The Texas Cavalry's Race to Reinforce Arkansas Post, January 1863

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Yesterday was a busy time in camps," wrote Lieutenant George Ingram of the Twelfth Texas Cavalry to his wife on January 2, 1863. "Night before last we received orders to take up the line of March for [Thomas C.] Hindman's army. Yesterday was spent in making preparations for the trip but last night the order was countermanded...." Indeed, as the new year opened Theophilus H. Holmes, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, recognized his dilemma. He needed to send reinforcements to Hindman's Confederates retreating after their battle at Prairie Grove in northwest Arkansas just three weeks before, but with a Federal army poised at Milliken's Bend above Vicksburg, he also feared a possible offensive from the southeast. The situation all across Arkansas appeared serious, but Ingram observed, "our leaders do not seem to be alarmed. In all probability they are drawing the Feds in a trap." Yet Holmes had concocted no stratagem. While he wavered, a massive force from Ulysses S. Grant’s Vicksburg expedition headed for Arkansas Post on the lower Arkansas River with plans to destroy the menacing enemy base located there. Only quick and decisive action by Holmes might save the Confederates stationed at the fortification.

Holmes had almost 5,000 — mostly Arkansas and Texas soldiers — at Fort Hindman, the Confederate bastion on the lower Arkansas River. Among the troops stationed there under Brigadier General Thomas J. Churchill was a Texas cavalry company from Harrison County led by Captain Samuel J. Richardson. These men had arrived early in December and had joined the Louisiana cavalrymen of L.M. Nutt and W.B. Denson on picket duty.

Many Texans at Fort Hindman, located about forty miles from the Mississippi River, regarded their position with foreboding. Captain Gil McKay of the Seventeenth Texas, a friend of Sam Richardson from Marshall, believed the fortifications totally unsuitable. Arkansas Post was, in his opinion, "Ft. Donaldson No. 2." A second member of the Seventeenth Texas, Marshall S. Pierson from Rusk County, agreed: "It was my impression that we could not hold this position." Lieutenant Flavius W. Perry of the same command joked: "This county was never made I don’t think for white people to live in, nothing but frogs and craw fish can live here long.... I don’t think the Yankees would have it if they could get it." Perry was correct. The Union commanders had no intention of taking and holding Arkansas Post. Reducing the garrison, nevertheless, would be a practical rehearsal for the more than 30,000 Federal troops waiting

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for Grant to resume his operations against Vicksburg. Major General John A. McClernand quietly planned his expedition without notifying either General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck in Washington, or Grant, the department commander.

McClernand had conceived an idea to recruit a special expedition of midwestern troops to open the Mississippi River. When Halleck did not appear interested, he turned to Abraham Lincoln for support. The president not only liked the plan, but he admired McClernand's enthusiasm and energy. As McClernand raised troops for the expedition down the river, however, Halleck forwarded them to Memphis within Grant's department.

Controversy plagued the expedition. Grant disliked the middle-aged McClernand, whose only military experience had come in the Black Hawk War. When the Civil War began McClernand received a commission as brigadier general and served under Grant in actions against Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. Yet his appointment, as the West Pointers knew, resulted from his prominence in the Democratic Party in Illinois and not his ability. And, after failing to block the retreat from Fort Henry as ordered, the boisterous McClernand claimed credit for the victory.

Grant did all he could to obstruct McClernand's control of the river expedition. Although he disliked the politician-turned-general, he began to favor the idea of a river approach to Vicksburg. To assure that
McClernand did not lead such an operation, Grant placed William T. Sherman over the troops. McClernand angrily complained to Edwin M. Stanton: "Either through the intention of the General-in-chief or a strange occurrence of accidents, the authority of the President and yourself, as evidenced by your acts, has been set at naught, and I have been deprived of the command that had been committed to me."

