3-1985

The Violent Possibility: The Tenth Cavalry at Texarkana

Garna L. Christian

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj

Part of the United States History Commons

Tell us how this article helped you.

Recommended Citation

Available at: http://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj/vol23/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by SFA ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in East Texas Historical Journal by an authorized administrator of SFA ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact cdsscholarworks@sfasu.edu.
THE VIOLENT POSSIBILITY:
THE TENTH CAVALRY AT TEXARKANA

by Garna L. Christian

On a wintry afternoon in 1899 an animated group of East Texans crowded the Texarkana station platform and eagerly pushed toward the troop trains waiting to transport the Tenth Cavalry to garrisons across the state. From a distance the scene might have appeared a festive reunion or a farewell celebration. It was neither. The civilians angrily denounced the escape from arrest, with the aid of fellow enlisted men, of a member of the regiment that was returning triumphantly from the Spanish-American War. And from the train windows gleamed the barrels of government-issued rifles, mutely poised at the vocal throng. Already in motion was the chain of events that would ignite civilian-black military outbursts of violence in Texas communities at the turn of the century and foreshadow the nationwide urban riots of later decades.

Recent acts of heroism in Cuba had garnered the Negro units governmental citations, public attention, and a curious mixture of admiration and suspicion, but that heralded tour of duty merely climaxcd decades of little-noted danger and drudgery on the western frontier. While blacks had served in every American war since national independence, Congress delayed the formation of regular army organizations open to them until after the Civil War. Between 1866 and 1869 four black regiments were created, the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry and the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry.

Each unit served some time in Texas over the next fifteen years, then moved on to more remote areas of the West with the completion of the railroads and the final defeat of the Plains Indians. The duty included the laborious tasks of constructing and repairing roads, telegraph lines, and their own forts, while protecting railroads and often uncaring or antagonistic civilians from all manner of lawless elements.

The black soldiers received little gratitude from the citizenry for these efforts. Indeed, part of the decision to station them in the sparsely populated West stemmed from their rejection by Eastern communities, both North and South. Until 1898 only one company of black troops was garrisoned at a post east of the Mississippi. Accordingly, “the Buffalo Soldiers,” as the Indians dubbed them, served the nation in outbacks of Kansas, Oklahoma, Wyoming, Montana, and West and South Texas.

Conditions of service ranged from barely tolerable to horrendous. Rations, equipment, and shelter usually failed to match even the meager

Garna L. Christian teaches at the University of Houston, Downtown Campus.
standards accorded white soldiers. White officers, commanding blacks thought to be unfit to provide their own leadership, took pride in reputations as strict disciplinarians. Yet the limited opportunities for advancement, together with even bleaker possibilities in civilian life, contributed to a lower desertion rate among black troops than for their white counterparts.

Racial prejudice often denied blacks the traditional military safety valve of carousel during off-duty hours in tolerant garrison towns. While the sight of fighting, stumbling white soldiers seldom drew excessive disapprobation from prospering merchants and secure citizens, raucous conduct on the part of Negroes reinforced negative racial stereotypes. When the political and business leaders of a town recognized the advantages of garrisoning troops near them, a spirit of cooperation between the civilians and military establishments acted to reduce the inevitable racial tensions. Otherwise, careless comments by community spokesmen or hostile press reporting signaled invitations to bored or vengeance-seeking shepherders, cowboys, and even peace officers to victimize the black soldiers.

Occasionally a particularly odious action on the part of civilians stirred the military to action. In 1881 Tenth Cavalry troops from Fort Concho shot up neighboring San Angelo, without casualties, after a string of racial incidents culminated in the murder of a comrade. In its fury the attack grimly predicted the "retaliatory violence" of the twentieth century, but the assault stood virtually alone, failing to spark the "contagion phenomenon" of later years. More typical was the tragedy at Fort McKavett, Texas, in 1870. There, without incident, a jury freed a white man who had killed three black soldiers, two of whom acted under orders to apprehend him.

