The Penetration of Foreigners and Foreign Ideas into Spanish East Texas, 1793-1810

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A backwater to the mainstream of world politics, the Eastern Interior Provinces of New Spain (Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Nuevo Santander, and Texas) nevertheless felt the impact of the French Revolution and the period of wars and intrigue that followed. Spanish officials in these provinces—commandants-general, governors, and army officers—for the most part were loyal adherents to the centuries-old royal tradition, and were determined to stop the spread of the doctrines of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Even before this period, in fact, they were suspicious and fearful of foreigners and foreign ideas. Their suspicion stemmed from provincialism, religious nationalism, and past events. Their fear was grounded in military weakness: the number of Spaniards in these provinces was few, especially in Texas, compared to the tens of thousands of fickle savages surrounding them. Therefore, following the outbreak of war in Europe in early 1793, these officials redoubled their efforts to keep foreign agents away from the Indians, as well as to keep foreign ideas away from their own people.

In the fall of 1793 when official confirmation arrived that Spain had joined with England and other European nations in a war against France, there was an immediate increase in tensions in the Eastern Interior Provinces. From Chihuahua City Commandant-General Pedro de Nava in November sent instructions to Governor Manuel Muñoz of Texas to dispatch an armed expedition to the Gulf Coast area. The leader of this party was to exhort the Indians not to treat with any French landing party, and he was to promise rich rewards to the chiefs if they would relay quickly the news of any French activities to Spanish officials. When rumors reached San Antonio a few months later that French agents were working among the tribes of North Texas, Nava likewise ordered an expedition to that region.

Viceroy Miguel de la Grua Talamanca y Branciforte (1794-1798) was not content that sufficient precautions had been taken in Nava’s area of command. In December he ordered that all Frenchmen in the Eastern Interior Provinces be arrested and confined. However, Texas was exempted from the provisions of this decree because of the large number of Louisiana-born French living there. Such practices ceased in July of the following year when word arrived from Europe that peace had been re-established with France.

Nevertheless, Spanish officials remained zealous in their efforts to prevent the entry into the area of French revolutionary doctrines in the form of printed matter. As quickly as such works became known, they were banned by the government and placed on the church list of proscribed
works. For example, in November of 1794 Nava ordered the governors under his command to seize all copies of *The Disenchantment of Man*, a work printed in Spanish in Philadelphia. All copies of the book were to be confiscated, and all persons arrested who possessed it or had read it.\(^5\) In October of the following year came a similar order regarding a manuscript entitled, "Discourse pronounced by Boisi d'Anglas, Member of the Public Order..." Nava concluded his dispatch with the prophetic words: "Exercise care about the types of material in circulation, for by this manner our religion, king, state, cult, vassalage, and security may be lost."\(^9\)

The war with France was hardly ended before another source of worry arose to replace it. In October of 1796 Nava informed his governors that the English were counterfeiting Spanish pesos at Birmingham, England, with the intention of introducing them into the New World to wreck the economy in the colonies.\(^10\) Within four months came word that war had been declared against England;\(^11\) and with this news there was a wave of fear, amounting almost to hysteria, that the English and Americans were planning a joint invasion of Louisiana, and possibly Texas. Governor Muñoz wrote his superior that he had taken all possible precautions to meet the threat: frequent inspections of the coast had been ordered, and diligent efforts were being made to keep enemy agents from going among the Indians.\(^12\)

The fear that the United States might invade the Eastern Interior Provinces was not new in 1797. In fact, such a feeling had been growing since the signing three years earlier of the treaty between the United States and England (Jay's Treaty). To the Spaniards this accord seemed a prelude to aggression. And as in the case of the French, there soon were rumors that American agents were circulating among the Indian tribes in Texas.\(^13\)

On July 30, 1795, Nava wrote Governor Muñoz of Texas that "the king has been informed on good authority that the United States has ordered emissaries to move here [the Interior Provinces] and work to subvert the population." He noted that dispatches from the Baron de Carondolet, Governor of Louisiana, told of "greedy persons from the western states" moving into the interior of that province. He concluded with a warning to "exercise care to see that no foreigners go among the Indian nations that are our allies."\(^14\) Even news of the signing of a treaty between Spain and the United States (Pinckney's Treaty) did not allay suspicions of American aggression in the Interior Provinces.\(^15\)

