

3-1985

Wright Patman and the Impeachment of Andrew Mellon

Janet Schmelzer

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj>



Part of the [United States History Commons](#)

[Tell us](#) how this article helped you.

Recommended Citation

Schmelzer, Janet (1985) "Wright Patman and the Impeachment of Andrew Mellon," *East Texas Historical Journal*: Vol. 23 : Iss. 1 , Article 8.

Available at: <https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj/vol23/iss1/8>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by SFA ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in East Texas Historical Journal by an authorized editor of SFA ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact cdsscholarworks@sfasu.edu.

WRIGHT PATMAN AND THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW MELLON

by Janet Schmelzer

Impeachment of a public official, especially a nationally recognized figure, has not been a common occurrence in American politics.¹ Since 1789 Congress has impeached only thirteen federal officials, and acting on only twelve cases, the Senate has voted six acquittals, two dismissals, and only four convictions.

In the first impeachment from 1797 to 1799 the House of Representatives charged Tennessee Senator William Blount with influencing Cherokees to aid the British against Louisiana and Spanish Florida; the Senate, which had already expelled him eighteen months before, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. In 1805 in Thomas Jefferson's administration the House charged Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase with malfeasance and misfeasance; but he was acquitted. Sixty-three years later Radical Republicans, waving weak evidence and trumped-up charges, claimed that Andrew Johnson had committed "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" by violating the laws of Congress; he, too, was acquitted. And during the Ulysses S. Grant administration, the Senate tried Secretary of War William W. Belknap for accepting bribes, but acquitted him as well.²

On several occasions, however, abortive impeachments have occurred. These cases, where impeachment resolutions failed in the House, included John Tyler (1843), Vice President Schuyler Colfax (1873), Attorney General Harry Daugherty (1923), Herbert Hoover (1932 and 1933), and Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas (1970).³ In the twentieth century two other investigations into possible impeachment proceedings have had dramatic effects on the national government. One, of course, centered on Richard M. Nixon. Actual criminal activities on his part in the Watergate scandal were never confirmed by a Senate trial or by a House vote to impeach. Yet the constitutional process of removal was imminent and was stymied only by his resignation.

The other case, that of Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon, failed to draw the audience or generate the fear caused by Watergate, but the investigation dramatized the changing political and economic atmosphere of 1932. More specifically, this impeachment attempt duelled two opposing philosophies. At one end of the spectrum was Mellon, the defendant, who epitomized the Conservative Republicanism of the 1920s; at the other end was Congressman Wright Patman of Texas, the prosecutor, who followed Democratic beliefs of govern-

Janet Schmelzer teaches at Tarleton State University, Stephenville.

mental responsibility for the general welfare. Since the key antagonists were Mellon and Patman, the entire affair reflected the conflict between conservative economics and populist-progressive ideas.

Herbert Hoover assumed the Presidency in 1929, three years before the impeachment attempt. Since helping to formulate economic policy as Secretary of Commerce during the Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge administrations, he maintained the prevailing governmental attitude toward business, banking, farming, and spending. He even carried over Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, not necessarily for the ideological continuity but for the Republican following which he commanded.⁴

The Hoover Administration continued to direct the nation as its predecessors had since 1921. But this relatively calm state quickly changed in October, 1929. With the advent of the Great Crash and the spiraling depression Hoover encountered bitter conflict and unsatisfactory solutions. He stubbornly applied principles that were outdated. Believing in self-reliance and self-respect, he could not balance *laissez-faire* and a socialized economy. If federal tinkering handicapped free enterprise, the government withdrew controls. When the unemployed, the starving, and the homeless sought aid, he thrust this chore on state and local authorities which were bankrupt. Under no circumstance would he approve a "handout" or "dole," believing that to do so destroyed American independent spirit and ambition or "rugged individualism," as he called it.⁵

As the leader of the nation, Hoover soon discovered that the application of his personal philosophy to government produced problems. He expected deference from congressional leaders, who openly refused; more often than not he received little cooperation from either the House or Senate. Only on rare occasions did he score significant legislature victories—the Agricultural Marketing Act in 1929 and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act in 1932. At the same time he would undo congressional programs by rejecting across-the-board aid programs, by depending upon "voluntary cooperation," and by hanging onto the antiquated "trickle down" theory. And much to the chagrin of legislators he either would not or could not recognize the severity of the depression.⁶

