EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL JOURNAL

OFFICERS
F. I. Tucker, President ........................................ Nacogdoches
Mrs. Dan Lester, Vice President ................................. Jefferson
C. M. Langford, Vice President ............................... Mt. Enterprise
Mrs. Richard Marshall, Secretary-Treasurer .............. Nacogdoches, Texas

DIRECTORS
Lee Lawrence .................................................... Tyler 1966
Cooper Ragan .................................................. Houston 1966
John T. Duncan ............................................... Bryan 1966
Samuel Evans .................................................. Beaumont 1965
Mrs. Guy Blount ............................................... Nacogdoches 1965
Mrs. W. H. Bridges ............................................. Roganville 1964
Seth R. Walton .................................................. Marshall 1965
Ralph W. Steen ................................................ Nacogdoches 1964

EDITORIAL BOARD
C. K. Chamberlain, Editor-in-Chief ............................ Nacogdoches
Ralph Goodwin ................................................ Commerce
James L. Nichols ................................................ Nacogdoches
Mrs. Charles Martin .......................................... Kirbyville
John Payne, Jr. ............................................. Huntsville

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Elmer W. Flaccus ............................................... Sherman
Herbert W. Gambrell .......................................... Dallas
Dorman H. Winfrey .............................................. Austin
Garland Roark .................................................. Nacogdoches
W. R. Beaumier ................................................ Lufkin
Preston B. Williams .............................................. Beaumont
Cooper K. Ragan ................................................ Houston
Bonner Frizzell ................................................... Palestine
Henry L. Foster, Sr. ........................................ Longview
J. F. Combs .................................................. Beaumont
Price Daniel ...................................................... Austin
Raiford Stripling ................................................ San Augustine

Vol. II, No. 2  ................................................... OCTOBER, 1964
EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

MEMBERSHIP

PATRONS contribute to the work of the Association $100.00 or more, payable if desired over a period of five years.

SUSTAINING MEMBERS contribute to the work of the Association $50.00 or more, payable if desired over a period of five years.

REGULAR MEMBERS pay $5.00 dues annually.

STUDENT MEMBERS pay $3.00 dues annually. A student enrolled in high school or college is eligible for membership.

P. O. Box 6127 S.F.A. Station
NACOGDOCHES, TEXAS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. THE PINES OF TEXAS: A STUDY IN LUMBERING AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1880-1930
   Robert S. Maxwell ............................................Page 77

II. THE PENETRATION OF FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN IDEAS INTO SPANISH EAST TEXAS, 1793-1810
   Odie B. Faulk ..................................................Page 87

III. DUDLEY CRAWFORD SHARP—SECRETARY FOR AIR
   Robert C. Cotner and Peyton E. Cook...Page 99

IV. A DUEL WITH RAILROADS: HOUSTON VS. GALVESTON, 1866-1881
   Vera L. Dugas ..............................................Page 118

V. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISCOVERY OF OIL IN TITUS COUNTY
   Morris Blachard ............................................Page 128

VI. REMARKS OF JUDGE JOE J. FISHER AT THE DEDICATION OF THE UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE, MARSHALL DIVISION Page 143

VII. East Texas, By the Editor .....................................Page 147

VIII. Book Reviews ................................................Page 159

IX. East Texas Colloquy ..........................................Page 161

X. Contributors to This Issue ....................................Page 163
THE PINES OF TEXAS
A STUDY IN LUMBERING AND PUBLIC POLICY,
1880-1930
ROBERT S. MAXWELL

The Pines of Texas occupy an area variously estimated at twelve to eighteen million acres in the extreme eastern edge of the state, an acreage comparable to the total area of a number of fair-sized eastern states. To be sure, there are small acreages of pine in other sections of the state, and merchantable stands of hardwood exist in limited quantities. But to the commercial lumberman timber in Texas means pines and East Texas. The lumbering industry, built on the exploitation of this magnificent pine forest, came to dominate the region and the lives of all the people in it. The State, both in behalf of the conservation of natural resources and the protection of the residents, periodically attempted to intervene and regulate the industry for the public good. It is this industry and the attempts of the state to control it that this paper seeks to discuss.

As late as 1880 the Texas pinelands remained virtually untapped. The industry was valued at less than two million dollars and less than 300,000,000 board feet of lumber annually were produced. The entire region was strangely isolated and existing railroads merely skirted the Piney Woods. The rolling hills concealed soils ranging from adhesive clays to white sand. Cotton culture was the principal occupation of the farmers but the yield was poor and subsistence was marginal. As could be expected the towns were small, straggling, and unlovely. The people were insular, largely uneducated, and suspicious. The roads were poor and the rivers unpredictable, too low in the summer; too violent and flooded in the winter and the spring.

Saw milling had been carried on in the Texas region on a limited scale since the days of the earliest settlers. Successively men, mules, water, and steam had furnished the motive power. But these mills were all small, operated intermittently, and frequently combined the sawmill with a grist mill. Most of their products were used locally. Except for Orange and Beaumont where logs were floated down the rivers and lumber was shipped by boat via Sabine Pass, commercial lumbering was virtually non-existent.

But a number of factors soon combined to stimulate interest in the East Texas pineries. Eastern lumber sources had been largely exhausted and the great white pine forests of the Lake States region were being rapidly depleted. The settlement of the Plains States opened new and attractive markets for lumber, and the passing of the worst features of the panic of 1873 encouraged the building of new railroads to link the sources of supply with the potential market. In the thirty years after 1875, new railroads criss-crossed the timber belt opening up the pineries to enterprising entrepreneurs and in turn opening the outside world to the East
Texas natives. Among the important roads were the Houston, East and West Texas, affectionately known as "The Rabbit," the Texas and New Orleans, the notorious "Orphan Katy," and the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe. Lesser roads opened still more acreage and provided connecting links with the main trunk lines. The state of Texas encouraged railroad building by granting sixteen sections of land for every mile of road built until 1882, when it was discovered that the unallotted land in Texas had been exhausted.4

Enterprising lumbermen, with or without previous experience, followed closely after the rail lines as they pushed into the pine forests. They rapidly acquired extensive acreages at bargain prices, ranging from as low as 50c to $5 per acre. They built complete lumber manufacturing plants including mill, dry kiln, yards, planer, warehouses, and frequently a tram road. In addition they acquired company towns, in which the houses, streets, wells, commissary, and frequently the schools and churches, were company-owned and company-dominated. In all but legal title they also owned a loyal work force numbering from 200 to more than 2000 men, both white and Negro, who, together with their families, were dependent on the mill owners for their livelihood. With few exceptions the workers were native born Texans, largely from the Piney Woods.

There were far too many major sawmill operators to attempt even to list them all. Some, such as John Henry Kirby, W. T. Carter, and John Martin Thompson, were Texas born. More, however, migrated from other states. H. J. Lutcher and G. B. Moore came from Pennsylvania; T. L. L. Temple was from Virginia; J. H. Kurth was born in Germany; Wm. H. Knox and Wm. Carlisle came from Wisconsin; W. R. Pickering, B. B. Foster, and R. A. Long were from Kansas City; David Wingate was from Mississippi; E. B. Hayward was from Iowa; Stanley Joyce was from Chicago; Wm. B. Buchanan came from Tennessee; E. A. Frost was from Arkansas; Peter Doucette was from Canada. Each of these men carved out for himself an empire in excess of a hundred thousand acres. In their own vast possessions, they in truth became feudal lords controlling and governing feudal baronies.5

Of all the lumber tycoons none was more colorful and flamboyant than John Henry Kirby. His career illustrates the extreme in large mill operations in the East Texas region. Born and raised in relative poverty in rural Tyler County, Kirby went to the usual local schools, attended Southwestern University briefly, studied law, passed the bar examination and served for a time as Clerk of the Texas Senate. As the result of a successful court case, Kirby became friendly with a group of Boston financiers and with their backing, he formed several companies to acquire and hold East Texas timber lands. Soon he began the construction of a railroad through the heart of the Texas longleaf belt and built a sawmill at Silsbee.

About this time he met officials of the Santa Fe Railroad who became interested in his enterprises. As a result, the Santa Fe purchased his railroad and extended it to Longview. The Santa Fe also loaned Kirby additional money which he invested in more timber lands. This proved to be a very profitable arrangement for both.
In 1901, with the aid of additional Eastern capital, Kirby organized the Kirby Lumber Company, capitalized at $10,000,000, which was a consolidation of a number of mills and timber properties which he owned or on which he held options. Shortly afterwards he, with Patrick Calhoun of New York, incorporated the Houston Oil Company, capitalized at $30,000,000 and to which he assigned some 900,000 acres of choice longleaf pine land. His two corporations then executed a stumpage contract estimated at 8 billion feet which guaranteed the Kirby mills a supply of pine timber for the next twenty-five years. Impressed by such financial magic and credit management, the citizens of Houston tendered him a banquet where he was hailed as the “Prince of Pines,” and Houston’s first citizen. On this occasion he was described as “tall, massive, white haired and ruddy cheeked. He sits like a colossus—with an expansive and all embracing smile.”

At the peak of its activities the Kirby Lumber Company operated 14 major sawmills, 13 logging camps, more than a hundred miles of tram road connecting with the Santa Fe, a large commissary warehouse and distributing office in Beaumont, and executive offices in Houston. This massive operation was based on some 320,000 acres of timber held by the company plus the stumpage rights to the 900,000 acres held by the Houston Oil Company. In the two tracts combined it was estimated that Kirby controlled between forty and sixty per cent of all the longleaf yellow pine in Texas. Kirby divided and fixed authority and responsibility among his subordinates. The mill manager was responsible only for production at his mill. The managers of the logging fronts were concerned only with meeting their log quotas for the week. All of the commissaries were under one management like a chain of small department stores. All were stocked from one warehouse and if an item did not move in one commissary, it was transferred up the line to a new site. Kirby prided himself on his medical and hospital system. He maintained a rather complete hospital at Beaumont and a resident doctor at every mill or logging camp. Each commissary had a drug department. For medical services, which included the family as well as the employee, $1.00 per month was withheld from each worker’s wages. All of the towns, mills and fronts had similar rules and regulations, pay scales, and policies. Collectively, the Kirby mills were capable of an output of over 900,000 board feet per day. Annual capacity was rated at 300,000,000 board feet. His permanent work force was estimated at 5,000.

A typical Kirby company town was Kirbyville, located in Jasper County. The only considerable industry was the Kirby mill rated in 1903 at 60,000 board feet per day, and the logging camp that supplied it with logs. All, or practically all, of the inhabitants were dependent upon the Kirby Lumber Company for their livelihood. As in all of the Kirby enterprises, the mill used merchandise checks or tokens in lieu of money. The company houses at Kirbyville were not as attractive as at some mill towns, being described in 1915 as “dull, gray, dingy boxes ranged row on row.” Yet some of these houses had electricity, and a few had running water. Most had small garden patches. As in all Texas mill towns, the Negro quarters were separated in Kirbyville from the white section by the mill pond or the tracks. It was agreed that most of the Negro houses were little better than shacks.
The worker at Kirbyville fitted the stereotype that he “was born in a company house, tended by a company doctor, nourished at the company store, worked at the company mill, often died of a company accident, had a funeral conducted by a company preacher, and was buried in a company graveyard.” Yet, this is far from the whole story. The wages, hours of labor, and housing of the employees compared favorably with those of non-sawmill people in the East Texas region. To most of the workers, lumbering was a way of life rather than just a job. Many spent an entire lifetime at the same mill and a majority remained in the industry once they began. The logging crews enjoyed the out of doors, and the mill hands gloried in their physical strength and their skills. The “Steel Gang” (track men for the tram roads), admittedly the men with the hardest physical work in the company, would not change jobs with anyone. Kirby himself, though a large operator and financier, was not inhumane. He was concerned about the health and working conditions of his employees. He regularly passed out Christmas gifts to the workers and once distributed 2500 Bibles to employees in the mill towns. He donated a school to his old home town of Woodville. More than a score of men and women could testify that it was a loan or gift from John Henry Kirby that enabled them to go to college. Many disabled workers and surviving widows continued to live in the company’s houses and where possible were given token employment.

Many of the lumber barons were bold and purposeful entrepreneurs with eccentricities which made them colorful characters. Stories were legion about their frugality, industry, or personal appearance. Gimlet-eyed R. A. Long, with his inevitable high starched collar, pious ministerial manner, and conservative business suit, always looked strangely out of place inspecting a logging or sawmill operation. Thomas L. L. Temple was forever picking up short lengths of lumber in the mill, marking a price on them, demanding who cut that off and why? W. T. Carter reportedly refused to purchase an automatic device to flip and turn logs on the saw carriage, known as a “steam nigger,” because the invention “couldn’t trade at the commissary.” Beautiful Mrs. Lillian Knox donned breeches and boots and took personal charge of her company’s logging operations to enable it to meet its contracts during the First World War. The same Mrs. Knox was the defendant a few years later in a spectacular murder case involving the death of her husband, Hiram Knox. Stanley Joyce was, for a time, the husband of famed actress and showgirl, Peggy Hopkins Joyce. J. H. Kurth was known for his blunt and candid speech, delivered with a trace of German accent. Peter Doucette liked to go into the woods and demonstrate his prowess to his men.

Many of the lumber barons were active in politics, and some were important political figures. Kirby was a personal friend of Senator Joseph W. Bailey who for a time was perhaps the most powerful politician in Texas. Kirby served as permanent chairman of the State Democratic Convention of 1904 and was a delegate on several occasions to the Democratic National Convention. During World War I, he was lumber administrator for the United States Shipping Board. J. H. Kurth was perhaps the leading Republican in the East Texas area. He was a member of the State Republican Executive Committee for many years and served as a
Presidential Elector and Delegate to the Republican National Convention. In 1924, he was the Republican candidate for Lt. Governor. From the mass of correspondence regarding federal positions, it would indicate that Kurth largely controlled federal appointments in East Texas during the Roosevelt and Taft administrations. Simon W. Henderson and Eugene H. Blount were also active participants in party and state conventions. 9

The Texas lumber manufacturers organized themselves into trade associations at an early date. Through them the mill owners exchanged production data, comparative price lists, and privately circulated lists of malcontent or undesirable workmen. Through the trade associations, the operators also cooperated on political and legislative action, and agreed on common labor and wage policies. Though they found organizations very beneficial to themselves, they were violently opposed to the formation of any union or association among their employees. Despite the determined efforts of the Brotherhood of Timber Workers to organize mill and woods workers in Texas, the operators were generally successful in preventing any union from getting a foothold until the coming of the New Deal.

The techniques employed were many and varied. Many mills used an anti-union contract (yellow dog) and known labor organizers were harassed by sheriffs and company police until they fled from the region. Some operated espionage systems which swiftly carried word of any unionization effort. The latent hostility of white and Negro workers was played upon to prevent any alliance and all union organizers were denounced as a new group of "Carpetbaggers" who were coming South in an attempt to place the Negro above the white man. As most companies owned the entire company town, including the streets, it was a simple matter to arrest and prosecute the would-be organizer for trespassing. This remained a favorite device for three generations. 10

Despite the obvious monopolistic features of their operations, the mill owners were able to escape serious penalties under the anti-trust laws, either state or federal. Kirby faced anti-trust action briefly at the time of the incorporation of his giant combine in 1901, but the suit was soon dismissed. The Yellow Pine Manufacturers Association and its successor, the Southern Pine Association, found themselves periodically investigated but successfully combatted all suits. In 1925, the federal court dismissed a suit in equity against the Association brought by the Attorney General of the United States charging combination, practices in restraint of trade, price fixing, and unfair employment practices. This was hailed by the companies as a great victory. 11

Because of their policies and practices and perhaps simply because of their great affluence, there rose a grassroots protest against the lumber companies and their owners, demanding that the state regulate their operations, protect the workers, and conserve the forests. Increasingly, after 1900, the legislature intervened in the affairs of the lumber industry. Of special interest to the state were the alarming number of serious accidents in the woods and mills which resulted in the maiming or death of hundreds of workers annually. As early as 1893, the first employer liability laws applying to rail and tram roads were passed during the admin-
istration of James Stephen Hogg. Additional laws in 1897, 1905, and 1909 strengthened the original law and narrowed the use of the traditional common law defenses which had enabled the employers to escape responsibility. In 1907, at the insistence of Governor Thomas Campbell, the legislature established a Bureau of Labor Statistics which then was able to provide the information for additional and more comprehensive legislation.\(^\text{12}\)

Agitation for a Workman's Compensation Law was general by 1912. This type of legislation was a hallmark of "Progressive" reform in many states and such states as Wisconsin, New York, and Massachusetts provided model laws for such legislation. The Texas Democratic state platform of 1912 called for the enactment of an employee's compensation law "affording adequate indemnity for injury to body or loss of life," and Governor O. B. Colquitt pledged his personal support. The result was the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913. It outlawed the traditional common law defenses, and set up a three man Industrial Accident Board to administer the compensation and awards. To meet the increased liability for employers, the Texas Employers Insurance Association was created. The law has steadily been strengthened and its scope extended. Its passage was a landmark for the sawmill workers of Texas.

Other measures improving the rights of labor passed the legislature during the same years. An act of 1899 explicitly recognized the legality of labor unions and the right of peaceful picketing (but not of trespass). The legislature of 1903 prohibited the employment of children under twelve in industry. The same group of law makers passed an anti-coercion bill, prohibiting employers from blacklisting or threatening to blacklist any employee. It also forbade an employer to force an employee to buy at a company store or commissary as a condition of employment. A bill to prohibit the compulsory withholding of wages as doctor's or hospital fees was considered but was killed in the House.\(^\text{13}\)

With the exception of the Workman's Compensation laws, the workers were most interested in legislation regarding the use of merchandise checks or tokens. These were almost universally used in the mill towns and logging camps and were regularly discounted 10 to 20% if used elsewhere than the company commissary where prices generally ranged 10 to 20% higher. In most companies they could be converted into cash only at stated times which were infrequent. As the result of continued agitation, the legislature in 1897 passed a law entitled "An Act to protect accountants, craftsmen, mill operators," etc. It directed that all wages should be due and payable weekly or monthly, and should be made in the lawful money of the United States. In 1901, the legislature passed a more specific law declaring it unlawful for any corporation or person to issue any ticket, check, or token obligatory to any employee redeemable in goods or merchandise. It directed that such checks or tokens be redeemable in current funds of the United States or merchandise at the option of the holder. This was not to apply to firms having monthly paydays or to checks issued only at the request of the employee during the current month. In 1905, this Act was amended and made more stringent by deleting the exceptions and loopholes. It prohibited the issue of all merchan-
dise checks or tokens and made the violation a criminal offense punishable by fine or imprisonment.

This law was at once challenged in the courts and in the important case of Jordan v. The State was declared unconstitutional and void. In his decision, presiding justice W. L. Davidson cited Lochner v. New York as a precedent, and denounced the act as depriving the worker of his freedom of contract and the company of its property without due process of law. In 1914, James E. Ferguson campaigned for the governorship promising that there should be at least two pay days every month. Following his election, the legislature of 1915 passed such a bill, but this act did little to change company policy. In fact, it was not until the coming of better transportation and competitive stores that the merchandise check fell into disuse.

Despite these legislative efforts, the condition of the lumber worker remained poor. The plentiful supply of labor and the isolated nature of his employment left him largely at the mercy of his employer. It was not until the New Deal period and the Second World War that the lumber worker's position markedly improved.

In their logging and milling operations, most of the lumber operators were as wasteful of timber as they were of manpower. A representative operation was that of the W. R. Pickering Company which came to Texas in 1905 from Kansas City and acquired some 120,000 acres in Shelby and Sabine counties. The Pickering mill was a typical big mill outfit with a double band rig and the most recent automatic machinery. The company logged almost exclusively by tram road, running spur lines every few hundred yards from the main line until the logging was finished and then taking up the track and relaying it again at another location. At the loading point, they used both a steam loader and a steam skidder, each operating from special trucks on the rails. The skidder, invented by a Ludington, Michigan, lumberman, made its first appearance in Texas in the late nineties. The Pickering skidder was a large rehaul model with four huge drums and cables that were capable of reaching out 1000 feet for logs and dragging them in to track side. En route the immense logs hurtled through the forest, now knocking down all the seedlings and young trees in the path, now swinging clear many feet in the air, until the skilled operator dumped them at the foot of the loader. The skidder soon came to be known as a man killer as well as a timber killer. The tongs man must be both able and alert to fasten the log securely and stand clear before the skidder operator, who often was out of sight, snapped the cable taut and began to bring the log in. Woods workmen, white and black alike, darkly whispered that an "onery skidder man" could snap your neck with the cable, catch your hand or arm in the tongs, or pull the log over you if he wished and no questions would ever be asked. The fallers or flatheads worked ahead of the trams cutting everything eight inches and up (Kirby, Carter, and some of the other companies cut only trees twelve inches and up). The Pickering Company cut out in 1931. The company transferred operations to the west coast and the workers began the task of finding new jobs in the depth of the depression. From virgin forest to cutover wasteland had taken only twenty-five years. Many companies had similar histories.
Many major operators anticipated the end of commercial lumbering in Texas, expecting that the cut-over lands could be turned into productive farms. Under the slogan, "The Plow Follows the Skidder," Long-Bell attempted to justify the extensive damage done by its logging practices. Under the watchful eye of R. A. Long, the Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation was organized for the purpose of selling lands in small units to Northern and Western farmers and stockmen. The Foster Lumber Company, the Kirby Lumber Company, and the Santa Fe Railroad (which had acquired some Kirby lands) had similar programs. Most of their settlers were recent immigrants from Central Europe who were attracted by the low prices and favorable terms. The newcomers soon found that their farms were good for growing trees—and little else. Most of them drifted to the Gulf Coast cities to work in the shipyards during First World War or to participate in the industrial boom of Houston and its neighbors. Today, most of the one-time neatly surveyed farm sites have reverted to the forest.16

The State of Texas exhibited an increasing concern for the conservation of forest resources from the turn of the century. In 1915, due largely to the efforts of W. G. Jones, the Legislature established the Texas Forest Service. Steadily growing in importance, by 1930 the Service had undertaken to control and prevent forest fires, to provide seedlings to replant denuded areas, to give instruction in selective cutting, and to promote public education in conservation. In the early thirties, the Texas National Forests were established, acquiring cut-over timber land from a number of major companies. Here the United States Forest Service demonstrated what conservation methods could do in bringing denuded timber lands back into production. Professional foresters began to be employed by the private companies which turned to selective cutting and other approved practices. Many of the larger companies learned to plan their cutting programs to make the timber supply last indefinitely. In the years since 1930, conservation and scientific silviculture increasingly have been accepted as the way to survival in the Texas forests.17

The half century from the coming of the railroads to East Texas to the Great Depression marked a complete cycle in the Texas lumber industry. Production rose from some three hundred million board feet in 1880 to a peak of more than two billion feet in 1907 and then declined to some three hundred and fifty million feet in 1932. The decline of commercial lumbering was accompanied by the termination of operations by numerous companies and the reduction of dozens of mill towns to ghost towns. For its first fifty years, the history of lumbering in Texas had not been markedly different from that in New England, the Lake States, or the states in the Southeast. The best efforts of the legislature, progressive reformers, professional foresters, and the workers themselves failed to alter markedly the predominantly laissez-faire drive to exploit the forests. As a result, the Pines of Texas were all but destroyed. It is fortunate that sound conservation practices and the amazing recuperative power of the southern yellow pine has enabled the new generation partly to repair the damage.18


(microfilm, University of Texas Library), 1915; Creel, "Feudal Towns of Texas," 76-78.


