Controlling the Workers: The Galveston Dock Workers' Strike of 1920 and its Impact on Labor Relations in Texas

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On March 3, 1920, after months of futile negotiations with coastwise shipping companies, sixteen hundred coastwise longshoremen in Galveston struck the Morgan and Mallory steamship lines. Striking as part of nationwide walkout, they demanded an hourly wage hike from $.60 to $.80 for straight time and from $.90 to $1.20 for overtime. Also, they wanted closed shop employment practices to continue on the Galveston docks, so only members of the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) would be permitted to work.¹

The strike, however, focused other issues, specifically the role that unions would play in the modernization of the Texas economy. The state’s businessmen believed that a militant, class conscious, and organized labor force would retard economic progress. As a group of Vernon, Texas, businessmen put it: “Although we are friends of the laboring man, self preservation and salvation from ruin demand that walking delegates and agitators of all kinds be prevented from making a ‘Russia’ out of America.”² In a somewhat more sophisticated vein, T.H. Coffee, president of the Vernon Chamber of Commerce, stated that his organization only wanted to “secure maximum production in labor and eliminate all possible waste as the only means of ... stabilizing conditions throughout the country.”³ For Vernon’s leaders — and their views paralleled those of businessmen throughout Texas — unions had to be controlled, their activities restricted.

During the period immediately following World War I, Texas businessmen went about the work of affirming class relationships so that owners and managers could dominate labor effectively. Together with politicians, they established a work setting in which capitalist enterprises would secure maximum productivity from their workers without facing the limits imposed by slowdowns, strikes, or negotiations with unions.⁴ Their aims included the establishment of open-shop policy wherever unions attempted to organize labor. Although many work stoppages and walkouts occurred in Texas both immediately before and after World War I, one of the most important was the Galveston Dock Workers Strike of 1920. This case illustrates the brutal willingness of private businessmen to ally with the state to create open-shop working conditions, or, in other words, an atmosphere in which only a weak labor opposition would exist.

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The Galveston City Commission generally sympathized with the strikers and did not interfere with the local's activities. In fact, city officials responded favorably to working class needs and interests. The commissioners had been elected in 1919 as members of the "City Party," whose platform advocated the abolition of sewer taxes, the equalization of all property value assessments, and the raising of taxes on property owned by the Galveston Wharf Company. Despite vigorous opposition from such business groups as the Young Men's Progressive League, the Galveston Commercial Association, and the Galveston Merchants' Association, the city's voters approved these reforms in a referendum election held in May 1920 — two months after the beginning of the Dock Workers Strike.

Thus, in the midst of the 1920 strike, Galveston capitalists felt increasingly hard pressed by labor groups in the city and by a city government unsympathetic to their needs. They were displeased with the benevolent attitude that the city commissioners had displayed toward the city's workers. They were also upset by the municipal government's intention to undertake tax reform at their expense. Their attitudes and their actions began to harden within a few days following the referendum.

On May 11, a brief flurry of violence affected the strike and stirred business' resolve. Someone fired gunshots at a group of railroad cars transporting strike-breakers from the Mallory Docks to Houston. Although no one was harmed seriously and although it was never proven that striking workers had fired the shots, the Galveston business community exploited the incident to exaggerate the labor troubles in Galveston. Speaking on behalf of the Galveston business community, the Galveston Daily News editorialized: "It is sincerely to be hoped that conservative leaders will step into the breach and curb the intemperate actions of radicals, prevent possible serious riots, and save their organization from possible blemish ... There have been numerous affrays between pickets and strikebreakers and two near riots. The protection afforded by the police has been almost a nullity."