Exasperated, McClernand decided to push his operation in spite of all opposition; he knew he had the support of the president and did not need any other approval. After the successful Confederate raid on Grant’s base at Holly Springs and Sherman’s withdrawal from Chickasaw Bluffs, McClernand decided the time had come to reclaim his troops. He immediately moved to Sherman’s camp at Milliken’s Bend. As soon as he arrived he assumed command and created the “Army of the Mississippi,” which he divided into corps under William T. Sherman and George W. Morgan. The action he planned for these men, if he could prevail upon Rear Admiral David D. Porter to commit his fleet to the scheme, would be a coordinated land and naval attack up the Arkansas River to destroy the Confederate fort at Arkansas Post.

As soon as McClernand convinced the Federal commanders to join his operation, planning and implementation took scarcely over a week. But first he had to coax Sherman to take part in the campaign. Then Sherman had to persuade David Porter, who thought McClernand a braggart with little military ability, to agree to participate. McClernand’s stratagem, as the movement commenced, was to outwit the Confederates at the post by deceiving them as to the destination of Porter’s fleet. To mislead the Confederates he ordered the admiral to steam by the mouth of the Arkansas and appear as if heading toward Helena or Memphis. But after bypassing the Arkansas River Porter turned his vessels up the White River toward a little used cut-off that led back to the arkansas below Fort Hindman. On January 9 the navy docked three miles below the fort and, to the astonishment of the Confederate scouts, began to debark thousands of men. No one, especially Churchill and Holmes, had expected what appeared to be Grant's entire army.

By the next morning McClernand’s army was ready for an assault on the Confederate bastion. One division lost its way in the swampy countryside while trying to locate a road suitable for flanking the enemy position and the soldiers had to retrace their steps and rejoin the main column. While this division futilely wasted precious hours, the force advancing directly at the fort drove Confederate defenders from the outlying earthworks. But because McClernand could not position his army to the satisfaction of all the commanders, the offensive stalled. By evening McClernand decided to postpone the attack until the following day.

Churchill, whose orders were “to hold out till help arrived or until all dead,” immediately applied to Holmes for reinforcements. This anxious request caught Holmes off guard; he had few troops available
to augment those at the beleaguered fortress. Churchill, therefore, had to face the initial onslaught with only those under his command. Outnumbered and bombarded by Porter’s gunboats, whose artillery found the Confederate line within easy range, Churchill ordered his defenders to pull back to the rifle pits near the fort.

The Texas cavalry under Samuel Richardson played a crucial part in this retreat. Captain Richardson, operating with the Louisiana cavalry, covered the infantry’s withdrawal toward the new position. Shot and shell raked the Texans. Private William W. Heartsill recalled, “every tree concealed a blue coat ... and I for one [was] dangerously scared.”

This was the first time under fire for many of the Texas horsemen. When Captain Richardson ordered a halt he asked twenty-three-year old Private Witt, “Luther wher’s your hat?” Luther, who normally served as bugler and was by occupation a painter, answered, “in the brush,” and, he sheepishly continued, “Captain I’ve lost my Pistol too.” Richardson, pulling himself up to his full six feet, narrowed his grey eyes and sharply chided: “Uh, you MUST have been in a hurry.” To the amusement of all Witt answered: “Yes, I was trying to KEEP UP with my Captain.”

Reinforcements arrived during the night. Around 10:00 P.M. Alf Johnson and part of his spy company skillfully eluded the pickets stationed along the Federal line and rode safely into the fort. Churchill quickly placed Johnson, a Texan from McKinney, in command of all the cavalry, although both men realized that without more help the less than fifty men Johnson brought would be of little use. Heartsill thought Churchill made a grave mistake; Richardson, ranking officer by over six-months, should command the cavalry. But Heartsill’s devotion to his own captain made him forget that Johnson, who had served under Ben McCulloch, had months of experience fighting in Arkansas that Richardson lacked.

Sunday morning dawned clear and beautiful; General Holmes, en route to the post, had no idea that at that moment the Federal army occupied a position in front of Churchill’s lines. Still believing reinforcements could arrive in time, Holmes had ordered nearly all the troops in Arkansas to march in that direction. Yet Thomas B. Smith, a captain in the Eleventh Texas Infantry who breakfasted with Holmes, penned in his diary that evening: “The General looks rather more savage this morning than usual.”