13Laws of Texas, 1899, ch. 262; 1903, ch. 28; ch. 63. Texas House Journal, 1903, 396. W. B. O'Quinn to Eli Weiner, February 3, 1903; S. M. Davis and W. B. O'Quinn to J. H. Kurth, January 28, 1903, in the Kurth Papers. The same legislature passed a maximum hour law (16 hours) for trainmen that applied to workers of tram roads. Laws of Texas, ch. 31.

14Laws of Texas, 1897, ch. 152; 1901, ch. 112; 1905, ch. 152; 1915, ch. 25; Ed Jordan v. The State, 51 Texas Criminal Reports 531 (1907); Trinity River Lumber Company to Eli Wiener, April 10, 1906. Kurth Papers. As late as 1937, the State of Texas was seeking an effective formula to forbid the obligatory issue of merchandise checks and to require their redemption at face value in lawful money. See Laws of Texas, 1937, ch. 354, p. 705.

15The Log of Long Bell, 1:20 (January 1919); Foster Lumber Company
Dr. G. F. Middlebrook, Oral History Collections, Stephen F. Austin State College.

16The Log of Long Bell, 1:20 (January 1919); Foster Lumber Company Papers, Stephen F. Austin State College; Interview with Judge J. W. Minton, Oral History Collections; Lawrence L. Waters, Steel Trails to Santa Fe (Lawrence, Kansas, 1950), 253.


THE PENETRATION OF FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN IDEAS INTO SPANISH EAST TEXAS

1793-1810

ODIE B. FAULK

A backwater to the mainstream of world politics, the Eastern Interior Provinces of New Spain (Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Nuevo Santander, and Texas) nevertheless felt the impact of the French Revolution and the period of wars and intrigue that followed. Spanish officials in these provinces—commandants-general, governors, and army officers—for the most part were loyal adherents to the centuries-old royal tradition, and were determined to stop the spread of the doctrines of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Even before this period, in fact, they were suspicious and fearful of foreigners and foreign ideas. Their suspicion stemmed from provincialism, religious nationalism, and past events. Their fear was grounded in military weakness: the number of Spaniards in these provinces was few, especially in Texas, compared to the tens of thousands of fickle savages surrounding them. Therefore, following the outbreak of war in Europe in early 1793, these officials redoubled their efforts to keep foreign agents away from the Indians, as well as to keep foreign ideas away from their own people.

In the fall of 1793 when official confirmation arrived that Spain had joined with England and other European nations in a war against France, there was an immediate increase in tensions in the Eastern Interior Provinces. From Chihuahua City Commandant-General Pedro de Nava in November sent instructions to Governor Manuel Muñoz of Texas to dispatch an armed expedition to the Gulf Coast area. The leader of this party was to exhort the Indians not to treat with any French landing party, and he was to promise rich rewards to the chiefs if they would relay quickly the news of any French activities to Spanish officials. When rumors reached San Antonio a few months later that French agents were working among the tribes of North Texas, Nava likewise ordered an expedition to that region.

Viceroy Miguel de la Grua Talamanca y Branciforte (1794-1798) was not content that sufficient precautions had been taken in Nava's area of command. In December he ordered that all Frenchmen in the Eastern Interior Provinces be arrested and confined. However, Texas was exempted from the provisions of this decree because of the large number of Louisiana-born French living there. Such practices ceased in July of the following year when word arrived from Europe that peace had been re-established with France.

Nevertheless, Spanish officials remained zealous in their efforts to prevent the entry into the area of French revolutionary doctrines in the form of printed matter. As quickly as such works became known, they were banned by the government and placed on the church list of proscribed
works. For example, in November of 1794 Nava ordered the governors under his command to seize all copies of *The Disenchantment of Man*, a work printed in Spanish in Philadelphia. All copies of the book were to be confiscated, and all persons arrested who possessed it or had read it. In October of the following year came a similar order regarding a manuscript entitled, "Discourse pronounced by Boisi d'Anglas, Member of the Public Order..." Nava concluded his dispatch with the prophetic words: "Exercise care about the types of material in circulation, for by this manner our religion, king, state, cult, vassalage, and security may be lost."

The war with France was hardly ended before another source of worry arose to replace it. In October of 1796 Nava informed his governors that the English were counterfeiting Spanish pesos at Birmingham, England, with the intention of introducing them into the New World to wreck the economy in the colonies. Within four months came word that war had been declared against England; and with this news there was a wave of fear, amounting almost to hysteria, that the English and Americans were planning a joint invasion of Louisiana, and possibly Texas. Governor Muñoz wrote his superior that he had taken all possible precautions to meet the threat: frequent inspections of the coast had been ordered, and diligent efforts were being made to keep enemy agents from going among the Indians.

The fear that the United States might invade the Eastern Interior Provinces was not new in 1797. In fact, such a feeling had been growing since the signing three years earlier of the treaty between the United States and England (Jay's Treaty). To the Spaniards this accord seemed a prelude to aggression. And as in the case of the French, there soon were rumors that American agents were circulating among the Indian tribes in Texas.

On July 30, 1795, Nava wrote Governor Muñoz of Texas that "the king has been informed on good authority that the United States has ordered emissaries to move here [the Interior Provinces] and work to subvert the population." He noted that dispatches from the Baron de Carondolet, Governor of Louisiana, told of "greedy persons from the western states" moving into the interior of that province. He concluded with a warning to "exercise care to see that no foreigners go among the Indian nations that are our allies." Even news of the signing of a treaty between Spain and the United States (Pinckney's Treaty) did not allay suspicions of American aggression in the Interior Provinces.

Despite the fact that no invasion ever materialized and no enemy agents were caught, the tension continued to mount among Spanish officials. As France and Spain had allied in the European struggle, and as an undeclared naval war was raging between France and the United States in the late 1790's, the commanding-general feared that Americans might attempt a sudden seizure of Spanish territory. Especially alarming to this official was the granting by Congress of authority for President John Adams to raise an army of ten thousand men. In August of 1798 Nava wrote Muñoz, "... some feel that [the Americans] shortly will declare hostilities with us. In view of this, you are to take all precautions to put
the province under your command in a good state of defense."\textsuperscript{16} Two
months later he wrote that the quarrel between the United States and
France made "an outbreak of war almost inevitable."\textsuperscript{17}

The victim of this Spanish fear of the United States was Philip Nolan.
This enigmatic figure first came to Texas as early as 1785, professing
to be a horse trader.\textsuperscript{18} In 1794-1795 he made another trip to the province,
visiting at San Antonio and La Bahía (present Goliad) to purchase horses
for the Spanish governor of Louisiana.\textsuperscript{19} In the fall of 1797 Nolan re­
turned, this time with permission to travel to Nuevo Santander on a pass­
port signed by Commandant-General Nava.\textsuperscript{20} Before this trip was com­
pleted, however, Nolan's fall from favor had begun. Nava revoked Nolan's
permit to import two thousand pesos worth of goods to be used as presents
for friendly Indians, giving "good reasons" as the grounds for his ac­
tion.\textsuperscript{21} When the horse trader remained in Texas an additional year for
vague reasons, the commandant-general became very suspicious. In April
of 1799 Nava wrote the governor of Texas: "Tell me if in your opinion he
has made himself suspect; but, in truth, to me his residing here so long
has not seemed good when less time would have been sufficient to gather
the horses I permitted. . . ."\textsuperscript{22}

Muñoz answered the request for information by stating: "In examining
[Nolan's] conduct, I find that he never did anything suspicious. . . . Al­
ways he has manifested much affection and gratitude for our govern­
ment. . . ."\textsuperscript{23} This reply did little to restore Nava's shaken confidence in
the American, and in June of 1799 he ordered the horse trader arrested.\textsuperscript{24}
Nolan, however, had already returned to the United States.

The following year, disregarding warnings not to enter Texas, Nolan
and a party of men again entered the province. In March of 1801 they
were surrounded north of present Waco by a force of 150 Spanish soldiers.
In the ensuing struggle Nolan was killed and the remainder of his party
captured.\textsuperscript{25} As a result of this affair, Spanish suspicions about the de­
signs of the United States grew.

Another factor contributing to the mounting Spanish distrust of the
Anglo-Americans was the purchase of Louisiana in 1803—an incident that
almost led to war between the two nations three years later. The transfer
of control of this province to the United States, effected on December 15,
1803,\textsuperscript{26} immediately raised two problems: what should be done about the
large number of Louisianans who wished to migrate to Texas, and exactly
where was the boundary between the two provinces?

Governor Juan Bautista de Elguézabal\textsuperscript{27} of Texas, who had succeeded
Muñoz, desired to populate the province under his command, and freely
granted licenses to immigrants. But the new commandant-general Nemesio
Salcedo y Salcedo,\textsuperscript{28} did not agree. On January 9, 1804, he wrote the
governor of Texas that no individual proceeding from Louisiana was to
be allowed to settle in the Eastern Interior Provinces. They could move
to New Spain, but only to the interior.\textsuperscript{29} Two months later, however, Sal­
cedo's order was countermanded by a royal decree approving the resettle­
ment of Louisianans in the Interior Provinces. The only proviso was that
they could not live at Nacogdoches because they might be tempted to smug­
gle.\textsuperscript{30} After the arrival of the king's order, the influx of settlers to Texas
from the neighboring territory doubled and redoubled, ending only with the Neutral Ground settlement of 1806.31

A greater problem for the Spaniards than the peaceful settlers was the deserters from the United States Army and the fugitive slaves who made their way to Texas and asked for asylum.32 The Spaniards feared that the deserters were spies, and the owners of the runaway slaves protested loudly. The commandant-general finally issued an order that any deserter about whom there was the slightest suspicion was to be returned immediately to the American authorities; the rest were to be removed as far west as San Antonio, as were all slaves.33

The other problem raised by the Louisiana Purchase—the exact boundary—was an old one. The American government had merely inherited a dispute that dated back to the years preceding 1763, when Spain had acquired Louisiana from France and rendered the question academic. Many Americans believed that the Louisiana Purchase included Texas, and began noisily asserting a claim to it.34 The Spaniards not only resisted such demands, but asserted a counterclaim. In Madrid the Council of State in March of 1804 delineated the boundary as Spain felt it to be: from the Gulf of Mexico up the Arroyo Hondo to the vicinity of Natchitoches, and up the Red River. The boundary in the north, the Council asserted, was the Missouri River.35

Local Spanish officials disagreed about the exact boundary. The Marquis de Casa-Calvo, Spanish consul in New Orleans, believed the Sabine was the dividing line. Governor Elguézabal thought the line should be drawn according to the boundary set in the treaty of 1800 which returned Louisiana to France. Commandant-General Salcedo said nothing at all; instead, he sent a detachment of troops to occupy a position at Bayupier (Bayou Pierre) near the abandoned Spanish presidio of Los Adaes. He further ordered that no Americans whatsoever be allowed to approach the area to survey a boundary until the royal government designated a commission for that purpose.36

Gradually Salcedo began shifting his troops in the Eastern Interior Provinces in order to be able to cope quickly with any emergency along the Texas-Louisiana boundary. By September of 1805 the number of soldiers in Texas had been increased from two hundred to five hundred and fifty. Governor Antonio Cordera y Bustamante,37 new chief executive in the province, still was dissatisfied; he asked for an additional seven hundred men.38 The commandant-general did the best he could under the circumstances, and by December 31 of that year there were seven hundred troops in Texas, 141 of them at Nacogdoches and its vicinity.39

Early in 1806 the boundary dispute began to boil in earnest. The mayor of Natchitoches, the American outpost nearest Texas, wrote the commandant at Nacogdoches, Captain Sebastian Rodríguez, asking an assurance "that there will be no more incursions or acts of violence committed by subjects of Spain on this side of the Sabine River, which is considered included in the territory of the United States." Furthermore, he requested that all Spanish troops east of the Sabine be removed.40 Rodríguez replied that the Spaniards occupied their "own territory," and that
patrols would continue to be sent as far east as the Arroyo Hondo until he received further orders from the commandant-general. \(^{41}\) Rodríguez at first seemed ready to back his bold words with action. On February 2 word reached Nacogdoches that a large party of American private citizens intended to occupy the area in dispute. The captain issued a proclamation to Spaniards in East Texas calling upon them to fight:

The time has arrived in which you should that you are vassals of His Catholic Majesty. I want you to know that the United States, full of ambition and greed, intends to usurp from our sovereign . . . part of this province. . . . It has been intimated to me by the commandant of the American troops that if we do not evacuate the terrain [between the Arroyo Hondo and the Sabine] . . . they will take that unjust pretext to declare war on us. I have given orders to our troops not to abandon their posts except at the price of their lives. . . . And I believe that you, on your part, should do as much in defense of the country in which you have your families, your property, and your subsistence, those whose station permits it taking arms. In this way you will show your fidelity and patriotism. \(^{42}\)

Just three days after this pronouncement, the Spanish troops east of the Sabine had a chance to demonstrate their bravery. Approximately 150 American private citizens, without official sanction, approached the Spanish outposts in the disputed territory, and the Spaniards withdrew without a fight. \(^{43}\) Captain Rodríguez decided that war was imminent, that the Spaniards could not win, and that it would be bad for his career to command a losing engagement. He asked to be replaced, declaring that the situation was "critical" and that his troops and their horses were "exhausted." \(^{44}\)

The commandant-general saw the explosive possibilities of the controversy with the United States and the need of a seasoned officer in the area. He sent Lieutenant Colonel Simon de Herrera, Governor of Nuevo Santander, to East Texas to take command of the military forces along the border. Herrera did not arrive at Nacogdoches until June, \(^{45}\) by which time war seemed inevitable. He found that the American force at Natchez was estimated at 12,000 to 15,000 men. According to the rumors circulating, this force was going to overrun the disputed territory and also take North Texas, then force this settlement on Spain by presenting an accomplished fact. \(^{46}\) Hastily the Spaniards moved the militias of Nuevo Santander and Nuevo Leon, as well as regular troops from other areas, to East Texas. By June 1 a record high of 1,368 Spanish fighting men were gathered in Texas, of whom 883 were at Nacogdoches and its vicinity. \(^{47}\)

High Spanish officials moved cautiously. From the king came orders to proceed carefully, but not to concede any of the disputed territory. Both the viceroy and the commandant-general echoed this feeling. Salcedo wrote Herrera: "Do not begin the action or attack the Americans without an absolute certainty of evicting them. . . ." \(^{48}\)

At the very instant that it seemed war would begin, Herrera and General James Wilkinson, the American commander in Louisiana, reached a
dramatic settlement. Wilkinson proposed a compromise, Herrera agreed, and on November 4 they signed an accord providing that Spanish troops would withdraw west of the Sabine, American troops would withdraw east of the Arroyo Hondo, and a final settlement would be left to negotiation between the two governments. Later, Herrera received the thanks and praise of both the viceroy and the commandant-general for the compromise—an act that amounted to disobedience of orders.

Following this settlement, tensions gradually relaxed in East Texas, and the number of Spanish soldiers in the area was reduced. Not all points of contention between the United States and Spain were solved by the Wilkinson-Herrera agreement, however. Fugitive slaves continued to make their way to Texas, and their owners continued to demand their return. Deserters from the United States Army continued to reach Nacogdoches and ask for Spanish citizenship. And forbidden books, spreading what Commandant-General Salcedo termed the “depraved . . . maxims of liberty and disunion,” continued to be introduced into the New World Spanish colonies.

To offset the possibility of further American expansion, Spanish officials in the Eastern Interior Provinces made attempts between 1806 and 1808 to increase the population of Texas by establishing new towns and by sending immigrants from Mexico. Between San Antonio and Nacogdoches at the Trinity River, the settlement of Trinidad de Salcedo was founded during the last week in December of 1805. Five families from San Antonio were joined there by a detachment of soldiers and twenty-three former Louisianans. Gradually the little village grew, until by March of 1809 it had a population of ninety-two. Also established was the smaller settlement of San Marcos de Neve at the spot where the road between San Antonio and San Juan Bautista (on the Rio Grande) crossed the San Marcos River. Financed personally by Governor Cordero, this village drew its settlers from Mexico. The founding date was January 6, 1808. Four months later the population numbered sixty-one, including a detachment of soldiers sent to guard the civilians from the Indian raiders.

Two final incidents disturbed the slumber of Spanish officials in the Eastern Interior Provinces during the last years before the storm of revolution broke in New Spain: the appearance of Lieutenant Zebulon Pike, and the American Embargo Act. Most Spanish officials, including Commandant-General Salcedo, believed that the Pike Expedition was part of a continuing American plot to acquire territory that belonged to Spain. Salcedo felt that Pike’s specific purpose was to subvert the loyalty of the Plains Indians. Therefore, as a counter measure, the commandant-general in 1808 ordered an expedition to march from San Antonio to Santa Fe, giving medals and flags to the various chiefs and exhorting them to retain their allegiance to Spain. Pike’s expedition had consisted of himself, a doctor, and seven soldiers; the Spanish expedition was made up of two hundred soldiers. Furthermore, Salcedo took steps to stop the illegal immigration of American settlers to Texas, giving specific orders to the governor of the province to arrest such intruders. Governor Cordero agreed with his superior; in October of 1808 he wrote: “We must assume . . . that the inundation of vagrants, who have been introducing themselves into the area [of North Texas] is nothing more than a plot by that
government [the United States] to take the land, and . . . realize, in succession, their ideas of conquest."54

The second cause of contention during the last years before revolution developed in the Interior Provinces, and in all of the Spanish New World colonies, was the American Embargo Act. Because of the disturbances in Europe, the Spaniards had been purchasing in the United States the goods which they annually distributed to the Indians as presents. Spanish officials saw the embargo as an insidious American plot to win away the allegiance of the Indian tribes in Texas and perhaps to cause uprisings and raids by disgruntled natives in the Interior Provinces.55

Besides the problems with the United States, the representatives of the king in the Interior Provinces were further disturbed by events in Europe. In 1808 Spain again did a turnabout in the involved Napoleonic Wars, declaring a war on France and allying itself with England following the forced abdication of Ferdinand VII. Salcedo and his fellow officers feared that representatives of the new French regime in Spain might attempt to take control of the colonies. The commandant-general ordered a careful inventory of all weapons held by the inhabitants of Texas, and he filled the officer ranks in the army to full complement.56 And he ordered that any Spaniard or Frenchman who presented himself in the Interior Provinces claiming to be a representative of the French regime in Spain was to be arrested immediately; he declared that such individuals were "traitors" to the "beloved king" and religion of Spain.57

In San Antonio two councils were held in connection with the new crisis. Convened by Brigadier Bernardo Bonavia, Salcedo's second-in-command, these councils were attended by Cordero, Herrera, and the new governor of Texas, Manuel de Salcedo. These gatherings were the last displays of pomp and ceremony in the province while Spain ruled it. Bonavia was met outside San Antonio by a military reception. Three days later, April 17, 1809, the first council convened to discuss military affairs in the Eastern Interior Provinces, and specifically the needs of Texas. The usual recommendations followed: more troops were needed, Nacogdoches should be garrisoned more strongly, and immigrants should be brought to populate the area between the Sabine River and San Antonio.60

Commandant-General Salcedo proved cold to these proposals, however. He was distrustful of foreigners and therefore was against the colonization scheme. Furthermore, he believed that in defending Texas all available strength should be concentrated at San Antonio, not at Nacogdoches. He had previously ordered that the road between San Antonio and Nacogdoches deliberately be left in a state of disrepair in order to slow an invading army.61

The second council was held in July of 1809 and discussed ways to improve the economy in Texas. The major recommendation of this meeting was that La Bahía be declared a port in order to facilitate the importation and exportation of goods.62 But again the commandant-general turned a deaf ear. He declared that it was "very remote" that La Bahía could be opened successfully as a port.63

The two councils at San Antonio represented the last chance for the
Spaniards to rejuvenate the economy of Texas and to institute reforms that would benefit the entire Eastern Interior Provinces. However, the same fear and distrust of change that made these officials resist the French ideas of equality and the American idea of frontier democracy also caused them to resist altering the status quo in the provinces under their command. Thus as the year 1810 dawned the soil was prepared for revolution, which in turn would further weaken and depopulate the provinces and lay them open to filibusterers.

FOOTNOTES

1 First created in 1776, the Interior Provinces were administered by a commandant-general whose headquarters was at Arizpe or Chihuahua City. Then in 1787 the area was divided into the Eastern and Western Interior Provinces with separate commanders. Three years later the two commands were rejoined and placed under Brigadier Pedro de Nava. For further information about the founding of the Interior Provinces, see Alfred B. Thomas, Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain, 1776-1783 (Norman, 1941), 16-20; and H. Bailey Carroll and J. Villasana Haggard (trans. and eds., Three New Mexico Chronicles (Albuquerque, 1942), 169-171.

2 Brigadier Pedro de Nava assumed command of the Interior Provinces on April 27, 1790. A combination of old age and poor health eventually forced him to request retirement from the royal service, a request that was granted. His replacement arrived on November 4, 1802, and Nava returned to Spain to enjoy his remaining years in peace and comfort. See El Conde de Revilla Gigedo to the governor of Texas, September 17, 1790, Mexico City, Béxar Archives (Archives, The University of Texas, Austin); Nava to Juan Bautista de Elguézabal, September 4, 1802, Chihuahua, Béxar Archives; and Nemesio Salcedo to the Governor of Texas, November 4, 1802, San Bartolomé, Béxar Archives. The Béxar Archives are hereafter cited as BA.

3 Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Muñoz became governor of Texas on August 14, 1790, and served in this capacity until his death on July 27, 1799. See Muñoz to Antonio Gil Ybarbo, August 16, 1790, San Antonio, BA; Francesco Xavier de Uranga to Elguézabal, August 3, 1799, La Bahía, BA.

4 Nava to the Governor of Texas, secret, November 30, 1793, Chihuahua, BA.

5 Nava to Muñoz, March 27, 1794, Chihuahua, BA.

6 Nava to Muñoz, very secret, January 6, 1795, Chihuahua, BA; Muñoz to Nava, No. 266, February 28, 1795, San Antonio, BA.