On May 13, Mayor H.O. Sappington requested the deployment of Texas Rangers to protect non-union workers on the docks. The Rangers more than fulfilled this function, preventing union proselytizing as well as interference. On one occasion, armed Rangers drew their pistols and dispersed two union organizers attempting to distribute union literature at a strikebreakers' encampment. With the Rangers in firm control, tranquility soon prevailed on the Galveston waterfront. On May 20, Ranger Captain R.W. Aldrich reported to Governor William Hobby that "quiet orderliness" prevailed on the docks and that no striking dockworkers were attempting to "subvert" working employees.
Galveston businessmen, however, were less concerned about the safety of the strikebreakers than they were fearful that local shipping companies would move to other ports. On May 12, the News had warned of the potential calamity that would follow if the Mallory Line relocated: “There will go with it many thousands of dollars paid out in salaries and other disbursements. It is generally known that other ports are making strong bids for the Mallory Line’s business, and it is now known that the Mallory Line officials are thoroughly dissatisfied with Galveston affairs.”

A few days later, events began to confirm Galvestonians’ concern. Mallory announced the relocation of its headquarters and business to Port Arthur, and the Morgan Line leaked word of a possible move to New Orleans. J.B. Dennison, vice president and general manager of the Mallory Line, announced:

> The company has been forced to seek another port as its Texas terminal due to the refusal of the strikers to accept the wage scale offered them and their interference with other workers . . . For this reason, we have moved our offices to Port Arthur, where we have found the facilities excellent. Our vessels are being loaded and discharged with dispatch and we are pleased with the results obtained.

Later under questioning Dennison refused to state that the move was only temporary. On May 28, the impact of Mallory’s decision became clear when 200 freight-filled rail cars were diverted from Galveston to Port Arthur, “because of the longshoremen’s strike” and because of the availability in Port Arthur of “facilities for loading freight on ships of the Mallory Steamship Company.”

To make matters worse, Houston businessmen were actively soliciting Mallory to build a terminal on the city’s Ship Channel. In fact, they tendered such an offer at a May 31 meeting which included representatives from the Houston Young Men’s Business League, the Salesmanship Club, the Houston Advertising Association, the Automobile Association of South Texas, and the Retail Merchants Association. Assured by B.C. Allin, director of the Port of Houston, that “The Port can easily care for the Mallory Line,” the meeting approved a resolution urging the issuance of bonds to provide proper facilities for the Mallory Company. One participant in the meeting echoed a view which surely must have rattled the nerves of Galveston businessmen: “The trouble with Galveston,” he declared, “is that it is a longshoremen’s town, is run by longshoremen, and for that reason no change in the present conditions [there] can be expected in the near future.” Others announced the expectation that acquisition of the Mallory Line would make Houston into a first-class world port, something Houstonians had wanted ever since they had initiated the ship channel project. Such sentiments coming from their greatest rival made Galveston’s businessmen sweat.
Throughout June 1920, the *Galveston Daily News* complained that striking longshoremen were restricting traffic at the Port of Galveston. Although the Mallory Line had attempted to use non-union workers to unload coastwise ships, the *News* pointed out that only two such vessels were unloaded between March 19 and June 6. Forty-two shipments of cargo normally would have been handled during that period. Similarly, the Galveston paper noted, longshoremen on the Morgan Docks should have unloaded sixty-six ships; by June 6, only four ships had been unloaded. Also, according to the *News*, Galveston’s grain elevators were full and awaiting coastwise shipment, while 2600 carloads of wheat were stalled in shipyards because no one would handle them.¹⁸

Capitalists in Galveston and throughout the state used these statistics to press for state intervention on their behalf. In Houston H.C. Engle, spokesperson for the local Chamber of Commerce, asserted: “The situation has become serious and something should be done. We should have whatever steps are necessary to move the goods now in Galveston, belonging to Houston shippers, and if protection cannot be had in Galveston, it can be obtained from the state or Federal government ...”¹⁹ From Dallas, T.E. Jackson, president of that city’s Chamber of Commerce, wired Governor William P. Hobby, “It is imperative to protect the interests of Texas shippers who depend on Galveston for port facilities.”²⁰

