Espionage During the Texas Revolution

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ESPIONAGE DURING THE TEXAS REVOLUTION

by Robert W. Kesting

During the months of February through July 1836, many Texas citizens contributed toward the initial founding of Texas as an independent entity. Most historians rightly or wrongly have sung the praises of Sam Houston, Stephen F. Austin, and William Barret Travis. However, there are countless others who contributed as much as those more famous statesmen and military leaders. Some of these individuals were not considered Texas citizens nor did they have a vested interest in Texas property. History has not been as kind to these individuals for various reasons. The objectives of this narrative are to introduce one of those unsung heroes of the Texas revolution, and to reveal one segment of his clandestine operation which provided Texas with valuable assistance in the form of enemy intelligence data.

Intelligence formation in its rudimentary form has changed little throughout the centuries. Enemy strength, location, deployment, equipment, and conditions have been some of the valuable factors which military leaders needed to know in order for their operations to be planned and executed with some degree of success. The Texas revolutionary forces also needed this same type of information. However, this information is valuable providing it arrives on time and is put to good use. Unfortunately, communication was a major handicap during the 1830s. It took days and sometimes weeks, especially by land, to obtain vital data in Texas. The sea route was more dependable and faster, providing the weather was fair and there were no unforeseen obstacles which would cause a delay. The Texas army was able to obtain intelligence data by land using the spy system to infiltrate enemy camps or to extract information from enemy captives. But many of the militia officers probably were not that knowledgeable in the art of recognizing and confirming worthwhile intelligence. This thesis extends to the fledgling navy, which also lacked experience. However, one avenue which provided Texas with fairly accurate and timely intelligence reports had to be considered a pleasant surprise and quite possibly an unexpected one, especially in aiding the operations of the army and navy. This source was William Bryan, citizen of the United States, supporter of the Texas cause, and newly appointed general agent for Texas in New Orleans.

Among the important decisions of the Provisional Government of Texas, the appointment of William Bryan as general agent has to rank as one of the most noteworthy.¹ William Bryan and his partner, Edward Hall, operated a prosperous trade brokerage in New Orleans. Bryan had a good reputation for his expert knowledge of the mercantile business and

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at times provided liberal extension of credit to Texas merchants, a vital necessity for the financially weak government. Also, Bryan had numerous trade contacts and access to banking institutions within the United States in order to obtain loans, which was also vitally important for the survival of Texas.\(^2\) Another plus was that his political sympathies favored the Texas revolutionary movement.\(^3\) Based on these considerations, Stephen F. Austin and William Wharton, members of the First Texas Commission to the United States, appointed Bryan to the post of general agent for Texas.

What was Bryan's attraction or motivation in dealing with the rebel trade as opposed to the established Mexican trade? Perhaps Bryan considered this to be a monumental gamble on his part. He sympathized with the Texas cause; however, like all successful businessmen he probably calculated that a Texas victory against Mexico would certainly provide his agency with continued wealth and a possible monopoly of the Texas trade. Instant commissions would bring short-term profits to his agency, but his goal was perhaps a long-range and continuous capital venture for much higher monetary rewards in Texas real estate. The Texans did approach other New Orleans agencies, but Bryan was the only one willing to risk advancing capital to the fledgling government.\(^4\) Bryan's willingness to assist Texas with a continuous flow of transportation, supplies, manpower, and financial resources sealed the bargain.

Austin and Wharton required certain tasks be accomplished by the Bryan and Hall Agency. For example, Hall was responsible for all Texas' logistical needs, such as buying food and chartering vessels to transport personnel and supplies to the Texas coast. Bryan accounted for all Texas funds and communicated all information that was vital to the survival of the Texas revolutionary government to the chief executive for the Texas government.\(^5\) The key phrase "provide all information that may be important" could have stipulated intelligence information regarding the activities of Mexico.\(^6\) Perhaps it meant anything that pertained to Texas, but this was one of those oral agreements between the commissioners, Bryan, and Hall which probably will never be known. From vague requirements, it can be determined that the Bryan and Hall Agency was more than a typical trade brokerage. A more appropriate designation for the agency was that proposed by Alma H. Brown in "Consular Service of the Republic of Texas." Whether Bryan or the Texas commissioners wished it this way is difficult to determine. Perhaps Bryan understood from the beginning that his agency was to be the focal point for all Texas-related activities in the United States, and it would have to operate undercover because of United States neutrality. Based on this premise and his own personal interest, Bryan deemed it necessary to provide the Texas government with communications which not only described numerous activities involving Texas, but also pertinent information regarding Mexico. Bryan knew that he was in a good location to provide Texas with
somewhat accurate information regarding Mexico and its military movements based on leaks of information from Mexican ports that were communicated to the port of New Orleans via traders.