Racial clashes, as opposed to white harassment and violence, intensified with the Spanish-American War, partly because of black resistance. All four black regiments, and several Negro volunteer units, served with distinction in the brief war of 1898. Heroism at El Caney, Las Guasimas, San Juan Hill, and elsewhere brought plaudits from the government and much of the white press and public. Newly confident of his worth and potential, the black Spanish-American War veteran, like his counterparts of the twentieth century, expected the democratic rhetoric of the war to translate into constitutional guarantees for black Americans.

The rising expectations of the servicemen collided with the intensification of a national trend toward further segregation and discrimination. Racial ideologies, the strains of industrialization and immigration, and political threats to white supremacy converged with emasculating court decisions to push the Negro farther into the lower reaches of
society. While the complexity of the far ranging forces obscured their full impact and direction, perceptive blacks and whites recognized the immediate signs of decline in the former's fragile status.

The black soldier suffered relatively less than most members of his race. As a representative of the national government, usually serving hundreds or thousands of miles from home, he enjoyed a measure of immunity from local and familial pressures. His uniform, military bearing, and record of achievement cast him inexorably as a role model for the Negro community. While many whites felt uncomfortable with any challenge to the existing racial order, some, particularly in the traditional South, perceived the black soldier as a distinct threat to their way of life and resolved to humble him.

With the Spanish forces in disarray, black regiments were ordered to West and South Texas after an absence of almost two decades. Contrary to the experience of the 1870s, violence erupted at a number of sites following the appearance of the troops. Members of the Twenty-fifth Infantry assaulted a peace officer at Laredo in October, 1899, following complaints of police brutality, and they killed a lawman at El Paso in February, 1900, while attempting to release a comrade from custody. Ninth Cavalry troopers turned a Gatling gun on Rio Grande City in November, 1899, to counter a suspected civilian onslaught on Fort Ringgold. These relatively obscure incidents preceded the widely publicized Brownsville Raid of August, 1906, in which unidentified soldiers of the Twenty-fifth Infantry allegedly invaded the South Texas town, killing one civilian and wounding another. In turn sixteen Houstonians lost their lives eleven years later when armed members of the Twenty-fourth Infantry sought revenge on the police.

The return of the Tenth Cavalry to Texas in early 1899 offers an insight into the accumulative effects of racial tension and the selective perception of participants and onlookers. When twenty rail cars delivered the regiment from Huntsville, Alabama, to Texarkana, Texas, on January 31, local whites and black soldiers had not encountered each other in years. Yet neither group came unencumbered to the other. Whites sought to block any encroachments on East Texas mores. The soldiers carried with them recent psychological scars from Alabama and Mississippi.

Huntsville had proven an unwelcome community for the Tenth Cavalry, not only from the standpoint of the white citizenry but also from an unexpected military source, the provost guard. Several troopers celebrated their arrival in October, 1898, by seeking out the restricted zone, an area reserved for the pleasure of white customers only. An altercation ensued and the military police arrested one of the sojourners. At that point armed comrades of the apprehended man interfered, and
in a confusing exchange of fire, they mortally wounded two guards. Three of the soldiers sustained wounds, while the others disappeared into the crowd. In a military investigation, witnesses failed to identify the fugitives."

Although the tragedy involved only a few men of the Tenth Cavalry, animosity between the regiment and the white Sixteenth Infantry guards continued. Captain S. L. Woodward accused the latter of singling out members of his unit for weapons searches at a circus performance in Huntsville. "There need be no fear," the officer assured a superior, "that the Tenth Cavalry will behave more disorderly or require more watching than other organizations . . . [or] appear in the streets . . . mounted, drunk, falling from horses, and vomiting over themselves as was the case yesterday . . . with men or another regiment."

Controversy and peril had dogged the black regiment into Texas. As the troops passed through Meridian, Mississippi, from Huntsville, Alabama, on January 30, 1899, unknown assailants fired upon the trains. Lieutenant H. B. Dixon, commanding one of the sections, reported that a dozen bullets smashed windows and doors of a coach, miraculously striking no one. The darkness of night, accentuated by rain and the motion of the cars, concealed the culprits. While Dixon believed the shooting deliberate, railroad employees suspected "reckless men [acting] for no other reason than mere sport."