Despite the fact that no invasion ever materialized and no enemy agents were caught, the tension continued to mount among Spanish officials. As France and Spain had allied in the European struggle, and as an undeclared naval war was raging between France and the United States in the late 1790's, the commanding-general feared that Americans might attempt a sudden seizure of Spanish territory. Especially alarming to this official was the granting by Congress of authority for President John Adams to raise an army of ten thousand men. In August of 1798 Nava wrote Muñoz, "... some feel that [the Americans] shortly will declare hostilities with us. In view of this, you are to take all precautions to put
the province under your command in a good state of defense." Two months later he wrote that the quarrel between the United States and France made "an outbreak of war almost inevitable." The victim of this Spanish fear of the United States was Philip Nolan. This enigmatic figure first came to Texas as early as 1785, professing to be a horse trader. In 1794-1795 he made another trip to the province, visiting at San Antonio and La Bahía (present Goliad) to purchase horses for the Spanish governor of Louisiana. In the fall of 1797 Nolan returned, this time with permission to travel to Nuevo Santander on a passport signed by Commandant-General Nava. Before this trip was completed, however, Nolan's fall from favor had begun. Nava revoked Nolan's permit to import two thousand pesos worth of goods to be used as presents for friendly Indians, giving "good reasons" as the grounds for his action. When the horse trader remained in Texas an additional year for vague reasons, the commandant-general became very suspicious. In April of 1799 Nava wrote the governor of Texas: "Tell me if in your opinion he has made himself suspect; but, in truth, to me his residing here so long has not seemed good when less time would have been sufficient to gather the horses I permitted. . . ." Muñoz answered the request for information by stating: "In examining [Nolan's] conduct, I find that he never did anything suspicious. . . . Always he has manifested much affection and gratitude for our government. . . ." This reply did little to restore Nava's shaken confidence in the American, and in June of 1799 he ordered the horse trader arrested. Nolan, however, had already returned to the United States. The following year, disregarding warnings not to enter Texas, Nolan and a party of men again entered the province. In March of 1801 they were surrounded north of present Waco by a force of 150 Spanish soldiers. In the ensuing struggle Nolan was killed and the remainder of his party captured. As a result of this affair, Spanish suspicions about the designs of the United States grew. Another factor contributing to the mounting Spanish distrust of the Anglo-Americans was the purchase of Louisiana in 1803—an incident that almost led to war between the two nations three years later. The transfer of control of this province to the United States, effected on December 15, 1803, immediately raised two problems: what should be done about the large number of Louisianans who wished to migrate to Texas, and exactly where was the boundary between the two provinces? Governor Juan Bautista de Elguézabal of Texas, who had succeeded Muñoz, desired to populate the province under his command, and freely granted licenses to immigrants. But the new commandant-general Nemesio Salcedo y Salcedo did not agree. On January 9, 1804, he wrote the governor of Texas that no individual proceeding from Louisiana was to be allowed to settle in the Eastern Interior Provinces. They could move to New Spain, but only to the interior. Two months later, however, Salcedo's order was countermanded by a royal decree approving the resettlement of Louisianans in the Interior Provinces. The only proviso was that they could not live at Nacogdoches because they might be tempted to smuggle. After the arrival of the king's order, the influx of settlers to Texas
from the neighboring territory doubled and redoubled, ending only with the Neutral Ground settlement of 1806.\textsuperscript{31}

A greater problem for the Spaniards than the peaceful settlers was the deserters from the United States Army and the fugitive slaves who made their way to Texas and asked for asylum.\textsuperscript{32} The Spaniards feared that the deserters were spies, and the owners of the runaway slaves protested loudly. The commandant-general finally issued an order that any deserter about whom there was the slightest suspicion was to be returned immediately to the American authorities; the rest were to be removed as far west as San Antonio, as were all slaves.\textsuperscript{33}