The latter part of 1835 and beginning of 1836 produced additional tensions and heightened existing ones between Mexico and its disgruntled and rebellious state of Coahuila and Texas. Plans to implement a reconquest to stamp out all vestiges of insurrection had passed from the operational to the execution phase. In order to implement a plan of such magnitude, logistical support was a prime ingredient for a successful campaign. In fact, Santa Anna already had given orders to procure at least a thirty-day supply of rations because he anticipated a swift and decisive campaign. Moreover, he counted on being able to forage for additional food supplies if the campaign dragged on. However, other valuable supplies, particularly arms and ammunition, were not readily available. Uninformed as to actual enemy strength and resistance as he would march toward their strongholds, Santa Anna initiated a plan to store vital supplies at Mexican ports such as Matamoros.

The Mexican government's financial posture was in no condition to sustain a protracted war after several years of quelling revolts south of the Rio Grande. Therefore, it was imperative that a rapid and terminal campaign be conducted to prevent further strain on the country's depleted treasury. As a result, Mexican officials contacted their agents, particularly in New Orleans, to provide the requested arms, ammunition, and other provisions to be delivered and stored at predetermined depots. This activity, coupled with the announcement that Mexico had closed Texas ports to foreign trade, placed Bryan on notice. By utilizing the merchant grapevine, Bryan was able to obtain important information relating to Santa Anna's movements and logistical plans. Perhaps his most valuable intelligence was relayed in a letter to the Governor and Council of Texas dated February 6, 1836. Bryan stated that Santa Anna had given his consent to a specific mercantile house in New Orleans to purchase provisions to support his Texas campaign against the Anglo-American rebels in the Texas colony. Additionally, Bryan received information that Santa Anna's supply ships were displaying a white-with-black-cross signal pennant. This pennant was actually the flag of a mercantile business in New Orleans.

This information was received at Matagorda by R.R. Royall, chairman of the Matagorda Safety Committee, and subsequently communicated to the Texas government. In Royall's letter addressed to the "Governor and Council" dated February 18, 1836, he stated that "Santa Anna provision vessels will sail under white flag with a black cross this will be a good mark for our vessels to be governed by." Bryan personally informed each Texas naval commander with the exception of William Brown while they were awaiting departure for the Texas coast. However, it cannot be determined that William Brown, master of the Liberty who patrolled waters near the mouth of the Rio Grande, was informed of this informa-
Probably he was not aware of this data. Shortly after this information was transmitted, the Texas armed schooner, Liberty, captured a Mexican vessel, the Pelicano, on March 3, 1836. Nineteen days later the Liberty captured and detained a United States merchant vessel, the Durango, in Matagorda Bay. On April 3, 1836, the Texas armed schooner Invincible seized and detained another United States merchant vessel, the brig Pocket, bound for the port of Matamoros, Mexico. Was Bryan’s information helpful in affecting the capture of these vessels?

On March 3, 1836 while blockading the port of Sisal, Brown encountered an armed Mexican trade schooner, the Pelicano, commanded by Captain Perez. Bryan later referred to this vessel in his letter to the governor and council dated March 29, 1836, as being “Mexican but owned by Americans.” The registry showed that the Pelicano was built in Baltimore. The Pelicano was probably a Mexican armed merchant vessel which loaded supplies at New Orleans and departed that port on February 25, 1836. She was on her return voyage when she was captured by the Liberty and subsequently taken to the port of Matagorda by a prize crew. The Pelicano ran aground while attempting to cross a sand bar. Attempts to salvage the cargo revealed that some gunpowder kegs were mingled with barrels of flour. The amount of the powder reported by a local newspaper and Captain Brown conflict, but Brown reported “280 kegs” were discovered. This may have been an exaggeration. Brown later stated in his letter to the editor of the True American, dated May 8, 1836;