Of the many congressmen who criticized the Hoover Administration and its misguided attitude toward public relief and economic policy, Wright Patman, a freshman in the House elected in 1928, was particularly vocal. A staunch Democrat, he disliked Hoover and had "no real use for Republicans." As far as he was concerned, the executive branch could not cope with national crisis; Congress should, therefore, fill the vacuum.⁷

Patman was not an irresponsible troublemaker. Always calling himself the representative of the "common people," he felt he knew what they needed. A native of rural East Texas, the son of a tenant farmer, he saw how inflexible credit and tight money hurt agriculture. Throughout his political career, he worked in the behalf of small businessmen, laborers, farmers, and veterans and against "big business," "greedy banks," and "special interests." In so doing he was at odds with Mellon, who, Patman believed, worked against the common good and symbolized the ills of government.¹

In 1932 Mellon was seventy-six-years old. Frail in appearance, thin in physique, with silver hair and cold blue-grey eyes, he possessed an air of distinction. To many he was the epitome of money, power, and success. Born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, he grew up in an affluent environment. After his father, Thomas Mellon, established the banking house of T. Mellon and Sons in 1869, he joined it as a partner in 1874 and within six years, upon his father's retirement, became sole owner. Since Pittsburgh was booming, he used every financial opportunity to build Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), Gulf Oil Corporation, Union Steel Company, Standard Steel Car Company, and New York Shipbuilding Company. He even helped organize the Union Trust Company of Pittsburgh in 1889 and incorporated T. Mellon and Sons into Mellon National Bank in 1902, becoming president of both firms. His reputation as an outstanding financier was fully merited.

By 1910 Mellon was an important figure in state Republican politics, contributing heavily to party candidates. Known as a fiscal conservative who espoused high tariffs, he became Secretary of the Treasury in the Harding Administration in 1921, then served in the same Cabinet position under Coolidge and Hoover. A powerful influence in national affairs, he helped to defeat "bonus" bills and agricultural legislation which, in turn, earned him the hatred of veterans and farmers. Recognized as one of the nation's most prominent economic leaders and richest men, second only to John D. Rockefeller, he was highly respected by the financial community. He was also known for tax reform and tight fiscal policies which reflected his economic belief in the "trickle down" theory. As a result he was popular with the business community, especially after refunding over \$2,000,000,000 to some of the largest corporations in the United States, including several Mellon companies. Thus by 1932, although misreading the depression—he believed it to be a temporary setback and urged liquidating labor, stocks, farmers, and real estate—he was being hailed as the "greatest Secretary of Treasury since Alexander Hamilton" and the only man "under whom three Presidents served."²

Despite the reverence with which many viewed his accomplishments and record, Mellon had for a number of years been the subject

of attack. In 1922 and 1923 several United States senators questioned the propriety of his appointment, but their efforts proved futile. Again in 1929, at the suggestion of Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee, the Senate Committee on Judiciary investigated the eligibility of Mellon to hold office. The committee could not reach a consensus, even though Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska and three colleagues wanted to remove Mellon for what they considered malfeasance in office. A majority of the members exonerated him, so Mellon remained head of the Treasury, unscathed by congressional action.¹⁰

In the meantime other issues also spurred opposition to Mellon. During February, 1930, Norris criticized the monopoly of ALCOA which was protected by a high tariff. At the same time Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana led a movement to reduce import duties on aluminum products. Then, in November, Senator Smith W. Brookhart of Iowa threatened to bolt the Republican Party and join the Democrats unless Mellon and Treasury Undersecretary Ogden Mills were removed. He was furious with them because they opposed farmer and labor relief measures. Such prominent economists as former president of the American Economic Association, John H. Gray, joined in the outcry charging that Mellon had been responsible for "continuing and extending the mania" of stock speculation and for the subsequent depression.¹¹

Patman was the most caustic of Mellon's critics. He was determined to remove Mellon from office for violating the laws of the United States. In speech after speech from 1929 to 1932 he vehemently denounced Mellon for a long list of alleged abuses. For too many years Mellon had destroyed "equal opportunity" in the market place. He also had "violated more laws . . . [and had] illegally acquired more property" than any other person "on earth without fear of punishment." With President Hoover as his "hireling" he was able to force on the country "an overdose of Mellonism"—"misery, misfortune, and malfeasance." Thus he had delivered the American people into the "clutches of organized greed." Because of his governmental power and influence he protected Mellon companies from anti-trust laws. Consequently, Patman often stated that converting "Clarence Darrow to the cause of Christianity" would have been easier than enlightening "Mr. Mellon to the cause of the plain people."¹²