The Texas cavalrmen camped near Des Arc greeted the news of an imminent campaign with marked excitement. William H. Parsons, who commanded a brigade consisting of his own Twelfth Texas, the Twenty-first Texas under George W. Carter, and the Nineteenth Texas led by Nathaniel M. Burford, prepared to march south. When the men in Carter’s regiment heard the order to reinforce the post they received it by cheering wildly and hastily began to clean their arms and accoutrements. Parsons’
Twelfth Texas, after cooking two days’s rations, had left for the post by sunset on Saturday evening; the rest of the brigade followed at daylight the next morning unaware that McClernand was at that time making preparations for his assault. Martin M. Kenney, captain of Company K, Twenty-first Texas, observed that the troops marched in a line two by two that strung out across the prairie for miles. “A song would be started at the head of the column,” he recalled, “generally some old camp meeting hymn which would be taken up all along the line to the rear.”

Early Sunday afternoon, as the Confederate cavalry rode toward the post, McClernand opened his attack. Porter’s gunboats commenced shelling while the infantry launched an assault. Two regiments that had once served as cavalry under Colonel Carter manned the right of a line that ran from the fort toward the bayou. Troops in the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Texas cavalries (dismounted) carried a variety of arms, including the Model 1841 or Mississippi Rifles and old flintlocks that the government had converted hastily to percussion fire. Moreover, shotguns were still the staple of many Texas troops. Because these weapons would be useless at any distance, Churchill instructed the troops not to fire until the enemy was well within range of the guns. F.C. Wilkes, a former Methodist minister who was the colonel of the Twenty-fourth Texas, ordered his men to wait and “shoot at their knees.”

The attack began on the Confederate left, thus the Twenty-fourth
and Twenty-fifth Texas did not feel the initial shock. When called upon to reinforce the line nearest the bayou, half of the companies from each of these two regiments moved toward the new position. But the firing had become so fierce that the Texans found they had to crawl through the trenches on their hands and knees.20

The bombardment from Porter's gunboat devastated the Confederate position. As the constant shelling efficiently reduced the fort, fires erupted in the wooden buildings and smoke choked soldiers trying to repel the Federal advance. Samuel T. Foster of the Twenty-fourth Texas watched the big square logs of the fort fly "about like they were fence rails." Iron flew in every direction.21 By mid-afternoon shells had so damaged the three big guns defending the post that artillerists could not return fire or prevent the gunboats from moving on their flank. Once Porter positioned gunboats behind the defenders, the Confederates were caught between the infantry and artillery in their front and the navy in their rear.

To many troops the situation seemed hopeless and further punishment would only delay the inevitable. Samuel Foster heard someone on his left cry out: "Hoist the white flag on the fort, — pass the word down the line." No one asked "whether it was a legitimate order or not" and no one knew where it had started. Reports said the flag first appeared in Wilkes's Twenty-fourth Texas, and Foster observed: "In a few minutes the Confederate flag is pulled down and a white flag run up on the flag staff in the fort, and white handkerchiefs or shirt tails are hoisted on ramrods and on guns all along the line as far as we can see ... in a minute everything is as quiet as a meeting-house."22 Someone in the Confederate right occupied by Robert Garland's First Brigade, consisting of the Sixth Texas Infantry, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Texas dismounted cavalry, William Hart's battery, and Denson's cavalry, had signaled surrender.

All of the commanders expressed surprise and anger. Furious that the deed had occurred in his brigade, Garland blamed the men in Twenty-fourth Texas. He believed that the "white flag which thus treacherously deceived the rest of the command was raised" by Wilkes's regiment of dismounted cavalry. His own regiment, the Sixth Texas, had "refused to raise the white flag or to pass the word up the line...."23 Colonel James Deshler, commanding the Second Brigade, reported, "knowing that it was General Churchill's determination to fight to desperation, I did not think it possible that a surrender could be intended...."24 Churchill added that after watching the flags appear in the midst of the Twenty-fourth Texas, "I was forced to the humiliating necessity of surrendering the balance of the command."25

Churchill had hoped to hold out until help arrived but the hierarchy had waited too long before deciding to reinforce him. By the time Parsons' command reached the Arkansas River on Tuesday, news arrived that the post had surrendered Sunday evening. Henry Orr of the Twelfth
Texas Cavalry, whose two brothers were among those captured, bitterly admonished: “The infantry censure Gen. Holmes for not getting [John G.] Walker’s Division at the Post before Churchill was compelled to surrender.” John Truss firmly believed: “If we could have got there we could have held the post in spite of all their efforts. Our forces was too much scattered.”