7 Juan Cortes to Muñoz, January 29, 1796, La Bahía, BA, contains notice of the peace treaty.

8 Nava to the Governor of Texas, November 21, 1794, Chihuahua, BA.

9 Nava to Muñoz, October 7, 1795, Chihuahua, BA.

10 Nava to Muñoz, October 12, 1796, Chihuahua, BA.

11 Muñoz to Nava, No. 498, February 27, 1797, San Antonio, BA, notes receipt of the declaration of war.
East Texas Historical Journal 95

12Muñoz to Nava, No. 587, August 6, 1797, San Antonio, BA.
13Muñoz to Nava, No. 265, February 19, 1795, San Antonio, BA.
14Nava to Muñoz, very secret, July 30, 1796, Chihuahua, BA.
15Muñoz to Nava, No. 473, December 5, 1796, San Antonio, BA.
16Nava to Muñoz, secret, August 28, 1798, Chihuahua, BA.
17Nava to Muñoz, secret, October 18, 1798, Chihuahua, BA.
19Baron de Carondolet to Muñoz, September 9, 1794, New Orleans, BA; Muñoz to Carondolet, January 18, 1795, San Antonio, BA.
20Nava to Philip Nolan, October 31, 1797, Chihuahua, BA.
21Nava to Muñoz, March 20, 1798, March 20, 1798, Chihuahua, BA.
22Nava to Muñoz, April 30, 1799, Chihuahua, BA.
23Muñoz to Nava, No. 660, June 12, 1799, San Antonio, BA.
24Ibid., notes this order.
25Bean, "Memoirs," quoted in Yoakum, History of Texas, I, 403-452; Bennett Lay, The Lives of Ellis P. Bean (Austin, 1960), 13-25. One member of the Nolan party, Steven Richard, was in San Antonio in 1809 serving a ten-year sentence in the militia of Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander for his participation in the expedition; see Nemesio Salcedo to Manuel de Salcedo, March 23, 1809, Chihuahua, BA.
26Francisco de Ugarte to Elguézabal, February 4, 1804, Nacogdoches, BA, contains the news of the change of control at New Orleans. However, the last Spanish governor-general of Louisiana, the Marquis de Casa-Calvo, wrote Elguézabal, that the American commissioners arrived on December 20. See Casa-Calvo to Elguézabal, March 5, 1804, New Orleans, BA.
27Lieutenant Colonel Juan Bautista de Elguézabal became governor of Texas on July 27, 1799. He served until September 10, 1805, when he was relieved because of ill health. He died in San Antonio on October 5 of that same year. See Urango to Elguézabal, August 3, 1799, La Bahía, BA; Nava to the Ayuntamiento of San Fernando of the Province of Texas, August 17, 1799, Chihuahua, BA; Cordero, Notarized Statement, December 23, 1805, San Antonio, BA. Elguézabal was replaced as governor by Antonio Cordero y Bustamente. One of Elguézabal's sons, Juan José, also served as governor of Texas in 1834-1835, when Texas and Coahuila were joined as one state; see Walter P. Webb (ed.), The Handbook of Texas (2 vols., Austin, 1952), I, 554.
28Upon the retirement of Pedro de Nava, Brigadier Nemesio Salcedo y Salcedo became commandant-general, serving from November 4, 1802, until 1813. A stern man, he stubbornly clung to the old order and blocked progress and change whenever he could. See Salcedo to the Governor of Texas, November 4, 1802, San Bartolomé, BA; Elliott Coues (ed.), The

29Elguézabal to Salcedo, February 15, 1804, San Antonio, BA, notes the commandant-general's order of January 9.

30Salcedo to Elguézabal, March 27, 1804, notes this royal order.

31Mattie Austin Hatcher, The Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement, 1801-1821 (Austin, 1927), 60-101.

32Ugarte to Elguézabal, November 26, 1803, Nacogdoches, BA; Elguézabal to Salcedo, No. 311, November 7, 1804, San Antonio, BA.

33Elguézabal to the Commandant at Nacogdoches, secret, September 30, 1805, San Antonio, BA, notes this instruction.

34For the justice of the American claim to the Rio Grande as the boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, see Richard Stenberg, "The Western Boundary of Louisiana, 1762-1803," The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXXV (October 1931), 95-108.

35Council of State, Decree, March 17, 1804, Madrid, Spain, BA. This decree did not give a north-south boundary between the Missouri and Red rivers.

36Casa-Calvo to Elguézabal, June 19, 1804, New Orleans, BA; Elguézabal to Ugarte, March 4, 1804, San Antonio, BA; Salcedo to Elguézabal, May 3, 1804, Chihuahua, BA; Sebastian Rodriguez to Cordero, November 4, 1805, Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches Archives (Archives, Texas State Library, Austin). President Jefferson's attempts to send scientific expeditions up the Red River in 1804-1806 were also suspect by the commandant-general; he feared these expeditions were merely disguised attempts to survey a boundary prejudicial to Spanish interests. Therefore he ordered the Dunbar and the Freeman and Sparks expeditions turned back. See Salcedo to Cordero, secreta, October 8, 1805, Chihuahua, BA; Coues (ed.), The Expeditions of Zebulon Pike, II, 70. Likewise suspect in the eyes of Salcedo were the foreigners in Nacogdoches in 1804. He ordered all of them listed and carefully accounted for. The census for Nacogdoches in 1804 showed twenty Americans, eleven Irish, two Englishmen, eighteen French, one Scotsman, and fourteen Louisiana-born French; Ugarte, "Padron que manifiesta los Extrangeros que tiene este Pueblo, y toda su jurisdicion ... ", January 1, 1804, Nacogdoches, BA.

37Colonel Manuel Antonio Cordero y Bustamente arrived in San Antonio on September 8, 1805, and two days later assumed the governorship of the province. In addition, he was governor of Coahuila during this same period. An enlightened official, he hoped to admit to the province large numbers of bonafide settlers, both from Europe and the United States. He was relieved as governor of Texas on November 7, 1808, but stayed in the province until July 27, 1809. See Cordero, Notarized Statement, December 23, 1805, San Antonio, BA; Cordero to Bernardo Bonavia, July 21, 1809, San Antonio, BA; Nettie Lee Benson, "Texas Failure to Send a Deputy to the Spanish Cortes, 1810-1812," The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LXIV (July 1960), note on 21-22; Cordero to Bonavia, July 26, 1809, San Antonio, BA, contains the notice that Cordero was leaving Texas the following day.
Cordero to Nemesio Salcedo, No. 19, September 15, 1805, San Antonio, BA.

Cordero, "Provincia de los Texas. Fuerza de las Tropas que la garrison y su Distribucion actual . . . ," December 31, 1805, San Antonio, BA.

Mayor Porter to Rodríguez, translated into Spanish and quoted in Rodríguez to Salcedo, No. 12, January 30, 1806, Nacogdoches, BA.

Ibid.

Rodríguez, "Manifiesto que hace el Capitan de Caballeria, Commandante del Puesto de Nacogdoches . . . a todos los havitantes de dicho Puesto y su Jurisdiccion, el 2 de Febrero de 1806 . . . ," February 2, 1806, Nacogdoches, BA.

José María González to Rodríguez, February 5, 1806, Arroyo de los Adaes, BA; Salcedo to Cordero, February 24, 1806, Chihuahua, BA.

Rodríguez to Cordero, No. 29, February 13, 1806, Nacogdoches, BA; Rodríguez to Cordero, No. 27, February 13, 1806, Nacogdoches, BA. This officer subsequently was brought to trial for his conduct during this period. A week later he was allowed to retire. See Salcedo to Cordero, March 25, 1806, Chihuahua, BA; Cordero to Salcedo, No. 636, September 28, 1807, San Antonio, BA.

Salcedo to Cordero, June 17, 1806, Chihuahua, BA; Viana to Cordero, June 6, 1806, Nacogdoches, BA.

Salcedo to Cordero, secret, April 19, 1806, Chihuahua, BA.

Miguel Serrano, "Estado que manifiesta la fuerza total y Desinos de las tropas que existen en esta Provincia," June 26, 1806, San Antonio, BA.

Salcedo to Cordero, secreta, October 24, 1806, Hazienda de los Ornos, BA; the king's order was contained in Salcedo to Cordero, very secret, March 17, 1807, Chihuahua, BA.


Reported by Pike in Coues (ed.), The Expeditions of Zebulon Pike, II, 702-703.

Pedro Lopez Prieta to Manuel Salcedo, No. 3, November 22, 1808, Trinidad de Salcedo, BA, reported twenty-seven fugitive slaves at that settlement; Nemesio Salcedo to Cordero, December 9, 1806, San Antonio, BA, noted the presence of twenty American deserters in the capital city of Texas. Both types of unwanted immigrants subsequently were prohibited from entering the province; see Nemesio Salcedo to Cordero, December 2, 1808, Chihuahua, BA, and Nemesio Salcedo to Bonavia, July 9, 1809, Chihuahua, BA. About the forbidden books, see Nemesio Salcedo to Cordero, secret, December 3, 1808, Chihuahua, BA.

Hatcher, The Opening of Texas, 102-103; Antonio Saens, "Padron General de toda la Jurisdicion de la Villa de Trinidad," March 22, 1809, Trinidad de Salcedo, BA.

Cordero to Felipe Roque de la Portilla, December 16, 1807, San Antonio, BA; Webb (ed.), Handbook of Texas, II, 558.

Francisco Amangual, "Diario de las Novedades y Operaciones occur-
rías en la Expedicion que se hace desde esta Provincia de Texas a la del Nuevo Mexico, de orden superior, siendo Primar Comandante el Capitan Don Francisco Amangual . . . ,” March 30-December 23, 1808, San Antonio, BA; Cordero to Nemesio Salcedo, No. 3, very secret, October 15, 1808, San Antonio, BA. For an example of such illegal entry, see Manuel de Salcedo, “Texas. Causa seguida a los reos extrangeros Enrique Kuerke, Jose Magui, Juan Macfarzon y Jose Brenton . . . ,” October 29, 1808-December 30, 1809, San Antonio, BA.

55Cordero to Marzelo Soto, Very Secret, March 15, 1808, San Antonio, BA.

56Cordero, “Pie de Lista, que manifiesta, los Yndibiduos que tiene la villa de San Fernando de Austria, capazes de podre tomar las Armas, con expresion, de los que estan armados, y montados . . . ,” October 25, 1808, San Antonio, BA.

57Nemesio Salcedo to Bonavía, June 22, 1808, Chihuahua, BA.

58Because of the critical situation in Texas, the distance to Chihuahua City, and the slowness of communication, Salcedo in November of 1808 named Cordero Second Commandant-General. Cordero was relieved of this post in April of 1809 by Brigadier Bernardo Bonavia y Zapata. Like Cordero, Bonavía was liberal and enlightened, but he accomplished little in the way of reform in Texas during his short stay. See Nemesio Salcedo to Cordero, July 21, 1809, San Antonio, BA; Bonavia, Decree, April 19, 1809, San Antonio, BA.

59Manuel María de Salcedo, the nephew of the commandant-general, assumed the governorship of Texas on November 7, 1808. He served during the revolutionary period that followed, and was executed by the filibusterer Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara on April 3, 1813. See Cordero, Decree, November 7, 1808. San Antonio, BA; Harry McCorry Henderson, “The Magee Gutiérrez Expedition,” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LV (July 1951), 46-52; Julia Kathryn Garrett, Green Flag Over Texas (New York, 1939), 17.

60Bonavia, Cordero, Manuel de Salcedo, Herrera, and Mariano Varela, Auto, April 19, 1809, San Antonio, BA (Part of this document is missing); Garrett, Green Flag Over Texas, 21-22.

61Manuel de Salcedo to Cordero, March 23, 1809, San Antonio, BA, communicates this information. See also Garrett, Green Flag Over Texas, 28.

62Bonavia to Nemesio Salcedo, No. 55, July 26, 1809, San Antonio, BA.

63Nemesio Salcedo to Bonavia, September 7, 1809, Chihuahua, BA.
DUDLEY CRAWFORD SHARP—SECRETARY FOR AIR*

ROBERT C. COTNER and PEYTON E. COOK

The Eugene C. Barker Texas History Center at the University of Texas was the place of my first meeting with Dudley C. Sharp. Although a very busy man, with manufacturing interests in Houston, he had come to Austin with his mother, Mrs. Walter B. Sharp, to discuss the progress being made with the Pioneers of Texas Oil Project. As many of you know, the University has about 150 tape recordings, collected over the past ten years by Mody Boatright, William Owens, Winnie Allen and others, dealing with the pioneers in the oil business in Texas. The Sharps have been keenly interested in this program and have contributed most of the money made available for obtaining the recordings. Recall that Walter B. Sharp was an early water well drilling contractor, turned oil man. While studying the oil developments at Spindletop, I learned that he was a business associate of ex-Governor James S. Hogg. You may recall that Sharp died from heat exhaustion after fighting an oil fire in 1911. Mrs. Sharp was widowed with several small children. Dudley, born in 1905, was about six when his father died.¹

As I talked with Dudley Sharp in Austin I could see the resemblance to his father. Both were handsome men, over six feet tall, rangy rather than stout, with alert eyes and friendly countenance. Dudley had evidenced early a keen interest in things practical and theoretical. His mother with business acumen and by careful investment was able to travel and the varying experiences heightened the imaginations of her sons. Because of his religious and philosophical insights, Mrs. Sharp considered for a while sending Dudley to the Orient to absorb its ancient learning. However, he enrolled at Princeton in the early 1920's, taking five years to graduate because he spent one year in Europe. Later he and some other college youths went big game hunting in Malaysia and narrowly escaped death from jungle fever. When he traveled up the China coast the Chinese crew mutinied when the boat nearly sank in a typhoon. Dudley worked to save the ship and passengers.² I have stressed these events to show that he was not unaware of the distant parts of the world when he was called to public service by the Eisenhower Administration.

Mr. Sharp continued his interest in the sea and owned a yacht which he turned over to the Navy in 1942. At this time he was co-owner with his brother and mother of the Mission Manufacturing Company in Houston, continuing a pattern started by his father who was once a partner with Howard Hughes in the Sharp-Hughes Tool Co., primarily interested in oil drilling machinery. When Dudley volunteered for duty with the Navy he served two years as Executive Officer and later Commanding Officer of submarine chasers and destroyer escort vessels. Recognizing his special knowledge of business, he was assigned to the Office of Procurement

*This paper was delivered by Dr. Cotner of the University of Texas at the East Texas Historical Association meeting in Huntsville.
and Material. He also served for six months "as administrative manager of the Applied Physics Laboratory"3 at Silver Spring, Maryland, which was engaged in important research and development work for the Navy.

Following the truce in Korea, the Eisenhower Administration began to reorganize the various branches of the armed services and to seek ways to economize, hoping to obtain a balanced budget. In 1955 Dudley Sharp was called in as a civilian adviser to General Edwin M. Rawlins, Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. His special duty related to the machine tool stockpiling program. It was apparent that Mr. Sharp was experienced in the field of manufacturing, had military experience both as a unit commander and as a staff officer, and he was learning the special problems of the Air Force. Apparently, he was making good for on July 12, 1955 the New York Times announced that "Dudley C. Sharp, a Houston manufacturer of oil field supplies, was said to be slated to succeed Roger Lewis as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for procurement."4 Confirmation of Secretary Lewis's pending resignation effective September 20, 1955, was soon announced and Sharp's nomination was public knowledge.

People, in and out of Congress, now wanted to know more about Mr. Sharp and why he had been selected. Eisenhower, if not the Republican party, had carried Texas in 1952. One reason for the growing strength of the party in Houston was the fact that a man like Sharp had served as finance chairman of the Harris County Republicans since 1952. He would also represent the spirit of unification in the defense department since he had experience in materiel with the Navy. Furthermore, he ought to know what manufacturing costs were and was prepared to give contracts a close look with a view to effective, quality procurement and to economy. He could be of service to the Eisenhower administration and to the country. His sense of public duty was best stated by himself:

I feel that it is a duty of people in business, if we intend to preserve our system under which I prospered, and many others of us prosper, to offer our services whenever they are available, whenever they are asked for, and whenever we feel that we can do a fair job and are qualified to the job.5

He also felt that people who failed to accept public responsibility when asked to contribute their skills, even with some loss of income, should not complain about how government was run.

The Houston Post sent Sharp off to the tests of confirmation with the following:

Mr. Sharp, a man of many and wide interests, will take with him to Washington the good wishes of all Houstonians. His will be a big and complicated job, but in his years here he has demonstrated that he is well equipped to handle it.5

But the hazard course to confirmation was to be a rugged one. He arrived in Washington when the business interests of Harold E. Talbott, Secretary of the Air Force, were much in the news. The Senate Armed Services Committee was sensitive over the criticisms and proceeded to go thoroughly into Mr. Sharp's business interests and probed for any signs
of conflict of interest, which is considered to exist if an official, such as Mr. Talbott, owned stock or had any interest in an organization doing direct business with the government. Even the chance of favoritism was to be avoided. Even companies doing business indirectly with departments of government came within the meaning of “Conflict of Interest.” Mr. Sharp understood his need to dispose of stocks in Gulf, Humble and Phillips oil companies, Libby-Owens-Ford Glass, etc. However, he expected to continue his interests in Texas Fund, Inc. and Mission Manufacturing (the father's company) which he felt “in no way, create a conflict of interest with my official duties.” Senator Harry Byrd (D-Va.) concentrated his questions on Texas Fund, which owned stock in companies, such as the Texas Company, which did direct business with the Defense Department. While the Texas Company was the largest stock account of the Texas Fund, it was only about 4% of the total holdings. Many people in the Southwest had invested in Texas Fund because of Mr. Sharp and he was reluctant to sell although it represented much less than 1/100th of his total securities holdings. Even giving up offices would not suffice, and after a conference with Senator Leveret SaltonSTALL (R-Mass.) he agreed to sell “as proof of my sincerity.” Except for the “Talbott Affair” and his desire to aid Eisenhower, he would probably have turned around and returned to Houston. However, he would not give up holdings in the family owned Mission Manufacturing.

Mr. Sharp promised that he would “take no part in the management of the company while in the Air Force post.” Talbott had transferred some of the holdings to his children. Senators Byrd and Russell wanted to know if he would sell “on the open market.” He answered, “Yes.” He considered the cost financially very great, but he had been nominated by the President and he decided to accept the confirmation and go to work. In 1962 he still felt that “the Senate Armed Services Committee was a little unreasonable with me, maybe because they thought it was the thing to do at the moment.” The Committee had approved the nomination on July 30, 1955 and the Senate confirmed two days later.

On October 3, 1955 Dudley Sharp was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Materiel). His duties were largely in the area of procurement of equipment and supplies—aircraft to nuts and bolts. He was responsible for storage and handling of supplies, transportation and communications for the Air Force, contracting, and for matters relating to civil aviation. The Assistant Secretary made policy in areas of responsibility. He must work in close coordination with his immediate superior—the Under Secretary—as well as the Secretary for Air. In February, 1956, the Assistant Secretary was present at the appropriation hearings and Congressman George Mahon wanted to know how a business man had gone about learning his job. Sharp made this reply:

It is quite a task. For one thing, I think I have traveled a total of about 50,000 miles in a very concentrated effort to call on the contractors, on the air materiel area headquarters and on depots, to see exactly how they go about pricing things, to find out first hand from the people who actually do it and how it is done.

I made a trip to Europe to investigate the MDAP [Mutual De-
fense Assistance Pact] program . . . and to investigate our depots over there.

In addition to that you have to burn the midnight oil quite a lot. I spend a good many hours a day studying things I would normally know if I had been here longer. I attend a great many conferences. I am briefed a great deal on individual problems as they come up and given the background.11

He also learned that it was seldom the "big things" which gave trouble, but the many "little things."12

One of the mysteries of Washington is the budget. The defense part was determined at a higher level than the Air Force (or Navy, as I found out while in a personnel planning section). The Defense Department then sliced the money in the proportions they felt were justified for each service. The Air Force or other branch must then fit its next fiscal year programs into its slice. The more stable costs, like pay and housing allowances, are not hard to determine but the allocation for other items becomes most difficult. Take for example procurement projects running over a period of years—missiles or bombers in blueprint. Furthermore, it is difficult to start and stop big projects. Speed up or slow down called for renegotiation of contracts; sometimes tooling or retooling. Instead of the older method of buying items that looked good then and stockpiling with possible early obsolescence, Sharp decided on a course of closer planning and of reducing of stockpiles. The Semi-annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to June 30, 1956 carried this announcement:

In November of 1955 the Air Force reoriented industrial mobilization planning to conform to changes in operational plans. In the place of the traditional view of a prolonged industrial buildup after a war begins, the Air Force substituted the concept of an industrial structure ready for war at all times.13

Sharp was thoroughly committed to the use of private industry, believing that "an efficient and progressive aircraft industry is the key to our airpower."14 Once he told a group at a Lockheed plant that the Air Force wished "to do everything in our power to keep the most efficient production underway and at the greatest possible capacity consistent with the Air Force overall program."15 The basic theory was that in case of a general war, "American industry would deliver every possible piece of critical equipment during the first 60 to 90 days. In the event of a local war, there would be a rapid acceleration in production of critical weapons."16 Therefore, in 1956 Sharp worked to stabilize and strengthen the aircraft industry. Stability was not enough—he demanded increased know-how.