...Sir—By Capt. Appleton, I am informed that J.W. Zacherie denied that there was any powder on board the schooner Pelicano. I have found a number of letters on the prize which proved the above fact. I feel it my duty to state these facts in regard to the powder. There was no mention made of it on the manifest. I should keep a constant lookout, and when I see the Mexican flag flying, I shall either take it or be taken....

It cannot be determined from existing documents whether the Pelicano, in addition to flying the Mexican flag, was also displaying the signal pennant identifying the cargo as belonging to Santa Anna’s logistical support effort as reported by Bryan. However, the possibility cannot be ignored.

Upon the Liberty’s return to Matagorda, Brown may have been informed of Bryan’s communication by Royall or others. During this same time, the Texas government was issuing orders to press into service anything that could be useful to support the war effort. On March 22, 1836, while patrolling in Matagorda Bay, the Liberty encountered a United States vessel, the brig Durango, bound for the port of Matagorda. The Durango was seized, boarded, and escorted into the port of Matagorda. The Durango was no stranger to the Texas trade and coast, because this vessel delivered Bryan’s initial intelligence report to Matagorda on February 18, 1836. The Durango was known to transport worthwhile supplies on her many recorded trips to Texas. In addition, James Reed,
the last recorded owner of the vessel and a merchant in New Orleans, purchased the vessel previous to July 9, 1835 on a business trip to Texas. The registry paper states that the vessel was purchased from Mexican authorities after the vessel was condemned. This statement may have meant Hispanics or more likely Anglo-Americans who were Mexican subjects. This Durango apparently was wrecked while attempting to cross the Brazos Bar. Reed must have purchased this vessel at a bargain price for him to have traveled from New Orleans to Texas. According to the registry document, Reed affected repairs in Texas and sailed the vessel to New Orleans where the vessel was registered officially. Reed declared himself a United States citizen and a resident of New Orleans and also that he had hired another New Orleans resident, James C. Ryan, as master of the Durango. Furthermore, Reed ran a mail service to Texas and knew David Burnet well. Also, he was an ex-partner of James Morgan, commandant of Galveston Island. The question remains: Was there a deal struck to ship contraband from the United States to support the logistical movement of Santa Anna or was this an attempt at recovering insurance money for a vessel that may have been over insured, which may account for the lack of protest by Reed when the Durango was captured? In any event, claims were not pressed immediately. The possibilities of these motives explaining the capture and impressment lack documentation.

Once the Liberty seized the Durango she was placed under armed guard at the port of Matagorda by a detachment of Texas Marines. The question now surfaces, what provoked Brown into capturing the Durango? Only two feasible explanations may be considered. The first is that the Durango, despite flying the American flag, also displayed the signal pennant which Bryan described in his letter of February 6, 1836. In his letter to the government on March 29, 1836, Bryan also mentions that the Liberty robbed an American vessel of an "anchor and cable" and the Americans considered this to be an "act of piracy." This perhaps was the Durango, because this vessel was the only known American vessel encountered by the Texas navy during this time. Bryan did not mention this ship by name because he was afraid that information and reports of this nature could fall into the wrong hands, especially in the United States, which at the time, was prosecuting American citizens for violating the neutrality of the United States government. In addition, he also was concerned that repeated occurrences would provoke "bad press" in the United States and may have some effect on the ultimate Texas goal of attaining recognition and annexation. To further allay fears that his communications to Texas would fall into the wrong hands, in January 1836 he ordered his captains "to destroy my communications to the government, should there be any fears of capture." However, this initial explanation loses some of its credibility because Santa Anna certainly did not want his supplies delivered into enemy hands. At the time of the capture, the port of Matagorda was controlled by Texas rebels. It was not until April 1836 that Matagorda was taken by advance units of Santa Anna's army.
The most logical and best documented explanation of why Brown captured the *Durango* was that Texas needed the supplies and the vessel was later used to transport troops and citizens along the coast. Previously, it has been mentioned that the Texas government had authorized the confiscation of private property to support the war effort and Brown probably was directed to confiscate the *Durango*. Unfortunately, a specific order to this effect does not exist, but apparently some documents fell into the hands of United States officials, who in 1837 and 1838 attempted to settle the only claim arising out of the *Durango* affair and several claims regarding the capture of the brig *Pocket*. John Forsyth, who was secretary of state of the United States, gave instructions to Alcee La Branche, *charge d’ affaires* to Texas, on July 27, 1837. In his letter of instruction, he directed that Le Branche demand immediate repayment of all claims arising from the *Pocket* affair. However, La Branche, in a letter to R.A. Irion, secretary of state of the Republic of Texas, tells the story of the capture of the *Durango* as it was told to him by Captain Ryan:

