butler to the possibility of yet another plan for acquiring Texas. Hoping to take advantage of the undefined boundary between Mexico and the United States as well as the Texas petition for statehood, Butler proposed that the United States occupy eastern Texas to the Neches River — the American claim — and then wait. Likening this move to President James Monroe's occupation of East Florida, Butler believed that such forceful action would either make the Mexican government more amenable to negotiations or else provoke war between the two countries. Either way, the United States was sure to win Texas. Moreover, American troops stationed along the Neches River would be in an excellent position to provide support to the Texas insurgents should an uprising occur. Despite Butler's impassioned plea for decisive action, Jackson flatly rejected the plan as irresponsible and impolitic. Jackson was unwilling to employ force and aggressive actions as a means of achieving American territorial goals.22

Though Butler preferred a more forceful tack with Mexico, Jackson's displeasure forced him to reformulate his Texas strategy. This led to his third Texas plan, a plan that was much less direct than his previous two and at the same time more conniving. On October 28, 1833, Butler relayed to the president the outlines of his "foolproof" scheme. Butler revealed that he had been approached by a leading Mexican national who had a great deal of influence over Santa Anna. This unnamed source informed Butler that Texas could be acquired if the American government were willing to pay high-ranking government officials sums varying from $3,000 to $500,000. The names of these officials, however, were not revealed. Remembering that Jackson had instructed him to use the money at his own discretion, Butler agreed to these terms provided the cession of Texas was guaranteed.

Obviously aware of the immorality of this bribery, Butler defended his action by rationalizing that such methods were common in Mexican business and politics. Sharing the racial and ethnocentric views common to most Americans at that time, he concluded that the Mexican overture "developes [sic] once the character of these people, selfish, corrupt, utterly unprincipled. Any of them may be successfully appealed to through their cupidity."23 Jackson had expressed the same sentiments to Butler four years earlier.

Butler at last believed Texas to be within his grasp. Indeed, all that stood in the way of this transfer were two formalities: firming
up the details of the transaction and obtaining Jackson's approval. Neither would present problems, thought the confident Butler.

Jackson's response soon shattered this confidence. He answered Butler's letter immediately, chiding him for his failure to put such sensitive and damning information in cipher and berating him for grossly misinterpreting his original instructions. His dander up, Jackson especially resented Butler's intimations that unethical practices such as bribery had been sanctioned by the White House. Attempting to set the record straight and perhaps even to vindicate his own reputation for the sake of posterity, Jackson rewrote his instructions to Butler and clarified his own intent. Jackson stated rather pointedly that the $5 million was to be used only as payment to Mexico for the cession of an unencumbered Texas. According to him, bribery was never considered, nor could it be condoned. He ended his letter by admonishing Butler:

...all the United States is interested in is an unincumbered [sic] cession, not how Mexico applies the consideration. Therefore I repeat that the best means to secure this object is left to your discretion — but I admonish you to give these shrewd fellows no room to charge you with tampering with their officers to obtain the cession thro [sic] corruption ... let us have a boundary [sic] without the imputation of corruption, and I will hail you welcome with it here — none else.24

Despite Jackson's apparent contempt for Butler and his unethical plans, he allowed him to remain at his post.

Butler considered Jackson's reprimand to be a betrayal of his former instructions. He assured Jackson that success in obtaining Texas peacefully could only be guaranteed through "bribery or by presents." He reminded Jackson that only two years before his instructions from the White House had mentioned that the disbursement of the purchase money was "a matter of no consequence to the government." Butler interpreted this statement to mean that he would have a free hand in negotiating for Texas. For some inexplicable reason, Butler concluded, Jackson had changed his mind.25 Butler also repeated his contention that the only viable option to "bribery and corruption" was bold action in eastern Texas: "If you will withdraw me from this place and make the movement to possess that part of Texas which is ours [west to the Neches], placing me at the head of the country to be occupied, I will pledge my head that we have all we desire in less than six months...."26 Jackson refused to agree to these tactics and instead instructed Butler to drop the Texas talks and to concentrate on the formalization of a boundary agreement with Mexico. Frustrated and bewildered, Butler hoped to salvage his Texas mission and requested a leave of absence on July 1, 1834.27 He wanted to return to Washington and explain his plans personally to Jackson. The leave was granted, and after completing
boundary discussions with the Mexican government, Butler left for the American capital on April 29, 1835, almost a year after he had asked for a leave.