Such was the preamble to the unit's brief but stormy passage through Texarkana. Ironically, the incident duplicated almost identically the clash at Huntsville, though with civil authorities and no fatalities. Unidentified Tenth Cavalrymen utilized a rest stop to patronize the Belmont House in the red light district. A frightened, partially clothed resident managed to escape the intruders and rushed to the courthouse to relate the occurrence in emotional terms. A peace officer, accompanied by several local officials, overtook a soldier proceeding from the site of the disturbance to the depot. As Constable J. F. Rochelle attempted to arrest the man, a group of cavalrymen crowded around the pair, jostling the prisoner free. The soldier concealed himself on a crowded train while a number of his regimental fellows intimidated the officials and townspeople by pointing rifles from the coaches' windows.

At the request of civil authorities, military officers delayed the departure of the trains for several hours in order to effect a search. Although several witnesses had promised to identify the wanted man and his rescuers, a prolonged inspection proved fruitless. When the locomotives finally steamed out of the station, the relatively minor incident had not yet run its course, however. Still to come were prevoca-
tive news reports, strained exchanges between state and military administra tors, and an accumulation of mutual ill-feeling that would burden civilian-military relations even before the troops reached their assigned garrisons at San Antonio and along the Mexican border.

Newspapers across the state carried the report, datelined Little Rock, below such compelling headlines as "The Tenth Cavalry Made a Rough House Out of Texarkana" and "Drunken Soldiers at Texarkana." "When they arrived here they were a drunken mob," asserted the writer, "and an effort was made by them to tear up the town." After sketching the main points of the story, the unnamed reporter stated that at the point of the soldiers' arrest, "Every car window held a drunken negro [sic] with a cocked rifle...." Irate Texarkanans, equipped with dynamite, surrounded the trains, "... ready to send the entire horde to destruction." The scribe concluded that "... every negro would have been dynamited out of existence ..." had not cooler heads prevailed.

Although some embellishments of the facts faded under closer scrutiny, enough of the story remained to attract the intervention of Governor Joseph D. Sayers, a Confederate veteran just beginning his term of office. The interest of the state's chief executive stemmed from a communication dispatched by Horace W. Vaughan, county attorney. As he divulged to the press the contents of his letter, Vaughan denied that there had been any threat of dynamite.

In other particulars the local official negated the tone of the original news release. He delayed four days before informing Sayers of the situation, though he admonished himself mildly for not having acted sooner. Vaughan acknowledged that the soldiers had attracted "no particular attention" during the hour-and-a-half which they passed in the town before the disturbance and cited no abuse of alcohol on their part.

The county attorney, nevertheless, corroborated the essential elements of the news story. He stated that he had been present in the courthouse with Constable Rochelle, Justice of the Peace P. G. Henry, and Deputy Sheriff L. C. Lynch when the distraught prostitute burst in. He confirmed the reported chase, the foiled arrest, and the display of weapons by members of the regiment. Fortunately, "a tall yellow officer" positioned himself between the armed soldiers and the gathering crowd, ordering the troops to hold their fire. "While this was transpiring," attested Vaughan, "the soldiers were guilty of conduct that almost precipitated a riot here. They used language that was calculated to fire up the blood of any white man on earth and were very insulting in their conduct." The local official requested of Sayers "... to demand of the proper authority in the proper way, an investigation ..." that would facilitate prosecution by the state.
The communication stirred the Governor to action. He assured Vaughan, "I will do everything within my power to carry out what you desire...", and fired off identical telegrams to Secretary of War Russell A. Alger and United States Senators Roger Q. Mills and Horace Chilton of Texas.