The other problem raised by the Louisiana Purchase—the exact boundary—was an old one. The American government had merely inherited a dispute that dated back to the years preceding 1763, when Spain had acquired Louisiana from France and rendered the question academic. Many Americans believed that the Louisiana Purchase included Texas, and began noisily asserting a claim to it.\textsuperscript{34} The Spaniards not only resisted such demands, but asserted a counterclaim. In Madrid the Council of State in March of 1804 delineated the boundary as Spain felt it to be: from the Gulf of Mexico up the Arroyo Hondo to the vicinity of Natchitoches, and up the Red River. The boundary in the north, the Council asserted, was the Missouri River.\textsuperscript{35}

Local Spanish officials disagreed about the exact boundary. The Marquis de Casa-Calvo, Spanish consul in New Orleans, believed the Sabine was the dividing line. Governor Elguézabal thought the line should be drawn according to the boundary set in the treaty of 1800 which returned Louisiana to France. Commandant-General Salcedo said nothing at all; instead, he sent a detachment of troops to occupy a position at Bayupier (Bayou Pierre) near the abandoned Spanish presidio of Los Adaes. He further ordered that no Americans whatsoever be allowed to approach the area to survey a boundary until the royal government designated a commission for that purpose.\textsuperscript{36}

Gradually Salcedo began shifting his troops in the Eastern Interior Provinces in order to be able to cope quickly with any emergency along the Texas-Louisiana boundary. By September of 1805 the number of soldiers in Texas had been increased from two hundred to five hundred and fifty. Governor Antonio Cordera y Bustamante,\textsuperscript{37} new chief executive in the province, still was dissatisfied; he asked for an additional seven hundred men.\textsuperscript{38} The commandant-general did the best he could under the circumstances, and by December 31 of that year there were seven hundred troops in Texas, 141 of them at Nacogdoches and its vicinity.\textsuperscript{39}

Early in 1806 the boundary dispute began to boil in earnest. The mayor of Natchitoches, the American outpost nearest Texas, wrote the commandant at Nacogdoches, Captain Sebastian Rodriguez, asking an assurance “that there will be no more incursions or acts of violence committed by subjects of Spain on this side of the Sabine River, which is considered included in the territory of the United States.” Furthermore, he requested that all Spanish troops east of the Sabine be removed.\textsuperscript{40} Rodriguez replied that the Spaniards occupied their “own territory,” and that
patrols would continue to be sent as far east as the Arroyo Hondo until he received further orders from the commandant-general. Rodríguez at first seemed ready to back his bold words with action. On February 2 word reached Nacogdoches that a large party of American private citizens intended to occupy the area in dispute. The captain issued a proclamation to Spaniards in East Texas calling upon them to fight:

The time has arrived in which you should that you are vassals of His Catholic Majesty. I want you to know that the United States, full of ambition and greed, intends to usurp from our sovereign... part of this province... It has been intimated to me by the commandant of the American troops that if we do not evacuate the terrain [between the Arroyo Hondo and the Sabine]... they will take that unjust pretext to declare war on us. I have given orders to our troops not to abandon their posts except at the price of their lives.... And I believe that you, on your part, should do as much in defense of the country in which you have your families, your property, and your subsistence, those whose station permits it taking arms. In this way you will show your fidelity and patriotism.

Just three days after this pronouncement, the Spanish troops east of the Sabine had a chance to demonstrate their bravery. Approximately 150 American private citizens, without official sanction, approached the Spanish outposts in the disputed territory, and the Spaniards withdrew without a fight. Captain Rodríguez decided that war was imminent, that the Spaniards could not win, and that it would be bad for his career to command a losing engagement. He asked to be replaced, declaring that the situation was “critical” and that his troops and their horses were “exhausted.”

The commandant-general saw the explosive possibilities of the controversy with the United States and the need of a seasoned officer in the area. He sent Lieutenant Colonel Simon de Herrera, Governor of Nuevo Santander, to East Texas to take command of the military forces along the border. Herrera did not arrive at Nacogdoches until June, by which time war seemed inevitable. He found that the American force at Natchez was estimated at 12,000 to 15,000 men. According to the rumors circulating, this force was going to overrun the disputed territory and also take North Texas, then force this settlement on Spain by presenting an accomplished fact. Hastily the Spaniards moved the militias of Nuevo Santander and Nuevo Leon, as well as regular troops from other areas, to East Texas. By June 1 a record high of 1,368 Spanish fighting men were gathered in Texas, of whom 883 were at Nacogdoches and its vicinity.