The Board of Directors for the Texas Chamber of Commerce, at the behest of merchants throughout the state, carried their appeal directly to the Governor in a June 1 meeting with him. J.G. Culbertson from Wichita Falls, president of this organization, Louis Lipsitz of Dallas, and H.H. Haines of Galveston all warned the Governor, “Assaults of a violent nature . . . have been an almost daily occurrence in Galveston to the great detriment of business interests in Texas.” Emphasizing that police protection in the Port was “inadequate,” they further urged Governor Hobby to intervene and uphold “the prestige of Texas Gulf ports.”²¹ Haines, who was president of the Galveston Commercial Association, and three businessmen from Galveston (H.A. Treat, John Jacobson, and Peter Cummings) advised Hobby that because commerce through the Port of Galveston was “paralyzed,” the Governor should “provide adequate protection to the citizens of Texas in the Port of Galveston, even to the extend of declaring martial law.”²² In their appeals to Governor Hobby, each of these capitalist groups indicated that workers who wanted to work were being harassed, while the local police force was making no attempt to intervene.²³

Governor Hobby quickly responded, sending an ultimatum to Sheriff Henry Thomas of Galveston County and to the Galveston City Commission. Asserting that the strike was creating chaos in the
Texas economy, the Governor warned: "I feel it is my duty to advise you that unless police protection is given and the peace laws of the state enforced by local authorities, ensuring the free and uninterrupted movement of freight and the absolute safety of any and all workers employed in the loading, unloading, and transfer or transportation of same, I shall . . . assume control." Hobby then ordered State Militia Brigadier General J.R. Wolters to Galveston to observe the dock situation and to discuss possible remedies with local authorities and businessmen. He also gave the militia commander the authority to "take such action as will be necessary to enforce the laws of the state without partiality and to keep open these arteries of trade which are essential to the prosperity and uninterrupted conduct of business in Texas." Stung by these events, Galveston's commissioners contended that Hobby, the Texas Chamber of Commerce, local businessmen, and other business interests had grossly overstated the situation in Galveston. They bristled at the Governor's implied threat to send the militia to their city. Wiring him, they claimed that the local police "would cope with and suppress" any violation of the law. Meanwhile J.H. Fricke, president of the South Atlantic District of the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA), argued that the strike was "the most peaceful and law abiding strike in history." J.M. Barb, president of the Galveston Labor Council, protested, "Governor Hobby's action is totally uncalled for. Those who went to Austin to lay the matter before Governor Hobby represented the situation in as black a light as possible. Gross misrepresentations were made by the State Chamber of Commerce and by some of the union-hating citizens of Galveston." Although dock traffic was still ensnared on June 7, cargo was beginning to move and there appeared to be little need for outside law enforcement. Even the Galveston Daily News reported, "There is peace on the waterfront at Galveston now and the non-union men are working undisturbed in increasing numbers." This latter view appears to be more accurate than the exaggerated interpretation of Governor Hobby and the version supplied by those businessmen urging him to action. Commercial data suggest that trade was proceeding through Galveston, despite the alleged problems the Mallory and Morgan Lines were encountering. One must keep in mind that the strike was among coastwise unions; deep sea longshoremen were still handling cargos, even those shipments destined for coastal ports. In May 1920, a total of ninety-eight vessels cleared Galveston Port with $27.8 million in exported goods while $3.2 million of goods were imported. In May 1919, one year earlier, the export-import traffic was $27.5 and $2.1 million respectively. These data hardly supports the charge that the strike was strangling
Galveston's and Texas' commerce.

Hobby and Texas capitalists likewise distorted and exaggerated the extent of physical abuse directed by the striking workers against the strikebreakers. On June 3, H.M. Wilkins, agent for the Morgan Line, reported to the contrary: "Large numbers of dock workers are arriving daily, and today a great many came in voluntarily. Several of our new dock workers who came in last week have returned to our docks bringing large numbers of new workmen with them." Work continued on the Morgan docks, even though workers still required an escort to get to work and the company continued to post guards to prevent disruption.