Mellon represented a philosophy of economic self-interest which Patman abhorred. After World War I the Secretary of the Treasury and 7,000 other men had profited because their companies had had government contracts and had been generously compensated for losses caused by the war. Even foreign countries who owed the United States millions of dollars in reparations, loans, and debts, had received preferential treatment at "his hand;" yet he had no compassion for needy Americans, charged Patman. From 1921 to 1932, when over 6,000

bank failures occurred, Mellon did nothing because, Patman asserted, Mellon banks were safe. Even worse, he created budget deficits so that spending on public works would have to be cut. In addition, being an ex-officio member of the Federal Reserve Board and at that time possibly the most influential member, he limited the amount of circulating money, making dollars dear and interest rates high. Because of this conservative policy he diminished spending power at a time of depression when buying and selling should have been increased.

Patman instinctively distrusted bankers. Therefore, he was especially leary of Mellon. Big, powerful bankers were, he was convinced, unempathetic creatures who cared only about raising interest rates and seeing debtors squirm. Oftentimes, he echoed the warnings of Thomas Jefferson that if banks ever controlled the currency then "banks and corporations . . . [would] deprive the people of all property."¹²

The one issue which widened the chasm between Patman and Mellon, however, was the "bonus bill" or adjusted service compensation.¹⁴ Since 1929 Patman had led the fight to redeem these World War I certificates immediately because veterans needed the money during the depression, not in 1945 when they were due. He considered this payment a legal debt owed by the government to veterans. Consequently, he presented bill after bill from 1929 to 1936 when it finally became law.¹⁵

During the Hoover Administration, Mellon was the chief adversary to Patman and the "bonus." Since 1922 he led Republican opposition against such payments. During the depression he seemed to prefer aiding large corporations through billion-dollar tax refunds rather than supporting war-time heroes. In 1931, while testifying before a Senate Finance Committee, he admitted to paying off \$3 billion of the national debt prematurely, an act which eventually created a budget deficit. As a result he was able to prevent "bonus" legislation because, Patman contended, the money was no longer available. Mellon also claimed that the \$2 billion needed to fund the adjusted service certificates would "hurt business by choking the bond market and the public debt operations." Ironically, he then requested congressional authority to float \$8 billion in bonds to retire the public debt but not the "bonus" debt. Although many veterans needed funds because of the depression, he defended his point by saying that the payments would only be "a temporary aid" and would not "constitute a real benefit" to anyone. If by chance a hearing was held on the "bonus," he sent Under Secretary Mills, "his mouthpiece," as Patman called him, to present the opposing arguments. So no matter where or when adjusted compensation was discussed, "the invisible hand of Mellonism was present." If not writing letters against aid to veterans, he was helping Hoover compose "bonus" veto messages. He even had his "stooges" at American Legion conven-

tions to prevent debate on the subject. Since such machinations were typical of Mellon, Patman frequently recommended that with "Capone out of the way, it would be a good idea to go after Andrew Mellon."¹⁶

Thus, the inevitable happened. "On my own responsibility," Patman announced to the House on January 6, 1932, "I impeach Andrew William Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States for high crimes and misdemeanors." Without hesitating for a moment, he charged that Mellon had violated parts of Section 343, Title 5 of the United States Code of Laws. To protect the public against dishonesty and unethical behavior in government, the Secretary of the Treasury could not be interested either "directly or indirectly" in the business of trade and commerce. Neither could he own any sea vessel, purchase public property, nor buy or sell securities. Moreover, he could not receive any emolument for negotiating or transacting business in the Treasury Department.¹⁷

According to the evidence Patman presented, Mellon had violated the entire code—willfully, knowingly, and intentionally. While serving in the Cabinet he and his family retained ownership of substantial voting stock in over 300 corporations engaged in worldwide trade and commerce. Such businesses, including railroads, utilities, banking, and shipping, were protected by tariffs whose enforcement and supervision were under the auspices of the Treasury Department. Personally interested in imports and exports, Mellon seemingly promulgated customs regulations to his own business advantage; thus, he held the "dual position," Patman asserted, "of serving two masters, himself and the United States." For example, in spite of the specific provisions that the Secretary should not own sea vessels, Mellon had acquired a fleet of sixty-seven ships, all but forty-nine registered under foreign flags. As ex-officio member of the Federal Reserve Board, he could not legally be a director of or hold stock in a bank, but he did so. As supervisor of internal revenue he was concerned with the assessment and collection of taxes. Acting in that capacity, he secretly approved gigantic refunds to large corporations, especially his own. Moreover, he exploited his position as Secretary of Treasury by encouraging the Supervising Architect, a subordinate, to use more aluminum in public buildings and to purchase it from the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), a company which he controlled.¹⁸