High Spanish officials moved cautiously. From the king came orders to proceed carefully, but not to concede any of the disputed territory. Both the viceroy and the commandant-general echoed this feeling. Salcedo wrote Herrera: “Do not begin the action or attack the Americans without an absolute certainty of evicting them....”

At the very instant that it seemed war would begin, Herrera and General James Wilkinson, the American commander in Louisiana, reached a
dramatic settlement. Wilkinson proposed a compromise, Herrera agreed, and on November 4 they signed an accord providing that Spanish troops would withdraw west of the Sabine, American troops would withdraw east of the Arroyo Hondo, and a final settlement would be left to negotiation between the two governments. Later, Herrera received the thanks and praise of both the viceroy and the commandant-general for the compromise—an act that amounted to disobedience of orders.

Following this settlement, tensions gradually relaxed in East Texas, and the number of Spanish soldiers in the area was reduced. Not all points of contention between the United States and Spain were solved by the Wilkinson-Herrera agreement, however. Fugitive slaves continued to make their way to Texas, and their owners continued to demand their return. Deserters from the United States Army continued to reach Nacogdoches and ask for Spanish citizenship. And forbidden books, spreading what Commandant-General Salcedo termed the "depraved . . . maxims of liberty and disunion," continued to be introduced into the New World Spanish colonies.

To offset the possibility of further American expansion, Spanish officials in the Eastern Interior Provinces made attempts between 1806 and 1808 to increase the population of Texas by establishing new towns and by sending immigrants from Mexico. Between San Antonio and Nacogdoches at the Trinity River, the settlement of Trinidad de Salcedo was founded during the last week in December of 1805. Five families from San Antonio were joined there by a detachment of soldiers and twenty-three former Louisianans. Gradually the little village grew, until by March of 1809 it had a population of ninety-two. Also established was the smaller settlement of San Marcos de Neve at the spot where the road between San Antonio and San Juan Bautista (on the Rio Grande) crossed the San Marcos River. Financed personally by Governor Cordero, this village drew its settlers from Mexico. The founding date was January 6, 1808. Four months later the population numbered sixty-one, including a detachment of soldiers sent to guard the civilians from the Indian raiders.

Two final incidents disturbed the slumber of Spanish officials in the Eastern Interior Provinces during the last years before the storm of revolution broke in New Spain: the appearance of Lieutenant Zebulon Pike, and the American Embargo Act. Most Spanish officials, including Commandant-General Salcedo, believed that the Pike Expedition was part of a continuing American plot to acquire territory that belonged to Spain. Salcedo felt that Pike's specific purpose was to subvert the loyalty of the Plains Indians. Therefore, as a counter measure, the commandant-general in 1808 ordered an expedition to march from San Antonio to Santa Fe, giving medals and flags to the various chiefs and exhorting them to retain their allegiance to Spain. Pike's expedition had consisted of himself, a doctor, and seven soldiers; the Spanish expedition was made up of two hundred soldiers. Furthermore, Salcedo took steps to stop the illegal immigration of American settlers to Texas, giving specific orders to the governor of the province to arrest such intruders. Governor Cordero aged with his superior; in October of 1808 he wrote: "We must assume . . . that the inundation of vagrants, who have been introducing themselves into the area [of North Texas] is nothing more than a plot by that
government [the United States] to take the land, and . . . realize, in succession, their ideas of conquest."\[54\]

The second cause of contention during the last years before revolution developed in the Interior Provinces, and in all of the Spanish New World colonies, was the American Embargo Act. Because of the disturbances in Europe, the Spaniards had been purchasing in the United States the goods which they annually distributed to the Indians as presents. Spanish officials saw the embargo as an insidious American plot to win away the allegiance of the Indian tribes in Texas and perhaps to cause uprisings and raids by disgruntled natives in the Interior Provinces.\[55\]