On the other hand, the Government would continue to operate some very special projects and even set up new facilities for experimentation, but old plants would be used prior to new construction. For example, the missile for THOR was being made at the Douglas plant in Santa Monica, California, but the engines were being tested at a new site at Santa Susana, as no old facility was available for this work.17

In 1958 there were eighty government owned facilities. Only five were
idle. These last could be disposed of by the General Services Administration. Mr. Sharp also looked over available plants of other services to see if the Air Force could use any. He noted that the Army and Navy had several reserve plants and many expensive tools in storage. Part of this was due to the Korean War. However, a complex accounting system had worked against trading equipment between services. Money was involved. While one branch of the Armed Services was without money to buy, another Service might have a surplus of unused tools. It may seem strange to learn that often, if they could buy from a sister service, the Air Force might be charged more for tools than new ones could be bought for in open market. Congress also was unhappy at the inter-service buying and selling policies.\(^{18}\)

Sharp deserved much credit for helping to bring about changes. The Army and Navy closed some installations and distributed the equipment. Now by using the Consolidated Machine Tool Index, set up with the assistance of the Defense Department, one service was able to use idle equipment of another without having to pay for it. The Army had planned to fight a war that might last five years, while the Air Force thought in terms of months or even weeks. All recognized it was costly to maintain large reserves and a partial compromise between the services was worked out. The maximum reserve in any class of supplies was set at 30 months.\(^{19}\)

In 1956 Sharp obtained $69 millions for new industrial equipment under a concept that the Air Force in order to achieve industrial readiness should keep most of its owned tools in use. The Air Force should also let industry know what new tools would be needed, along with replacements. As of June 30, 1956 there were 147,520 industrial items in the Air Force inventory 104,949 of which were in active use. At the same time in 1957 the inventory was 148,163 but the number in use had increased to 115,323. Then in 1958, with a new emphasis on missile production, the number of machine tools in use decreased as did the inventory. Many tools were now obsolete. On June 30, 1958 the inventory of industrial items was down to 101,843 while those in use had dropped to 74,135.\(^{20}\)

Other reforms initiated by the Assistant Secretary included tightening upon contracts by offering incentives to keep down costs. Formal advertising for bids had been called for by the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. However, in emergencies, like Korea, so-called “negotiated contracts” were used sometimes. In March 1956, Sharp, in answer to criticism of this practice, explained that the Air Force had enough “sound statistics” that they could estimate costs for the “learning curve” period while something new was being produced; the procedures were constantly reviewed and yardsticks were modernized “to further adapt them to the even more complicated weapons of the future.”\(^{21}\) A study of air industry profits extending back to 1942 was declared to be in line with other industrial profits. The Air Force had decided to use formal advertising for almost every contract, but where complex weapons were being developed of secret nature, it seemed wise that the Secretary retain the “negotiated contract.” For an example, use the B-52. No one really knew what it would cost and sometimes only one or two companies were ready to proceed.
In 1958 an improvement in formal advertising was made by the so-called "two-step" process. First, interested companies would submit technical data without prices for a contemplated product. Second, after the evaluation of the data, those concerns which had submitted satisfactory proposals were allowed to bid under normal procedures. The contract was then awarded the lowest bidder. The purpose was to reduce the chance of procuring an inferior product and to continue the use of formal advertising and bidding.22

Mr. Sharp had authority over approval or disapproval of a contract. He now pushed the "incentive" feature in contracts expecting thereby to encourage contractors to reduce costs below their estimates in order to get higher profits. To guard against too high profits, the Air Force established measurement criteria on costs of finished items. Based upon these data, maximum profits were set. The Air Force wanted better equipment at lower costs over the long run. However, Sharp recognized the incentive clauses required new contracts to be renegotiated each year and while the early incentive to reduce cost was substantial, it would fail to produce results after a few years.23

Mr. Sharp entered his duties at a time when the peacetime Air Force reached its maximum strength of 137 wings. From this point until 1959, when he resigned as Assistant Secretary, the size of the Air Force decreased. By 1959 the strength had decreased to 104 manned bomber wings and one missile wing. The major emphasis shifted to quality rather than quantity. Also the emphasis on types of weapon systems was changing. Missiles were assuming more importance in the retaliatory structure of the Air Force, and the proportion of missiles to manned aircraft increased during this period. It was also during this period that the last B-47 bomber was delivered to the Air Force. This occurred in February 1957. The B-52 was to be the main manned bomber and it became operational in 1956 and was being delivered at the rate of 15 per month.24

In the Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense for the period July 1, 1958 to June 30, 1959, the Air Force stated that this was a period of dramatic change. The Air Force said that missiles were assuming a much more important role. Missiles would complement and replace current weapons, and the trend would continue in the future. However, it was felt that there would always be a need for manned weapon systems. This was because the "judgment and reasoning ability of man have always been required to assure complete accomplishment of the Air Force mission regardless of the sophistication of the equipment. Man and his powers of decision and his ability to reason will continue to be decisive in space."25 In this same report, signed by Mr. Sharp, the Air Force felt that it was the most effective single deterrent force in the nation.

The Air Force continued to increase the percentage of missiles procured. In fiscal year 1959 money for procurement of missiles and aircraft was divided 22 per cent for missiles and 38 per cent for aircraft of the 60 per cent allotted to these systems. This was an increase in favor of missiles over fiscal year 1958. It was Mr. Sharp's responsibility to implement higher decisions though it can be assumed that he contributed to the mak-
ing of them; he was in complete agreement with the balanced force concept for the future.26

One of the most interesting threads that is woven into Mr. Sharp's job, and one that was very close to the problems of industrial planning, contracting, and procurement, was that of small business. This appears to have been a major concern of his. Much of the answer for this interest lies in the fact that Mr. Sharp had been connected with small business most of his adult life. As a small businessman he had been in competition with big business. He had an appreciation of what small business could do. He felt that small business was much more efficient than large business and in certain fields could produce much more economically than the large concerns because small business was much more flexible and not as bureaucratic as big business.

Mr. Sharp felt that it was more economical and more justifiable to spread the wealth as much as possible. This fits very well into the concept of a ready industry, and would help to spread work over a larger geographical area, and to more efficient organizations. Mr. Sharp cited the case of a large contractor which was making an item for eight or nine hundred dollars. The Air Force forced this company to go outside for this part and the company was able to get it for $125.00. Mr. Sharp put it this way.

To maintain production in depth in the weapon industry, we are re-emphasizing and strengthening our make-or-buy procedures. This, in effect, subjects the primes [prime contractors] to close screening by the Air Force of work which is performed in plant versus that work which is placed with outside sources by the prime contractor.27

However, it must be kept in mind that Mr. Sharp knew perfectly well that there were some items which small businesses could not make, such as the B-52. Also, it was these large items that took most of the Air Force's procurement dollars, as much as 85 per cent. Therefore, it may appear that small business was not getting a very large share of these procurement dollars. This is true. But during Mr. Sharp's tour as Assistant Secretary they did get an increased portion of the remainder. Mr. Sharp was satisfied with the efforts of the Air Force to give small business more of its money and he kept close watch on progress in this direction.28

In fiscal year 1956, small business had an opportunity to bid on items worth $1.06 billion and actually received contracts valued at $686 million. The $1.06 billion represented 12.8 per cent of the total spent on procurement for the year and the $686 million was 8.3 per cent of the total procurement and 65 per cent of the $1.06 billion. In 1957 these figures climbed to $1.79 billion out of $8.26 billion or 21.6 per cent as compared to 15 per cent in 1953. During fiscal year 1958 there were more than 2,700 concerns working under Air Force contracts, and 1,751 were classified as small businesses. These small businesses received 17.2 per cent of the prime contracts to the sum of $757 million and at the same time prime contractors subcontracted 20 per cent of their Air Force business
to small business. The total amount received by small concerns in fiscal year 1958 was $2.5 billion.  

One of Mr. Sharp's primary responsibilities was that of civilian aviation. It was his job as Assistant Secretary to ascertain that in the event of war there was an efficient and adequate civilian reserve fleet to augment the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) operated by the Air Force. In January, February, and March of 1958 MATS came under fire from Congress. Hearings were held on MATS and as its came under Mr. Sharp's jurisdiction, he was the Department of Defense's chief witness, and had to conduct and coordinate that Department's testimony. The basic questions were whether or not MATS was too large and whether or not more of MATS business should be turned over to the civil airlines. 

At the outset of the hearings, Mr. Sharp made it very clear "that a strong, well-trained and fully responsive military airlift force is an absolutely essential element of our defense posture." He felt that this had to be a force in being, "which when augmented by civil air transport resources, are qualitatively and quantitatively capable of providing the airlift support required for successful implementation of war plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The plan was for MATS to provide airlift for the initial 48 hours of an emergency with the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) providing assistance after this time. This 48 hour period would give CRAF an opportunity to become fully organized and assembled. In fiscal year 1958 CRAF consisted of 362 4-engine aircraft. Because of the 48 hours delay before CRAF would become effective, Mr. Sharp thought that to reduce MATS would weaken national defenses. On the contrary he thought it would be more "reasonable to assert that MATS peacetime operations must continue at the present rate, or go higher." 

It is natural that the longer Mr. Sharp remained in Washington with the Air Force that his pride in this service should increase. He likened the Air Force to a business concern, the biggest in the United States, but with a less tangible product. This was "the assurance that one can continue to live in and enjoy the privileges of this great nation." In other words, security. The Air Force touched almost every aspect of American life with its bases, research facilities, and dealings with industry. In addition, much contact with foreign nations was maintained through overseas bases.

Though Mr. Sharp was proud of the job the Air Force was doing, he was equally aware that there were shortcomings in its operation. He recognized that the Air Force was not without criticism, and that it was always seeking constructive criticism. For this reason he felt that Congressional hearings were helpful because they might uncover weaknesses of the Air Force. But at the same time he felt that progress was being made toward better management of the Air Force.

We have isolated the areas that require top level attention. Control in the other areas has been decentralized to the lowest level at which effective action can be provided. This to me is the essence of good management. With the able assistance of your committee, and the others interested in the progress of the Air
Force, the situation will continue to improve. The professional management of the Air Force, both civilian and military, is without any question one of the finest, most dedicated groups I have ever been privileged to work with. If you will bear with them should they make minor mistakes because of the fearful complexity of their task, I think you can rest assured that they will produce an effective force to defend our land at a reasonable cost to our people.34

This statement sums up Mr. Sharp's opinion of the Air Force and of the job this service was doing for the country.

On January 28, 1959 the New York Times carried the announcement that Mr. Sharp has resigned as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Materiel. This had been hinted at as early as October 28, 1958. His resignation was to be effective on January 31, 1959. His successor was reported to be Philip B. Taylor of Upper Montclair, New Jersey. Mr. Sharp gave his reasons for resigning as home, friends, and business. He stated, "My job with the Air Force has been very rewarding. But it has also been very wearing and confining. I came to Washington with the idea that it would only be for two years. I think it is time I gave someone else a chance to enjoy the pleasures of a very fine job."

President Eisenhower paid him this tribute in a letter:

The attention you have given to the civil aviation industry and small business and your many other contributions in the procurement field should be a source of great satisfaction to you as well as they are to me. Providing an adequate military airlift is an item of utmost importance to our national security. Your contribution toward achieving this goal is noteworthy.35

Mr. Sharp was not destined to remain long in Houston among his friends and with his business. On June 30, 1959, only five months after his resignation, it was reported that Mr. Sharp would succeed Malcolm A. MacIntyre as Under Secretary of the Air Force. A formal announcement was expected in a few days. On July 9 the formal announcement came. Mr. MacIntyre was resigning effective July 31, and the President had nominated Mr. Sharp to replace him.

The primary reason for Mr. Sharp's return to government service was because Mr. MacIntyre had resigned on short notice and there was not enough time to cast around for an experienced replacement. As Mr. Sharp was experienced in the Department of the Air Force, Mr. James Douglas, Secretary of the Air Force, prevailed upon him to take the position of Under Secretary. Mr. Sharp had no apparent qualms about returning to Washington, but rather felt it was his duty to do so.

Mr. Sharp hardly had time to get acquainted with his new duties when another shift occurred. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles died suddenly in November 1959. Also a change in Defense Secretaries took place with Thomas S. Gates succeeding Neil H. McElroy. The most likely candidate for the Deputy Secretary position was Mr. Douglas. If this came about then Mr. Sharp would be the logical choice for Secretary
of the Air Force. On December 10, 1959 it was announced that Mr. Doug­
las would be Deputy Secretary of Defense and Mr. Sharp would be Secre­
tary of the Air Force. He was sworn in the next day.36

The tasks confronting Mr. Sharp as Secretary of the Air Force were
to be more encompassing and much more Air Force wide than those he
had as Assistant Secretary. He was to deal more with overall policy, and
general Air Force programs and concepts than before. But this is not to
assume that the problems and tasks that he had been concerned with pre­
viously were forgotten. Many of the same threads that had been broken
by his short absence were picked up again. In addition, by virtue of his
position of increased importance, additional tasks were performed. It
would be best to pick up and complete the threads that ran through the
years that he was Assistant Secretary before going into other aspects of
his job as Secretary.

The Air Force continued to reduce the number of machine tools in its
possession. By June 1960 there were 77,000 valued at $928 million com­
pared to 88,900 valued at $1.09 billion a year before. It is significant that
the number in use remained virtually steady at 65,000. This reduction
was part of the effort to reduce "spiraling costs due to technological
changes and frequent changes in requirements."37

As indicated previously, Mr. Sharp was never completely satisfied with
contracting procedures even though he had made efforts to get more in­
centive clauses into contracts. The dollar value of contracts let during
the period when Mr. Sharp was Secretary remained fairly stable; $9.65
billion in fiscal year 1960 as compared to the nine year average of $9.42
billion. More emphasis was being placed on missiles than before. A good
example of Mr. Sharp's dissatisfaction with contracting is the contro­
versial SKYBOLT missile. The program was started on a hush-hush basis. The
Martin Company received approximately $7 million to fire 18 missiles in
a 12 month period to test the missile's feasibility. No guidance system
was to be included in the original tests. Martin fired 11 missiles well
within the allotted time and felt that no further firings were required
as they had learned all that was necessary. However, Martin decided to
go ahead and fire the last two SKYBOLTs at satellites to see how close
they could come. They apparently came very close. When Martin had
completed their tests they turned back $2 million to the Air Force. Now
in accordance with the system of source selection for final production, the
prime contract was let to the concern with the largest engineering depart­
ment; Douglas Aircraft. Mr. Sharp expressed concern that the con­
tract had not been let to the company that had proved it had the team to
do the job.38

As it turned out, Douglas was spending about $10 million a month on
SKYBOLT with an engineering department of 3500 (100 at Martin) and
they were not producing any missiles. Mr. Sharp felt this was wrong
because SKYBOLT was being lost because it got out of hand. He felt
that the missile was of importance because it would prolong the useful
life of bombers on hand; the B-52, and the British V-bombers.39

Mr. Sharp was not sure what the solution should be, but he proposed
a possible solution:
You might have two or three contractors carry on the development of the project, in its early stages, to some point in the development and then decide which one had done the best job, and the cheapest job, and looked like he was the best contractor. Then pick him to carry on the final development and the production. You'd really have some competition in the system. Now our competition is paper competition.40

In the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force for fiscal year 1960 (July 1, 1959 to June 30, 1960) Mr. Sharp stated that plans instituted five years previously were bearing fruit in actual weapon systems, "bringing us considerably closer to our military goal of maximum security against nuclear missile aggression."41 The ATLAS missile had been declared operational, TITAN was well into the development stage and would be operational in 1961, and the MINUTEMAN was one year ahead of schedule and would become operational in 1963. The Air Force was striving to do three things: (1) to maintain a combat force that could withstand an attack and mount a retaliatory force capable of destroying any aggressor; (2) to do everything possible to develop weapons; and (3) to help in any other way to contribute to the defense of the free world. However, Mr. Sharp was quick to point out that though the Air Force was strong it had by no means attained full strength. There was always room for improvement and the biggest problem was to determine what future weapons were to be invested in. Money was the most important factor in this determination, and Mr. Sharp felt that success in putting the money available in the right places would determine the effectiveness of the Air Force in the future. Mr. Sharp had stressed before that quality not quantity was the important thing in the Air Force. This test of quality applied to personnel as well. Constant reductions in the strength of Air Force personnel were taking place: 840,435 to 814,752 between July 1, 1959 and June 30, 1960. Therefore, with a decreasing manpower force Mr. Sharp felt that the quality of this manpower had to improve and was being improved. It is interesting to note that Mr. Sharp felt there were still too many people in the Air Force. The size of the Air Force in 1960 was the same as in 1952. There were 96 wings; 93 manned and 3 missile. But the quality had improved.42

During appropriation hearings in 1960, Mr. Sharp stressed the point that the $17,737,000,000 requested for the Air Force for the coming year, though a large amount, did not provide for everything that possibly was needed by the Air Force. On the other hand he felt a strong balance had been provided in the Air Force programs. Again he stressed the fact that change was evident in the Air Force. Missiles were playing a more important role in the inventory and would become more important in the future. Mr. Sharp could not foresee the time when the manned aircraft would not be necessary. He concluded his statement at the hearings with a statement that clearly indicates his idea of the structure of the Air Force in the future.

In conclusion, I believe I can characterize this budget as one which provides for reasonable progress in the continuing transition from a manned aircraft force to a mixed manned and missile force; permits a reasonable degree of modernization of the
manned aircraft portion of that force; affords an acceptable level of research and development toward the weapon and support systems of the future; and provides for maintenance, operation, and training of today's force in being at a minimum acceptable level.\(^43\)

An increased percentage of Air Force business was going to small business even though the dollar value decreased. In fiscal year 1960 small business received $864 million as compared to $920 million in fiscal year 1959. However, the percentage increased from 8.5 to 9%. The reduction was caused by a total reduction in procurement of $1.2 billion. The percentage of Air Force business going to small concerns was well above the nine year average of 7.5 per cent.\(^44\)

As Secretary of the Air Force Mr. Sharp became involved in matters dealing with more policy and with problems that would have a great deal to do with the future structure of the Air Force. One of these was the B-70 program. During fiscal year 1961 the Air Force was faced with the problem of deciding whether or not to put $456 million into developing the B-70. A choice had to be made between the B-70, an offensive weapon, and the F-108, a defensive weapon. This was necessitated by the budget. Both weapons could not be included in the Air Force budget. There was disagreement within the Air Force itself on which program should be continued. The Weapons Board wanted both, but preferred the F-108. The Air Force Policy Council wanted both also, but preferred the B-70. This left the final decision up to Mr. Sharp and General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. General White lost a lot of sleep in deciding on the B-70. Mr. Sharp was not as convinced as the Chief of Staff in the beginning. However, he came to look upon the B-70 as the right choice. "I finally came around to the conclusion, that in the first place, that we needed our atomic deterrents more than we needed the defensive capabilities of the F-108."\(^45\)

Also he felt that one more generation of manned bombers was necessary because he did not feel that missiles had been developed far enough to be relied upon as the only deterrent weapon. In addition, just by going ahead with the B-70 would pose a problem to the enemy and would possibly force him to spend valuable time and money devising and constructing a defense. This, Mr. Sharp thought, would take effort away from some other project that might prove more harmful to the United States than building a defense against the B-70. He felt in 1963 that the B-70 should be continued, but he frankly admitted he was not sure at what level of annual expense. He was not able to determine this while he was Secretary of the Air Force.\(^46\)

The whole issue was brought to light because the Air Force was asking for less than previously for the B-70. Congressman Carl Vinson strongly supported this program and he thought that by reducing funds for the B-70 it would "increase the threat to our own survival." General White stated that the decision to cut funds had not been made by the Air Force. This indicates that the decision had been made at a higher level. In October 1960 the Air Force received an additional $100 million for the B-70
from Congress and a target date for an operational squadron was set for 1966.47

Most of us remember the furor over the so-called missile gap. Mr. Sharp became actively involved in this controversy. His part began when he and General White, at a briefing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 26, 1960, “sought to allay fears of the ‘missile gap’ by stressing the ‘prime threat’ of Soviet bombers now.”48 They felt that due to the attention being paid to the increasing Soviet missile threat that the Russian aircraft strength was being overlooked. They were not attempting to say that there was not a missile threat, but rather a mixed missile and bomber threat. Based on 1959 intelligence estimates the Soviets were out-producing the United States three to one in missiles. This was the missile gap.

No one disagreed with the fact that there was a gap in missiles number for number. But what Mr. Sharp wanted to make clear was that there was no “deterrent gap.” There is a difference. Missiles mean, simply, missiles. Deterrent means all of the offensive weapons in the arsenal; SAC bombers, carrier based bombers, and missiles. He said at the time that the Air Force was getting as many missiles as it needed for a well balanced program, and added that intelligence estimates had indicated that the Russians were not making missiles as fast as previously thought. However, he felt that the United States should push ahead in its missile production, and stated that increased success was being had with the ATLAS. The President had given the missile program first priority.49

In 1963 Mr. Sharp maintained that this gap never existed in terms of overall deterrence. He felt that no one really knew how many missiles the Soviets were producing. Even if the number was large the Soviets would have had to make a great many to destroy the United States retaliatory capability, and he felt that they did not have the strength to do it at that time; neither do they have it now.50

All of this harks back to Mr. Sharp's basic idea of a balanced deterrent force. He was not at all receptive to the idea of putting all of the emphasis on missiles to the detriment of manned bombers. This was the reason why Mr. Sharp wanted the B-70 program to continue. He was worried by the thought that if the United States invested entirely in missiles, and the Russians developed an anti-missile missile, the American deterrent force would be impotent. He stated that missiles fly a predetermined track to targets, whereas a bomber does not have to do this. In addition they can go in at low levels thereby avoiding many defenses. Maintaining a balanced deterrent force was to Mr. Sharp the best policy for the United States to follow at present, and he did not believe that the Soviet strategic capability would equal that of the United States at any time in the future.51

Closely connected with the problem of the structure of the United States deterrent force was the proposal by General Thomas Powers, Commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), for a full time airborne alert of SAC in February 1960. The proposal was to keep a substantial number of SAC bombers in the air 24 hours a day as a precaution against
surprise attack. What part of SAC this was to consist of or consists of today is not known as this is classified information. Mr. Sharp agreed with General Powers's proposal in principle. The difference was that the Commander of SAC wanted planes in the air while Mr. Sharp wanted to prepare for an airborne alert should the necessity arise. Mr. Sharp wanted to set aside a reserve of spare parts in case a full-blown airborne alert should become necessary. This was already in progress—the setting aside of spare parts. Also an airborne alert would require additional personnel and plans had been initiated to provide these. But all of this would cost more money. Mr. Sharp said that the only way to avoid increased spending was to reduce the size of the Air Force but retain quality, and he wanted to make it clear that any additional stockpiling of spare parts would be expensive. While he was willing to prepare for an airborne alert he did not want to implement it until it became an absolute necessity because of the expense. He would rather spend budget dollars on other projects at the time. Further he felt the time would pass when an airborne alert would be necessary because of the increased number of missiles that would be introduced into the United States retaliatory force. Also just the threat of an airborne alert without announcing the size of it “is in itself a pretty good-sized deterrent.”52 The first Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was due to become operational in September 1960, and Mr. Sharp stated that this would alleviate to some degree the problem of having SAC destroyed on the ground by better early warning. This would decrease the necessity of an airborne alert.53

As missiles began to assume a more important role in the Air Force inventory it became important to get them located in sites. In late 1959 or early 1960 the idea of putting the MINUTEMAN on mobile trains had been advanced. This appealed to Mr. Sharp. He felt that mobility would make the missiles much more difficult to find and hit as they would be constantly moving. A mobile MINUTEMAN, a mobile POLARIS, and the airborne alert would prove difficult targets and in case of surprise attack it would be possible to have a larger retaliatory force. However, he had this additional thought. If the United States made its deterrent force too difficult to find and hit the enemy might decide to put all of his missiles on our population centers. Mr. Sharp felt that the POLARIS was an expensive way to get mobility, but had the advantage of getting such strategic targets out of the country. Again the Russians might be willing to sustain the POLARIS, as they were almost impossible targets, to reach targets in the United States.54 There were some MINUTEMAN trains planned and even tested but they were dropped in 1962 in favor of hard sites.