When Patman sat down, House members were stunned, as if having just heard that some great man had died. But their silence lasted only for a moment. The first to speak was Joseph W. Burns of Tennessee who moved that Patman's resolution be sent to the Judiciary Committee. Soon the chamber was filled with speculation. Although Patman had for many months been threatening some sort of attack against Mellon, several congressmen were surprised by his boldness, or some would

say his foolhardiness, in actually seeking an impeachment. Some expressed sympathy with the resolution but lamented that Patman had doomed his own political career. Occasionally, someone spoke above the hushed babble to condemn the proceeding or seek recognition from the Speaker. Only the House pages, moving like "shadows," darted in and out of the chamber to fetch reference and law books for members who wished to brush up on proper impeachment procedures.¹⁹

Outside the House the activity was confusing, the atmosphere tense, the mood emotional. Reporters buttonholed everyone entering or leaving the floor, seeking explanations, expressions of opinion, and more details. Some of Mellon's Republican supporters angrily denounced Patman while others, tight-lipped and grim, rushed back to their offices to plan a course of action that could be implemented to counter Patman's charges. In the hallways, cloak rooms, and committee rooms "Mellonites, poll parrots and 'yes' men," as Patman later characterized them, began organizing themselves into some sort of a "defense machine."²⁰

Patman soon became the target of illegal actions, the object for vituperative abuse, and ridicule. Besides his phones being tapped, his offices were ransacked; Capitol police were ordered to patrol the hallways outside his office. And he received the full treatment from the pro-Mellon press. Caricatures by cartoonists depicting him as foolish and inept appeared daily. Editorials questioned why a congressman wasted time on such insignificant issues. One article referred to his impeachment proposal as "sorry business . . . which Mellon-baiters . . . now joyfully promote." Other writers suggested that Congress and the country needed a "personal scapegoat" to blame for the depression and that Mellon was "the inevitable target." At the same time Republicans and businessmen discredited Patman by praising the Secretary for ushering in the prosperous 1920s.²¹

On January 13, 1932, the House Judiciary Committee began considering Patman's charges. Overall, the proceedings were orderly. Meeting in the House Office Building, the twenty-three committee members convened at 10:00 a.m. Then acting chairman Hatton W. Sumners of Texas explained that the hearing was a preliminary investigation to determine if substantial evidence against Mellon existed. At the conclusion of the inquiry a detailed report, recommending either impeachment or not, would be made to the House. From the beginning the members came to the understanding that any type of evidence could be presented to substantiate or refute a charge. Consequently they allowed news clippings, letters from prospective witnesses, and other data which could in a formal House hearing be properly documented. Having precipitated this action, Patman sat on one side of the table facing several representatives of Mellon, who would not attend. Alexander W. Gregg,

former solicitor for the Internal Revenue Bureau, and D. D. Sheppard, a Pittsburgh attorney, were the primary defenders for the Secretary.²²

For over a week the committee members listened to each side. They constantly interrupted witnesses to ask a question or request clarification. Although Patman and Gregg endured grilling, members frequently expressed skepticism of the evidence and explanations offered by Mellon's defense. On numerous occasions Fiorello La Guardia of New York and Frank Oliver of New York were especially persistent that Gregg not sidestep a question but answer as precisely and accurately as possible.²³

Acting the role of prosecutor, Patman skillfully presented his case against Mellon. From the beginning he assured the committee that he had "no persecution involved" or "no personal reason" for seeking an impeachment. "Just like President Hoover said, 'Law enforcement should commence at the top,'" he continued, "and I think it should apply to Mr. Mellon . . . the same as anybody else." In his arguments, he contended that any important stockholder would have a close personal interest in a business with total resources of over \$2 billion. His inquiry of several months into Mellon's financial investments revealed that he held stock in corporations owning sea vessels; thus, he had a share "in whole or in part" of these ships. In addition, as the supervisor of the Coast Guard and the Customs Office, Mellon faced a conflict of interest whenever formulating American regulations on imports and exports. A similar condition existed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, also under the Treasury Department. As Secretary, he had refunded billions of dollars not only to corporations such as United States Steel Corporation and ALCOA but also to himself at 6 percent annual interest. Even more astonishing, he had carried out these federal transactions unrestrained since public inspection was forbidden—no system of checks and balances.²⁴