Although Holmes’s ineffectual attempt to aid Churchill’s troops failed, not all the Confederates were captured. Many defenders had fled from the post before the enemy soldiers cut off all lines of retreat. Marshall Pierson, when he heard, “We are surrounded!,” immediately shouldered his double-barrel shotgun and began walking toward the bayou on the west side of the fort. And, without having a shot fired at him, continued on until he reached the Confederate lines.

Surrender! Such an ignominious end. William Heartsill moaned: “If the Cavalry had been with their horses when the white flag was run up, we could all have escaped; but by the time that our boys reached their horses from the ditches, the Yankee Cavalry was around in our rear.”

Henry Orr, who later inspected the fortifications where his brothers had fought, concluded: “I have no doubt but half of them could have escaped after the fort was surrendered, but perhaps thought they would be paroled or shortly exchanged.”

For those who remained, relinquishing their possessions proved a gloomy task. To cavalrymen, the surrender of their cherished mounts was distressing. Many Confederates, however, refused to relinquish their sidearms; instead they threw them into the muddy waters of the stagnant bayou as their captors approached.

Upriver chaos followed the fall of the post. When Thomas Smith arrived near Pine Bluff he heard that Churchill had surrendered and the army expected Federal cavalry in the city by sundown. Rumors multiplied; travelers just as often swore the fort still held out. Confirmation of the capitulation came from enemy soldiers — prisoners captured as hungry Federals foraged the countryside near Porter’s fleet.

Confusion gave way to despair, anxious anticipation to uneasiness. The Texas cavalry, camped on the banks of the Arkansas River, waited for Holmes’ next order. Captain Martin Kenney remarked: “There were no more songs in our camp after these dismal tidings reached us, the sky was overcast with dark and threatening clouds, and the men prowled gloomily about the glaring camp fires....” They had no time to rest; at midnight orders came for the brigade to move south of the river. Scarcely had one company crossed on the ferry before a storm hit that extinguished all the torches and made further movement impossible. With no shelter near, the men huddled on their horses and waited for daylight. The rain poured in icy cold torrents and filled their boots and soaked their blankets. The Texans tried to shout and joke, but the rain outlasted even the most
resolute; long before daylight all stood freezing and silent. Kenney looked at his men, "the little band of wet and shivering soldiers hovered on the bank, with most of their ammunition wet and their trembling horses standing humped up," and pondered. They seemed a forlorn defense, he mused, "against the countless host of the foe in warm and waterproof clothing and comfortably housed on their iron boats."  

Daylight proved no better. The command finally crossed the river, but it rained steadily all day with no chance for anything to dry. Kenney finally found an abandoned house where he took his company for relief from the bitter cold. The men scarcely had built a fire before the bugle sounded "to horse" and then "forward." He recalled: "I do not know when I hated to leave anything as bad as I did that fire, but there was no help for it, the men took it cheerfully enough, they were eating their dinner, but in five minutes we were in ranks again." They moved only a short distance before camping again and finishing their meals. Yet the rain never ceased and when someone found a cache of whiskey the captains decided to issue it to the freezing men. But, as Kenney soon realized, "there was either a little too much of it, or long abstinence made them susceptible to its influence for when we started you would have thought that we were driving a herd of wild cattle."  

The weather frustrated their movement and seemed to taunt the miserable troops. As the effect of the whiskey died out it left the men colder than before. The brigade camped on a plantation where the horsemen took shelter in vacant slave dwellings with one company quartered in each cabin. Kenney, with forty men, decided to allow ten inside at once. But, he recalled, "the thirty outside froze faster than the ten inside could thaw and so we passed a miserable night; after dark it turned to a snow and snowed all night and all next day, being near a foot deep." John Truss grumbled as he sat astride his horse: "It was even in my boot tops."  