Probably one of the most disagreeable controversies that Mr. Sharp got involved in was that in February 1960 over one of the Air Force's training manuals. This was Air Reserve Center Training Manual, Student Text, NR 45-0050, Vol. 7. In this manual certain religious organizations were said to have been infiltrated by Communists. As a result the National Council of Churches protested. Congress held hearings, the manual was withdrawn, and Mr. Sharp himself had an investigation started. He further initiated safeguards against any recurrence of the episode. Mr. Sharp held to this position: “I feel that this sort of accusa-
tion was not necessary, from an Air Force standpoint, to warn its people that they must look in all organizations for Communist infiltration. I think that the Air Force should not enter into the controversy as to whether or not a particular organization or group is infiltrated by Communism." He later termed the episode as "perfectly ridiculous."55

As Secretary of the Air Force Mr. Sharp was called upon to make more speeches and public appearances than he was as an Assistant Secretary. Covering one such trip will suffice as an example. On June 8, 1960 he made the graduation address at the United States Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, Colorado. In his address Mr. Sharp summed up his basic idea on the force structure of the Air Force:

We are changing our force structure, our procurement, our priorities and our personnel skills to accommodate an ever-increasing number of missile units. We are establishing vast new missile bases and closing manned bases.

While we do not known the optimum relation between missiles and manned aircraft in our forces of the future, each system has its advantages and each can perform essential functions that others cannot. Thus, we are certain that we will have both type weapons in our inventory as far into the future as we can see.56

He admonished the Class of 1960 never to "allow the narrow view of apparent service interest to blind you to your basic duty—to cooperate with the other services and all departments of Government, to the end that we will have in this nation an adequate total defense force to achieve our national goals."

In January 1961 with the coming of the Kennedy administration Mr. Sharp left the post of Secretary of the Air Force. He was replaced by Mr. Eugene Zukert who had been an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force from 1947 to 1952, and, incidentally, was also a Naval officer during World War II.57

CONCLUSION

Mr. Sharp went to Washington to serve. For four and one-half years he worked exclusively for the United States government. During this time he sacrificed his business and his financial interests to perform a duty for his country. He gave of his time, energy, and experience. Though he did not always have success in his endeavors, he did contribute.

When speaking of the programs and progress of the Air Force, he almost always used the plural "we," not the singular "I." He did not try to answer questions to which he did not know the answers, but deferred them to more qualified persons. These qualified persons were generally military officers who were specialists in a particular field. In Congressional hearings Mr. Sharp never allowed one of his Air Force officers to be harassed, but would step in himself and defend a position or take the blame.

The words of other men do not always convey a true picture of how well a man has performed. But men who have worked with individuals or have seen them in action are able to form fairly accurate judgments of their ability and performance.
General Orval R. Cook, USAF (Retired), President of the Aircraft Industries Association, 1957-1961, said:

Mr. Sharp is a very conscientious man. He believes that he owes a duty of service to his country, and he has tried to render service to the best of his ability. He has a high sense of integrity—higher, in my opinion, than others I have known in the positions he occupied. I found him very cooperative; not easily ruffled; and much better informed on many subjects than he was generally given credit for. He was a good listener, and did not do much to let the person he was listening to know how much he (Sharp) knew about the subject being discussed. He is articulate, but his ability in this respect is about average. He gives a first impression of being serious-minded, and is, to a degree. I have found that he has an excellent sense of humor, however, and enjoys a humorous situation or circumstance as well as most of the extroverts.58

Senator Stuart Symington stated that “Secretary Sharp was known to be a man of integrity and ability—and made a fine record in the high positions he held in the Executive Branch of the Government.”59

Representative Carl Vinson has made it a matter of policy not to give appraisals of past or present government officials. Mr. Vinson does say that “any comments I might make as to Mr. Sharp’s performance of duty would, I assure you, be complimentary.”60 What starts out to be no comment is, in fact, very complimentary to Mr. Sharp.

Senator Richard B. Russell stated, “In his appearances before the Committee [Armed Services], Mr. Sharp impressed me as being well informed and as having the ability to articulate his views clearly. I think the performance of his duties reflects credit upon him personally and resulted in progress by the Air Force.”61

FOOTNOTES


2Ibid.

3Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Nomination of Dudley Sharp, 4.


5Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Nomination of Dudley Sharp, 4.

6Houston Post, July 21, 1955, Sec. 4, 8.

7New York Times, July 13, 1955, 37; Senate Committee on Armed Services, Sharp, 3.

8Ibid.

9Ibid., 9.
Peyton Cook's interview with Dudley Sharp in Houston, December 20, 1962.


Ibid.


Ibid., 287-8; 361.

Ibid., 288; 343.


Ibid.


*ANAF Journal*, September 27, 1958, 27.


Ibid., 369; Interview with Dudley C. Sharp, December 20, 1962.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid., 1; 13; 21.


Ibid., December 31, 1960, 10.

Personal letter from General Orval R. Cook, USAF (Retired) to Peyton E. Cook, October 16, 1962.

Senator Stuart Symington, Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Washington, D. C. to Peyton Cook, December 8, 1962.

Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services, Washington, D. C. to Peyton Cook, December 18, 1962.

Senator Richard B. Russell, Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Winder, Ga., to Peyton Cook, December 16, 1962.
A DUEL WITH RAILROADS: HOUSTON VS. GALVESTON,
1866-1881

VERA L. DUGAS

Before the Civil War, Galveston was the only deep-water port in Texas, and therefore the depot through which flowed all of Texas's trade with the outside world. Houston, located on the mainland fifty miles northwest of Galveston, had developed almost as a colony of the Island City, large wholesale merchants maintaining facilities in both towns. As Jesse Ziegler recalled it, "Houstonians assisted materially in financing the early wharves in Galveston, and Galvestonians reciprocated by lending equal assistance in the building of railroads extending out of Houston."1

After 1865, separatism developed. One reason was that many merchants were too poor after the war to maintain establishments in both towns, therefore had to choose between the railroad center and the seaport. Another was that during the 1850's some wealthy Houstonians had withheld support from railroads that simply went through Houston on their way to Galveston, supporting instead railroads that terminated in Houston. A third reason was that after the Civil War the export-import trade at Galveston became a monopoly of the Galveston Wharf Company, in which Houstonians had no voice.2

Fearing that the Galveston Wharf Company might ruin them with high wharfage charges, Houston merchants exerted themselves to bring deep water to their own town. In 1866, several of them chartered the Houston Direct Navigation Company for the avowed purpose of providing transportation facilities that would eliminate the necessity of paying wharfage at Galveston. Another company, the Buffalo Bayou Ship Channel Company, undertook the specific task of deepening the channel and was given $200,000 by the City of Houston for that purpose. This company soon found out what the Galveston Wharf Company already knew, that keeping a channel open was terribly expensive. (Actually, charges at Galveston were no higher than at other United States ports.)3

The Houstonians sought federal aid for their project and in 1870 secured $10,000 from the United States government, which in the same year made Houston an official port of delivery. Pending further aid from some source, the Houston Direct Navigation Company sent barges to Galveston harbor and had the goods of Houston merchants transferred directly from ship to barge.4

Galvestonians, while scoffing at Houston's "ship channel"5 and calling it the "damndest fake out of door,"6 were nonetheless mindful that they were largely at the mercy of the rising metropolis on Buffalo Bayou. Five railroads entered Houston, but only one entered Galveston, and that was a short line which merely connected the two cities. The Galveston, Houston and Henderson had not built beyond Houston into northeastern Texas as originally planned; its Houston backers had abandoned it once
it reached their city and had devoted their capital to building other railroads into the interior.

Galvestonians were annoyed also by the fact that whenever there were rumors of yellow fever on the island, which was almost every fall, just as the cotton harvest was beginning to roll seaward, Houston imposed a quarantine, forbidding the trains to come in from Galveston. Thus cotton shipments addressed to Galveston merchants were diverted to Houston merchants, and Galveston newspapers explaining the true situation on the island were prevented from delivery outside Galveston County. The more the islanders thought about it, the more they were convinced they needed a railroad which would connect them with the interior of the state without going through Houston.

At first they pinned their hopes on the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railway Company (formerly the Buffalo Bayou, Brazos, and Colorado), which operated between Columbus, in Colorado County, and Peirce Junction, seven miles south of Houston, and which was authorized to build an extension to Galveston. The Hutchings-Sealy interests of Galveston owned one-eighth of the stock of this railway company, which was controlled by Thomas W. Peirce of Boston. Before the Civil War, Peirce had operated a string of packets which regularly called at Texas ports. He also had served as attorney for the Buffalo Bayou, Brazos, and Colorado Railroad. Although a Northerner, he was a frequent visitor to Texas both before and after the war; apparently no Texan thought of him as an outsider or resented his influence in Texas affairs. He did disappoint the Galvestonians, however. Having acquired control of Galveston's only railroad, the Galveston, Houston and Henderson, in 1868, he was in no hurry to duplicate its facilities. Instead, when he resumed construction on the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio, in April, 1873, it was at the western end of the line.

One month later, in May, 1873, Galveston interests chartered the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Company. Businessmen of the city subscribed for $250,000 worth of stock, and the County of Galveston agreed to take $500,000 worth, the largest contribution ever made by a Texas county to a railroad. John Sealy's brother George, an employee of the Lackawanna Railroad before coming to Texas in 1857 and joining his brother's mercantile firm, had been the prime mover in the project and became treasurer of the railroad company.

The Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe was projected to build from Galveston westward to Columbia, in Brazoria County, then northwestward to Cameron, in Milam County, and Belton, in Bell County. From Belton it would continue northwestward through Eastland County, crossing the Texas and Pacific right-of-way there, and on through the Texas Panhandle to Santa Fe, New Mexico. At Santa Fe, it would connect with the Denver and Rio Grande Railway, then under construction by Denver interests, or with the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe. As projected in its northern parts, the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe seemed to be inviting financial support from the Boston backers of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe, but this did not materialize. The Bostonians beat the Denverites to Raton Pass and then raced for California, hoping to beat Colis P. Huntington through the
pass at Needles. This was far more important to them than obtaining a Galveston outlet.\footnote{13}

The Galvestonians made two alterations in their plans. First, they decided not to build to Columbia, but to go on a straight line northwestward from Galveston to Belton, crossing the International and Great Northern (Columbia Tap) at Arcola, in Brazoria County, and the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio at Richmond, in Fort Bend County. Secondly, they would build north from Belton to Fort Worth, where they would meet both the Texas and Pacific Railroad and the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway, chartered in 1873 by citizens of Fort Worth, and possibly also the Missouri, Kansas and Texas. From Richmond northwest to Fort Worth, the tracks of the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe would run within fifty miles west of the Houston and Texas Central, a Houston-owned railroad, cutting it off from the trade of western Texas. As projected in 1874-1875, the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe seemed to be bidding for financial support from the owners of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas, which was authorized to build from Denison to Fort Worth, but again, no such help was forthcoming.\footnote{14}

Meanwhile, Tom Peirce had mollified the Galvestonians somewhat by moving the main office of the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railroad from Harrisburg to Galveston, where it remained from late 1873 until 1876, even though the railroad came no closer to Galveston than Peirce Junction, more than forty miles away. At about the same time, 1873, the company’s board of directors agreed to let John Sealy increase his holdings to one-third of the outstanding stock. These two developments made Galvestonians hopeful that they might acquire control of this railroad and use it to bypass Houston.\footnote{15}

Meanwhile, also, the Houstonians had obtained a powerful ally in the person of Charles Morgan, whose vessels had dominated Gulf Coast shipping since the 1840’s. A quarrel had arisen between the Galveston Wharf Company and Charles Morgan early in 1873, when he asked for a reduction in wharfage rates and was refused. Although talks continued through 1873, no agreement was reached. While quarreling with the Wharf Company, Morgan entered into negotiations with E. W. Cave, president of the Houston Direct Navigation Company, and with Abraham Groesbeck, a director of the Navigation Company and also acting president of the Houston and Texas Central Railroad. Having worked out satisfactory arrangements with the Houston interests, Morgan in 1874 bought control of the navigation company and may also have made plans for buying control of the railroad.\footnote{16}

Morgan’s correspondence at this time reveals that he was less concerned about wharfage rates than about the fact that Houston’s railroads, rather than bringing goods southward to his steamship line, were draining Texas commerce northward through Denison and Texarkana to St. Louis, Missouri.\footnote{17} This being the case, Galveston and Houston merchants would have been well advised to compose their differences and work together against a common danger. Instead, each city fought the other for a larger share of the dwindling trade, and each solicited northern capital to help in the fight.
One fact seemingly unknown to the Galvestonians during the late 1860's and early 1870's was that the Northern capitalist on whose friendship they relied most heavily, Thomas W. Peirce of Boston, was an even closer friend and ally of Charles Morgan of New York. Before the Civil War, these men had operated competing lines of packets along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Both had lost ships through wartime commandeering and sinkings, Morgan being particularly hard hit. After the war, Peirce decided to concentrate on railroads and gave the vessels he still had to Morgan. How close their financial relationship became is not clear, but there are indications it was a partnership in both shipping and railroading.

Like Peirce, Morgan had become interested in railroads before the Civil War, particularly in those roads which linked his ports of call. No doubt he foresaw that railroads ultimately would take the bulk of the trade from coastal shipping. Before 1861, Morgan had constructed a railroad from New Orleans to Berwick's Bay, Louisiana,19 and in 1869 he purchased the New Orleans, Opelousas, and Great Western Railroad. Later he acquired the right to build westward from Lafayette, Louisiana, to a junction with the Texas and New Orleans at Orange, Texas. Since he already had a road from Berwick's Bay to Lafayette, Morgan and his associates controlled the Louisiana section of the best route between New Orleans and Houston, via the Texas and New Orleans Railroad. By 1873, Thomas W. Peirce owned stock in the Texas and New Orleans and also controlled the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio, which was authorized to build westward to El Paso. This group of connecting railroads through Louisiana and Texas was almost certain to attract the attention of someone interested in building a southern transcontinental route to compete with Union Pacific, and there are indications that Colis P. Huntington did become financially interested in this group prior to 1974.20

The chief promoter and ante-bellum president of the Texas and New Orleans, Abram Morris Gentry, had left Texas for New York soon after the Civil War ended, presumably to find northern capital for the railroad, of which he was still chief officer but which had been held in trust since March, 1861, possibly for Northern owners, by B. A. Shepherd and W. J. Hutchins of Houston. Apparently Gentry failed in his mission, because in 1870 the railroad went into receivership. Under the receiver, Josiah F. Crosby,21 the road was rehabilitated on August 16, 1870, and put into operation between Houston and Liberty. R. S. Hayes was general manager at this time.

The stockholders of the Texas and New Orleans did not pay the bondholders what was due them, however, and in May, 1871, the section of the road between Liberty and Orange was sold by the receiver to J. T. Terry, who represented eastern interests including Morton Bliss and Company, Oakes Ames (of Credit Mobilier notoriety), George T. Tyler, Page Richardson and Carr, and Thomas W. Peirce. More than a year later, in October, 1872, Terry bought the Houston-Liberty section of the road for the same interests. He continued to operate the road between Houston and Liberty, but did nothing to restore service to Orange until July, 1875, after the men he represented had organized the Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company of 1874.22
Work to restore rail service to Orange was begun at once under the superintendence of R. S. Hayes, who was at that time vice-president of another railroad in which Colis P. Huntington seems to have had an interest, the International and Great Northern, and service to Orange was restored on August 1, 1876. Other officers of the Texas and New Orleans included John T. Terry, president, J. F. Crosby, vice-president, and T. W. Peirce, director. 23

The International and Great Northern Railway Company, of which R. S. Hayes was a vice-president at the time he was superintendent of the Texas and New Orleans, was a combination of two earlier railroad companies, the International, and the Houston and Great Northern. The International had been chartered in 1870 by eastern capitalists then building the St. Louis Iron Mountain and Southern. It was authorized to build from Texarkana through Austin and San Antonio to the Rio Grande at Laredo. Among its directors was Thomas W. House, a wealthy Houston merchant who was also a director of the Houston and Texas Central Railroad Company. Therefore the International was built from Hearne, a station on the Houston and Texas Central, through Palestine to Longview. At Longview, early in 1873, the International connected with the Texas and Pacific Railroad, then controlled by Thomas A. Scott and other officials of the Pennsylvania Railroad. 24

At Palestine, the International made connections with the Houston and Great Northern Railroad, chartered in 1866 to build from Houston to the Red River and possibly on to Canada. Incorporators of the Houston and Great Northern included such prominent Houstonians as E. B. Nichols, formerly Galveston agent for the Peirce and Bacon shipping firm; W. J. Hutchins, a private banker; William Marsh Rice, a former partner of E. B. Nichols; and B. A. Shepherd, another private banker. All of these men were also stockholders in the Houston and Texas Central. Another incorporator of the Houston and Great Northern was Moses Taylor, president of the First National Bank of New York City. The first president of the Houston and Great Northern Railroad Company was Charles G. Young, a former president of the Vicksburg and Shreveport Railroad who had spent the Civil War years in Texas. After his death on a construction train north of Houston in 1871, the presidency of the Houston and Great Northern was taken over by Galusha A. Grow, a politician and financier with residences in both Pennsylvania and Texas. 25

After connecting at Palestine in 1873, the International Railroad and the Houston and Great Northern merged and were rechartered as the International and Great Northern Railroad Company. The new company built west from the junction with the Houston and Texas Central at Hearne, entering Austin in 1876. 26 There construction halted. It was not resumed until 1880, more than three years after Thomas W. Peirce completed construction of the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio westward to San Antonio (February, 1877). 27

During the years 1876-1878, Huntington apparently pulled out of the International and Great Northern Railroad, probably because he could not control its Texas-to-St. Louis outlet, the St. Louis Iron Mountain and Southern. Just when Jay Gould acquired control of the International and
Great Northern is not clear, but there are indications he had a strong voice in its affairs as early as 1876. The company, previously solvent, went into receivership for the first time in 1878, with R. S. Hayes as receiver. When it was reorganized, late in 1879, the list of stockholders was virtually the same as before.28

Somewhat earlier, in the years 1873-1876, Jay Gould had acquired control of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad, which provided the Houston and Texas Central with connections to St. Louis, and also of the Texas and Pacific Railroad, with which the International and Great Northern formerly had enjoyed friendly relations, sharing a track from Longview to Texarkana. The fact that Gould controlled the only two railroad exits from northern Texas did not become known in eastern financial circles until 1876.29 When Huntington learned it, he realized that the International and Great Northern Railroad would not provide him with an eastern connection and quietly began transferring his capital from it to the more southern group of railroads put together by Charles Morgan and Thomas W. Peirce.

In the meantime, Morgan had brought deep water to the village which he renamed Clinton, on the peninsula known as Morgan's Point. When a channel nine feet deep had been dredged out all the way from Galveston harbor to Clinton, in 1876, Morgan completed a seven-mile railroad connecting Clinton with Houston. Then, if not earlier, he began buying into the Houston and Texas Central Railroad, and by 1877 he controlled it. Thereafter the Houston and Texas Central preferred southbound to northbound traffic to such an extent that its track between Sherman and Denison was taken up, breaking off the connection between it and the Missouri, Kansas and Texas (the "Katy"), which Jay Gould controlled.30

Some Houston and Texas Central directors and stockholders who sold shares to Charles Morgan used the money to construct three-foot-gauge railways, which some railroad men of the time strenuously preferred. One such was the Texas Western Narrow Gauge, projected to run from Houston to El Paso and possibly beyond. Its backers included Houstonians T. W. House, W. D. Cleveland, S. K. McIlhenny, and Brown Botts. By April, 1877, they had built forty-two miles west from Houston to Patterson, near the Brazos River, in Waller County, but they could secure neither additional capital nor sufficient business and the company went into receivership. Reorganized in 1880 as the Texas Western Railway, with U. S. Grant and his son Frederick on the board of directors, the company built fifteen miles farther, to Sealy, and failed again.31

Two months after this unfortunate little railroad was spawned, in 1875, Houston interests had chartered another narrow-gauge, the Houston East and West Texas, which was projected to run southwest from Houston to Victoria, Goliad, and Laredo, and northeast from Houston to Nacogdoches, Marshall, and Texarkana, with a branch from the east bank of the Trinity River in Polk County through the pine region to the Louisiana border, or from Nacogdoches to Shreveport. The projectors apparently hoped to sell this railroad to the Huntington interests; they made ample provision for tying in with his Louisiana projects and their agent in charge of interesting eastern capital was Abram Morris Gentry, the for-
mer president of the Texas and New Orleans Railroad, who now divided his time between New York City and Huntington, Long Island, where he had property.32

Among the original stockholders of the Houston East and West Texas were Paul Bremond, W. J. Hutchins, W. R. Baker, and F. A. Rice, all of whom had sold Houston and Texas Central stock to Charles Morgan. Others were T. W. House, Abraham Groesbeck, E. W. Cave, W. D. Cleveland, J. T. Brady, Ben A. Botts, Eugene Pillot, S. C. Timpson, and John Shearn (brother-in-law of T. W. House and son of his former partner, Charles Shearn).33

Construction began in 1876, and by 1879 the road was in operation between Houston and Goodrich Station, on the east bank of the Trinity, a distance of sixty-three miles. By 1880, unable to attract eastern money, the Houston East and West Texas had crept another twenty or thirty miles farther, through Livingston to Moscow, but still in Polk County.34

Meanwhile, the Galveston backers of the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe were having an equally difficult time. Unable to obtain eastern capital, they had used their own resources to bridge the bay between Galveston Island and Virginia Point, on the mainland, in 1875, and had proceeded northward, crossing the International and Great Northern at Arcola Junction, forty miles from Galveston, in 1876, and reaching a junction with the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio at Richmond, twenty-six miles farther, in 1878.35

In 1876 Charles Morgan had taken his steamship business from Galveston to Houston (Clinton) and Thomas W. Peirce had moved the main office of the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railroad from Galveston to Houston. Peirce, who was allied with C. P. Huntington after 1876, if not before, seems to have engineered similar arrangements between Huntington and Charles Morgan sometime before Morgan’s death in May, 1878.36

Sometime during these years the man who had emerged as Huntington’s chief rival in the transcontinental race through Texas, Jay Gould, found agents and allies in Galveston. He came into control of the Galveston, Houston and Henderson Railroad “several years before” 1879, in which year John Sealy became president (an office T. W. Peirce had held in 1875-1876) and H. M. Hoxie, who was also an officer of the International and Great Northern, became vice-president.37

The Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe also elected new officers in 1879. The company had received donations totaling over a million dollars from individuals, towns, and counties along its right-of-way; nevertheless, it defaulted on $250,000 owed to its own treasurer, George Sealy, and was sold under foreclosure in April, 1879. George Sealy bought it, for $200,000. The company then was reorganized under the same name and with practically the same principal owners, except that these men purchased the County of Galveston’s financial interest. In the reorganization, John Sealy became president and George Ball became treasurer.38 The list of directors and officers elected a few months later, in January, 1880, is interesting. It includes Israel Corse of New York (president), H. F. Taylor
of New York, Thomas W. Peirce of Boston, H. B. Andrews of San Antonio (Peirce's right-hand-man in Texas), H. M. Hoxie (an officer of the Galveston, Houston and Henderson and of the International and Great Northern, both controlled by Jay Gould, as well as of the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe), and R. S. Hayes and D. S. H. Smith, both of Palestine. 39

Thus reorganized, the company found that it had ample funds for construction. B. M. Temple, the chief engineer, extended the tracks to Brenham, Belton, and Fort Worth, reaching Fort Worth by late 1881. There the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe made connection, as planned in 1875, with the Texas and Pacific Railroad and the Missouri, Kansas and Texas, both of which were Gould properties. 40 The Galvestonians had secured what the Houston-Huntington interests still lacked, rail connections with St. Louis, Missouri, and were in position to learn what Houstonians already knew, that freight could move northward out of Texas quite as easily as it could roll southward to Galveston.