...The brig *Durango*, commanded by James C. Ryan, also an American Vessel, was seized in Matagorda Bay and pressed into the Texian service by orders of John A. Wharton, Adjutant general of the Texian Forces, and William S. Brown, commander of the Texian schooner *Liberty*. Said vessel sailed from the port of New Orleans bound for the port of Matagorda. Captain Ryan finding himself deprived of his vessel, and being unable to reclaim her in a legal way was compelled to abandon her....

Despite several key documents being lost which would further unravel some of the mystery regarding the capture, at least a comparable order of John A. Wharton did survive. It gives some indication of what a letter directing the confiscation of the *Durango* might have contained. In his directive to Major William T. Austin, local military commander of the Brazos District, dated March 18, 1836, four days prior to the capture of the *Durango*, he states:

...You are duly empowered to purchase or press any property that you may deem of advantage to the army ... your own discretion will govern you in many respects....

A similar order might have been issued to Brown, whose sector of patrol was Matagorda Bay, or this same type of order was given to another high-ranking officer in charge of the mouth of the Colorado River and Brown cooperated with him in the seizure of the *Durango*.

There is no existing evidence to support the claim that the *Durango* was transporting contraband. However, the vessel carried food supplies, which eventually aided the rebel army and later helped feed civilians temporarily housed on Galveston Island. Between March 22, and May 22, 1836 after the *Durango* was moved from Matagorda to Galveston Island to avoid the possibility of Santa Anna’s advancing units retaking the vessel, all that remained of the *Durango’s* cargo was “43 barrels of damaged flour,” as recorded by W. Lawrence, quartermaster of Galveston Island.
However, 100 barrels also remained on board the vessel, because this was to be used to feed the garrison and prisoners on Galveston Island. Apparently, officials had ordered transfer of the remaining cargo on board the *Durango* to be stored on the *Pocket* and eventually transferred elsewhere so military personnel could utilize the *Durango* to transport troops and supplies along the coast. Mirabeau Lamar, secretary of war for the interim government of Texas, ordered James Morgan to effect the transfer on May 15, 1836. In his directive, he ordered the following:

"...You will therefore cause her [Pocket] to take on board from the *Durango* all flour that remains on her excepting one hundred barrels which you will reserve for the use of the garrison, prisoners on the island. You will be very particular to have an Acct. taken for the number of barrels received from the *Durango*."  

The *Durango* disappeared from history after Wharton ordered the vessel to assist in transporting 140 troops down the Texas coast on September 16, 1836. Although gone, the *Durango* was not forgotten. A claim later filed by the Sea Insurance Company of New York, the insurance company for the vessel and perhaps the cargo, plus added pressure by the United States Department of State, provoked Texas into settling the claim for $8,050.32. Perhaps the most convincing evidence that supports this explanation is the fact that the Texas government was quite agreeable and had no objections to the terms as opposed to the controversy which surrounded the brig *Pocket* claims.

The evidence suggests that the *Durango* affair was not initiated by the information which Bryan provided on February 6, 1836. This incident probably was precipitated by other motivating factors. The most credible is that Texas' needs took precedence over everything, including international maritime law. Texans fighting for their survival paid scant attention to signal pennants or national flags.