Soldiers of the Tenth U.S. Cavalry in passing through Texarkana acted in a most outrageous manner violating the law, insulting citizens and putting their lives in jeopardy. Please see President at once and obtain from him an order directing a trustworthy officer to proceed immediately to Texarkana and inquire into the matter, first conferring with Honorable Horace W. Vaughan [sic] ... Please answer."

Meanwhile, the press exposed differences of opinion between some military officers and civil authorities, tending to place the latter in a better light. A statement by Captain Guy Carleton of the Tenth Cavalry denying the reported outburst drew the derisive comment of being "... regarded as a huge bluff by the people of Texarkana." The item stated that Representative J. L. Sheppard of East Texas had placed the matter before Secretary of War Alger, while repeating accusations of Negro drunkenness and lack of cooperation by army officers.

The news release revived other emotional, if questionable, issues. The discredited dynamite episode resurfaced, with townspeople purportedly purchasing ninety pounds of explosives from local hardware stores to protect themselves from rampaging blacks. Expanding on the theme of Negro destruction, the writer alleged "Every railroad station from Little Rock to Texarkana shows signs of the soldiers' depredations. The sign board on every depot designating the colored waiting rooms was demolished." Interestingly, in this offhand and accusative reference to firing from trains, the press came as close as it ever would to reporting the shooting incidents of which the military complained at Meridian and, subsequently, near Houston.

Happily, an encounter at Houston between a reporter and an army officer ended on a more amicable note, despite early misgivings on the part of the interviewee. On the day following the Texarkana incident, a contingent of the Tenth Cavalry that had bypassed the East Texas town and had drawn fire at Meridian stopped in Houston en route to Fort Clark. When a reporter posed a question to Colonel T. A. Baldwin on the destination of the troops, the agitated officer turned him back with the reply: "I have absolutely nothing to say. You would print whatever you wished, any statement of mine to the contrary notwithstanding." On reflection Baldwin attributed his bad humor to the reporting of the Texarkana controversy rather than any action of the local newspaper. An accompanying junior officer voiced the sentiments of his superior and, doubtless, other army officers who had commanded
black troops. “They fought like tigers before Santiago,” exclaimed the lieutenant, who had suffered a stomach wound in the campaign, “and I cannot bring myself to believe that they could commit such acts of lawlessness as have been ascribed to them.”

The journalist displayed more sympathy for the black soldiers than was the case with many of his colleagues. “The men were given their liberty all during the time they were here [approximately three hours],” he stated, “and it can be said to their credit that they conducted themselves in a manner which elicited nothing but commendation from those who saw them.” Extolling their war record, the writer described the troops as “a fine, lusty looking set of fellows” and accepted an invitation from Colonel Baldwin to visit the headquarters at Fort Clark.

The optimistic mood established at Houston dissipated in the adjoining countryside before a hail of bullets as the troop movement resumed in the evening. When the train bearing Troops C and D steamed passed Harlem, shots rang out from the darkness. In what must have seemed a recurring nightmare, Lieutenant Dixon heard reports from a .44 or .45 caliber single action pistol at ten o’clock, while most of the men slept in dimly lit or darkened coaches. “A badly executed volley” of both rifle and pistol shots quickly followed from both sides of the track, striking the cars in front of him and breaking glass in a dozen windows. Some of the soldiers returned fire, the crack of their .30 caliber carbines “plainly distinguishable” from the sounds of the other weapons. After ordering his command to cease fire, Dixon discovered no serious injuries but treated a number of cuts and scratches about the face and hands. It appeared to Dixon that only the reclining position of the soldiers, asleep in their berths at the time of attack, prevented tragic casualties.

Although the attack occurred only a few miles from Houston, it went unnoticed in the local press except for a terse item and an angry letter to the editor. An entry datelined Richmond, Texas, described “outrageous conduct” on the part of soldiers whose alleged target practice from trains left “houses all along the line filled with bullets.” Under the heading, “Bad Conduct of Negro Soldiers,” a resident of Harlem complained of troops firing “indiscriminately in every direction” from their coaches on the night of the attack. The writer protested that shells struck several houses, narrowly averting mortalities, and ended on a sardonic note: “If such conduct can’t be stopped, as I live very near the railroad, I would thank anybody who would let me know that they are coming, so we can escape with our lives, and will leave them our house and furniture and consider ourselves lucky.”