Besides the problems with the United States, the representatives of the king in the Interior Provinces were further disturbed by events in Europe. In 1808 Spain again did a turnabout in the involved Napoleonic Wars, declaring a war on France and allying itself with England following the forced abdication of Ferdinand VII. Salcedo and his fellow officers feared that representatives of the new French regime in Spain might attempt to take control of the colonies. The commandant-general ordered a careful inventory of all weapons held by the inhabitants of Texas, and he filled the officer ranks in the army to full complement.\[56\] And he ordered that any Spaniard or Frenchman who presented himself in the Interior Provinces claiming to be a representative of the French regime in Spain was to be arrested immediately; he declared that such individuals were "traitors" to the "beloved king" and religion of Spain.\[57\]

In San Antonio two councils were held in connection with the new crisis. Convened by Brigadier Bernardo Bonavia, Salcedo's second-in-command, these councils were attended by Cordero, Herrera, and the new governor of Texas, Manuel de Salcedo. These gatherings were the last displays of pomp and ceremony in the province while Spain ruled it. Bonavia was met outside San Antonio by a military reception. Three days later, April 17, 1809, the first council convened to discuss military affairs in the Eastern Interior Provinces, and specifically the needs of Texas. The usual recommendations followed: more troops were needed, Nacogdoches should be garrisoned more strongly, and immigrants should be brought to populate the area between the Sabine River and San Antonio.\[60\]

Commandant-General Salcedo proved cold to these proposals, however. He was distrustful of foreigners and therefore was against the colonization scheme. Furthermore, he believed that in defending Texas all available strength should be concentrated at San Antonio, not at Nacogdoches. He had previously ordered that the road between San Antonio and Nacogdoches deliberately be left in a state of disrepair in order to slow an invading army.\[61\]

The second council was held in July of 1809 and discussed ways to improve the economy in Texas. The major recommendation of this meeting was that La Bahía be declared a port in order to facilitate the importation and exportation of goods.\[62\] But again the commandant-general turned a deaf ear. He declared that it was "very remote" that La Bahía could be opened successfully as a port.\[63\]

The two councils at San Antonio represented the last chance for the
Spaniards to rejuvenate the economy of Texas and to institute reforms that would benefit the entire Eastern Interior Provinces. However, the same fear and distrust of change that made these officials resist the French ideas of equality and the American idea of frontier democracy also caused them to resist altering the status quo in the provinces under their command. Thus as the year 1810 dawned the soil was prepared for revolution, which in turn would further weaken and depopulate the provinces and lay them open to filibusterers.

FOOTNOTES

1 First created in 1776, the Interior Provinces were administered by a commandant-general whose headquarters was at Arizpe or Chihuahua City. Then in 1787 the area was divided into the Eastern and Western Interior Provinces with separate commanders. Three years later the two commands were rejoined and placed under Brigadier Pedro de Nava. For further information about the founding of the Interior Provinces, see Alfred B. Thomas, Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain, 1776-1783 (Norman, 1941), 16-20; and H. Bailey Carroll and J. Villasana Haggard (trans. and eds., Three New Mexico Chronicles (Albuquerque, 1942), 169-171.

2 Brigadier Pedro de Nava assumed command of the Interior Provinces on April 27, 1790. A combination of old age and poor health eventually forced him to request retirement from the royal service, a request that was granted. His replacement arrived on November 4, 1802, and Nava returned to Spain to enjoy his remaining years in peace and comfort. See El Conde de Revilla Gigedo to the governor of Texas, September 17, 1790, Mexico City, Béxar Archives (Archives, The University of Texas, Austin); Nava to Juan Bautista de Elguézabal, September 4, 1802, Chihuahua, Béxar Archives; and Nemesio Salcedo to the Governor of Texas, November 4, 1802, San Bartolomé, Béxar Archives. The Béxar Archives are hereafter cited as BA.

3 Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Muñoz became governor of Texas on August 14, 1790, and served in this capacity until his death on July 27, 1799. See Muñoz to Antonio Gil Ybarbo, August 16, 1790, San Antonio, BA; Francesco Xavier de Uranga to Elguézabal, August 3, 1799, La Bahía, BA.

4 Nava to the Governor of Texas, secret, November 30, 1793, Chihuahua, BA.

5 Nava to Muñoz, March 27, 1794, Chihuahua, BA.

6 Nava to Muñoz, very secret, January 6, 1795, Chihuahua, BA; Muñoz to Nava, No. 266, February 28, 1795, San Antonio, BA.