One of Patman's major arguments against Mellon was his interest in ALCOA. Admittedly, Mellon owned substantial stock in this corporation. But what Mellon failed to reveal was that Richard B. Mellon, his brother, was a close associate. These two men represented 100 percent control of the corporation, an inextricable business relationship in which the same secretary, office, and telephone were shared. With such close ties to ALCOA, Patman charged, Mellon must have been interested in and must have voiced some opinion on its financial operations. Since the company was the largest American aluminum manufacturer—a monopoly protected by a high tariff—he had blatantly violated anti-trust laws. Thus he used his government position to further personal finances. This unethical behavior was especially evident when he allowed the *Federal Architect*, a professional magazine which carried articles urging the use of aluminum as well as advertisements

praising ALCOA, to be published in the Treasury Building.²²

Patman also pressed one other matter. He accused Mellon of using the Treasury Office to obtain oil property, known as the Barco Concession. In June 1930, at a dinner hosted by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, Mellon had "bargained" with Colombian President Olaya Herrera. At that time Mellon implied that if an oil deal could be worked out Olaya's request for an American loan to sustain his government would be fulfilled. In June 1931 Olaya granted a fifty-year contract to the Colombia Petroleum Company, seventy-five percent of which was owned by Gulf Oil Corporation, a Mellon company. Subsequent to that transaction, Patman pointed out, the National City Bank of New York extended a loan to the Colombian government.²³

In answer to Patman's charges, Attorney Gregg presented the Mellon's defense. He contended that Mellon did not have a controlling interest in the companies in which he had stock; therefore, he could work with the customs and the Coast Guard because he did not actually own any sea vessel. Besides, Gregg asserted, previous secretaries had held shares in businesses and had performed their duties without any problems. At the time of appointment to the Treasury Mellon had resigned all his bank offices and had sold his bank stock. As for tax refunds, he had personally received \$91,000 and then had later paid back an additional \$209,000 for duplication of dividends. He did have fifteen percent interest in ALCOA, but, according to Gregg, even when the Mellons were considering a merger with a Canadian business, the Secretary, although in the same private train car with both companies' representatives, remained disinterested, looked out the window, and never entered into the conversation. To refute Patman's charges on the Barco matter, Gregg stated that Olaya had since retracted his previous statement that Mellon had used coercion or made a "deal" with him during the dinner in June 1930.²⁴

On January 19, 1932, after a week of testimony and argument, the committee recessed in order to obtain more information, especially a list of bank stock from Mellon and from the Treasury Department. Then a series of unforeseen events occurred which dramatically affected the impeachment. On February 3 Ambassador to Great Britain Charles G. Dawes resigned in order to head the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. With this foreign assignment now vacant, Hoover quickly coerced his "wisest and most experienced public servant"—Andrew Mellon—to accept the Ambassadorship two days later.²⁵

Suddenly, the subject of the impeachment was no longer Secretary of the Treasury. On February 10 the House Judiciary Committee members reconvened to take some action, but they did not arrive at a decision easily. Behind closed doors, in a "heated two hour executive

session," they debated whether or not to drop the inquiry. At times the loud discussions reverberated down the hallways. Eventually the members agreed "to discontinue further consideration of allegations" by a vote of seventeen to four. According to Chairman Sumners, this resolution was the only alternative since the original intent of the hearing constituted "an ouster proceeding." Moreover, the basic premise of the majority report viewed further investigations as useless since the accused party had resigned as Treasury Secretary.²⁸

The four dissenting members submitted a minority report. In carefully worded language, they concurred with the majority "that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the investigation." They stressed, however, that their action was based "on that reason alone." "The law in question," they continued, at this point was "no longer applicable to the office now held by Mr. Mellon." Thus, they subtly underlined that Mellon had not been exonerated by the committee, more pointedly, the accusations that he had violated the law had not been satisfactorily answered by the defense.²⁹

That same day while the House Judiciary Committee was debating its resolution, the Senate confirmed Ogden Mills as the new Secretary of the Treasury. Three days later Sumner, with the grim-faced Patman silently sitting beside him, presented the majority report to the House. Surprisingly the chamber was almost empty; the mood surely languid. Unenthusiastically the congressmen accepted the recommendation of the Judiciary Committee, and in a few minutes the impeachment attempt ended.³¹