On June 4, Adjutant General W.D. Cope met with Galveston's commissioners and local labor leaders. J.H. Fricke, an ILA official, eloquently tried to counter the reports of union violence, asserting that "Our men believe in law and order and the records will show that our members are law abiding citizens." Fricke went on to argue that the imposition of martial law was unwarranted. "There is no trouble here of any account," he claimed, "[and] the majority of the people in the city do not even know there is a strike on. Except for a few peaceful pickets, all men are kept away from the docks." The next day Cope, Mayor Sappington, and Ranger Captain Brooks observed freight being loaded onto ships at Galveston wharves. Cope wired Governor Hobby that "he saw additional workers on the Wharf at work; that switchers were moving empty cars onto the wharf and . . . loaded cars out." Furthermore, he expressed "satisfaction with the ability of the mayor, the city government, and the police to handle the situation."

This "peace on the waterfront" should have obviated any assistance from the Governor, but Texas businessmen were interested in more than simply subduing a gaggle of striking longshoremen. If the longshoremen's unions could be suppressed, then similar control could be exercised over other unionized employees. Pursuing a more profound objective than simply clearing the alleged commercial logjam in Galveston, they also wanted to open the Island City to non-union labor. To accomplish this aim, they would use the coercive power of the state government, waiting as long as need be to achieve their objective.

On June 2 — the day after its representatives met with Governor Hobby — the Texas Chamber of Commerce and the Galveston Chamber of Commerce issued a statement proclaiming the need for the open shop:

The long continued succession of strikes in marine circles has tired the business interests of Texas, affecting as it does the handling of water-borne commerce so essential to the industrial life of the state . . . Galveston has determined to organize and operate an
open shop policy on these coastwise docks as the only solution to a serious and expensive obstruction of traffic and commerce.33

F.O. Thompson, president of the Southwest Open Shop Association, expressed sympathy for such a policy, declaring, "The only solution to the strike is the establishment of the open shop . . . Give us law and order and we can bring in the open shop and put it in successful operation."34 Three days earlier, Thompson had met with several Galveston businessmen to help organize a local open-shop association.35

To create conditions ripe for the open shop, however, capitalist interests needed to secure the support of the Governor and the state government. By this time businessmen in Galveston and throughout Texas were distrustful of both the ILA and the Galveston authorities, viewing them as collaborators in some scheme to wrest economic power from the dominant business powers. The Galveston Commercial Association strongly articulated this view in a June 2 message to the Governor:

"We say to you unhesitatingly that we have no confidence in the possibility of protection from Galveston police . . . But the docks must be opened. It is useless to make contracts with these unions; they violate them as soon as they are made. The unions have no property interests; they can not and will not make agreements that are enforceable; and it is only folly to temporize with them. Only from the State can we expect such measures of protection as will enable us to operate."36

The Commercial Association did not mince words about what actions it expected from the state government. Declaring that the entire state's interests were affected, the Association charged, "It would appear to be the state's job to furnish protection in whatever quantities may be necessary, and to whatever extent, even to the extent of putting the city under martial law."37 Thus, before they had even met with Governor Hobby on June 4, capitalists in Galveston knew what they wanted to accomplish and they were not about to allow any temporary "peace" on the Galveston docks to thwart their aims.