On March 20, 1836, the brig *Pocket*, a merchant ship from Boston and a United States registered vessel, sailed from New Orleans to Matamoros, Mexico, under American colors. The vessel was carrying United States as well as Mexican citizens and cargo bound for the Mexican port. On April 3, 1836, somewhere near the mouth of the Rio Grande, she encountered the Texas armed schooner *Invincible*, mastered by Captain Jeremiah Brown. Captain Brown boarded the vessel and examined the cargo against the manifest. He discovered that several items did not agree. He also discovered war contraband such as arms, ammunition, powder, and military dispatches and a map of the coastline of Texas among other ship's papers. The dispatches and map were in Spanish. In a letter from David Thomas, acting secretary of war for the government of Texas, to Sam Houston, dated April 8, 1836, Thomas reveals the contents of the capture:

"...The cargo consists of 100 lbs. of flour, lard-rice-6 or 700 lbs. of buscuit. She had on board very important documents giving
information of the design of Sant Ana ... There is one document which gives the information that Sant Ana was at Bexar—that his force in all teamsters, women and children did not exceed eight thousand—that his object was to secure all sea ports intended to land 1,000 men on Galveston....”

In addition to the contraband cargo, dispatches, and map, also aboard the Pocket were several Mexican naval officers who were easily identified by Brown. Confronted by the obvious, Brown seized the Pocket. He immediately escorted the vessel to Galveston Island and turned the cargo, dispatches, map, crew, and passengers over to Morgan. The Pocket was assigned to a prize crew. The original crew and passengers were detained for several days. In the meantime, the Invincible set sail for the port of New Orleans where she was scheduled to be refitted. While at the port, news of the capture reached the local newspapers. To further inflame the situation, the crew and passengers of the Pocket had returned to New Orleans. Additional “bad press” by New Orleans publications incited the local merchants into a united front to do something to protect their commerce in the Gulf of Mexico. Local sentiment for the Texas cause deteriorated rapidly when merchants were confronted with the choice of maintaining friendly relations as opposed to the loss of revenue. Some merchants published their displeasure in the local newspapers. One comment extracted from the New Orleans Bee of May 6, 1836 states:

It is high time that American commerce in the Gulf of Mexico should be protected from both Texas and Mexico and unless the government interpose the evils will be very serious....”

Continuous pressure was applied to New Orleans federal officials. In addition to local merchant pressure, insurance companies joined the protest and began to exert their influence. The result was that the Invincible’s crew was arrested and placed on trial for piracy. Furthermore, Commodore A.J. Dallas, United States Naval Squadron Commander, Gulf of Mexico, was compelled to escort vessels in and out of Mexican ports. The most important result of the trial was the fact that the M. De Lizardi and Co., acting on a purchase order from Rubio and Co., a world-wide agent for Santa Anna, authorized and instructed the M. De Lizardi and Co. to purchase and ship the supplies which were discovered on board the Pocket at the time of her capture. Also revealed was the fact that the Mexican consul in New Orleans provided the dispatches. The map probably was constructed by one of the Mexican naval officers on board the Pocket. Additionally, Rubio and Co. instructed the M. De Lizardi and Co. to provide that signal pennant which Bryan alluded to in his correspondence of February 6, 1836. Major Samuel Ellis, a Texas agent [spy] and secretary to the Bryan and Hall Agency, exposed some of the evidence revealed during the trial and the confirmation of Bryan’s data. In an editorial dated May 16, 1836 in the New Orleans Bee, he states:

...The evidence of one of the firm, given before the examining court, was by the order of and charged to Rubio and Co., that the
premium was charged to them and that they considered the cargo at
their own risk. That such was the understanding is evident from the
clause of the charter, which expressly stipulates that the brig shall carry
a signal generally known as that of the acknowledged agents of San­
ta Anna, which signal was to be furnished by Lizardi and Co....41

Moreover, the trial produced three witnesses who told the court that Cap­
tain Howes, master of the brig Pocket, stated to each individual that once
they arrived at Matamoros he was contracted to transport Mexican troops
to Texas.42