Mellon's sudden appointment as ambassador left Patman with mixed emotions. If the impeachment proceedings had been carried to the logical conclusion he had hoped to see the Secretary convicted and removed from public office forever. In fact, he accused Hoover of granting a "presidential pardon," an artifice to save the President, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Republican Party. He was personally convinced that his actions had ousted Mellon from one of the most powerful positions in the country. After all, if no impeachment had been pending in the House, Hoover would probably have been more hesitant and cautious about removing Mellon, a respected leader of conservative Republicanism, from the Cabinet and sending him off to socialize at the Court of St. James. Now Patman had more hope that Americans would receive needed depression relief, although Mellon's first assistant, Mills, was now Secretary. Thus, while Mellon considered his appointment as ambassador "a divorce" from the government, Patman looked upon the attempted impeachment as a victory.³²

By the end of February the Mellon investigation was fading from notice. Although the public had not heard all the facts, Patman could

not dwell on the issue indefinitely. Other matters required his attention—veterans' legislation, farm aid, and depression relief. Then, too, he would be campaigning in 1932 for re-election and for Democratic presidential nominee, Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt of New York.

The attempted impeachment and subsequent removal of Mellon signified the end of an era. In 1932 the election of Roosevelt reflected an evolution of attitude—laissez-faire and socialized control (essentially Hoover's "American System") being replaced by governmental responsibility. Even though the impeachment did not precipitate this philosophical transformation, this affair, centering on two opposites—Mellon and Patman—was a signal of the changing times. The conservative political and economic policies which had held sway since 1921 were now obsolete. And the innovative programs, known as the "New Deal," marked the emergence of a new age, the impact of which has continued to the present.

NOTES

¹Impeachment is the process whereby the House of Representatives, by majority vote, charges a federal official with specific malfeasances and crimes. The Senate then conducts a trial. To reach a conviction, the Senate must have a two-thirds vote. The official is then removed from office.

²For more detailed information on impeachment trials see *Impeachment and the U.S. Congress* (Washington, D.C., 1974); William Swindler, "High Court of Congress: Impeachment Trials, 1797-1936," *American Bar Association Journal* LX (April, 1974), 426-428; Walter Ehrlich, *Presidential Impeachment: An American Dilemma* (St. Charles, Mo., 1974). For information on impeachment procedures, especially on Andrew Johnson, see Raoul Berger, *Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems* (Cambridge, 1973); John R. Labovitz, *Presidential Impeachment* (New Haven, 1978); Michael Benedict, *The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson* (New York, 1973); Irving Brant, *Impeachment: Trials and Errors* (New York, 1974).

³For more information on abortive impeachments, see *Impeachment and the U.S. Congress*, 6-7.

⁴Herbert Hoover, *The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover* (New York, 1952), II, 36, 40, 41; III, 11, 13, 17, 30-31 41.; Eugene Lyons, *Herbert Hoover: A Biography* (Garden City, 1964), 56-74; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Crisis of the Old Order: 1919-1933* (Boston, 1957), 77-89; Merlo Pusey, *Eugene Meyer* (New York, 1974), 201-202, 210-212.

⁵Lyons, *Herbert Hoover: A Biography*, 56-74, 84-110; Schlesinger, Jr., *Crisis of the Old Order*, 77-89; John D. Hicks, *Republican Ascendancy: 1921-1933*, (New York, 1960), 208; William Starr Myers and Walter H. Newton, *The Hoover Administration: A Documented Narrative* (New York, 1936), 3-13, 22-25, 153-155, 268-69, 272-279.

⁶While Hoover was President, powerful congressional leaders would not submit to administrative policies. Such men as Republicans George W. Norris of Nebraska and Charles L. McNary of Oregon, Democrats Morris Sheppard of

Texas, Tom Connally of Texas, and Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas led the Senate opposition. In the House were Republicans Fiorello La Guardia of New York and Gilbert Haugen of Iowa, and Democrats John Nance Garner and Sam Rayburn of Texas, Cordell Hull of Tennessee, and William E. Bankhead of Alabama. Hicks, *Republican Ascendancy: 1921-1933*, 16, 56, 86, 108, 197-98, 209; Schlesinger, Jr., *Crisis of the Old Order*, 59, 107, 121-124; Lyons, *Herbert Hoover: A Biography*, 245-256. For more information on Congress during the Hoover Administration see Jordan Schwarz, *Interregnum of Despair* (Urbana, 1970).