On June 7, Governor Hobby honored their pleas when he declared martial law in Galveston and dispatched 1000 militiamen, including two machine gun companies to the city.38 The next day, Galveston businessmen announced the formation of an open shop association. Responding to these events and to Hobby's order as attempts to "establish the Open Shop in Galveston," labor leaders and city commissioners were incensed at the Governor's action. The shipping companies reacted by bringing in over 200 additional non-union workers to unload cargos.39

By June 13, most Galvestonians believed the "crisis" over; in reality it was just beginning. Hobby declined to remove the troops,
fearing that the situation at Galveston would “blow up immediately if the troops left.” The volatile conditions, however, were largely due to the shipping companies’ exploitation of racial animosities. Before the strike the Mallory Shipping Company had employed black longshoremen and the Morgan Line had hired only whites. Shortly after the strike began Mallory brought in white workers to replace the striking black longshoremen, and Morgan hired blacks to work the company’s docks in place of the white unionmen. These attempts to manipulate racial tensions generated little violence, as Fricke’s and Barb’s remarks above indicate. Racial eruptions only occurred when both shippers began to employ Mexican braceros as strikebreakers, at which time both white and black dock workers began to harass the newcomers.

It was at this time that Governor Hobby declared martial law and sent troops to control alleged violence on the docks. When the longshoremen persisted in harassing the Mexican workers, Hobby decided to prolong the troop deployment in order to protect “those citizens of Galveston who wanted to work but who were being harassed by strikers.” But the violence that allegedly occurred in the Galveston strike was not totally worker-inspired. Rather, the Mallory and Morgan steamship companies’ use of minority strike breakers ignited racial conflict, thus giving Hobby the needed justification to continue the troop deployment.

Not only did the soldiers remain, but in July the Governor signed an order which suspended and restrained Galveston’s mayor and commissioners “from performing their duties appertaining to their respective offices with respect to enforcement of penal laws of the State and the City of Galveston.” His order also suspended all members of the Galveston police force. Hobby declared this move was required because Galveston officials had “failed to maintain and preserve the peace and to protect the citizens engaged in lawful occupations.”

Galveston Commissioners A.P. Norman, U.L. Purcell, John Ger­nand, and George Robinson, City Attorney Frank Anderson, and City Judge Henry O’Dell jointly blasted the Governor’s order: “The whole situation is political, and martial law is for the avowed purpose of establishing [the] open shop, destroying union labor, and taking over the city government.” Galveston officials believed they were being punished because they had abolished “special privilege” and had equalized taxes, a move which reportedly added $5.5 million to city revenues. According to the city officials, the bulk of this increase had come from “assessment against corporations, firms, and individuals which either [had] escaped taxation or where grossly under­assessed.”

Despite this remonstration, Governor Hobby maintained martial
law in Galveston throughout the summer of 1920. Visiting Galveston on the morning of July 21, he spoke privately with several city businessmen, including J.H. Langben, president of the Galveston Dry Dock and Commercial Association, and W.R. Phillips of the Galveston Commercial Association. These conversations apparently hardened the Governor’s resolve. In a speech to the Rotary Club that very afternoon, he specified that he would not remove the troops until he had an “absolute demonstration that Galveston can care for the situation.” Furthermore, he argued, “I believe the life of Texas business is involved in the existence of the port, and I will continue while in the governor’s office to use all powers vested in me in keeping the port of Galveston open, in causing the movement of freight through it . . .”

To local business interests, however, the phrase “keeping Galveston open” signified more than simply allowing for the free movement of trade. On July 31, thirteen cotton compress companies turned down ILA demands for higher wages, shorter hours, and the closed shop, proclaiming instead the existence of open-shop conditions on company premises. A.S.L. Toombs of the Southern Products Company asserted, “When the contract expired, we decided to operate our businesses as we saw fit, rather than have a walking delegate [i.e., a union representative] in control of certain phases of it. Therefore, we declined to make an agreement with any organization to exclusively supply us with workers.” In a similar move, steamship agents refused to renew closed-shop contracts with locals of the Marine Checkers Union. The Machinists Union and the Cooks and Waiters Union received like treatment from their employers. By the fall of 1920, Galveston was becoming an open-shop city.