Butler arrived in Washington in June, and during his one-month stay had meetings with Jackson and Secretary of State John Forsyth.²⁸ Butler argued passionately for his “bribery” scheme and even submitted a written report on its origin and details. In this report he revealed that Don Ignacio Hernandez, a Catholic priest and the father confessor to Santa Anna’s sister, was to aid him in negotiating for Texas. In fact, Butler included in his report a note from Hernandez which stated: “I have already ascertained the opinions of all the parties whose influence it will be necessary to conciliate and assure you that all difficulties are removed.” According to Butler, the priest was “the manager of all the secret negotiations of the palace,” and his word could be trusted. Butler concluded his report by appealing to Jackson’s expansionist sentiment: “... the treaty which gives us Texas would only be the first of a series which must at last give us dominion over the whole of that tract of territory known as New Mexico and the upper and lower California...”²⁹ Expediency, not morality, seemed to be Butler’s overriding concern, and all the while his unmistakable conclusion was that Texas was at last obtainable.

Butler later claimed that in his private talks with the president, Jackson had agreed to the bribery plan, but had instructed him to “settle it with Mr. Forsyth and manage the affair as you please but do not let me know it.” In addition, Jackson, according to Butler, “voluntarily promised” him the governorship of Texas should he succeed in acquiring the territory. And finally, Jackson instructed Butler to return to his Mexico City post, assuring him that while he could remain there for “as long as was necessary” to complete the Texas talks, time was of the essence.

His faith in Jackson renewed, and eager to consummate the deal for Texas, Butler looked forward to returning to Mexico. The night before he was to leave Washington he received his official instructions from Forsyth, but in his haste did not bother to read them. He assumed that these instructions merely reiterated what had already been agreed upon in his talks with Jackson.³⁰ His assumption proved to be wrong.

Butler left Washington in July, 1835, choosing to travel to Mexico at a leisurely pace along a slow, overland route that took him through Texas. He arrived in Mexico in November, at which time he unpacked and read his official instructions for the first time. He was shocked to discover that Secretary Forsyth’s instructions forbade him from using “equivocal” methods to obtain Texas and stipulated that all Texas negotiations be terminated by the time Congress convened in
December. Obviously Jackson had had second thoughts about sanctioning Butler's unethical plan and as a result revoked his promise of support. With less than a month to work for Texas, an enraged Butler fired off a dispatch to Jackson, asking him if this timetable were to be adhered to. If it proved to be, the testy envoy had decided to resign his post, concluding that the December termination date and Jackson’s duplicity made his job impossible and his official mission no longer tolerable. Jackson never answered Butler’s dispatch because in December, shortly after the Texas revolution began, the Mexican government demanded Butler’s recall. His slow return through Texas had convinced Mexican government officials that he had helped to foment the revolt east of the Rio Grande. Eager to replace the troublesome Butler, Jackson quickly complied with the Mexican demand. On March 26, 1836, Powhatan Ellis replaced Butler as charge d’affaires to the Republic of Mexico, bringing the South Carolinian’s Mexican mission to a disappointing close.

Anthony Butler’s six-year mission to acquire Texas for the United States ended in failure, frustration, and bitter recrimination. The reasons for his lack of success were threefold. First, Jackson’s misguided and naive attempts at guiding the negotiations from the White House while unapprised of the anti-American sentiment in Mexico, led Butler to initiate Texas negotiations at a time when success was all but impossible. Moreover, the contradictory signals received from Jackson concerning the acceptability of various diplomatic tactics kept Butler constantly off-balance in his talks with Mexican government officials and uncertain as to Jackson’s true wishes.

Second, Butler’s ambition, motives of personal aggrandizement and lack of diplomatic experience were partly to blame, for the failure of the mission. Indeed, evidence shows that while charge to Mexico, Butler also worked as an agent for both the Arkansas and Texas Land Company and the Trinity Land Company, attempting to secure Mexican recognition of their grants in Texas. Had the envoy been successful in this and in negotiating the transfer of Texas to the United States, he stood to receive a total of one million acres of Texas land for his efforts. In addition, Butler hoped to use the successful completion of his mission as a springboard to other appointments — possibly even the governorship of Texas as Jackson had once promised. With his financial and professional future depending on the outcome of his diplomatic assignment, it is no wonder that Butler overzealously pursued the goals of the Jackson administration. To have even had a real chance of success, the Mexican negotiations required the subtle and deft touch of an experienced career diplomat, not the inexperienced efforts of a self-centered zealot.

The third and perhaps the most important reason for Butler’s failure with Mexico itself. With or without bribery, the American goal
to acquire Texas peacefully from Mexico was nearly impossible. Mexican pride, hostile public opinion against such a transfer, constitutional obstacles, and persistent governmental instability prevented the Mexican government from seriously considering the American offer. As rumors circulated in Mexico City charging the United States with conspiring to grab the land west of the Sabine, Texas became a symbol to the Mexican people of their government’s willingness to resist American aggression and expansion. Almost certainly, a government that would have ceded Texas to the United States would have been overthrown. That Butler did not realize this and thus inform Jackson of the futility of negotiating for Texas was perhaps the major failure of his mission, for, in the final analysis, his continued attempts to seek the unobtainable only widened the political and philosophical rift between the United States and Mexico.