¹Mrs. Wright (Pauline) Patman, interview, January 10, 1978, (in possession of author); Wright Patman interview, by Joe B. Franz, August 11, 1972 (Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas).

²"Background of Congressman Wright Patman," (Wright Patman Papers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library). Hereafter cited as WPP. "Born in Texas Tenant Farm House; He Came Up the Hard Way; He is Rough and Tough When the Peoples Welfare is at Stake," *Wright Patman for Congress*, July 27, 1940, WPP.

³"Fifty-nine Leaders Named by Gerard as Men Who 'Rule' America," *New York Times*, August 21, 1930; Philip Love, *Andrew W. Mellon: The Man and His Work* (Baltimore, 1929), 5-20, 35-46, 201-208; *Congressional Record*, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 3678; Hoover, *The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover*, III, 30-31.

⁴"Mellon's Counsel Replies to Patman," *New York Times*, January 16, 1932; Harvey O'Connor, *Mellon's Millions: The Biography of Fortune; The Life and Times of Andrew Mellon* (New York, 1933), 318-321. U.S., Congress, House, *Charges of Hon. Wright Patman Against the Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Seventy-Second Congress, First Session on H. Res. 92, Serial 1, January 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 1932*, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 1-5, 74-146.

⁵*H. Res. 92, 74-146*; "Insurgents Demand Control in Senate," *New York Times*, November 8, 1930.

⁶*Congressional Record*, 71st Cong., 3d sess., 3107, 5090-5091; 72d Cong., 1st sess., 356, 4175, 4965-4969.

⁷Wright Patman to J. J. Taylor, January 2, 1932, WPP; Patman to *Dallas Morning News*, October 26, 1931, WPP; *Congressional Record*, 71st Cong., 3d sess., 3107, 5090-5091; 72d Cong., 1st sess., 356, 4175, 4965-4969, 9862.

⁸In 1925 the Adjusted Service Compensation Act provided extra money to World War I veterans for wartime services. For more information on the "bonus" issue see Janet Schmelzer, "The Early Life and Early Congressional Career of Wright Patman: 1893-1941" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1978).

⁹*Congressional Record*, 71st Cong., 2d sess., 6481-6496; 3d sess., 897 898, 900, 901, 2467-2470, 2709; 72d Cong., 1st sess., 352, 4968, 5224; "Patman Charges Bonus Is Fought By Wall Street," *Dallas Morning News*, April 24, 1932.

¹⁰Wright Patman, *Bankteering, Bonuseering, Melloneering* (Paris, Tex., 1934), 129-172. Patman to Charles Coughlin, January 1, 1931, WPP; *Congressional Record*, 71st Cong., 3d sess., 1774, 3106; 72d Cong., 1st sess., 359-360, 4965-4969, 9862-9863; 2d sess., 2756.

¹¹*Congressional Record*, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 1400-1401; "Wants to Oust Mellon," *New York Times*, April 28, 1931; "Patman Seeks Impeachment," *New*

York Times, September 29, 1931; "Demands That House Impeach Mellon," *New York Times*, January 7, 1932; "Patman Asked Congress to Impeach Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon," January, 1932, WPP; "Texan Demands Impeaching of Andrew Mellon," WPP; "Act of Congress Establishing the Treasury Department—Section 8," WPP.

¹⁸*Congressional Record*, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 1400-1401; "Patman to Impeach Mellon," WPP; Patman, *Bankteering*, 129-136; *H. Res. 92*, 1-5.

¹⁹"Patman Seeks Impeachment," WPP; "Wants to Oust Mellon," WPP; "Demands that House Impeach Mellon," WPP; "Story of Impeachment of Andrew Mellon," WPP; Robert Sherrill, "The Last of the Great Populists' Takes on the Foundations, the Banks, the Federal Reserve, the Treasury," *New York Times Magazine*, March 16, 1969, 24-25, 88, 106-118.

²⁰"Demands that House Impeach Mellon," WPP; "Story of Impeachment of Andrew Mellon," WPP.

²¹"Story of Impeachment of Andrew Mellon," WPP; "A Poor Time for Mellon-Baiting," WPP; O'Connor, *Mellon*, 308-321.