The result of the Pocket affair confirmed the value of Bryan’s in­
telligence communication of February 6, 1836. Furthermore, while the
trial was in progress, additional prizes were captured by the Texas navy,
but little is known of these seizures. Mexico was affected by this informa­
tion. Any hope of its army receiving a continuous flow of supplies was
destroyed by the many captures which took place during this time. The
destitution of the army is well documented, and Mexico had to change
the identification signal once the plot was exposed. Texas also was af­
fected by the results of Bryan’s information. Texas used the captured goods
to its advantage during the battle of San Jacinto. Also, Texas had to read­
just her thinking and mode of operation upon the seas. As a result of the
Pocket affair, the Texas government was compelled to announce a
blockade of Mexican ports, which previously was given casual considera­
tion.43 The ad interim government had to establish a district court with
admiralty jurisdiction to adjudicate prize vessels, which prior to the Pocket
capture was ignored.44

In addition to the revelation of the signal used to identify Santa An­
na’s supply vessels, Bryan obtained other pertinent information regarding
Santa Anna’s troop strength, route of march, and overall condition of
his army. Sometimes this information was not always accurate and some
of it was known to the Texas government, but Bryan perhaps decided that
whether this information was factual or misleading should be a prerogative
reserved only for the military leaders of Texas to determine and cor­
robore. His job was only to obtain and provide information. Accom­
panying his report of February 6, 1836, Bryan also reported that “General
Santa Anna is at Saltillo with 7000 men waiting provisions, which are very
scarce in his army.”45 In another communication, dated February 26, 1836,
he reported that “9000 men were ready to advance upon Texas, as soon
as provisions could be obtained.”46 In a report dated April 30, 1836, he
relied that “news has come that the expedition against Galveston is about
leaving Matamoros under convoy of the Paragon.’’47 This latter piece of
intelligence probably meant little to the Texas government, because this
expedition never became a reality while David Burnet was president.
However, Texas was placed on alert to protect its most valuable port. Dur­
ing the months of April and May 1836, most of the Texas navy was
deployed around Galveston Island.48
Bryan's intelligence operation was a small part of an overall network of intelligence gathering employed by the Texas government during the revolutionary period. This network, besides extending into the United States, reached deep into Mexico. Both land and sea intelligence was gleaned from several sources. In particular, Texas had to compete with Mexican espionage activities within the United States. Since Texas was not recognized as a viable government, it was mandatory that some system of intelligence collection be established in the United States. The Bryan and Hall Agency provided that outlet, especially in New Orleans, where enemy intelligence information arrived frequently from Mexican ports. Besides his working under the veil of secrecy and constant pressure of arrest and imprisonment for aiding the Texas cause, the Texas government never appreciated Bryan's zeal and patriotism. Texas officials ironically rewarded Bryan by replacing his agency with another, leaving him with an enormous personal debt and damaged credit.

NOTES

5. Letter from Austin and Wharton to Hall, in Jenkins, ed., Texas Revolution, 4, p. 5.

Letter from La Branche to Irion, in Garrison, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1, p. 270.


Ship Registry Document, Book for the year 1835, port of New Orleans, document number 72, Record Group 41, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


Letter from Wharton to Austin, in Jenkins, ed., *Texas Revolution*, 5, pp. 138-139.

Inventory of Public Property on board the brig *Pocket*, James Morgan Collection, Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas. Lawrence did not record the additional flour alluded to by Lamar. He only accounted for the damaged flour.


Letter from Irion to La Branche, 30 December 1837, Records for the Department of State for the Republic of Texas, Record Group 307, Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas. Irion commented that the president had no objections to the payment of the Durango claim; however, the *Pocket* was already purchased in New Orleans by William Bryan and Toby & Brother. Texas was not going to pay twice for the same vessel.

Letter from La Branche to Irion, in Garrison, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1 p. 270. Neu, "Pocket," pp. 276-280. To further illustrate the inventory completed by W. Lawrence on board the *Pocket* dated 22 May 1836, he accounted for the following items: 20 muskets, 30 dragoon swords, 7 bayonets, and 43 pistols.


"Letter from Bryan to Governor and Council, in Jenkins, ed., Texas Revolution, 4, p. 270.


"Letter from Bryan to the President of the Republic, in Jenkins, ed., Texas Revolution, 6, p. 125.