7 Juan Cortes to Muñoz, January 29, 1796, La Bahía, BA, contains notice of the peace treaty.

8 Nava to the Governor of Texas, November 21, 1794, Chihuahua, BA.

9 Nava to Muñoz, October 7, 1795, Chihuahua, BA.

10 Nava to Muñoz, October 12, 1796, Chihuahua, BA.

11 Muñoz to Nava, No. 498, February 27, 1797, San Antonio, BA, notes receipt of the declaration of war.
Munoz to Nava, No. 537, August 6, 1797, San Antonio, BA.

Munoz to Nava, No. 265, February 19, 1795, San Antonio, BA.

Nava to Munoz, very secret, July 30, 1795, Chihuahua, BA.

Munoz to Nava, No. 473, December 5, 1796, San Antonio, BA.

Nava to Munoz, secret, August 28, 1798, Chihuahua, BA.

Nava to Munoz, secret, October 13, 1798, Chihuahua, BA.


Baron de Carondolet to Munoz, September 9, 1794, New Orleans, BA; Munoz to Carondolet, January 18, 1795, San Antonio, BA.

Nava to Philip Nolan, October 31, 1797, Chihuahua, BA.

Nava to Munoz, March 20, 1798, March 20, 1798, Chihuahua, BA.

Nava to Munoz, April 30, 1799, Chihuahua, BA.

Munoz to Nava, No. 660, June 12, 1799, San Antonio, BA.

Ibid., notes this order.

Bean, “Memoirs,” quoted in Yoakum, History of Texas, I, 403-452; Bennett Lay, The Lives of Ellis P. Bean (Austin, 1960), 13-25. One member of the Nolan party, Steven Richard, was in San Antonio in 1809 serving a ten-year sentence in the militia of Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander for his participation in the expedition; see Nemesio Salcedo to Manuel de Salcedo, March 23, 1809, Chihuahua, BA.

Francisco de Ugarte to Elguezabal, February 4, 1804, Nacogdoches, BA, contains the news of the change of control at New Orleans. However, the last Spanish governor-general of Louisiana, the Marquis de Casa-Calvo, wrote Elguezabal, that the American commissioners arrived on December 20. See Casa-Calvo to Elguezabal, March 5, 1804, New Orleans, BA.

Lieutenant Colonel Juan Bautista de Elguezabal became governor of Texas on July 27, 1799. He served until September 10, 1805, when he was relieved because of ill health. He died in San Antonio on October 5 of that same year. See Urango to Elguezabal, August 3, 1799, La Bahia, BA; Nava to the Ayuntamiento of San Fernando of the Province of Texas, August 17, 1799, Chihuahua, BA; Cordero, Notarized Statement, December 23, 1805, San Antonio, BA. Elguezabal was replaced as governor by Antonio Cordero y Bustamente. One of Elguezabal’s sons, Juan José, also served as governor of Texas in 1834-1835, when Texas and Coahuila were joined as one state; see Walter P. Webb (ed.), The Handbook of Texas (2 vols., Austin, 1952), I, 554.

Upon the retirement of Pedro de Nava, Brigadier Nemesio Salcedo y Salcedo became commandant-general, serving from November 4, 1802, until 1813. A stern man, he stubbornly clung to the old order and blocked progress and change whenever he could. See Salcedo to the Governor of Texas, November 4, 1802, San Bartolomé, BA; Elliott Coues (ed.), The

29Elguézabal to Salcedo, February 15, 1804, San Antonio, BA, notes the commandant-general’s order of January 9.

30Salcedo to Elguézabal, March 27, 1804, notes this royal order.

31Mattie Austin Hatcher, The Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement, 1801-1821 (Austin, 1927), 60-101.

32Ugarte to Elguézabal, November 26, 1803, Nacogdoches, BA; Elguézabal to Salcedo, No. 311, November 7, 1804, San Antonio, BA.

33Cordero to the Commandant at Nacogdoches, secret, September 30, 1805, San Antonio, BA, notes this instruction.

34For the justice of the American claim to the Río Grande as the boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, see Richard Stenberg, “The Western Boundary of Louisiana, 1762-1803,” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXXV (October 1931), 95-108.