Gould, meanwhile, had pushed construction of the Texas and Pacific westward from Fort Worth, reaching Sierra Blanca, ninety-two miles east of El Paso, at a time when the crews of the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio, the Huntington-affiliated railroad, had not quite reached Uvalde. Although Huntington had already completed his track from California to El Paso, he decided to make arrangements with Gould concerning the track to be laid between El Paso and Sierra Blanca. The negotiations, begun in 1881, soon expanded into other areas, resulting in agreements that affected not only the entry into El Paso but also every railroad that the two financial giants controlled in Texas. 41

So ended the railroad duel between Houston and Galveston. Gould and Huntington together controlled all four existing railroad exits from Texas (three east and one west) and also, to some extent, the port facilities at both Houston and Galveston. The futures of both cities were largely in their hands.

FOOTNOTES

1Jesse A. Ziegler, Wave of the Gulf: Ziegler's Scrapbook of the Gulf Coast Country (San Antonio, 1938), 176.
2Ibid., 176, 181; Galveston Wharf Company (Pamphlet in the office of the Galveston Port Authority, Galveston, Texas [n.d.]), 2, 4, 11-13, 17, 27-28; S. G. Reed, A History of Texas Railroads (Houston, 1941), 490-491.
3H. P. N. Gammel, comp., The Laws of Texas, 1822-1897 (Austin, 1898), V, 1834-1837, and VI, 116-119, 557-562; Reed, Texas Railroads, 238, 491; A. L. Weinberger, The History and Development of the Houston Ship Channel and the Port of Houston (M.A. thesis, The University of Texas, 1940), 64.
4Weinberger, The History and Development of the Houston Ship Channel and the Port of Houston, 64.
5Ziegler, Wave of the Gulf, 98.
6Quoted in Weinberger, The History and Development of the Houston Ship Channel and the Port of Houston, 71.
7Reed, Texas Railroads, 283-284.
8Ibid.
9Ibid., 192-193. Peirce Junction subsequently became Pierce Junction, in accordance with the popular idea of how the name should be spelled. Ibid., 71.
10Ibid., 71, 192-193.
11Vinton Lee James, Frontier and Pioneer Recollections of Early Days in San Antonio and West Texas (San Antonio, 1938), 113; Reed, Texas Railroads, 194.
12Gammel, Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, VII, 1302; Charles S. Potts, Railroad Transportation in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Bulletin No. 119, 1909), 58; Ziegler, Wave of the Gulf, 181; Reed, Texas Railroads, 284.
14Gammel, Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, VII, 1285-1289, and VIII, 615; Potts, Railroad Transportation in Texas, 58; S. G. Reed, "Fort Worth and Denver City Railway Company," The Handbook of Texas (Austin, 1952), I, 634. The road from Belton to Fort Worth was called a branch line.
15Ziegler, Wave of the Gulf, 93; Reed, Texas Railroads, 205. Sealy did not acquire the additional stock. Ibid.
16Reed, Texas Railroads, 239-240.
17Ibid.
18Ibid., 242; Handbook of Texas, I, 235; Wilson and Taylor Southern Pacific, 69.
19Handbook of Texas, II, 235; Reed, Texas Railroads, 227.
21The Texas Almanac for 1867 (Galveston, 1866), 271; Reed, Texas Railroads, 225; Sam Wood Geiser, "Gentry, Abram Morris," Handbook of Texas, I, 679.
22Gammel, Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, VII, 979; Reed, Texas Railroads, 226-227.
23Potts, Railroad Transportation in Texas, 54-55.
26Gammel, Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, VIII, 659-663; Reed, Texas Railroads, 320.
27 Reed, Texas Railroads, 194.

28 Ibid., 325-326.

29 V. V. Masterson, The Katy Railroad and the Last Frontier (Norman, 1952), 202-206; Perkins, Trails, Rails and War, 262; Reed, Texas Railroads, 365.


31 Gammel, Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, VIII, 619-620; Reed, Texas Railroads, 478-479.


33 Gammel, Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, VIII, 676; Ziegler, Wave of the Gulf, 275; Handbook of Texas, II, 599.

34 Reed, Texas Railroads, 236-237.

35 Ibid., 285; Potts, Railroad Transportation in Texas, 30, 58.

36 Potts, Railroad Transportation in Texas, 46; Reed, Texas Railroads, 205, 228, 242, 262; Wilson and Taylor, Southern Pacific, 73.

37 Reed, Texas Railroads, 354.

38 Gammel, Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, IX, 3-4; Potts, Railroad Transportation in Texas, 58; Reed, Texas Railroads, 285. W. L. Moody appears among the stockholders at this time. Ibid.


40 Potts, Railroad Transportation in Texas, 58, 59; Handbook of Texas, II, 722; Reed, Texas Railroads, 285.

41 Wilson and Taylor, Southern Pacific, 77; Potts, Railroad Transportation in Texas, 46.
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
THE DISCOVERY OF OIL IN TITUS COUNTY

MORRIS BLACHARD

The worst days of the depression were past by 1936 and few Titus County people went hungry or wore tattered clothing; but the great majority still could afford little more than the bare necessities of life. People hoped for better times, but it had begun to seem that only a miracle could make any great improvement in their lot. A miracle had happened a few years before when the discovery of the East Texas oil field had brought wealth to many struggling farmers. The hopes of Titus County land owners for a similar miracle had soared from time to time as oil companies leased large acreages, only to be dashed when a test well proved dry or leased acreage was released without a test having been made. After a time a new leasing flurry no longer caused much excitement. Few people were expecting it, therefore, when on a chill February day with the wind of a blue norther sweeping across the countryside, Titus County got its miracle. Oil was discovered at Talco and soon all of Titus County was in the midst of more excitement than anyone had thought possible.

In a matter of hours after word of the discovery was passed to oil company friends of the promoters, oil speculators began pouring into the area. This was to be expected. Booms are the rule when a wildcat oil well comes in in virgin territory. No one should have been surprised that the Talco discovery created quite a stir. But this boom seems to have been somewhat out of the ordinary. On February 11, 1936, the Dallas Morning News gave an idea of what was taking place:

The biggest crowds ever seen in this section thronged the towns and the biggest business ever known was transacted. Maps of the county were in big demand and every country road was alive with oil men.1

On February 15 the News continued:

Even the most pessimistic, who discount the show because of the heavy oil found and because of the little gas reported must admit the show has occasioned more of a quick play than any other strike they remember. Trading climbed to fever pitch the day news of the strike leaked out and has been hot ever since. Acreage prices jumped immediately to prices general in semi-proven areas but seldom found in such a wildcat territory on the showing of a single well. Talco has been the greatest excitement the traditionally excitable oil business has had in a long time.2

There were several reasons for this. The fact that the discovery was sixty miles from any other production and that it was made in the Paluxy, a hitherto non-productive zone, were probably of most importance; but the feeling that this might be the mother pool of the huge East Texas field no doubt contributed to the excitement.
Before long the oil strike was almost the sole topic of conversation in all of Titus County:

Frenzied oil promoters turned this quiet little farming community into a wildly booming mushroom town Thursday as they excitedly awaited confirmation of their hopes that another rich oil field had been discovered.

... In Talco the citizens are running in circles. The town has no hotel and there are insufficient spare rooms in private homes to accommodate the hundreds of oil men, speculators and fortune hunters rushing in.

Talco's State Bank, with more money on hand than it had ever dreamed of seeing, has abandoned the thought of maintaining regular banking hours or holidays. Long after the regular closing time each day the bank is jammed with customers.

Two sacks of pedigreed cotton seed lay forgotten beside the money-crammed vault. There was a dozen or so cans of ribbon cane syrup on the floor near the door, which some farmer had exchanged for an extension on his note a few days ago.

The object of most of the oil men in coming to Talco was to buy leases or mineral rights and they soon contacted every land owner in the area. For a week hardly any of the older Talco schoolboys showed up for classes: they were making what seemed to them fabulous sums of money acting as guides for oil company land men and speculators hoping to contact land owners who had not yet signed an agreement.

Along with the oil men from outside the county huge crowds of local people came to look. According to the Mt. Pleasant Times Review, hundreds stayed up all night watching the proceedings. Some of these people were land owners who had good reason to be concerned, but most were merely farmers or small-town people who welcomed the break in their normally not very exciting existences.

If it was Talco that attracted the lease-hounds and the curiosity-seekers, it was Mount Pleasant that soon became headquarters for most of the oil men. Mount Pleasant was larger; it had hotels and tourist courts; it had better banking and communication facilities. Most important of all perhaps was that it was the county seat and thus the place where one had to go to check a title or register a transaction. Twenty-four hours after word of the discovery had been announced, around the courthouse and in the vicinity of the hotels the Cadillacs seemed to outnumber the Fords. The aroma of expensive cigars floated in the air, overriding that of Prince Albert and Bull Durham.

As in Talco, many Mount Pleasant agencies had difficulty coping with the sudden avalanche of business. The regular force at the telephone office could not handle all the calls placed by speculators, and it was necessary for the day force to remain and assist with the night load. A tax survey, which had been started by the tax collector's office a few weeks previously, had to be discontinued because of so much activity at the
courthouse. Because of the oil boom the records were in use all of the time; furthermore, the employees had obtained better-paying jobs.6

One agency that proved adequate to the increased demands placed upon it was the Mount Pleasant Police Force. The Paris News on March 9 referred to it as most capable and said, "Chief Ard and his force took care of the situation in fine shape, and there has been but little pilfering."7 Three oil men who were kidnapped in their automobile, robbed of five dollars, and dumped five miles out of town by two prisoners escaping from the county jail might not have agreed with this evaluation; but theirs was an isolated case.8

Trading in leases and royalties took place in the lobbies of the banks and hotels, with the Jefferson Hotel—located diagonally across the street from the courthouse and the larger of the town's two hotels—being the most important center of such activities. One newspaper account mentioned the "seething, milling crowd" there and stated that the whole town was "humming like a beehive."9

Quite literally, fortunes were made or lost in a single day. The Paris News carried the report that one broker, through outside connections, reaped over $75,000 in commissions—a very tidy sum in those days.10 Claude McDonald, a veteran oil operator and at that time owner of the Jefferson Hotel, was quoted as saying that on the Sunday following the discovery half a million dollars changed hands.11

The curious native residents who were privileged to observe many of these transactions quickly learned that the world of oil was very different from the world they knew. It would be difficult to say which impressed them most, the casualness with which huge hums of money were exchanged or what seemed to them the utter unscrupulousness of some of the traders. If most of the local people had to squeeze their pennies, they had also put great value on their honesty, and among the free-spending oilmen all that seemed to matter was what would hold up in court.12

This hectic activity could not continue for very long considering that the number of properties which seemed likely to lie in the zone of production was rather limited. After three or four days most land owners who were willing to lease had leased, and the leases acquired by speculators had been disposed of at the best possible price. After a week or ten days conditions at Mount Pleasant were approaching normal while the setting of the casing and the bringing in of the well were awaited. Some people were optimistic enough about the outcome that they went ahead with plans for making the most of the expected boom. The Mt. Pleasant Times Review reported on February 1413 that the Jefferson Hotel would be enlarged to the extent of a forty-six room addition; a contract had been let for the building of a twenty-room hospital for Drs. W. A. and William Taylor; and many new homes were being planned. In Talco, dozens of small homes and stores were springing up; and a weekly newspaper, the Talco Times, was established just one week after the discovery was announced.14

The local residents' feeling of optimism was sustained somewhat during more than a month of waiting by the faith the oil industry was demon-
strating by going ahead with new wells without waiting for the bringing in of the discovery well.\textsuperscript{15}

But not everyone felt so optimistic about the outcome. John B. Stephens told the writer that when he and his associates attempted to borrow money from a bank to pay for the drilling of a second well, they were told that the money would be forthcoming only on presentation of a favorable report from a firm of professional appraisers. With considerable difficulty the partners managed to scrape up the five hundred dollars necessary to pay for the appraisal; and then, much to their chagrin, the appraiser’s estimate called for only a five well field with none of the wells being on the acreage held by Stephens and associates.\textsuperscript{16}

The people who discovered the oil may have been having their troubles, but many others in the county were doing well. Long before receipts from the sale of oil began to flow into the county, the economy of the county was feeling the effects of the boom. Only a rather small number of families—possibly three dozen—owned land in the fairly limited area that later saw production; but, as no one knew then what this area would be, leasing and the sale of royalties took place over a much larger area.\textsuperscript{17} A high proportion of the money obtained in this way soon found its way into circulation. When this was added to the money paid out by the free-spending oil crowd for goods and services, business was noticeably stimulated—so much so that the \textit{Mt. Pleasant Times Review} was moved to say that “even if the oil does not materialize, hundreds of thousands of dollars have already been poured into the county and the public will benefit in a big way.”\textsuperscript{18} The \textit{Paris News}, in a similar vein, referred to an estimate that over two millions of dollars had been paid out for leases and royalties and said that this money had “found its way through the arteries of trade and has greatly stimulated business.”\textsuperscript{19}

Proof of the accuracy of these statements was not long in coming. On February 21, 1936, the \textit{Mt. Pleasant Times Review} reported that long-overdue back taxes were being paid\textsuperscript{20} and on March 20 it reported that the banks of the city had shown a big gain in deposits.\textsuperscript{21}

Concerning the ways Mount Pleasant business men reacted to this sudden onslaught of prosperity, there are conflicting reports. The \textit{Mt. Pleasant Times Review} in mid-February chided certain unnamed citizens of the city for charging high prices for rooms and various other services, warning them that if prices were too high, people would go to other places to trade and would always have a bad feeling about the town. It concluded with the plea, “Let’s don’t kill the goose that laid the golden egg.”\textsuperscript{22} This would certainly seem to indicate that some people were taking advantage of the chance to make a little extra profit, but in an article written by special correspondent Ed Coleman and published in the \textit{Paris News}, the Mount Pleasant hotels were given a good report. Said Coleman:

\textit{The report sent out after the first rush, that hotel rates were out of reason, $9 per day for a room, has proven false. At the Jefferson Hotel, where so many oil men live, prices have not been increased, and the only difference is that additional beds have been placed in the rooms, and that more for accommodation than anything else.}
At the Main Hotel, long known as "the home of the traveling man," J. O. Clayton, the genial proprietor, has not advanced his rooms one cent for the traveling man.  

In general Mount Pleasant was much better prepared to take the discovery in stride than was Talco. Talco remained in the center of the activity as new wells were spudded in. Because of its small size, the increase in population and activity was quite apparent while the effect on Mount Pleasant was hardly noticeable after the first few days. But when the casing had been set, the titles had been cleared, and the crew began preparations to drill the plug and bring the well in, excitement again rose to fever pitch in all parts of the county. An estimated 2,000 persons were watching the operations at the discovery well at one time.  

There were several days of painful uncertainty during the period when unsuccessful efforts were being made to produce a flow of oil, despite assurances by Housh and Peveto that the well was a producer; and there was a concerted sigh of relief when it was finally announced that the well was on the pump and producing 552 barrels a day.  

As the site of the discovery well and the center of the later activity, Talco was the place most drastically affected by the coming of oil to Titus County. Every part of the county was affected by the oil boom, but in no other part of the county did oil assume anything like the importance to the typical resident that it did in the Talco region; in no other place did it become so much a part of every person's daily life. For this reason, Talco will be the subject of the major part of the remainder of our discussion.  

The boom which had gotten underway with such excitement did not let up for many years. When the post-discovery leasing and trading activity began to slacken off after a week or so, Mount Pleasant and most of the county returned to a state approaching normal, but not so Talco. The little town grew at a fantastic rate which caused it to double in population and then double again and then still another time in less than two years. From a village of about 350 people before the strike, Talco soon grew into a town of 3,000 to 5,000, depending upon whose estimate is accepted. It is assumed that these estimates included all newcomers living in the vicinity of Talco, because, due to the shortage of building sites and paved streets inside Talco, most of the construction took place outside the township limits.  

A considerable part of the construction took place in the camps which the Magnolia and Humble oil companies established. These camps were primarily residential, with playgrounds, tennis courts, and other recreational facilities for the benefit of company personnel; but they also housed company executive offices. Despite the fact that they were located some distance from Talco proper and had their own utilities, they were commonly thought of as being part of Talco. Many of the people of these camps were active in affairs of the community. According to the Talco Times, "Employees living in these comfortable homes are just as interested in Talco as those who live in town."  

Otherwise, the major part of the new construction, both business and
residential, spilled out along the only hard surface available, the public highway. On June 9, 1936, the Mt. Pleasant Times Review reported that construction had reached Meadow's Curve, a point nearly three miles out on the road to Mount Pleasant. The new enterprises established to supply the needs of the field and of the men doing the work were, as a rule, housed in rather cheaply constructed wooden structures. A high percentage of the proprietors had been through other booms and were not inclined to take chances on getting caught with a heavy investment in immobile real estate.

Among the most conspicuous of the new businesses were those which provided food, drink, and entertainment for the oil field workers. Although the appellation "roughneck" was not meant to convey its literal meaning when applied to oil field workers, it was not altogether inappropriate when applied to the considerable number who were inclined to hard drinking and fast living. Establishments which catered to the needs of this group proliferated and, in general, prospered. Often a foreman needing to round up his crew knew just which honky-tonks to check.

There was, as might have been expected, an increase in brawling and minor disorders; and newspapers of the day mentioned an occasional knife or shooting. But Titus County had always had a considerable amount of this sort of thing and considering the circumstances the increase was not great. The police forces were able to keep things under control and there was never anything that could be called a "crime wave," as far as newspaper accounts show.

Perhaps the most vexing problem was that of the roads. The only paved road in the vicinity was the state highway running north and south through Talco from Mount Pleasant to Paris, and the paved area in the town of Talco other than that of the highway was small. The tremendous load of traffic, much of it huge trucks loaded with heavy oil field equipment, soon turned the unpaved roads into mire; and even the highway began to break down before long. Out in the field it was not unusual for a vehicle to remain stuck all night, and some got stuck on the main street of Talco. The oil field crews were accustomed to this and knew how to manage so that it was never necessary to suspend operations because of bad roads, but operations were slowed to a considerable degree.

While these developments were taking place, the oil field was growing rapidly in number of wells and in the amount of oil being produced; and nowhere was this growth more visible than inside the Talco limits. The fact that—within this comparatively small area—land was owned by a great many different people made it possible for several different oil companies to lease at least a small area, and each company started drilling feverishly in order to get its share or a little more of the oil below. The result was that the Talco townsite soon became a veritable forest of derricks.

Outside Talco leases were in larger blocks and drilling proceeded more leisurely—entirely too leisurely for those whose land lay some miles from the discovery well, and who waited anxiously to see if they were to be among the blessed. And not everyone had leased his land at once. Prices offered for leases varied with the distance from the discovery well or the
predictions of the geologists; so many land owners had the painful choice of accepting a comparatively small sum for their acreage at once, or waiting to let fate decide whether they would receive a princely sum or nothing at all. Most chose not to gamble because they, like most Titus County farmers at that time, had a pressing need for ready cash. They also felt that if the oil production reached their property, the royalties would make them well off; and if it did not, they would be ahead by the amount of the lease money.

After the initial bonanza which came from the sale of leases and mineral rights, the wealth flowed in more slowly than had been expected. The price of oil (especially Talco oil) was low, the allowable production was not great, and the oil companies did not appear in any particular hurry to get the oil out of the ground. Of course, the general state of the economy was greatly improved, as could be seen in the example of the post office, and most people benefited indirectly because of improvements. According to the Talco Times:

When oil was discovered at Talco the post office was of fourth class, and the postmaster's salary less than $1,000 a year. . . . The office was advanced from fourth to third class, and last July to second class, and the postmaster's salary nearly tripled. 33

Another source mentions that the amount of mail received with each delivery increased from one hundred and fifty or two hundred pieces to ten or fifteen thousand. To take care of this increase, a new post office building was constructed, and two clerks were added. 34

And the Post Office Department was not the only agency forced to take notice of the needs of an expanding community. At the same time, the trustees of the Talco Independent School District were providing for the increased school enrollment. Completed in 1939 and built at a cost of $185,000, Talco's new school building was one of the finest and most modern in the state. One of the most talked-about features was an intercommunications system which permitted the superintendent to monitor the proceedings in any classroom without leaving his office.

In its School and Oil Anniversary Edition put out on March 5, 1939, to celebrate the opening of the new school and the third anniversary of the oil strike, the Talco Times explained at some length how Talco was able to afford such an expensive school plant. The essential points are given below:

In neighboring towns, dependent almost entirely upon agriculture, livestock, and dairying, where school bonds run 20, 30 and 40 years at high rates of four and five per cent interest, they cannot understand how a city no larger than Talco can handle such an investment as we have here. They have not reckoned with the immense value of oil.

... Talco school district is only 32 miles square, but its assessed valuation for tax purposes is greater than the entire county of Titus before oil was discovered. Last year it was seven and a half million dollars, and will be greater this year due to new wells drilled. 35
That the above was not idle boasting was demonstrated when the school plant was completely paid for in just ten years.  

But if the school district with its thirty-two square miles and its 600 wells, three of them on school property, had smooth sailing all the way, the same was not true for the City of Talco. When it became obvious that something would have to be done to meet the need for such things as paved streets and sewage disposal, the logical first step seemed to be incorporation. There was considerable resistance to this move, however, and when the issue was voted on May 25, 1936, it carried by only forty-four to thirty-three. On the same date that Talco voted to incorporate, it chose its city officials, a mayor and two city commissioners; and the new administration immediately set about securing the things that a real city must have. The sum of $200,000 was expended for a water and sewage program, $125,000 went to pay for paving streets, and a city hall cost $25,000. 

In later years the city administration received a considerable amount of criticism because of its handling of these matters—and not just from its own residents. The Mt. Pleasant Times Review, on October 29, 1948, warned of the danger of bankruptcy if an agency went beyond its means and then said:

This is actually what took place in Talco. The city launched a huge paving program, it built a beautiful municipal building, installed a water system and made other modern improvements. The community was crowded, future prospects were rosy and money was free. But today, years after the discovery of oil, Talco is still trying to pay the bill.

Although the area within the limits of the city was increased to more than two times its former size, it still was rather small; and a high proportion of the new construction in the area was not within its bounds. Apparently the revenue to be collected from oil wells within the city limits was expected to pay for most of the improvements, and this is where the city got into difficulties. As mentioned earlier, the wells were closely spaced within the city limits. This meant that oil was extracted at a rapid rate; and, although the city coffers benefited accordingly at first, in time, as the Talco Times explained, this caused trouble:

Due to density of wells in the townsite, some of these which were also drilled too deep, are troubled with salt water, while a few have been abandoned, and plugged. Out in the field where reasonable spacing was observed very little of this trouble has been encountered.