Unknown to the general public, apprised only of accusations against the soldiers, the military filed complaints of its own. Upon
receipt of Lieutenant Dixon's report, Colonel Baldwin forwarded the account to the adjutant general at Washington with the comment: “I would respectfully state that I make this report to show how the colored troops have been treated while changing station and request that some steps be taken to enable them to pass through country which they are sworn to protect without danger from hidden assassins.” Secretary of War Alger dispatched copies to the governors of Texas and Mississippi and requested the United States Attorney General “... to ferret out the perpetrators of these outrages and to prevent their reoccurrence.”

The exchange between Washington and Austin officials conformed to diplomatic correctness, masking any sentiments that may have accompanied the communications. Secretary Alger begged of Governor Sayers “... such consideration and action, with a view to discovering the parties engaged in the outrage, as may seem to you to meet the ends of justice.” The state executive responded that he had “... taken the necessary steps to secure a thorough investigation of the affair...” and promised to advise the cabinet officer “fully” of the results.

In compliance with Special Orders No. 36 Captain B. H. Byrne, Sixth Infantry, drew the assignment to investigate the Texarkana affray. He departed Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, on February 9 and arrived in the East Texas town the following day. There he contacted county attorney Vaughan for “a detailed account of the alleged misdeeds” of the troopers, only to be presented with a duplicate of the letter which the local official had sent to the Governor. Vaughan insisted that the communication contained the entire story. Captain Byrne then asked that Vaughan and Constable Rochelle, also present, produce participants or eye witnesses.

The attendants of the Belmont House described the abrupt arrival of six or seven soldiers, prominent among them a tall mulatto and a short dark man. One woman recalled that the former placed his foot in the door when she attempted to prevent their entrance and shouted, “Open that door and open it damned quick you God Damned whores, bring your white bitches or we will tear the house to pieces.” The other tenants and a black porter corroborated the narrative, the latter distracting the soldiers sufficiently for one of the prostitutes to escape. The porter reproved the intruders, “You are in the wrong country to do any thing like that...,” prompting two of the men to threaten to “blow [him]... to hell.” The mulatto intervened, according to the custodian, exclaiming: “He is a colored gentleman like ourselves, don’t hurt him, it is the white sons of bitches we are after.”

Other witnesses described the attempted apprehension of the soldier and his escape, with some confusion on detail. Some disagreement arose on the point of contact between the arresting officer,
Rochelle, and the wanted man. There was also a lack of consensus on whether Rochelle had spotted the soldier or was directed to him by an accusor. Witnesses presented the investigating officer a rather wide range of numbers of soldiers involved in freeing the fugitive.¹¹

Constable Rochelle, unquestionably the most reliable witness, depicted his role essentially as reported in the press. He stated that about three in the afternoon on the day in question "... one of the inmates of Lottie Stewart's house of ill fame came running to the Justice of the Peace office very much excited, asking for an officer [and] saying that there was a crowd of Negroes in her house tearing it up." Rochelle, Vaughan, and Lynch, the deputy sheriff, rushed to the site and saw the men proceeding toward Union Station. The constable overtook "a tall yellow Negro" and placed him under arrest, only to lose the prisoner to "... about forty or fifty [soldiers] ... each with a gun." Immediately, "... about two hundred Negroes ... some of them loading their guns ..." poured out of the coaches, prompting the three civil officials to seek shelter, though an army sergeant commanded the troops not to fire. "We had no chance against these men," judged Rochelle. "They could have cleaned the town out."¹²

From the standpoint of the inquiry, all roads from Lottie Stewart's house reached a dead end. Although a number of witnesses had believed themselves capable of identifying the wanted soldiers, none was able to do so during the lengthy inspection following the incident. Nor could bystanders sought out by Captain Byrne clarify the confusion. Indeed, the civil officials at Texarkana doubted that any additional useful information could be gleaned from the populace. Still undetermined was the company or companies to which the disorderly men belonged and the units to which they escaped.¹³