Both infantry and cavalry suffered. At daylight, when Kenney's men left their little hut, they passed the infantry and artillery struggling with "a helpless situation in mud knee deep." In the camp of Walker's Texans, known to the infantrymen as "Camp Freeze Out," the soldiers built fortifications of mud, snow, ice. "There we lay for six or seven days without tents and with but little food," lamented John Simmons of the Twenty-second Texas Infantry, "amid snow eight inches deep, with but one blanket apiece, shivering around our campfires." When the cavalry arrived at Walker's camp, the troops relieved the tired infantry pickets from duty just in time to suffer another downpour which began in the evening and continued all night, turning the snow to slush. 

Fortunately, and much to the surprise of everyone, the Army of the Mississippi retreated. Although the expedition had proved successful it had angered Grant, who had complained to Halleck: "Genl. McClernand has fallen back to White river and gone on a wild goose chase...." And
to McClernand, Grant protested: "I do not approve of your move on the 'Post of Arkansas,' while the campaign against Vicksburg is in abeyance."

"Unless you are acting under authority not derived from me," he continued, "keep your command where it can soonest be assembled for the renewal of the attack on Vicksburg." 42

The Federal commanders bitterly attacked each other. McClernand lamented to Lincoln just a few days after the operation: "My success here is gall and wormwood to the clique of West Pointers who have been persecuting me for months." 43 And to Grant, McClernand pointedly penned: "I take the responsibility of the expedition against Post Arkansas, and had anticipated your approval of the complete and signal success which crowned it, rather than your condemnation." 44 But as Admiral Porter pointed out, McClemand "actually had nothing to do with the management of the Army, and was down four miles below the forts during all the operations. Sherman was virtually the military commander."

Ironically, the weather proved an advantage to the Confederate defenders waiting at Pine Bluff for the Federal attack. Although Saint Charles, Clarendon, Devall's Bluff, and Des Arc fell to Brigadier General Willis A. Gorman, he could not pursue his advantage. He found the railroad from Devall's Bluff to Little Rock in good running condition, but the low marshy country between the two points was "one vast sheet of water." 45 The snow, melting rapidly, made any advance impossible.

And Grant pointedly instructed McClernand, "Unless there is some object not visible at this distance your forces should return to Millikin's Bend or some point convenient for operating on Vicksburg."

The race for Arkansas Post had ended. It was, as McClernand insisted, a singular success for the Federal army. United States forces had captured almost 5,000 Confederates; approximately seventy Southerners had died in the fighting and nearly two hundred suffered wounds. Many more Rebels would succumb on the vessels transporting them to northern prison camps as intense cold aggravated those sick and wounded.

Most Confederates in Richardson's Rifles and Johnson's Spy Company captured at the post never returned to the Trans-Mississippi Department. After a brief confinement in northern prison camps they were exchanged and assigned to Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee as dismounted cavalry. A few fortunate officers returned to Holmes's department — Captain Richardson was among the lucky ones sent back. Others, members of the rank and file such as William Heartsill, simply left without permission and moved west. Henry Orr wrote to his sister in June: "A few of Johnson's Spy Company have passed here enroute for their company east of White River; say they were in the battle on Big Black near Vicksburg."

Yet these troops would not rejoin Alf Johnson. This perspicacious Texas scout had died less than a month after the surrender. He had become
ill on the ship transporting the Confederate prisoners upriver and was among those taken off at St. Louis. He died at the City General Hospital on February 7,\textsuperscript{10} Heartsill, who learned of this in May, recorded in his diary, "by his death the Confederacy has lost one of her best Officers — A BRAVE MAN HAS FALLEN."