Complicating factors were the closing down of the two small refineries, which had not been able to compete with the large modern refinery at Mount Pleasant, and the fact that much fewer personnel were required to operate the pumping equipment than had been needed to drill the wells and lay the pipelines. As the drilling slowed down after three or four years, the city suffered a sharp drop in population, which means a further loss of tax revenue.
The upshot was that eventually the City of Talco found itself unable to meet its financial obligations; and in 1955 some warrants were refunded at 75c on the dollar with the approval of the bondholders.40

Even today it is difficult to see how the city fathers could have done otherwise than take steps to meet the needs of a rapidly growing city; but it seems clear that they erred in their estimate of the amount of revenue that would be forthcoming and in committing the city to such a heavy load of indebtedness. This was a rather understandable error considering that the city officials had had little previous experience in such matters and that not even the experts were able to predict how much oil production could be expected.

Considering Talco's tremendous growth in the period immediately following the discovery of oil, it is rather surprising to find that its 1940 population was only 912.41 But by that time the frenzied boom that came with the discovery and continued through the early days of development was ended. In the words of a 1940 visitor:

Talco . . . has the appearance of a community that is resting after a hectic oil boom—its many small frame shacks mushroom out from an older business area. . . . Today, Talco is a quiet town, almost exclusively engaged in business hinging upon the nearby oil field.42

The population was apparently quite stable by 1940 because there was very little change in the next ten years, the 1950 population being 917.43 The 1960 population figure of 1,02444 represents a fairly substantial gain which seems to have been due mainly to the discovery of the new oil fields in the vicinity and to renewed activity in the Talco field.

By mid-1963 the oil well pumps were running on electricity, which meant that fewer personnel were needed to operate a given number of wells. Nevertheless, according to an estimate by a long-time resident of Talco, Felix Jones, about 200 people living in Talco were involved in work directly connected with the oil industry; and the industry was indisputably the mainstay of the economy of Talco and the surrounding area.45 Vocational agriculture was taught in the Talco High School in 1962 for the first time since 1936; but that did not mean, said Jones, that the economy of the area was again becoming dependent upon agriculture. Agriculture was still very definitely secondary to oil.46

Talco, in 1963, had been little affected by the industrialization that was taking place in Mount Pleasant and other parts of East Texas. Its only noteworthy industrial acquisition was the Whitten Sawmill and Lumber Company, which was located there in the mid-1950's. This was a hardwood mill, which turned out oil rig and bridge timbers for the most part.47

One of the requirements of industry which Talco had in abundance was good water. Although ground water was plentiful in Titus County, it had proved difficult to obtain any considerable supply of usable water in most areas. Because of the lignite beds and iron ore deposits in the Wilcox formation, water drawn from that group was likely to be foul-
smelling and bad-tasting. A plentiful supply of artesian water was available from below the Midway, but this had proved to be salty. Strangely enough, this same zone on the north side of the Mexia-Talco fault, which ran roughly along the northern boundary of Titus County, yielded a plentiful supply of pure water. This proved to be the solution to Talco’s water problems. A well drilled in Red River County three and one-half miles northeast of Talco in 1937 pumped 500 gallons a minute from a depth of 408 feet, and the water was so pure it required no treatment. Then, in December, 1963, the Humble Oil Company presented its $87,000 water system, consisting of 3 wells and a 65 acre reservoir, all located in Red River County, to the City of Talco. The Humble system had provided water for the Humble camp near Talco and for drilling operations. There were 175 customers on the system at the time of its donation to Talco, and it extended for seven miles to the east and seven miles to the west of the town.

Talco’s chances of developing into an industrial center were no doubt seriously damaged by another development—the Paris and Mount Pleasant Railroad stopped running. This railroad had derived much of its revenue from the transportation of timber for the Hoffman Heading and Stave Company and, in the first year or so after the discovery of oil, from the transportation of oil. But pipe lines were soon built to carry the oil; and when the Hoffman Heading and Stave Company closed in 1950, that source of revenue was also lost. In 1956 it was decided that the railroad could no longer be operated profitably and its operation was discontinued.

On the other hand, the construction of a well-paved farm-to-market road from Talco east across the northern part of the county to Morris County no doubt was of considerable benefit in enlarging the trade area served by the town.

It would not have been correct to have said in 1964 that Talco had slipped back into the obscurity of its prewar days, but certainly it had dropped out of the limelight. There was no longer any trace of the honkytonks and the ugly shacks of the boom days. It was once again a pleasant little town where things moved at a leisurely pace and everybody knew everybody else. As Richard L. Jurney said, “It is not the town it once was, but it is still a good little town.”

One might expect that many people would oppose something which changed their lives to the extent that the oil strike changed the lives of most Talco residents; but if such people exist, they are a small minority who keep their views to themselves. The writer, in discussing the matter with people of Talco and elsewhere in the county, found some who spoke of evils or even tragedies that had resulted from the discovery of oil, but none who felt that these came near to outweighing the benefits it had brought.

The impact of the discovery of oil and the subsequent development of the oil industry was not as concentrated in any other part of the county as it was in the Talco area, but all of the county was affected to some degree. Looked at from a purely economic viewpoint, oil soon became the county’s most important industry. In 1938, a serious depression year for most of the United States, the production of oil in Titus County was
7,342,497 barrels which, at the approximately one dollar a barrel for which Talco crude was selling at that time, would have meant more than $7,000,-000 paid for Titus County oil. Not every year was as good as 1938 in regard to either production or price: the value of the 1940 production was only about $5,000,000; but even this dwarfed the $1,179,453 which was the value of all farm products in 1939. It is true that the land owner's share of the return from oil sold was only one-eighth, and that some land owners had sold all or part of their mineral rights. But the sale of mineral rights was partly offset by the holding of some Titus County residents who were involved in the production end of the operation; and even one-eighth of eight million dollars was a lot of money.

It is also true that most of this sum went to some three dozen families who had happened to own the land where the oil was found, but a much larger number received benefits from the oil production in other ways. Census figures show that from 1935 to 1937 the number of manufacturing establishments in Titus County increased from eight to eleven, the number of wage-earners in such establishments increased from 153 to 260, and the value of wages paid increased from $87,683 to $181,873. Also, the value of products manufactured increased from $680,745 to $1,568,711, and the value added by manufacturing increased from $257,408 to $689,075. The economic importance of manufacturing had more than doubled in just two years. Nearly all these increases would seem to have been the result of the construction of three oil refineries in the county. Unfortunately, figures showing the amount of wages paid to those engaged in oil production are not available; but it is known that 291 of the 298 persons engaged in mining in 1940 were engaged in the production of crude petroleum. These are the direct economic benefits; indirectly, hundreds of other people benefited as the money brought into the county by oil filtered down through the channels of trade.

A study of the economy of Titus County as it was in the late 1950's and early 1960's revealed that the oil industry was as important as ever and that its benefits for Titus County had been very great throughout this period. In 1958 the mineral industry payroll in Titus County amounted to $1,359,000. In the same year, the 614 employees of manufacturing establishments received $2,483,000 in salaries. Census reports do not break this down to individual plants; but, on the basis of a 1956 newspaper report stating that the refinery at Mount Pleasant then employed "about 300" people, we would probably be safe in adding $1,000,000 of the manufacturing payroll to the mineral industry payroll for a total of approximately $2,359,000. Admittedly this is a very rough approximation but it is close enough to enable us to determine that the mining of oil and the refining of oil combined were far more important than manufacturing exclusive of oil refining as far as payroll was concerned. This seems to be about the only meaningful comparison that can be made; but, for whatever it may be worth, in 1960 the value of shipments and receipts of the mineral (actually petroleum, in this case) industry, $9,059,000 far outstripped the value added by manufactures, $6,682,000, for the same year, or the value of all farm products, $1,963,000, for 1959. A major portion of the value added by manufactures, of course, came from the refining of oil.
Among the other important benefits of the petroleum industry to Titus County was the support given to businesses in the county by oil industry payrolls and other expenditures. Another way in which oil contributed to the county, in this case to almost everyone in the county, was by the payment of taxes. A look at school tax valuations will give us an idea of the importance of oil wells for tax purposes. In 1962 six rural school districts of Titus County with an average attendance of 397 had an assessed valuation of $927,194. Wilkinson, also a rural school district but with an average daily attendance of only forty-eight, had an assessed valuation of $986,490. The difference, of course, is that Wilkinson had oil while the others did not.

One more or less accidental benefit which the oil industry brought to Titus County was the betterment of the unpaved rural roads, a benefit which the farmers, the rural mail-carriers, and the school bus drivers particularly appreciated. When oil is pumped from the wells, a portion of it comes out contaminated with salt water and other substances in such a way that it is not feasible to refine it, and it therefore has no commercial value. The oil companies were happy to make this oil available to the county gratis; and the county made good use of it and of additional quantities which were purchased by mixing it with the top few inches of soil on dirt roads to make what amounted to a low quality pavement. By 1963 every unpaved road in the county had been so treated, and one could drive nearly everywhere without stirring up a cloud of dust in dry weather or getting stuck in a “mud-hole” in wet weather. The dust had been an annoyance and had made driving more hazardous, while muddy, slippery, sticky roads had sometimes added hours to the mail-carriers' routes, made school buses late for school, and kept farm people isolated from the towns.

John B. Stephens mentioned another benefit which he felt had resulted in large part from the discovery of oil—the coming of industrialization to Titus County. Certainly it brought the refinery, by far the most important of Titus County's industrial plants, and it possibly brought men who had knowledge of such matters, and contacts which helped to speed the process. Also of great importance, it supplied some Titus County persons with the financial resources which they used to finance various manufacturing ventures. The foremost of these was Stephens himself, who built the E-Tex Packing plant and the Mount Pleasant Rendering plant and assisted in a number of other ventures.

In March, 1964, twenty-eight years after the discovery of oil at Talco, the turbulence and the excitement were no more than a distant memory for those who had lived through that period. The derricks were still there, scattered all across the northern part of the county; and the pumps still brought up their daily quotas from hundreds of wells; but the atmosphere was quiet, prosaic, that of a small country town—hardly more riotous than in the days when the people of this area derived their sustenance from what grew on top of the ground rather than what was brought up from beneath it. The difference was that now the people were living better, not only there but all over the county, than they had at the beginning of 1936. They had better homes, they drove better automobiles on better
roads, their children went to better schools, and they ate better food while wearing better clothes. Many factors had combined to make this possible, but the discovery and production of oil was by far the most important.

FOOTNOTES

1Dallas Morning News, February 11, 1936.
2Ibid., February 15, 1936.
3Ibid., February 14, 1936.
5Ibid.
6Ibid.
7Paris News, March 9, 1936.
9Ibid., February 14, 1936.
12Carl Reed, tool pusher on the discovery well and later drilling superintendent for the W. B. Hinton Company, when asked about this, stated that a few unscrupulous operators usually turned up at the scene of a strike, but they were not typical representatives of the oil industry. One of the favorite practices of these people, he explained, was to obtain an option on a lease by agreeing to pay a liberal sum as soon as the title was cleared and then stall payment with the excuse that there were difficulties in clearing the title. If the well did not prove to be a producer they naturally did not take up the option (tape-recorded interview, Mount Pleasant, Texas, June, 1963).
16Tape-recorded interview with John B. Stephens, Jr., Mount Pleasant, Texas, June, 1963.
17Personal interview with Farris Brown, Talco, Texas, June, 1963.
21Ibid., March 20, 1936.
22Ibid., February 14, 1936.
23Paris News, March 6, 1936.
24Ibid., March 15, 1936.
25Ibid., March 17, 1936, 1; C. A. Warner, Texas Oil and Gas Since 1543 (Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1939), 178.
26The Talco Times, Anniversary Edition, March 3, 1939, gave the impression that the boom was still going strong on the fourth anniversary of the discovery. However, the 1940 census showed a population of only


31Reed, tape-recorded interview, June, 1963.

32/bid.


36Personal interview with Felix and Jerry Jones, Talco, Texas, June, 1963. Felix Jones was President of the Talco Bank at the time of the oil discovery. His son, Jerry, had succeeded him as president of the bank and was also Mayor of Talco in 1963.


38/bid.

39/bid.

40Felix and Jerry Jones, personal interview, June, 1963.


45Jerry and Felix Jones, personal interview, June, 1963.

46/bid.


48Personal interview with Matthew E. Broom, Mount Pleasant, Texas, March, 1964. Mr. Broom, a U. S. Geological Survey geologist, was at that time working on a study of the ground water resources of Franklin, Titus, Morris, and Camp Counties. His study, which he expected to complete in the summer of 1964, was to be published as a Texas Water Commission Bulletin.

49Public Water Supplies in Eastern Texas, Geological Survey Water Supply Paper 1047 (U. S. Department of the Interior in cooperation with

52Ibid., 92.
54Texas Almanac: 1941-1942, 230.
59Ibid., 377.
61County and City Data Book, 1962, 380.
62Ibid., 377.
63Ibid., 381.
65Personal interview with Jerry Jones, June, 1963; Personal interview, Alford Flannagan, March, 1963, Mount Pleasant, Texas.
REMARKS OF JUDGE JOE J. FISHER
AT THE DEDICATION OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTHOUSE, MARSHALL DIVISION

It has been said that anyone who is ignorant of the past and oblivious to the present cannot expect much of the future. Therefore, on the possibility that such a statement may have some merit, it would be well for us to review the history of the Federal Judiciary in Texas, and particularly, for the Eastern District and the Marshall Division.

When Texas was admitted to the Union on December 29, 1845, Congress created the "District Court of the United States for the District of Texas," to hold regular sessions of the District Court at Galveston. On May 29, 1846, John G. Watrous was confirmed as Judge of the Court. His appointment was the result of a deadlock between the two Texas United States Senators, Sam Houston and Thomas Jefferson Rusk. Rusk favored James Webb who had been Attorney General for the Republic of Texas under President Lamar who also had served ten years as a Federal Judge in Florida where it was his proud boast he had "escaped without a single one of his decisions being reversed by the Supreme Court." Senator Houston favored A. B. Shelby of San Augustine, a former District Judge of the Republic. Each of the candidates had strong endorsements and recommendations, but Judge Watrous was appointed.

On February 21, 1857, Congress divided the State of Texas into two districts. Judge Watrous was assigned to the Eastern District, which contained Galveston and Brownsville, and Judge Thomas H. Duval was appointed Judge of the Western District, with division points at Austin and Tyler. Judge Duval was commissioned on March 3, 1857.

At the outbreak of the War between the States, both of these judges left Texas on or about January 21, 1861, and did not return to their respective judgeships until in 1866. Judge Watrous held his first postwar session on May 7, 1866, at Galveston.

Judge Watrous spent a great deal of his time in Washington in defending himself against attempts to impeach him. He was troubled from the beginning with charges by members of the Bar as well as of the public, the principal charge being that he sat as Judge in matters in which he had a personal interest. Impeachment charges were filed. The House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States refused to sustain the impeachment. However, charges of dishonorable conduct continued to plague Judge Watrous and in the spring of 1869, he suffered a stroke of paralysis. On April 21, 1874, on the advice of his doctor, he resigned in order to permit Congress to confirm another Judge for the district.

The jurisdiction of the District Courts was defined to include all the powers enjoyed by other District Courts and also those normally exercised by Circuit Courts. Appeals and Writs of Error were to go directly to the Supreme Court in the same cases as they normally would from a
Circuit Court and under the same regulations. However, an act of July 15, 1862, attaching Texas to the Sixth Judicial Circuit, withdrew the special jurisdiction from the District Courts and provided that regular circuit courts should be held at the same times and places as the district courts.

Following the resignation of Judge Watrous, two judges served for short periods of time. Apparently, they were appointed but did not qualify, or rather, they merely served for recess appointments—Judge John F. Appleton, May, 1870 to October 11, 1870; Judge Joel C. C. Winch, October, 1870, to March, 1871; both serving less than one year.

It might also be mentioned that during the Civil War period, the Confeder ate States maintained Federal Courts of the Eastern and Western Districts. Judge Thomas J. Devine served as Judge of the Western District and Judge William P. Hill for the Eastern District.

Judge Amos Morrill, who qualified February 19, 1872, and served until March, 1884, was succeeded by Chauncey B. Sabin who served until March 30, 1890. David E. Bryant of Sherman served from May 27, 1890, to the date of his death, February 5, 1910. He was followed by Gordon Russell of Sherman, who served from June 6, 1910, to the time of his death, September 14, 1919. His successor was William Lee Estes of Texarkana, who was Judge from February 18, 1920, to June 14, 1930. He was followed by Randolph Bryant, son of Judge David E. Bryant, who served from January 31, 1931, to the time of his death, April 24, 1951. He was succeeded by Joseph Warren Sheehy of Tyler, who has served from June 23, 1951, to the present, and is now serving as Chief Judge of the Eastern District.

Another judgeship was created and the Eastern District had two judges for the first time when the late Lamar Cecil of Beaumont began service September 9, 1954, which continued until the time of his death, February 14, 1958. I succeeded Judge Cecil, and took the oath of office October 23, 1959, in Beaumont.

Court sessions for the Eastern District are held in Tyler, Sherman, Paris, Texarkana, Marshall, and Beaumont.

I believe it is interesting to note that of the twelve judges who have been appointed for the Eastern District, three were appointed by Democratic Administrations, to wit, Judge Watrous by President James Polk; Judge William Lee Estes by President Woodrow Wilson, and Judge Joe Warren Sheehy by President Harry S. Truman. Nine were appointed by Republican Administrations, to wit: Judge John F. Appleton and Judge Joel C. C. Winch and Judge Amos Morrill by President Ulysses S. Grant; Judge Chauncey B. Sabin by President Chester A. Arthur; Judge David E. Bryant by President Benjamin Harrison; Judge Gordon Russell by President William Howard Taft; Judge Randolph Bryant by President Herbert Hoover; Judge Lamar Cecil and I by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

A rearrangement of the State into three districts—northern, eastern, and western—was provided for by an act of February 24, 1879, and each district was broken down into three divisions with seats at Waco, Dallas, and Graham in the northern district; at Galveston, Tyler, and Jefferson in the eastern district. Another act of the same year (June 11, 1879) placed Texas in the fifth circuit and provided that circuit courts should
be held regularly for the northern district at Waco, Dallas and Graham; for the eastern district at Jefferson; and for the western district at San Antonio. Additional sessions of the circuit court for the western district at Austin and Brownsville were provided for by an act of February 18, 1881; and an act of June 3, 1884, setting up a new division within the district, specified that regular terms of both district and circuit courts should be held for it at El Paso. On June 20, 1884, provision was made for the holding of circuit courts at Galveston and Tyler, as well as Jefferson in the eastern district.

By an act of March 1, 1889, the Chickasaw Nation and part of the Choctaw Nation were annexed for judicial purposes to the eastern district of Texas. These portions of the Indian Territory, together with the counties of Lamar, Fannin, Red River, and Delta formed a new division for which both district and circuit courts were to hold regular sessions in the City of Paris. Within the Indian Territory, thus annexed, the federal courts were granted a special jurisdiction to apply the criminal laws of Arkansas, as well as those of the United States. Civil causes not of a federal nature were left to the local tribunals already existing.

By an act of June 11, 1896, the courts at Graham in the northern district were transferred to Abilene. At the same time, two new divisions were established in the northern district with seats at Fort Worth and San Angelo, respectively. The Beaumont division in the eastern district was created by an act of February 8, 1897; and on February 19, 1901, in the same district, was established a division at Sherman.

A second major rearrangement, effected by an act of March 11, 1902, gave the state four districts. The northern district retained its division seats at Dallas, Fort Worth, Abilene, and San Angelo, but lost that at Waco to the western district. The eastern district kept its divisions of Tyler, Jefferson, Paris, Beaumont, and Sherman, but lost Galveston to the southern district. The new southern district received the division of Galveston from the eastern district and the division of Brownsville from the western district, besides the divisions of Houston, and Laredo, which were created by the act. The western district kept the divisions of Austin, San Antonio, and El Paso, and received the Waco division from the northern district, but lost the Brownsville division to the southern district.¹

We learned through our District Clerk, Mr. James R. Cooney, and our former Deputy Clerk, Mrs. Dixie L. Johnson, that the Jefferson Division was established by an act of Congress in 1879, with the following counties: Bowie, Camp, Cass, Franklin, Harrison, Hopkins, Marion, Morris, Red River, Titus, and Upshur. As you know, the Marshall Division was created by an act of Congress in October, 1961, which included all of the counties of the former Jefferson Division with the exception of Upshur, this county having been transferred to the Paris Division; Franklin County apparently was transferred to the northern district, and Bowie, Red River, and Titus counties became the Texarkana Division, created in 1903, leaving the remaining seven counties for the Jefferson Division.

The historical old red brick courthouse building in Jefferson was built in 1878-1879 and has been the only court building for the Jefferson and
Marshall divisions. Of course, it was with some emotion that we were forced to sever the tie with the past and make peace with reality by providing for our new, modern building here in Marshall. We recognize that, while historically and architecturally attractive, the old building in Jefferson had outlived its usefulness and for that reason, we are highly pleased and gratified to have the newly remodeled building which we are today dedicating.

I would also like to add, in absolute truthfulness and without any attempt to exaggerate, that I am personally far more satisfied with our remodeled court building, which is functional in every respect, than I would be with a completely new structure, and in my humble opinion, it answers our purpose far better because it represents a compromise between the old and the new and should more than adequately serve our court needs for the next fifty years or longer.

I am sure I speak for Judge Sheehy in saying that we are honored to be the first judges to serve in the Marshall Division, and of course, I am extremely proud to have the Marshall Division assigned to me as my primary responsibility.

It affords me much pleasure to dedicate this building which will always stand as a symbol of our faith in the rule of law, and in the Judiciary, as the instrument which makes that rule a reality. This faith is a challenge to those of us who are honored to sit on the Bench of this court; to undertake the search for and determination of the correct law and the right decision, and to at all times maintain the high standards of judicial administration established by this Court's illustrious predecessors.

We are fully aware of the difficulty of preserving our cherished principles of right and justice, while at the same time meeting the demands of our complex social structure, but with help from above, we will accept the challenge and will give our best to measure up to the responsibility.

It is our fervent wish that this Court, with its great heritage, with the best efforts which we who are fortunate to serve may make, and the best efforts of those yet to come, may be maintained always as a citadel of justice where all may receive "equal justice under the law."

FOOTNOTES

The Panola County Historical Society has acquired the old city jail, built in 1891, to house the Society's historical collection.

The Society has a number of antique jail cells for sale, and would be glad to hear from a prospective buyer.

Miss Marjorie Neal, the first woman state senator in the United States, is chairman of the Board of the Historical Society, and Travis Williamson, Dean of Panola College, is the President.