Two weeks later, steamship companies turned down a concession offered by the striking longshoremen. The striking workers had agreed to return to work, pending arbitration of their demands and providing that the steamship owners dismissed non-union workers. The steamship owners rejected this compromise because Galveston docks were operating at seventy percent capacity, and with plenty of non-union labor the companies saw little need to deal with the unions. Also, if the companies dismissed the non-union workers in favor of the union employees, it would imply de facto recognition of the closed shop. The companies held firm, rejecting the concession. Hobby’s martial law policy thus allowed the local open-shop movement to gain momentum.

The militia remained in Galveston until October 1920. Even after the Governor restored the powers of the municipal officers, local law enforcement remained under the supervision of the Texas Rangers. By December 1920, the extensive “show of force” had subdued the striking longshoremen. Mallory workers were the first to submit,
accepting an hourly wage hike to $.67/hour, $1.00/hour for overtime. According to the new contract, "No discrimination [would] be made with respect to the employment of non-union workers." Thus, open-shop conditions would prevail on Mallory Docks. Also, union representatives would not be permitted on the docks, "except in the performance of duty," and at no time would discussion of union activities or business be allowed.53

Again the companies tried to play the black and white workers against each other, this time with considerably more success. They induced the black Mallory longshoremen to sign this rather repressive contract, and a few weeks later, the white Morgan workers, faced with a fait d'accompli, signed a similar agreement.54 By early 1921, Galveston was essentially an open-shop city. Capital had forced a devastating defeat upon labor.

The Galveston Dockworkers' Strike of 1920 — though not especially violent and costing only one life — was still noteworthy. The strike's resolution established an atmosphere involving a tightly knit state government/private business coalition, united in its opposition to unionized labor. One of this coalition's intended objectives was to mold the state into a "free-labor" territory, where new industries could develop and where new factories could locate unfettered by the perceived restrictions imposed by organized labor.

Having imposed its will on the Galveston Dockworkers, the coalition began to consolidate its gains once victory seemed assured. In September 1920, Governor Hobby called a special session of the state legislature "to consider the Galveston Strike situation."55 He submitted an Open Port Bill for the legislature's consideration which confirmed the Governor's right to declare martial law in cities where strikes restricted the shipment of goods.

In a message to the legislators, Hobby declared: "The channels of trade affecting the life of the business of Texas and affecting the living conditions, the occupations of all the people, must be kept open, and I shall exert the full limit of the state's power to accomplish that purpose."56 The bill made it "the policy of the state to effectively prohibit interference with those whose work is needed to carry on the business of the port."57 State Senator Page, whose rhetoric reflected the views and beliefs of the measure's supporters, echoed support for the Governor: "If you refuse to pass this bill, you are pandering to the worst element in Texas. You are framing conditions so that we may soon have Lenines [sic] and Trotzskys [sic] among us. This is not a political matter, but a matter on which the good government of the State of Texas is at stake."58 The mood of the state legislature made for speedy passage of the Open Port Bill, and the lawmakers overwhelmingly approved it on October 1920, the bill becoming law on January 1, 1921.59
The Open Port Act legitimized the right of the state government to use its law enforcement powers to break up strikes, thwart union activities, and preserve or establish open-shop practices. As such, its passage sanctioned Governor Hobby's actions in the Galveston Dockworkers' Strike. The act made it "unlawful for any two or more persons to use physical violence or to threaten its use to interfere with or protest or harass any persons engaged in the work of loading, unloading, or transporting any commerce." Having application to commerce on any common carrier, including railways, streetcar companies, pipelines and wharf companies, the law also gave the Governor broad powers to "exercise full and complete jurisdiction" in any areas where common carriers were being impeded. Because it was a violation of the law to urge a common-carrier's employees to strike while they were at work, the act straight-jacketed union efforts to communicate with workers while on the job.\(^\text{60}\)