The inspecting officer hoped that an internal military investigation might yet disclose the wanted information. The testimony suggested that the second section of three troop trains carried the disruptive soldiers. Accordingly, Captain Byrne shifted the focus of his inquiry to the command of the Tenth Cavalry. He soon discovered a striking contrast to the civilians' statements in the level of emotion and certitude.³⁶

On the essential matters of identification and responsibility, the officers commanding the troop movement contributed negligibly. Major J. L. Fowler, in charge of the second section, learned of the incident only after noticing a crowd gathering on the platform. He disciplined a train guard who apparently had been drinking, although the soldier comported himself well and employed courtesy and restraint to the angry townspeople. The major quoted the civil authorities as satisfied with the military cooperation and doubted that members of his command had participated in the misdeed."¹⁴
The regimental commander, Colonel S. M. Whitside, also acknowledged no first hand knowledge of the matter. Traveling aboard the third section, he noted “nothing to attract attention” at his arrival and took lunch at the depot dining room. While the colonel ate, “the sheriff,” probably Constable Rochelle, entered the restaurant and approached the table. The peace officer appeared so little agitated that he insisted upon waiting for Whitside to complete the meal before telling him of the disturbance. The colonel immediately appointed Captain L. P. Hunt to assist the civil officers in a search of the trains. The regimental commander saw no evidence of intoxication on the part of any soldier during the entire journey from Alabama."

Captain Hunt, who assisted in the search, first learned of the trouble by asking some soldiers the cause of a gathering crowd. They replied that “…two citizens had disarmed a soldier and…some of the latter had resisted and threatened to shoot.” He accompanied Vaughan through the coaches on two separate occasions, the second time with a witness who had claimed that he could recognize “the yellow man.” Although Hunt required each soldier to directly face the front, the wanted man remained at bay.”

Captain Charles G. Ayers, leader of the first section, discounted the surmise of some officials that the fugitive fled on an early departing train. Like the other officers, he denied direct knowledge of the incident that prompted the delay and search and asserted that no mention of trouble arose until the other sections arrived at the depot. “Men under my orders and control have yet in my career to make a disturbance as is herein described,” Ayers attested, not commenting on the possibility that a soldier from another section had stolen away in his train’s departure.”

There the matter lay. A subsequent army report concluded: “From the tone of the accompanying endorsements it would seem that no special effort has been made to ascertain the identity of the men who made the visit to the house of ill fame and who were responsible for the consequent conditions although such inquiry may have been made.” Indeed, the tenor of each officer’s response seemed primarily designed to release that commander and his unit from any share of culpability. No such frank appraisal accompanied the unrecorded efforts of the governors of Mississippi and Texas to locate the attackers of the troop train at Meridian and Harlem. Given the circumstances, one may doubt that the undertaking manifested much zeal.”

Curiously, the relationship between Texas Governor Sayers and the Tenth Cavalry thawed momentarily as the investigations floundered. Fear of a smallpox epidemic moved Sayers, at the behest of the state health officer, to dispatch Texas Rangers to Laredo in order to vaccinate
an unwilling Hispanic population. When an irate mob defied the fabled lawmen, the Governor called upon the assistance of the black garrison at Fort McIntosh to pacify the populace and thwart the spread of the feared disease."

Within a few months, however, the conditions reverted to their ominous beginnings. Racial clashes at Rio Grande City and Laredo raised a public outcry, echoed by Sayers, for the withdrawal of the Tenth Cavalry from Texan soil."