35Council of State, Decree, March 17, 1804, Madrid, Spain, BA. This decree did not give a north-south boundary between the Missouri and Red rivers.

36Casa-Calvo to Elguézabal, June 19, 1804, New Orleans, BA; Elguézabal to Ugarte, March 4, 1804, San Antonio, BA; Salcedo to Elguézabal, May 3, 1804, Chihuahua, BA; Sebastian Rodriguez to Cordero, November 4, 1805, Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches Archives (Archives, Texas State Library, Austin). President Jefferson’s attempts to send scientific expeditions up the Red River in 1804-1806 were also suspect by the commandant-general; he feared these expeditions were merely disguised attempts to survey a boundary prejudicial to Spanish interests. Therefore he ordered the Dunbar and the Freeman and Sparks expeditions turned back. See Salcedo to Cordero, secreta, October 8, 1805, Chihuahua, BA; Coues (ed.), The Expeditions of Zebulon Pike, II, 70. Likewise suspect in the eyes of Salcedo were the foreigners in Nacogdoches in 1804. He ordered all of them listed and carefully accounted for. The census for Nacogdoches in 1804 showed twenty Americans, eleven Irish, two Englishmen, eighteen French, one Scotsman, and fourteen Louisiana-born French; Ugarte, “Padrón que manifiesta los Extranjeros que tiene este Pueblo, y toda su jurisdiccion . . .,” January 1, 1804, Nacogdoches, BA.

37Colonel Manuel Antonio Cordero y Bustamente arrived in San Antonio on September 8, 1805, and two days later assumed the governorship of the province. In addition, he was governor of Coahuila during this same period. An enlightened official, he hoped to admit to the province large numbers of bonafide settlers, both from Europe and the United States. He was relieved as governor of Texas on November 7, 1808, but stayed in the province until July 27, 1809. See Cordero, Notarized Statement, December 23, 1805, San Antonio, BA; Cordero to Bernardo Bonavia, July 21, 1809, San Antonio, BA; Nettie Lee Benson, “Texas Failure to Send a Deputy to the Spanish Cortes, 1810-1812,” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LXIV (July 1960), note on 21-22; Cordero to Bonavia, July 26, 1809, San Antonio, BA, contains the notice that Cordero was leaving Texas the following day.
38Cordero to Nemesio Salcedo, No. 19, September 15, 1805, San Antonio, BA.

39Cordero, “Provincia de los Texas. Fuerza de las Tropas que la guarnicion y su Distribucion actual . . . ,” December 31, 1805, San Antonio, BA.

40Mayor Porter to Rodríguez, translated into Spanish and quoted in Rodríguez to Salcedo, No. 12, January 30, 1806, Nacogdoches, BA.

41Ibid.

42Rodríguez, “Manifiesto que hace el Capitan de Caballeria, Comandante del Puesto de Nacogdoches . . . a todos los havitantes de dicho Puesto y su Jurisdiccion, el 2 de Febrero de 1806 . . . ,” February 2, 1806, Nacogdoches, BA.

43José María González to Rodríguez, February 5, 1806, Arroyo de los Adaes, BA; Salcedo to Cordero, February 24, 1806, Chihuahua, BA.

44Rodríguez to Cordero, No. 29, February 13, 1806, Nacogdoches, BA; Rodríguez to Cordero, No. 27, February 13, 1806, Nacogdoches, BA. This officer subsequently was brought to trial for his conduct during this period. A week later he was allowed to retire. See Salcedo to Cordero, March 25, 1806, Chihuahua, BA; Cordero to Salcedo, No. 636, September 28, 1807, San Antonio, BA.

45Salcedo to Cordero, June 17, 1806, Chihuahua, BA; Viana to Cordero, June 6, 1806, Nacogdoches, BA.

46Salcedo to Cordero, secret, April 19, 1806, Chihuahua, BA.

47Miguel Serrano, “Estado que manifiesta la fuerza total y Desinos de las tropas que existen en esta Provincia,” June 26, 1806, San Antonio, BA.