²²"Accuser of Mellon to Plead Case Today," *New York Times*, January 13, 1932; Patman, *Bankteering*, 129-137; *H. Res. 92*, 1-5.

²³*H. Res. 92*, 21-74, 147-201.

²⁴Patman, *Bankteering*, 129-172; *H. Res. 92*, 5-52, 179,198; Patman to Coughlin, January 1, 1931, WPP; *Congressional Record*, 71st Cong., 3d sess., 1774, 3106; 72d Cong., 1st sess., 359-360, 4965-4969, 9862-9863; 2d sess., 2756.

²⁵*H. Res. 92*, 5-52, 179-198; Patman, *Bankteering*, 129-172; *Congressional Record*, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 4964.

²⁶About the same time Senator Hiram Johnson, Chairman of the Finance Committee, was investigating foreign loans including those funds to Colombia. Remaining distant from these events, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson denied knowing "that there was such a thing as the Barco Concession," expressing no fear of Patman but some uneasiness over the Johnson inquiry and the leaks from the State Department to journalist Drew Pearson. In fact, he briefly mentioned that Mellon had only one reservation about living in England—the climate might injure his health. Henry L. Stimson Diaries (Manuscript and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut, 1973, Microfilm, Reel 4, Vol. XX, January 13; February 1, 3, 5, 1932); *H. Res. 92*, 5-52, 179-198; Patman, *Bankteering*, 129, 172; Stimson to Patman, October 19, 1931, WPP; *Congressional Record* 72d Cong., 1st sess., 358-361, 4965, 4966, 9862; "Mellon Denies Charge on Oil Grant," *Dallas Morning News*, January 16, 1932; "President Olaya Denies Talk With Mellon About Oil," *Dallas Morning News*, January 20, 1932.

²⁷*H. Res. 92*, 53-178, 198-201; "Olaya's Version Disputed by Mellon," *New York Times*, January 16, 1932. Whether or not Mellon made a deal with Olaya could possibly be answered in the Andrew Mellon Papers which at this time are not open. For biographies on Andrew Mellon and the Mellon family see David E. Koskoff, *The Mellons: The Chronicle of America's Richest Family* (New York, 1978); Burton Hersh, *The Mellon Family: A Fortune in History* (New York, 1978). Both books discuss the Mellon impeachment but Hersh is more sympathetic to Mellon than Koskoff.

²⁸"Mellon is Made Ambassador to Great Britain," *Dallas Morning News*, February 5, 1932; "Mellon Makes Ready to Yield Office to Mills," *Dallas Morn-*

ing News, February 5, 1932; O'Connor, Mellon, 234; *Congressional Record*, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 4966; Mellon to President [Herbert Hoover], February 8, 1932, Andrew Mellon File, Presidents Personal File, Herbert Hoover Papers (Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa). Hereafter cited as AMF. Hoover to Mellon, February 12, 1932, AMF. For more information on Hoover see Joan Hoff Wilson, *Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive* (Boston, 1975), 80, 84-85, 92. A brief mention of the Mellon impeachment and of Hoover's desire to remove Mellon from the Treasury can be found in David Burner, *Herbert Hoover: A Public Life* (New York, 1979), 280.

²⁹In the House Judiciary Committee meeting two members did not attend; so only twenty-one votes were recorded. See "Patman's Charge Against Mellon is Formally Dropped," *Dallas Morning News*, February 11, 1932; "Senate Confirms Mills as Treasury Secretary; Mellon Inquiry is Dropped by House Committee," *New York Times*, February 11, 1932; U.S., Congress, House, *Relative to Action of Committee on Judiciary with Reference to House Resolution 143 [To discontinue further consideration of charges made against Andrew W. Mellon]*, H.R. 444, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 1932, 1-2.

³⁰The signers of the minority report were Fiorello La Guardia of New York, Gordon Browning of Tennessee, Malcolm C. Tarver of Georgia, and Francis B. Condon of Rhode Island. See H.R. 444, 2.

³¹Patman, *Bankteering*, 137-139; *Congressional Record*, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 3444, 3850, 4966; "Mellon Charges Formally Dropped," *New York Times*, February 14, 1932.

³²Patman, *Bankteering*, 137-139; *Congressional Record*, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 4965-4966. Although appearing regretful that Mellon resigned, Hoover made no special efforts to attend farewell dinners for the outgoing Secretary. See Jesse H. Metcalf to Hoover, March 14, 1932, AMF; Hoover to Metcalf, March 15, 1932, AMF.