By the measurements of later civilian-military clashes, the incidents at Texarkana and Harlem pale in comparison. Although both sides brandished arms, and in the latter instance one group resorted to their use, no serious physical injuries and only limited property destruction resulted. The spectacle of a half-dozen enlisted men scurrying from depot to bawdy house during a rest stop hardly merited mention, nor the attempt by a hunted soldier, with the aid of friends, to avoid arrest. Neither was the practice of firing at trains "for sport" as unusual as rail employees would have liked. The racial factor turned obnoxious, if recurring, actions into potentially devastating events. The sharply etched memory of a white mob demanding a black soldier and the recollection of armed Negro troops leveling rifles at civilians, whether or not in self-defense, overpowered subsequent gestures at comity between garrisons and communities. In that stark moment at the Texarkana depot, the approaching violence at Rio Grande City, Laredo, El Paso, Brownsville, and Houston became possible.

After the incident at Texarkana army and state governmental reports on military-civilian clashes in Texas would no longer enjoy the luxury of indifferent inquiry.

NOTES


Foner, *Blacks and the Military*, 77-79. Other examples of racial tension produced by an underprivileged class entering the military are shown in L. Kennett, “Camp Wadsworth Affair,” *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LXXIV (Spring, 1975), 210-211.


Foner, *Blacks and the Military*, 74-75.

S. W. Dunning, Captain, 16th Infantry, to the Adjutant General, 4th Army Corps, Huntsville, Alabama, October 17, 1898, AGO file 2046322, RG 94, National Archives.

S. L. Woodward, Captain, 10th Cavalry, to Lieutenant Colonel T. A. Baldwin, 10th Cavalry, Huntsville, Alabama, October 28, 1898, AGO file 2046322, RG 94, N.A.

H. B. Dixon, 2d Lieutenant, 10th Cavalry, to Baldwin, Fort Clark, Texas, January (sic) 7, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

B. H. Byrne, Captain, 6th Infantry, to the Adjutant, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, February 13, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.


Houston Daily Post, February 1, 1899; Galveston Daily News, February 1,

Galveston Daily News, February 5, 1899; Horace W. Vaughan, County Attorney of Bowie County, Texas, to Honorable Joseph D. Sayers, Governor, Texarkana, Texas, February 3, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

Galveston Daily News, February 5, 1899; Vaughan to Sayers, February 3, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

Galveston Daily News, February 5, 1899; Vaughan to Sayers, February 3, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

Galveston Daily News, February 5, 1899; Vaughan to Sayers, February 3, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

Sayers to Vaughn, Austin, Texas, February 4, 1899, Governors’ Papers: Joseph D. Sayers Letter Press Books 2-11/420, vol. I, no. 197, Archives, Texas State Library, Austin; Assistant Adjutant General to Commanding General,
Department Gulf, Washington, D.C., February 8, 1899, AGO 200526, RG 94, N.A.

*Houston Daily Post*, February 3, 1899.

*Houston Daily Post*, February 3, 1899.

*Houston Daily Post*, February 2, 1899.

*Houston Daily Post*, February 2, 1899.

Dixon to Baldwin, January 7, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.; Baldwin to the Adjutant General, Fort Clark, Texas, February 7, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

*Houston Daily Post*, February 3, 1899; February 4, 1899.

Baldwin to Adjutant General, February 7, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

Secretary of War R. A. Alger to His Excellency, the Governor of Texas, Washington, D.C., March 4, 1899, Joseph D. Sayers Correspondence 2-11/378, Austin; Sayers to Alger, Austin, Texas, March 11, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

Byrne to Adjutant, February 13, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

Byrne to Adjutant, February 13, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

Byrne to Adjutant, February 13, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

Byrne to Adjutant, February 13, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

Byrne to Adjutant, February 13, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

Byrne to Adjutant, February 13, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

J. L. Fowler, Major, 10th Cavalry, to Regimental Adjutant, 10th U.S. Cavalry, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, February 28, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

3rd Endorsement, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, February 20, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

5th Endorsement, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, February 24, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

9th Endorsement, Fort McIntosh, March 13, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

Mattingly, March 30, 1899, AGO 184450, RG 94, N.A.

W. F. Blum, M.D., State Health Officer, to Sayers, Austin, Texas, March 9, 1899, Correspondence 2-11/378, Austin.