The Hunt County Historical Society is currently headed by the Honorable Fletcher Warren, former Ambassador to Turkey and various Latin American nations. President Warren is a native of Hunt County. Under his leadership and program direction the interest and membership of the Society is at its highest.

Serving as vice president is General Hal C. Horton, one of the original incorporators when the charter was issued to the Society in 1923.

Other officers are Mrs. Ed. M. Jones, recording secretary; Mrs. Norine P. Morris, treasurer; Miss Elizabeth Burnett, corresponding secretary; Mrs. R. L. Jones, reporter; W. Walworth Harrison, curator.

Present projects of the Society include marking of historic spots and buildings. Among these is the grave of William Lane, the first Anglo-American born in what is now Hunt County. The Society also looks forward to the possible completion and publication in 1965 of the History of Hunt County.

A major project begun in 1957, while W. Walworth Harrison was president, was the restoration of the Ende-Gaillard Home, the oldest building in Greenville. Erected in 1859 by Fred von Elde, a young merchant, as a new home for his bride from New Orleans, the cypress siding and other material for the building were hauled to Greenville from Jefferson by ox teams. The architecture of the old home is an excellent example of the period, with side-lights around both the front and back doors. This building was saved from destruction by the Hunt County Historical Society.

The Ende-Gaillard Home, located in a Greenville park, houses a small museum, which displays some interesting archives and objects connected with Hunt County's early history.

Dr. R. L. Jones, of the History Department of East Texas State College, has made one of the most valuable contributions in local historical material. While serving the Society as president from 1961 to 1963, he discovered what are known as the Alfred Howell letters. These letters
were written by Alfred Thomas Howell, a young lawyer from Greenville in the period from 1853 to 1866 describing his efforts to establish himself in his profession in the village of Greenville. Dr. Jones found the letters in the library of the University of Tennessee and brought microfilms of the complete set, numbering about 500 letters, to the East Texas State College Library.

Later, under Dr. Jones’ direction, Dr. William E. Sawyer, of the East Texas State College History Department, edited the letters and prepared them for publication in narrative form. Professor Sawyer published an article on Howell in Volume I of the *East Texas Historical Journal*.

Two others who have served the Society as president in recent years are Dr. Jesse Guy Smith also of the East Texas State College History Department, and author of “Heroes of the Saddlebags,” and General Hal C. Horton, descendant of a pioneer Hunt County family, officer in both World Wars and one of the leading students of Texas history in the area.

Now in its sixth year, the Smith County Historical Society and Historical Survey Committee, has over 130 members, and is one of the few county groups regularly publishing material on local history.

The Society’s magazine, *Chronicles of Smith County*, is issued semi-annually, and has included such varied research articles as “The Neches Saline,” “Railroading in Smith County,” “When World War II Came to Tyler,” and the photos and histories of twenty old homes in the county. Other issues have carried the 1850 Heads of Households for Smith County; Civil War letter reprints; and book reviews.

The Fall 1964 issue will contain the history of the several courthouse buildings that have served the county, as well as material on money (or script) issued in Smith County. Every issue carries a reprint of a rare item, such as an early newspaper or city ordinance.

Regular monthly meetings are held by the Society, usually in the ante-bellum city-owned Goodman House in Tyler. The Society's free Museum Collection is located in this lovely structure, and over 1,000 persons each month view the many fine exhibits. Highlights of the displays are the original Confederate battleflags, Indian skeletons excavated in East Texas, and the Camp Ford horn, carved by a Union soldier at the Confederate Prison in Tyler. This elaborately carved and decorated steer's horn is the only known artifact from the old prison.

Recent programs heard by the Society at its monthly meetings have been: “Indian Trails in Smith County,” “History of Tyler Street Names,” “East Texas Scrapbook”—slide presentation of historical sites for weekenders, “How Early Texans Acquired Their Land,” and “A Kentucky Mother's Pre-Civil War Letters to her Texas Lawyer Son.” One meeting was a field trip to Roseland Farms, two ante-bellum homes restored by Mrs. W. C. Windsor.

A growing Archives Collection is being assembled, catalogued and prepared for microfilming. With the Society’s cooperation and support, the local City Library has acquired a microfilm reader and numerous film
rolls have been purchased and donated by the Society. Included in these gifts have been all Smith County Census rolls, the Texas Almanac, and films of all pre-1900 Tyler newspapers.

The printed material in the Archives includes the Goodman, Woldert, Wood, and Douglas Collections, plus several others. An example of this material is the "Woldert Manuscript," hundreds of pages of original research notes on Tyler, Smith County, and East Texas, compiled over a lifetime by Will A. Woldert, pioneer surveyor and historian.

The work of the Society in 1964 has been directed by James Wilkins, President; Bill McCorkle, Vice-President; Mrs. C. E. Parker, Secretary; Paul Lutz, Treasurer; and Virgil Martin, Museum Director-at-Large. Lee Lawrence serves as Local/State Coordinator and Jack Greer is Program Coordinator.

Committee Chairmen are: Publication, Miss Mary K. Haynes; Historic Buildings & Homes, Mrs. Elsie Wills; Archives, Howard Pollan; and Museum, Bill McCorkle.

The Shelby County Historical Society has secured an outside marker for the site of the first court house in the county which was in Shelbyville. Shelbyville was the home of Sydney Pennington, a signer of the Texas Declaration of Independence. Pennington is buried in Shelbyville. Shelbyville was the headquarters for the "Regulator-Moderator War," and has served as a place where troops were organized for the Republic of Texas Army, for the Mexican War, and for the Confederacy.

A large sign designates the site of the "Old Texan Cemetery" where Captain John M. Bradley is buried. Captain Bradley won distinction at the Battle of San Antonio, and later was murdered by Charles Walt Moorman, the leader of the Regulators.

The Society has also placed a marker at the Old John Buckley Cemetery, one of the oldest cemeteries in Texas. John Buckley was listed as a citizen of Shelby County in the first Texas census.

Medallions have been secured for the Eva Taylor Lane home at Center; the Still pioneer log home at Myriek's Ferry on the Sabine River in the Huxly Community; the Shelby County Court House which was built in 1885; the Methodist Church located in the McClelland Community; and the Methodist Church in Shelbyville.

Brazos County Historical Survey Committee was reconstituted in January, 1963. Its first task was to find out what historical items pertaining to the County had been preserved and if such items were accessible for the public use. It was soon evident that the history of the County was not in publication, though most of the County records have been preserved. Newspaper files are skimpy or non-existent for the first sixty years of the County's history. Surprisingly there is a paucity of primary ma-
terial relating to the Civil War and reconstruction. If letters, diaries, or newspapers now exist in the County, which contain information about this period of "the war and reconstruction," they have not yet been made available to the researcher.

On October 20, 1963, the Millican Confederate Information marker was dedicated with Judge W. T. McDonald of the Court of Criminal Appeals as guest speaker. Plans have been made for the publication of a county map which would show some of the better known landmarks of the county before 1860. A second project is the preparation of a pamphlet or folder containing historical, geographical, and economic information about Brazos County.

A group from Rusk County has petitioned the State of Texas for a charter for the Rusk County Heritage Association. The organizational meeting was held Tuesday, April 28, 1964, with Paul Howard as temporary chairman.

In a second meeting, Tuesday, May 5, sixteen members were elected to the board of directors: Sam Ross, Mrs. Carl Jaggers, Paul Howard, Mrs. Norris Langford, Mrs. Gene Lasseter, Tom Perryman, Charles Langford, Donald Leverett, Miss Virginia Knapp, Mrs. Doris Bolt, Mrs. Kathleen Cannon, Mrs. Davis McMahon, Mrs. Gordon Brown, Fred Hale, Miss Mary Craig, and Mrs. A. E. Morris.

On Friday, May 29, the Board of Directors convened to select officers and Charles Langford was elected president; Sam Ross, vice-president; Mrs. Mary Frank Dunn, secretary; and Miss Virginia Knapp, treasurer.

Preservation of the ante-bellum Howard home, one of two such homes left standing in Henderson, is the immediate goal of the Association. The home, mentioned in some records as the Howard-Dickinson House, is owned by Homer Bryce, Henderson business man, who has offered to give the house and a 151x155 foot lot on South Main Street to the non-profit organization.

To publicize the project, two students of Henderson High School, Gay Poovey and Arthur Rosseau, and their sponsor, Mrs. Doris Bolt, have presented to Henderson civic clubs a thirty-minute history of the Howard home which they prepared from letters in the Bryce collection. The letters include correspondence with one of the survivors of the builders. The students pointed out that the wife of one of the brothers, who built and lived in the house, was a first cousin of Sam Houston, and Houston was a frequent visitor in the home.

The century old house, situated two blocks from the main square of Henderson, was built of brick and steel by the Howard brothers who were early contractors and brick makers of Rusk County. The house has not been occupied in fourteen years, and has suffered neglect and abuse.

The walls, foundation floors, and chimneys of the structure are sound, and, although the roof has a large hole in it, engineers and architects have given assurance that the house can be made beautiful again.
To further publicize the project, two members of the Rusk County Historical Survey Committee, a group acting under the State Historical Commission, presented to the public a program of colored slides showing the old houses of the county and the heritage that could be found in them. Two local historians, Mrs. Gordon Brown, and Mrs. Mary Frank Dunn, have aroused interest in the old homes of Rusk County, particularly since the Arnold home on North High Street in Henderson was torn down, after the last surviving descendant of the family gave the house to the city to raise funds for a memorial to her parents.

Future plans of the Rusk County Heritage Association include: “Save the Howard House,” restoration of the Lowe home at Glen Fawn, and establishment of a county museum, and historical tours.

A map has been published by the Jessie Allen Wise Garden Club of Jefferson and distributed in Jefferson at the Excelsior House, the Chamber of Commerce, and at service stations. It is self-explanatory and shows forty historical medallion structures, more than any other town in the state.

A Children of the American Revolution Chapter was organized in Jefferson on June 6, 1964. The scene of the organization was the historic Cypress River Steamboat Turn Basin. Mrs. A. K. Payne, Regent of the Martha McCraw Chapter D.A.R., organized the local Chapter. The Chapter was honored to have present at the organization, Miss Alice Naomi Wilson, of the James Haymes Society of Dallas, Texas State President, C.A.R., her mother, Mrs. Joseph M. Wilson, the Senior Second Vice President, C.A.R., who presented program material and a guest book to record the charter meeting and other events. Mrs. Cornelia Alexander Duer, Senior Flag Chairman of the James Haymes Society, C.A.R. of Dallas, was also in attendance.

The Martha McCraw Chapter, D.A.R., held an impressive dedication ceremony at the historic Bonhams Landing Sunday, June 14, 1964. The occasion, in addition to Flag Day, was the placing of a D.A.R. Marker at the Rives Cemetery, the oldest cemetery in Marion County. Mrs. Jessie DeWare III, Historian, Texas Society D.A.R., spoke on the historic significance of this section of the Texas-Louisiana border. She also gave the background and the prominent part that John Green Rives, a pioneer settler who came to Texas in 1832 and carved a plantation out of the wilderness, played in its development. John Green Rives, born in 1795, was buried in this cemetery, and his grave is reported to be the first white man's grave in this section.
WELCOME TO HISTORIC JEFFERSON
ONE OF THE OLDEST TOWNS IN TEXAS

The Texas State Historical Survey Committee has awarded this Medallion to each of the forty Homes, Churches and Structures listed below, as worthy of preservation because of Historical and Architectural significance.

1. T. J. TAYLOR, JR. HOME
2. FREEMAN PLANTATION
3. SAGAMORE
4. J. M. DOWARE, JR. HOME
5. KNIGHTWOOD
6. GUARDING OAK
7. HOSIER PLANTATION AND STORE
8. GEORGE KREESE HOME
9. APOTHECARY SHOP AND COUNTRY STORE
10. OLD ROWELL HOUSE
11. HOUSE OF THE SEASONS
12. FALLING LEAVES
13. ZION CHURCH
14. THE MANOR
15. THE MANS
16. JOE McCASLAND HOME
17. MARVIN CARLSON HOME
18. PERRY WOODS HOME
19. PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH
20. DOYLE BOWEN HOME
21. J. B. HENEFIELD, SR. HOME
22. D. H. R. SELL TAYLOR
23. MRS. HUTT SEDERBEY HOME
24. CARROLL LIBERTY AND JEFFERSON HISTORICAL SOCIETY MUSEUM
25. EXCELSIOR HOUSE
26. OLD ROSEBUD SALOON
27. OLD FEDERAL BUILDING
28. IMMACULATE CONCEPTION CHURCH
29. R. R. TERRY HOME
30. BEARD HOUSE
31. MRS. R. C. BROWN, JR., BUSINESS BUILDING
32. OLD RAGGARD BUILDING
33. OLD RED RIVER WAREHOUSE COMPANY
34. OLD PLANTERS BANK BUILDING
35. OLD ST. LOUIS COMMISSION WAREHOUSE AND OFFICES
36. W. S. TERRY HOME
37. GEORGE E. RAGGARD FUNERAL HOME
38. OLD SINGLETON HOME
39. JUDGE S. W. MOSELEY HOME
40. BLUEBONNET FARM

OAKWOOD CEMETERY
An exhibit of items used in Texas before 1900 was staged in the Old Nacogdoches University Building in Nacogdoches during June by the Stone Fort Chapter of the Daughters of the Republic of Texas, headed by Mrs. W. C. Fouts.

Admission was charged for the exhibits and several hundred dollars were added to the restoration fund for the old building.

Exhibit items ranged from a money box used by Charles S. Taylor of Nacogdoches, one of the signers of the Texas Declaration of Independence, to a bed used in the home of S. M. Orton, one of Nacogdoches' early sheriffs.

Restoration of the old building, which is under the supervision of Mrs. Stephen B. Tucker of Nacogdoches, is the pet project of the D.R.T. and several other women's organizations.

The restoration is about two-thirds complete. Needed are light fixtures, finishing of woodwork upstairs, and furnishing.

A number of items were given to the building during the Texana Exhibit and since that time. Some of these pieces are authentic colonial period pieces and form the nucleus of a collection which will depict early Texas.

Herbert O. Wilson is president of the Nacogdoches Historical Commission which holds the old building in trusteeship from the Nacogdoches Independent School District.

The Texana Exhibit was the most ambitious undertaking for the old building in the way of activities using it, but Mrs. Tucker reports that it is available for meetings, socials, and other functions of local clubs and organizations.

Plans for raising additional money to continue restoration of the building will be discussed in a September meeting of the commission. About $20,000 has been spent on the building.
Dr. Ralph W. Steen, president of the Stephen F. Austin State College and one of the state's outstanding historians, made the principal address for the opening of the Texana Exhibit in the Old Nacogdoches University. The display was sponsored during June by the Stone Fort Chapter of the Daughters of the Republic of Texas.
Mayor M. M. Stripling welcomed guests at the opening of the Texana Exhibit sponsored during June in the Old Nacogdoches University Building by the Stone Fort Chapter of the Daughters of the Republic of Texas. With Mr. Stripling on the porch of the old building are other participants in the opening day program.
The Old Nacogdoches University building was completed in January, 1859. It is located on the Nacogdoches High School campus and is now being restored.
The Old Stone Fort was built in the 1770's in what is now downtown Nacogdoches. The original building was torn down in 1901. The above replica was built by the State of Texas in 1936 and is located on the Stephen F. Austin State College campus.
The spring meeting of the East Texas Historical Association was held on the campus of Sam Houston State College on March 21, 1964.

Dr. J. T. Clark of Sam Houston State College was general program chairman, and presided at the 10:15 meeting. Dr. Elliott T. Bowers, Acting President of Sam Houston State College, welcomed the Association to the campus. Three papers were read at the morning session: "Dudley C. Sharp: Secretary of the Air Force," by Robert C. Cotner of the University of Texas; "I Visit with a Nonagenarian," by Martha Anne Turner of Sam Houston State College; and "Texas Lumber Barons—Newcomers and Natives," by Robert S. Maxwell of Stephen F. Austin State College.

President F. I. Tucker, of Nacogdoches, presided over the luncheon at which Ben F. Proctor of Texas Christian University read a paper, "John H. Reagan and His Fight for a Democratic State." A business session followed.

A tour of the Sam Houston Memorial Museum, which is located across the street from the college campus, began at two o'clock.

The annual meeting of the East Texas Historical Association will be held at the College Center on the Stephen F. Austin College campus, October 10, 1964. The meeting will begin at nine o'clock in the morning.
BOOK REVIEWS


American railroads, like the American colonies before them, seldom proved profitable to their original founders and investors. The capital outlay was too great, the returns too slow in materializing, to make for quick financial success. A combination of private buccaneer and public benefactor, adventurer and visionary, the railroad promoter built to satisfy his ego, his purse (he hoped) and his belief in the economic potential of the area to be penetrated by his road. Such a man was Paul Bremond, who opened the Piney Woods of East Texas with his HE & WT Railway.

The HE & WT was conceived by Bremond after his earlier success in building the Houston and Texas Central which eventually reached Dallas. Chartered in 1875, "Bremond's Road"—as the HE & WT came to be called—was constructed out of Houston with agonizing delays between 1876 and 1886 when finally the Sabine was bridged and connection made with Shreveport. Bremond poured a large measure of his private fortune into this project; also, there was some support (mainly gifts of land) from localities touched by the road. In spite of Bremond's fund raising ability, New York capital became necessary to complete the line, and these mortgages led to receivership, changes in ownership, and eventually to absorption of the HE & WT by the Southern Pacific.

Professor Robert S. Maxwell presents a detailed and readable account of Bremond, his road, and its effects upon the Piney Woods area. The author successfully conveys the excitement and great expectations of the people as they waited for the arrival of the railroad to their town. Indeed, many new towns were laid out by the company to aid in developing the lumbering industry—the railroad's chief hope for freight revenues. Town and street names along the way provided a "who was who" directory with the HE & WT: Appleby, Burke, Blair, Bremond, Corrigan, Lufkin, Timpson, and Groesbeck.

Operations of the HE & WT, whether factual or legendary, are of interest to the railroad buff and the folklorist. Jay Gould has his "Wabash Cannonball" but Bremond had "The Rabbit"—a fitting Texas name for the bobbing and weaving narrow-gauge trains of the HE & WT. Information on schedules, rates, organization, and connecting lines is given to round out the picture of the railroad.

In Professor Maxwell's words,

... the HE & WT opened up the Piney Woods region of East Texas. Along its route grew up flourishing towns, thriving industries, and improved homes. In its cars, derided and ridiculed though they were in the early days, lay the only route to the out-
side world and to the city. The building of the HE & WT and its connecting lines to a large extent made possible the commercial lumber industry in East Texas and along the route of 'Bremond's Road' were to be found the plants of most of the big names in Texas lumber.... They supplied the principal traffic; the HE & WT supplied the transportation.

For an understanding of a railroad and its relation to an area and its people, this book is excellent reading. The work is pleasing in appearance, clearly written, and free from typographical errors. It is a worthy addition to the series of publications by the Texas Gulf Coast Historical Association.

WILLIAM W. WHITE
Texas Lutheran College
EAST TEXAS COLLOQUY

(Help the Editor name this section)

Lee Lawrence, P. O. Box 180, Tyler, is interested in Trammel's Trace.

The Handbook of Texas II, 793, say the Trace was sometimes described as an early Indian trail, and sometimes as a horse path and was used by Nicholas Trammel as early as 1813. According to this account the trail began near Conway, Arkansas, crossed the Red River at Tulton, entered Bowie County, Texas, crossed the Sulphur River at Epperson's Ferry, passed near Hughes Springs, crossed Cypress Bayou near Jefferson, passed near Marshall, crossed the Sabine River near Tatum, and continued to Nacogdoches. John Terry, of Jefferson, says that Nicholas Trammel was sometimes known as Nathaniel Casper Trammel. Terry also believes the trail continued from Nacogdoches to a bayou east of Galveston Bay and that Jean Lafitte or some of his followers often used the trail in their illicit trade. Terry tells of an alleged attack on Trammel and some of Lafitte's men by a detachment of Spanish Cavalry, and to save their contraband, Trammel ordered a fortune in gold and silver, which had been taken from a Spanish merchant in Galveston Bay, dumped into Hendricks Lake which is near Marshall.

Terry mentions a number of surveys the trail passed through in Harrison, and Marion counties, but says there is much confusion in regard to the exact route it followed in these two counties. A Boy Scout troop in Jefferson is making plans to mark the exact route in Marion County.

The Rusk County Historical Society is also attempting to locate the route followed by Trammel's Trace in Rusk County.

Professor John Duncan, Texas A & M University, questions the location of the present little log replica of the San Francisco de los Tejas Mission. "The present site," he says, "is devoid of historical feeling—no possible view of a cemetery, a spring, or objects of antiquity."

Dr. Llerena Friend, of the Texas History Center, the University of Texas, says that apparently all are agreed that the original site was not used when the mission was re-established in 1716. She cites the Houston Chronicle of July 5, 1935, which has an article and a picture of the dignitaries present for the dedication of the replica of the first mission in Texas. According to Father Foik, of the Centennial Historical Board, a piece of seventeenth century cannon found in 1928 on the farm of G. A. Moore led to an investigation. Dr. Albert Woldert published an article in the Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume XXXVIII about the site. Bishop Byrne, Miss Adina de Zavala of the Texas Historical and Landmarks Association, and R. Woldert of Tyler seem to have been chiefly responsible for the location of the site of the present building. Judge A. A. Aldrich, of Crockett, was Master of Ceremonies for the dedication occasion, on July
The present building, as Professor Duncan says, is not on either of the original sites.

The Houston Enterprise of July 14, 1935, says the Civilian Conservation Corps created the park and built the mission replica.

The Houston Chronicle for February 19, 1961, says the site became a state park in 1956. Until that time the site had been managed by the Texas Forest Service of Texas A & M University.

John W. Wilkins, 220 Reading Avenue, Texarkana, Texas, is copying tombstone inscriptions and gathering other information on the old families of Gregg and upper Rusk Counties. He has already copied most of the older stones in southern Gregg County and many in the northern part of the county.

He will share information with anyone who is interested. When the work is completed, Wilkins plans to mimeograph copies of the tombstone inscriptions for libraries and others who are interested.
CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Robert S. Maxwell is a professor of history at Stephen F. Austin State College. He is the author of several books.

Odie B. Faulk is a professor of history at the University of Arizona. He is the author of a number of articles and books.

Robert C. Cotner is a professor of history at the University of Texas. Professor Cotner is the author of a definitive biography of James Stephen Hogg. Peyton E. Cook is a teacher at the Air Force Academy.

Vera L. Dugas is a professor of history at Stephen F. Austin State College. She is a graduate of the University of Texas.

Morris Blachard is a graduate student at the University of Texas. His article in this issue of the Journal is a chapter from his Master of Arts thesis.

The Honorable Joe F. Fisher is a Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Judge Fisher lives in Beaumont.