The loss at Arkansas Post was a severe blow and the surrender of 5,000 troops out of the department was a painful setback. But it only accentuated a more serious problem plaguing the Trans-Mississippi Department. The ease with which the Federal army had swept down upon Fort Hindman was a psychological victory which had potent impact on the civilian population as well as the military leaders in Little Rock. Hindman's retreat from Prairie Grove in December, followed by Churchill's capture in January, troubled Confederates all throughout the region. By March, Secretary of War James A. Seddon complained that "the most deplorable accounts reach the department of the disorder, confusion, and demoralization everywhere prevalent, both with the armies and people of that State." Holmes, who had failed to gather his infantry and cavalry in time to save the troops at Fort Hindman, had "lost the confidence and attachment of all...."\textsuperscript{51}

Many Confederates believed their presence at the post might have made a significant difference. In reality Holmes did not have sufficient force in his department in turn back the combined naval and ground attack aimed at the fort. Yet these Southern cavalrmen's only encounter with Federal soldiers, when Samuel Curtis marched his army through Arkansas in June and July of 1862, had given them a false sense of superiority. In that campaign the Texas cavalry, led by Colonel Parsons, had protected Little Rock successfully. But Curtis's "Army of the Southwest," tired and hungry after a long campaign, had been one-tenth the size of McClernand's well-fed and well-supplied "Army of the Mississippi." Had both Parsons' cavalry and Walker's infantry joined Churchill in time to take part in the fighting there was almost no chance they could have changed the outcome. Indeed, Confederates west of the Mississippi had little chance of changing anything. The fall of Arkansas Post was only an indication of the rapidly deteriorating conditions all throughout the department.

\textbf{NOTES}

\textsuperscript{1}George W. Ingram to Martha Ingram, January 2, 1863, Henry L. Ingram, (comp.), \textit{Civil War Letters of George W. and Martha F. Ingram 1861-1865} (College Station, 1973), pp. 46-47.

\textsuperscript{2}Ingram, \textit{Civil War Letters}.

\textsuperscript{3}For a more detailed account of the arrival of Samuel Richardson's company see W.W. Heartsill, \textit{Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days in the Confederate Army}, edited by Bell Irvin Wiley (1876; reprint ed., Jackson, Tennessee, 1954), pp. 85-89.

\textsuperscript{4}McKay referred to the surrender of Fort Donelson in February 1862. Heartsill, \textit{Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days}, p. 85.


J.A. McClernand to Edwin Stanton, January 3, 1863, U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (128 vols., Washington, D.C., 1880-1901), Series I, XVII, pt. 2, pp. 528-530 (hereinafter cited as OR; unless otherwise indicated all references are to Series I).


S.W. Bishop, "The Battle of Arkansas Post," Confederate Veteran, V (April, 1897), pp. 151-152.


John W. Truss to Rebecca Truss, January 3, 1863, "Civil War Letters From Parsons' Texas Cavalry Brigade," Johnette Highsmith Ray, (ed.), Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XLIX (October, 1965), pp. 219-220. Since Truss is telling his wife about the fall of Arkansas Post the letter would have to be after January 11, probably January 13, or 23.


Heartsill, Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days in the Confederate Army, p. 97.

Henry Orr to Father and Mother, February 18, 1863, Anderson, Campaigning with Parsons' Texas Cavalry Brigade, pp. 91-92.

Heartsill, Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days in the Confederate Army, p. 97.

Diary entry dated January 12, 1863, Thomas B. Smith Diaries.


Kenney, "Letter from Arkansas."

Kenney, "Letter from Arkansas."

Kenney, "Letter from Arkansas."


Kenney, "Letter from Arkansas."

Entry for January 13, 1863, Blessington, The Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division, p. 70.


McClernand reported 134 killed, 898 wounded, and twenty-nine missing for a total of 1,061. The Confederates reported around sixty killed, less than eighty wounded and 4,791 captured. OR, XVII, pt. 1, pp. 708. 716-719.


Unfortunately there is no record to indicate whether Johnson had sustained a wound in the battle at Arkansas Post. See the Compiled Military Service Record of Alf Johnson.

Diary entry dated March 28, 1863, Heartsill, Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days in the Confederate Army, pp. 116.

James A. Seddon to E. Kirby Smith, March 18, 1863, OR, XXII, pt. 2, pp. 802-803.