48Salcedo to Cordero, secreta, October 24, 1806, Hazienda de los Ornos, BA; the king’s order was contained in Salcedo to Cordero, very secret, March 17, 1807, Chihuahua, BA.

49For Wilkinson’s letter and Herrera’s reply, see Ernest Wallace and David Vigness (eds.), Documents in Texas History, 1528-1846 (Lubbock, Texas, 1960), I, 37-38.

50Reported by Pike in Coues (ed.), The Expeditions of Zebulon Pike, II, 702-703.

51Pedro Lopez Prieta to Manuel Salcedo, No. 3, November 22, 1808, Trinidad de Salcedo, BA, reported twenty-seven fugitive slaves at that settlement; Nemesio Salcedo to Cordero, December 9, 1806, San Antonio, BA, noted the presence of twenty American deserters in the capital city of Texas. Both types of unwanted immigrants subsequently were prohibited from entering the province; see Nemesio Salcedo to Cordero, December 2, 1808, Chihuahua, BA, and Nemesio Salcedo to Bonavia, July 9, 1809, Chihuahua, BA. About the forbidden books, see Nemesio Salcedo to Cordero, secret, December 3, 1808, Chihuahua, BA.

52Hatcher, The Opening of Texas, 102-103; Antonio Saens, “Padron General de toda la Jurisdiccion de la Villa de Trinidad,” March 22, 1809, Trinidad de Salcedo, BA.

53Cordero to Felipe Roque de la Portilla, December 16, 1807, San Antonio, BA; Webb (ed.), Handbook of Texas, II, 558.

54Francisco Amangual, “Diario de las Novedades y Operaciones occur-
ridas en la Expedicion que se hace desde esta Provincia de Texas a la del Nuevo Mexico, de orden superior, siendo Primar Comandante el Capitan Don Francisco Amargmental . . .," March 30-December 23, 1808, San Antonio, BA; Cordero to Nemesio Salcedo, No. 3, very secret, October 15, 1808, San Antonio, BA. For an example of such illegal entry, see Manuel de Salcedo, “Texas. Causa seguida a los reos extrangeros Enrique Kuerke, Jose Maguir, Juan Macfarzon y Jose Brenton . . .,” October 29, 1808-December 30, 1809, San Antonio, BA.

55Cordero to Marzelo Soto, Very Secret, March 15, 1808, San Antonio, BA.

56Cordero, “Pie de Lista, que manifiesta, los Yndividuos que tiene la villa de San Fernando de Austria, capazes de podre tomar las Armas, con expresion, de los que estan armados, y montados . . .”, October 25, 1808, San Antonio, BA.

57Nemesio Salcedo to Bonavia, June 22, 1808, Chihuahua, BA.

58Because of the critical situation in Texas, the distance to Chihuahua City, and the slowness of communication, Salcedo in November of 1808 named Cordero Second Commandant-General. Cordero was relieved of this post in April of 1809 by Brigadier Bernardo Bonavia y Zapata. Like Cordero, Bonavia was liberal and enlightened, but he accomplished little in the way of reform in Texas during his short stay. See Nemesio Salcedo to Cordero, July 21, 1809, San Antonio, BA; Bonavia, Decree, April 19, 1809, San Antonio, BA.

59Manuel Maria de Salcedo, the nephew of the commandant-general, assumed the governorship of Texas on November 7, 1808. He served during the revolutionary period that followed, and was executed by the filibusterer Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara on April 3, 1813. See Cordero, Decree, November 7, 1808. San Antonio, BA; Harry McCorry Henderson, “The Magee Gutierrez Expedition,” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LV (July 1951), 46-52; Julia Kathryn Garrett, Green Flag Over Texas (New York, 1939), 17.

60Bonavia, Cordero, Manuel de Salcedo, Herrera, and Mariano Varela, Auto, April 19, 1809, San Antonio, BA (Part of this document is missing); Garrett, Green Flag Over Texas, 21-22.

61Manuel de Salcedo to Cordero, March 23, 1809, San Antonio, BA, communicates this information. See also Garrett, Green Flag Over Texas, 28.

62Bonavia to Nemesio Salcedo, No. 55, July 26, 1809, San Antonio, BA.

63Nemesio Salcedo to Bonavia, September 7, 1809, Chihuahua, BA.