NOTES

1 Anthony Butler has not been the subject of a full biography, but a good biographical sketch can be found in Robert A. Carter, Jr., “Anthony Butler and His Mission to Mexico,” (M.A. Thesis, The University of Texas, 1952), pp. 1-15.


5 “Notes on Texas,” August 11, 1829, Van Buren Papers.

6 “Notes on Texas,” August 11, 1829, Van Buren Papers.

7 Jackson to James Monroe, June 20, 1820, and Jackson to John C. Calhoun, December 21, 1820, in John Spencer Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson (6 vols.; Washington), 3, 28; 35.

8 Jackson to Van Buren, August 12, 13, 15, 1829, Van Buren Papers; “Notes on Poinsett’s Instructions,” Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Jackson, 4, 58-59.

9 Van Buren to Joel R. Poinsett, August 25, 1829, Van Buren Papers; Van Buren to Poinsett, October 16 and 17, 1829, House Executive Documents, No. 351 (25 Congress, 2 Session), serial set 332.

10 Perhaps the best example of the press’s advocacy for Texas can be found in Thomas Hart Benton’s “Americanus” and “LaSalle” articles appearing in the St. Louis Beacon, August 1 and 8, September 7, 10, 14, 17, 21, 24, and 28, and October 28, 1829. See also United States Telegraph, November 12, 1829, and Niles National Register, September 19, 1829, p. 49; October 3, 1829, p. 87; and October 24, 1829, p. 137.

11 Jackson to Butler, October 10, 1829, Anthony Butler Papers, Eugene Barker Texas History Center, Austin.

12 Van Buren to Butler, October 15, 1829, House Executive Documents, No. 351 (25 Cong., 2 Session), serial set 332.

13 Jackson to Butler, October 10, 1829, Butler Papers. Jackson reiterated his desire for Texas only nine days later, Jackson to Butler, October 19, 1829, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Jackson, 4, 82.
Butler to Van Buren, January 5, 1830, Butler Papers; Butler to Van Buren, January 10, 1830, House Executive Documents, No. 351 (25 Cong., 2 Session), serial set 332.


Jackson to Butler, March 23, October 7, 1830, and February 15, August 24, 1831, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Jackson, 4; 129-130, 183-184, 243-245, 335-336. Jackson first heard of the purported plot from Dr. Robert Mayo, see Mayo to Jackson, December 2, 1830, in Robert Mayo, Political Sketches of Eight Years in Washington (Baltimore, 1839), 104-108.

Butler to Jackson, October 6, 1831, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Jackson, 4; 354.

The minutes of Butler’s two official discussions with Alaman can be found in Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 8; 252-255. Butler indicated as early as 1829 that he considered the Neches to be the proper border between Mexico and the United States, see “Notes on Texas,” August 11, 1829, Van Buren Papers.

Butler to Jackson, January 2, 1833, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Jackson, 5; 2. See also Butler to Jackson, August 30, 1832, Andrew Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Butler to Jackson, February 10, 1833, Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 8; 258-260.

Houston to Jackson, February 13, 1833, Amelia Williams and Eugene C. Barker (eds.), Writings of Sam Houston, 1833-1863 (8 vols., Austin), 1; 274-275.

Butler to Jackson, September 26, October 2, 1833, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Jackson, 5; 210, 214-216.

Butler to Jackson, October 28, 1833, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Jackson, 5; 219-220; “Notes for Benton,” [n.d.], Butler Papers.

Jackson to Butler, November 27, 1833, Butler Papers.

Butler to Jackson, February 6, 1834, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Jackson, 5; 244-246.

Butler to Jackson, March 7, 1834, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Jackson, 5; 249-250.

Butler to Jackson, July 28, 1843, and Butler to Poinsett, July 8, 1846, Butler Papers. See also Butler to Louis McLane, July 1, 1834, Despatches from United States Ministers to Mexico, 1823-1906, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. and Butler to Jackson 2, 1834, Jackson Papers.

Washington Globe, June 22, 1835.

Butler to Forsyth, June 17, 1835, Despatches from the United States Ministers to Mexico, 1823-1906, Record Group 59, For the Hernandez quote see Hernandez to Butler, March 21, 1835, Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 8; 293.

Butler to Jackson, July 28, 1843, and Butler to Poinsett, July 8, 1846, Butler Papers.

Butler to Jackson, November 28, 1835, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Jackson, 5; 375-377.

Forsyth to Butler, December 16, 1835, Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 8; 37; Butler to Jose Monasterio, March 26, 1836, Butler Papers.

For information on Butler’s dealings with the two land companies, see James Prentiss to Butler, July 17, 27, 1835, and John C. Beales to Butler, June 4, 1833, Butler Papers. See also Eugene C. Barker, “The Private Papers of Anthony Butler,” The Nation, 92 (June 15, 1911), pp. 600-601.