Two years later Governor Pat Neff invoked the Act to break the 1922 Railroad Strike. On July 1, 1922, members of the Federated Railway Shopworkers Union in Houston stopped work in response to a proposed reduction in their wage scale. Railworkers in Palestine, Corpus Christi, San Antonio, Denison, Sherman, Waco, Childress, Temple, Fort Worth, and other Texas cities followed suit.\(^\text{61}\) When the Southern Pacific line fired striking workers and hired non-union replacements, fist-fights and gunshot exchanges erupted in several communities, most notably Denison, Childress, and Sherman. On July 26, Governor Neff, as authorized by the Open Port Law, declared martial law in Denison, where he deployed several companies of state militia. Neff also dispatched Ranger detachments to Sherman, Childress, Amarillo, Temple, Waco, Marshall, Cleburne, Lufkin, and Kingsville.\(^\text{62}\)

By September 25, freight was once again moving freely, with both the Texas and Pacific and Southern Pacific lines doing business as usual. On October 2, the strike ended with a capitulation by the workers. Not all of the striking workers were rehired; only those needed by the companies to share the workload with those non-union employees hired during the strike were called back. Furthermore, they returned to work at the reduced wage rate, as had been proposed in June, and they lost their seniority in the interim. They were rehired only as "new employees."\(^\text{63}\) Neff's application of the Open Port Law forced a stunning defeat on Texas' striking railroaders.

The Texas government and the state's capitalists had once again set an example for workers and for potential outside investors. They had once again exercised their willingness to suppress organized labor activity. In 1929 a Federal court ruled the Open Port Law unconstitutional as a violation of both the United States and the Texas Constitutions,\(^\text{64}\) but organized labor had already been taught a lesson.
After all, Hobby had exercised the state's power without any law, and conceivably future governors could do the same. The alliance between the state government and organized capital certainly could be expected to deter any worker "uppityness" in Texas.

Another thought to consider is that Governors Hobby and Neff were progressive governors when compared to the series of reactionary executives who followed them in the late 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. W. Lee O'Daniel (1939-41), Coke Stevenson (1941-47), Beuford Jester (1947-49), and Allen Shivers (1949-57) all made it clear during their terms that unions were not welcome in Texas. Shivers, especially, couched no sympathy for unions, and he heartily resisted the CIO's repeated attempts to organize industrial workers in Texas. He parlayed this anti-union stance into re-election victories in 1950, 1952 and 1954, primarily by labeling members of the CIO as communists, charges resembling those aimed at union members in 1920.**

These later governors simply were operating in a political tradition consistent with that which existed in the 1920s. Hobby and Neff, in cooperation with Texas businessmen, established a precedent which these later, more reactionary governors, willingly exploited.

NOTES

5Galveston Daily News, May 11, 14, 1919. From 1919 to 1921, the Galveston City Commissioners were: A.P. Norman (Police and Fire), J.C. Purcell (Finance and Revenue), J.H. Gernand (Street), and George Robinson (Water and Sewerage).
7Galveston Daily News, May 12, 1920.
16Galveston Daily News, June 1, 1920.
Occupations for these businessmen were: John G. Culbertson—president, Culbertson Oil Company; general manager, Wichita Falls Motor Company; Louis Lipsitz—president, Lipsitz Lumber Company; vice-president, American Exchange Bank of Dallas; H.H. Hines—full-time president, Galveston Commercial Association; Peter Cummings—president, Cumming and Company, Galveston (sporting goods and auto supplies); H.J. Langben—manager, Galveston Dry Dock and Construction Company; John Jacobson—General Contractor, Wichita Falls City Director, 1912; Dallas City Director, 1920; Galveston City Director, 1920.


Galveston Daily News, January 1, 1921, year-end business supplement.


Galveston Daily News, June 1, 1920.

Galveston Daily News, June 1, 1920.


Galveston Daily News, January 1, 1921.

General Laws of the State of Texas Passed by the Fourth Called Session of the
36th Legislature (Austin, 1920), 7-10.

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* Houston Post, July 12, 1922.
* Houston Post, July 26, 1920.
* Houston Post, October 2, 1922.

**Rupert Richardson, Texas: The Lone Star State (New York, 1943), 425.